Case Information
*1 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
AUSTIN
GERALD C. MANN ATTORNEY GENERAL
Honorable Dan W. Jackson District Attorney Houston, Texas
Dear Sir:
Opinion No. 0-4713 He: Whether a personage when owned by the pastor individually, rather than by the Pedigipus organization is exempt from taxation.
We are in receipt of your letter of July 26, 1942 in which you request an opinion on the following submitted facts:
"I have been requested by the pastor of the Houston Gospel Tabernacle, which I understand is affiliated with and under the jurisdiction of a national religious organization known as Peltwood Church, Inc., whose general secretary has an office at 1312 N. 67th St., Hobston, Texas, for an opinion as to the exemption from an valorem taxation of the following property:
The local pastor proposes to purchase out of his individual funds and take title in his individual name to property which he will acquire and use solely as a personage. The property will not be purchased by the church nor will table the taken in the name of the church."
Article VIII, Section 2, of the State Constitution provides that the Legislature by general laws may exempt from taxation "actual places of religious worship, also any property owned by a church... for the exclusive use as a dwelling place of the ministry."
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Honorable Dan W. Jackson, Page 2
By this authority the Legislature enacted Article 7150, the pertinent part of Seotion 1, of this oxemption statute reads as follows: "Sehools and Churohes. -- Public sehool houses and actual places of religious worship, also any property owned by a ohuroh or by a strictly religious soolety, for the oxelusive use as a dwelling place for the ministers of such ohuroh or religious soolety, the books and furniture therein and the grounds attached to such buildings necessary for the proper occupancy, use and enjoyment of the same, and which yields no revenue whatever to such ohuroh or religious society; provided that such oxemption as to the dwelling place for the ministers shall not extend to more property than is reasonably necessary for a dwelling place and in no event more than one acre of land. . . ."
It has always been the policy of our Courts not to favor exemptions of this type. All doubts are resolved against the exemptions and the enactments by which they are given will not be enlarged by construction, but, on the contrary, will be strictly construed. Santa Rosa Infirmary v. City of San Antonio, (Comn. of App.) 259 S. W. 926; Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Lodge No. 151 vs. City of Houston, (O1v. App.) 44 S. W. (2d) 930; Houston Belt and Terminal Ry. Co. vs. Clark (Civ. App.) 122 S. W. (2d) 356.
In the case of Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of San Antonio, (O1v. App.) 201 S. W. 668, decided before the amendment of Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution and the extension of the oxemption statute to include the property owned by ohurohes for ministers' residence by Article 7507.
*3 Honorable Dan W. Jackson, Page 3
now Article 7150, and addition of Article 7150b; Mr. Chief Justice Fly makes the following statement:
"It is well settled by excellent authority that the exemption of church property does not include a restory or parsonage. St. Mark's church v. Brunswick, 78 Ga. 541, 3 S. E. 561; State vs. Board of Assessors, 52 La. Ann. 223, 26 South. 872; Third Cong. 800. v. Springfield, 147 Mass. 396, 18 N. E. 68; Hennepin County vs. Grace, 27 Minn. 603, 8 N. W. 761; Presbyterian Church vs. New Orleans, 30 La. Ann. 259, 31 Am. Rep. 224; People vs. First Cong. Church, 232 Ill. 158, 83 N. E. 536; Broadway Church vs. Comm., 112 Ky. 448, 66 B. W. 32. In the last case cited it is said:
"Parsonages are not exempt, although erected on a portion of the church lot which would otherwise be exempt, and occupied by the minister free of rent, if the language of the exemption only includes places actually used for religious worship, with the grounds attached thereto, and appartenant to the house of worship. The authorities on this point seem to be unanimous."
"This was held under a constitutional provision much broader than that used in the Constitution of Texas, for the Kentucky law exempts not only 'places used for/religious worship,' but also 'the grounds attacked thereto and used and appartenant to the house of worship, not exceeding one-half acre in cities or towns and not exceeding two acres in the country."
*4 Honorable Dan W. Jackson, Page 4 "The language of the Constitution must fix the exemptions, no matter what the language of the statute may be, and under Section 2 of Article 8 of the Constitution appellant has not shown itself entitled to exemption for its personage as being an 'actual place of religious worship' or an 'institution of purely public charity'. The evidence failed to show that the per- sonage was used for a place of religious worship, but as a home for the pastor. It may be that it was a necessary appartenance to the church, but the Constitution does not exempt anything attached or appurtenant to a church on the ground of necessity. Permitting the preacher to use the building may have been very charitable, though it appears that the use of the house paid a part of the salary earned by or promised to him, and certainly it was not in the interest of the public that he should re- side in the personage."
The above quotation places a restriction on the exemption statute which we feel certain has been modified only by express provisions of the amendment. Article 7150b, providing the exemption of minister's residence, is for "any property owned exclusively and in fee by a church for the exclusive use as a dwelling place for the ministry of such church" and cannot be construed as to include a home owned by a minister. The fact that property might be used for religious or educational purposes would not bring it within the meaning of the exemption statute. It must be owned and used exclusively for the purpose as provided for in the statute. City of Dallas v. Cochran, (Oiv. App.) 166 S. W. 32; Little Theatre of Dallas v. City of Dallas, (Oiv. App.) 124 S. W. (2d) 863; Red v. Johnson, 53 Texas 285.
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As the express wording of the exemption statute includes only property owned by the ohureh, a personage owned by the pastor could not be brought within the strict judicial interpretation of Articles 7150 and 7150b.
Trusting the foregoing fully answers your inquiry, we are
Yours very truly ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEIAS By By Waltor R. Kooh Assistant
JEJ:MBR
ADENOVELAUG 28, 1942 Bened E. Pinn ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEIAS