*1 I LLINOIS O FFICIAL R EPORTS Appellate Court
Uphoff v. Grosskopf
,
Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellee.
District & No. Fourth District
Docket No. 4-13-0422
Filed December 12, 2013
Held An order granting defendant’s request under the Freedom of Information Act for the production of documents relating to a 2001 murder trial ( Note: This syllabus prosecuted by the office of plaintiff State’s Attorney was reversed on the constitutes no part of the opinion of the court ground that State’s Attorney’s office is a “public body” for purposes of but has been prepared the Act and is exempt from complying with the Act.
by the Reporter of
Decisions for the
convenience of the
reader. )
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Livingston County, No. 11-MR-41; the Hon. Stephen R. Pacey, Judge, presiding. Review Judgment Reversed.
Counsel on Seth Uphoff (argued), State’s Attorney, of Pontiac (Randy A. Yedinak, Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for appellant. Appeal
Donald M. Craven and Esther J. Seitz (argued), both of Donald M. Craven, P.C., of Springfield, for appellee.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Jane Elinor Notz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), amicus curiae .
Panel JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justice Turner specially concurred, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Appleton dissented, with opinion.
OPINION Plaintiff, Seth P. Uphoff, the Livingston County State’s Attorney, appeals from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, Matthew Grosskopf. The court ordered Uphoff to produce documents to Grosskopf pursuant to his request under the Freedom of Information Act (hereinafter FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 to 11.5 (West 2010)). For the reasons that follow, we reverse. I. BACKGROUND In February 2010, Grosskopf sent Thomas Brown, who was then the Livingston County
State’s Attorney, a FOIA request for documents relating to a 2001 murder trial conducted in Livingston County. Brown denied the request, and Grosskopf appealed to the Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor, who issued a letter finding that Brown was required to disclose the documents requested by Grosskopf, subject to permissible redactions. In April 2011, Brown filed a complaint for declaratory relief, seeking a court determination as to whether the State’s Attorney’s office was a “public body” within the meaning of section 2 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/2(a) (West 2010)). Brown named Grosskopf and Lisa Madigan, in her capacity as Illinois Attorney General, as defendants. Grosskopf answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim to compel Brown’s compliance with the Public Access Counselor’s advisory opinion. Madigan filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Brown was unable to state a cause of action for declaratory relief because no actual controversy existed. Specifically, Madigan asserted that the Public Access Counselor’s letter was a nonbinding and nonreviewable opinion, meaning it could not form the basis of an *3 actual legal controversy. The trial court later granted Madigan’s motion to dismiss.
Brown appealed, and this court affirmed.
Brown v. Grosskopf
,
¶ 15,
Following this court’s decision, the trial court amended the caption to reflect the named plaintiff and counterdefendant, Seth P. Uphoff, who is the current Livingston County State’s Attorney. Grosskopf filed a motion for summary judgment on his surviving counterclaim. After a May 2013 hearing, the court ruled in Grosskopf’s favor and granted summary judgment. The court concluded that FOIA applied to State’s Attorneys and ordered the requested documents be released to Grosskopf.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS Uphoff argues that the trial court erred by concluding that a State’s Attorney’s office is a “public body” within the meaning of FOIA. Uphoff asserts that the office instead is a part of the judicial branch of state government and, therefore, exempt from complying with FOIA. Because we conclude that a State’s Attorney’s office is a “judicial body,” we agree with Uphoff that it is exempt under FOIA.
A. The Standard of Review
When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, this court determines whether the
case presents any genuine issues of material fact. If not, then we decide whether the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review
de novo
the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment
. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Hamer
,
B. Statutory Interpretation
In
Relf v. Shatayeva
,
“The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. The best indication of that intent is the language of the statute. [Citation.] In construing that language, words and phrases should not be considered in isolation. Rather, the language in each section of the statute must be examined in light of the statute as a whole, which is construed in conjunction with other statutes touching on the same or related subjects.”
And:
“When construing statutes, it is appropriate to consider similar and related
enactments, though not strictly
in pari materia
. We must presume that several statutes
relating to the same subject are governed by one spirit and a single policy, and that the
legislature intended the several statutes to be consistent and harmonious.”
