63 F. 951 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Washington | 1894
At the instance of the receivers of this court, in charge of the business and property of the Meal tie, hake Shore & Eastern Railway Company, the defendant has been arrested and brought before the court to answer a charge of. contempt alleged to have been committed by him, in this: That on or about the 14th day of August, last, said defendant unlawfully, willfully, and clandestinely wrested from the xiossession of said receivers, and removed out of the jurisdiction of this court, a raft of saw logs which were theretofore in the lawful possession of said receivers. The undisputed facts are that the defendant, prior to the date of the alleged offense, was engaged in cutting saw logs at a place near to the line of said railroad, and dependent on said railroad for transportation of his saw logs to salt water. The logs were delivered to the receivers, and carried upon trucks to Salmon bay, where they were unloaded, and placed in a boom owned and controlled by one A. C. Ba tes. Timber belonging to other loggers, transported by the same railroad,’ was also received and cared for by said Pates, who, for a consideration paid by the loggers, attended to the unloading of the logs from the trucks, and placed them in a general boom, and afterwards, as required, sorted them, and made up rafts for towing; having pocket booms, rafting gaps, and
I make said findings notwithstanding the testimony to the contrary given by the defendant upon this trial. Testimony was introduced upon this trial strongly tending to prove that, at the time of the taking of the raft on the 14th of August, Mr. Pates made objection to the taking of said raft until he should first notify the receivers and receive their consent, and that his objections were overcome by assurances then given by the defendant to the effect that he had just come from the office of the receivers, and that they understood he was to take the logs, and had assented thereto. I am not, however, convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any such objections or assurances wen; made or given, and 1 give the defendant the benefit of the doubt on this point. As a matter of fact, Mr. Pates was the authorized agent of the receivers to hold possession of said logs; but he had no authority to surrender the possession of said logs to the defendant, or to any one else, except as he should be especially instructed by the receivers or the general officers of the railroad acting under them, and no such special instructions were at any time given for the release of the raft taken by the defendant on the 14th of August. I consider his position to have been similar to that of a warehouse keeper having possession of goods received from a carrier, on which charges for carriage are unpaid, and who, in consideration of the delivery of the goods to him for storage, has undertaken to hold the same for the unpaid freight, or until released by the earner’s order. But the evidence fails to show that the defendant knew the extent of Pates’ authority as agent, or knew that he was not authorized to release said logs without special instructions. The evidence fails to prove that the defendant would have willfully taken forcible posses
Section 725 of the Revised Statutes of the United States limits the power of this court to punish for contempts. Persons not parties to litigation pending in the court, and not holding official positions requiring them to yield obedience to the court in their official conduct, can be punished in proceedings for contempt only for acts committed in the immediate presence of the court, or so near thereto as to interfere with the administration of justice, or for willfully resisting the execution of the lawful process or commands of the court. The word “resistance,” used in the statute, is to be understood as implying a willful purpose to interfere so as to prevent the execution or enforcement of process or the court’s orders. Accusations for contempt must be supported by evidence sufficient to convince the mind of the trior, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the actual guilt of the accused, and every element of the offense, including a criminal intent, must be proved by evidence or circumstances warranting an inference of the necessary facts; otherwise, the defendant is entitled to go acquit. In this case, while the proof clearly establishes the fact of an actual interference with the business of the receivers of this court by the taking away of property in their lawful custody, without their consent, and while the prosecution appears to have been founded upon evidence showing just cause for the accusation, I nevertheless am constrained to decide that the accusation has not been proven. Without proof of knowledge on the part ■ of the defendant of the lack of authority in Pates to release the logs, and without convincing evidence that the defendant did fraudulently induce Pates to surrender the logs by falsely representing to him that the receivers had consented thereto, I can find no facts warranting an inference of the criminal intent necessary to justify the infliction of punishment