In
Prazen v. Shoop
,
“[I]n determining the legislative intent of a statute, a court may consider not only the language used, but also the reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purposes to be achieved. [Citation.] Words and phrases should be construed in light of other relevant provisions of the statute and must not be interpreted in isolation. [Citation.] Each word, clause and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous.” ¶ 15 C. The Judicial Exemption Under FOIA “[T]he purpose of FOIA ‘ “is to open governmental records to the light of public
scrutiny.” ’ ”
City of Champaign v. Madigan
,
See
Copley Press, Inc. v. Administrative Office of the Courts
,
Attorney’s office a “public body” subject to FOIA? See
Nelson v. County of Kendall
, 2013
IL App (2d) 120635, ¶ 8,
which became effective on May 28, 2010. Public Act 96-900 amended the State’s Attorneys *5 Appellate Prosecutor’s Act (SAAP Act) (725 ILCS 210/1 to 11 (West 2012)), which created the office of the State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor (SAAP).
¶ 23 The General Assembly created SAAP 36 years ago to handle criminal cases on appeal
for prosecutors outside Cook County. As described by the Second District in
Nelson
, SAAP
is “the statutorily created appellate arm of the office of State’s Attorney.”
Nelson
, 2013 IL
App (2d) 120635, ¶ 19,
Each of those amendments dealt with minor issues of SAAP governance and contained no changes of substance. See Pub. Act 80-1331 (eff. Aug. 7, 1978); Pub. Act 83-747 (eff. Jan. 1, 1984); Pub. Act 84-1062 (eff. July 1, 1986). Significantly, the first sentence of section 3 of the SAAP Act provides as follows: “There
is created the Office of the State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor as an agency of state government.” 725 ILCS 210/3 (West 2008). That sentence appeared in the original SAAP Act as enacted in 1977 and remained unchanged until 2010. F. The FOIA Litigation As earlier noted, in February 2010, Grosskopf sent the then-Livingston County State’s
Attorney a FOIA request for documents relating to a 2001 murder trial conducted in Livingston County. That request began the litigation that is now before this court. Also in 2010, the plaintiff in Nelson filed an action in the circuit court of Kendall County (Kendall County No. 10-MR-143) pursuant to a FOIA request, seeking injunctions requiring Kendall County and the Kendall County State’s Attorney to turn over emails that the plaintiff contended were generated by the Kendall County State’s Attorney’s office. , 2013 IL App (2d) 120635, ¶ 1, 990 N.E.2d 1237. That litigation ultimately led to the Second District’s decision in . G. The Language and Timing of Public Act 96-900 Senate Bill 3372 of the 96th General Assembly, which ultimately became Public Act 96-
900, was introduced in February 2010. That bill amended three sections of the SAAP Act and repealed two others. See Pub. Act 96-900 (eff. May 28, 2010). Most of the provisions of that bill dealt with relatively minor revisions in the governance of SAAP, but the bill contained one important change. That change appears in the first sentence of section 3 of the SAAP Act, which was amended to provide as follows: “There is created the Office of the State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor as a judicial agency of state government.” (Emphasis added.) Pub. Act 96-900 (eff. May 28, 2010). We note again that prior to the enactment of Public Act 96-900, that sentence simply referred to the creation of SAAP “as an agency of state government.” 725 ILCS 210/3 (West 2008). *6 H. The Purpose and Meaning of Designating SAAP
“As a Judicial Agency of State Government” Given the timing of the FOIA requests made to the State’s Attorney in the present case and to the State’s Attorney in , and given further the timing of the enactment of Public Act 96-900, we are convinced that (1) the amendment to the first sentence of section 3 of the SAAP Act in 2010 was in response to the litigation in this case and in and (2) the purpose of Public Act 96-900, deeming SAAP to be “a judicial agency of state government,” was to provide a FOIA exemption for that agency. At oral argument, this court presented Grosskopf’s counsel with this proposed
interpretation of the reason for the legislature’s designating SAAP to be “a judicial agency of state government” and asked, if that interpretation was not correct, what interpretation she could provide for the legislature’s enactment of Public Act 96-900. She could provide none, and neither can we. I. The Prosecutorial Role of SAAP and State’s Attorneys Further supporting our conclusion that the purpose of Public Act 96-900 was to exempt
SAAP from FOIA requests is that SAAP is, in fact, in no sense a judicial agency of state government. That is, SAAP performs no functions that are remotely similar to those performed by judges. Instead, SAAP is purely a prosecutorial agency and has been throughout its 36-year existence. In discussing the prosecutorial role of State’s Attorneys, this court has written the
following:
“The State’s Attorney is a constitutional officer. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 19.) His office is part of the executive branch of State government and the powers exercised by that office are executive powers. ( People v. Stinger [, 22 Ill. App. 3d 371, 373, 317 N.E.2d 340, 342 (1974)]).” People v. Thompson ,88 Ill. App. 3d 375 , 377, 410 N.E.2d 600, 601 (1980).
Before this court made the above observation in
Thompson
, the Illinois Supreme Court relied
on the principle that the State’s Attorney’s office is part of the executive branch. See,
inter
alia
,
People ex rel. Daley v. Suria
,
the judicial article of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, the State’s Attorney’s office is not part of the judicial branch of government. The judicial branch exercises judicial power, which is the power to adjudicate cases. We agree with the following description of “judicial power” taken from Black’s Law Dictionary 864 (8th ed. 2004):
“The authority vested in courts and judges to hear and decide cases and to make binding judgments on them; the power to construe and apply the law when controversies arise *7 over what has been done or not done under it.”
We again note that neither SAAP nor State’s Attorneys exercise such judicial power. However, none of the above discussion about the role or duties of the State’s Attorneys (or SAAP) matters to the resolution of this case. That is because, as the Nelson court explained:
“[T]he focal point of our inquiry is not the history and tradition of State’s Attorneys’ powers and functions. Nor is our focus on determining the branch of government to which State’s Attorneys belong. Rather, our narrow objective is to determine only whether the legislature intended to include State’s Attorneys within the Act’s definition of ‘public body.’ Again, given that (1) the Act’s definition of ‘public body’ does not include judicial bodies, (2) the legislature’s use of the term ‘judicial’ in another context [(referring here to section 3 of the SAAP Act (725 ILCS 210/3 (West 2012)))] reveals that the term is broad enough to include an entity created under the constitution’s judicial article, and (3) the office of State’s Attorney is established in the constitution’s judicial article, we decline to infer a legislative intent to include State’s Attorneys within the Act’s definition of ‘public body’ absent a clear expression to that effect.” , 2013 IL App (2d) 120635, ¶ 21,990 N.E.2d 1237 . We note that Public Act 96-900, in addition to deeming SAAP to be a “judicial agency
of state government,” added no new powers or duties to SAAP that in any way could be viewed as judicial in nature. Thus, despite the fact that SAAP performs no judicial functions, the legislature–in 2010–while the litigation in this case and in was being either proposed or pursued, changed the designation of SAAP from “an agency of state government” to “a judicial agency of state government.” The General Assembly’s declaration that SAAP is “a judicial agency of state
government” reminds us of a story involving Abraham Lincoln, who, when questioned about an issue concerning the use of language, asked his questioner how many legs a dog would have if they called the dog’s tail a leg. The questioner confidently responded “five,” but Lincoln was not persuaded. He is reputed to have responded, “Calling a dog’s tail a leg doesn’t make it a leg.” Similarly, the legislature’s designation of SAAP, a state agency that performs no judicial functions whatsoever, as “a judicial agency of state government” does not somehow make it so. We must presume that the legislature is aware of agencies of state government–like
SAAP–that it has created and would further be aware that SAAP performs no judicial functions. Yet, despite this awareness, the legislature enacted Public Act 96-900, designating SAAP, an exclusively executive and prosecutorial agency of state government, as a judicial agency of state government. The General Assembly must have had some reason for passing legislation that is the statutory equivalent of declaring a dog’s tail to be a leg, and the only reason we can see is to provide SAAP with a FOIA exemption. J. The Term “Judicial Bodies” as Used in Nelson This case does not involve a FOIA request made to SAAP. Nonetheless, we have
extensively discussed Public Act 96-900 that amended the SAAP Act because, in our view,
*8
it supports the Second District’s holding in that (1) FOIA does not apply to “judicial
bodies” and (2) the term “judicial bodies” is broader than the term “the judiciary.” After all,
as we have concluded, the legislature in Public Act 96-900 (1) deemed SAAP to be “a
judicial agency of state government” (although it clearly is not) and (2) did so to exempt
SAAP, clearly a prosecutorial agency, from FOIA requests. Thus, at least in the context of
determining whether a judicial exemption under FOIA exists, (1) the Second District’s
interpretation in of “judicial bodies” as being broader than it normally would be is
correct and (2) the legislature intended for the judicial exemption under FOIA to be broadly
construed and to include the State’s Attorneys of Illinois. In our opinion, this conclusion
regarding the legislature’s intent is compelled by the enactment of Public Act 96-900.
K. Epilogue Regarding Statutory Interpretation
The role of this court when construing statutes is not to ask whether the legislature could
have stated the matter more directly and less ambiguously because such perceived legislative
deficiencies do not matter. The judiciary’s purpose when construing statutes is to determine
as best it can what the statutes mean based upon what the legislature has written.
One might think that the legislature could have been more direct and less ambiguous in
this very case. For instance, if the legislature really intended to exempt State’s Attorneys
offices from FOIA, it could have simply and explicitly so stated. The definition of “public
body” in section 2(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/2(a) (West 2012)) could have been amended to
state that it did not include State’s Attorney’s offices. Multiple opportunities to make such
an amendment have repeatedly arisen. We note that over the last 19 years, section 2 of FOIA
has been amended 13 times, with 4 of those amendments occuring since 2010. See Pub. Act
88-614, § 92 (eff. Sept. 7, 1994); Pub. Act 89-681, § 5 (eff. Dec. 13, 1996); Pub. Act 90-144,
§ 7 (eff. July 23, 1997); Pub. Act 90-670, § 5 (eff. July 31, 1998); Pub. Act 91-935, § 30 (eff.
June 1, 2001); Pub. Act 92-335, § 5 (eff. Aug. 10, 2001); Pub. Act 92-468, § 10 (eff. Aug.
22, 2001); Pub. Act 92-547, § 3 (eff. June 13, 2002); Pub. Act 92-651, § 7 (eff. July 11,
2002); Pub. Act 96-261, § 900 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010); Pub. Act 96-542, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010);
Pub. Act 96-1000, § 10 (eff. July 2, 2010); Pub. Act 97-579, § 3 (eff. Aug. 26, 2011).
On the other hand, we note that FOIA contains no explicit exemption for the judiciary
in the first place. As we observed earlier, the appellate court in
Copley Press
simply inferred
such an exemption because FOIA, in defining “public body” in section 2(a), refers to all
“legislative, executive, administrative, or advisory bodies of the [s]tate.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)
Copley Press
,
¶ 48 III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment. Reversed. JUSTICE TURNER, specially concurring. While I agree with Justice Steigmann’s ultimate resolution of this case, I write separately
to note I agree with the Second District’s analysis and holding in and would have followed that analysis here. Specifically, I agree with the court that it is significant the office of State’s Attorney was established in the judicial article of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 19. PRESIDING JUSTICE APPLETON, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. While I recognize the very real policy reasons in preventing the
disclosure of prosecution files and work product (a policy with which I agree), I do not find the slender reed of the legislature’s denomination of the State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office as a “judicial agency of State government,” without any substantive policy analysis of this conclusion by the General Assembly, is sufficient to support the conclusion this state’s 102 State’s Attorneys are exempt from FOIA. Nor do I believe the inclusion of State’s Attorneys within the several iterations of the judicial article of our state constitution places those offices within the judicial branch of government. Indeed, it is the judicial branch of government that is specifically excluded as a “public body” within the meaning of FOIA. Those 102 offices function as the prosecutorial arm of our system of justice, independent of judicial control. Because State’s Attorneys are not members of the judicial branch and, thus, excluded, it stands to reason the offices are “public bodies” according to our legislature’s definition of that term. Should the legislature come to the conclusion that State’s Attorneys’ files not be subject
to FOIA, it can specifically exclude State’s Attorneys’ offices from its purview.