University of Utah Hospital Ex Rel. Harris v. Pence
657 P.2d 469
Idaho
1982
Check Treatment

*1 UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL

Behalf of William HARRIS and Karen

Harris, wife, parents husband and Harris, infant,

Sara who are medical

indigents, Plaintiff-Appellant, PENCE, Clerk;

Richard Twin Falls Board County Commissioners; and Twin County, Defendants-Respondents.

Falls

No. 14004.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Sept. 1982.

Rehearing Denied Feb. Williams, Blackfoot, plaintiff-

Dean for appellant. Webb, Webb, Burton, Carlson, J.

Lloyd Paine, Falls, Pederson & Twin for defend- ants-respondents.

McFADDEN, Justice. appeal arises from an action

The instant filing complaint by of a initiated Medical University of Utah Center, T. Harris and on behalf of William Harris, Harris, parents Karen F. Sara the com- child. The actual nature of minor attempt was that of a collateral plaint County a decision of the Board appeal re- County Falls for Twin Commissioners under grant plaintiff fusing to seq. 31-3401 et of I.C. provisions §§ relate to those references seq, 31-3501 et dis- indigent. The medically the aid to the defendants’ motion granted trict of dismissal of judgment summary We affirm. claim. plaintiff’s affidavits as well as the complaint establish the fol- filed below deposition of review. lowing purposes facts for *2 titled 25, 1975, Harris, made to a document On is also October Sara the Reference Expenses.” The document Harrises, Living the daughter prema- “Monthly of was born income Harrises after-tax turely, physical with attendant serious com- reflects that the they were plications. necessary per The month and that facilities for was $710.00 in the of being expenses $707.00 child una- amount incurring medical treatment of the Idaho, per vailable in the Harrises’ doctor or- month. immediately

dered that the child be trans- the ac- moved to dismiss The defendants the of Utah University Hospital ferred to (1) the tion, following objections, raising the City, Center Lake and Medical in Salt Utah. file timely plaintiff failure the received treatment at the The child medical benefits; indigent for medical application through hospital February, the 25th were that the Harrises (2) the allegation 1976. The statement medical treat- failure (3) and the indigent; not medically the child ment of over this of time administra- to exhaust its plaintiff $42,117.78. totalled the defend- Subsequently, tive remedies. 5, 1976, hospital, On November the on dis- summary judgment of ants moved for Harrises, behalf of the application filed an pertinent was in missal. motion based The medically indigent for aid for the with the of William part upon deposition the taken Clerk, former Twin Falls County H.A. Lan- 2,1977. deposition The March T. Harris on caster. Mr. Lancaster failed to file a certif- their to the birth of that disclosed with icate the Twin Falls Board of County income daughter, Harrises combined the Commissioners, as required month, in situations of $1,150.00 they per was excess indigency. medical $2,000.00 savings in a had accumulated account, approximately incurred plaintiff the filed January On expenses. deposi- The $42,- per month complaint seeking payment $620.00 the that of March tion also discloses Attached 117.78 in medical bills. to the $1,400.00 a earning month Mr. Harris was application of complaint was the verified a totalling his income $903.00 with after-tax Harris, the William T. which stated follow- month. ing:

“WILLIAM T. and KAREN F. HARRIS also plaintiff the On November HARRIS, wife, own real husband and no claim. summary judgment on its moved for any They estate nor interest therein. judgment summary for Both motions in a Datsun equity have automobile Decem- on were to the district court argued and which paid on which have $800 days the district Two later ber $2,000. owing a balance thereon for motion granted the defendants’ court Dodge own They also a 1963 Dart auto- ordering, In so judgment of dismissal. at not more than mobile which valued applica- that the plaintiff’s court reasoned also 1962 Honda which They own a $100. was un- indigency benefits tion for medical running is not in condition stove not medi- parents were timely and that they paid None the said $50.00. meaning of cally indigent within the any a value of conse- have market assets court also district applicable law. dryer ma- quence. Include washer not was plaintiff hospital opined that $250.00, balance of equity chine $350.00. un- claim relief lawfully could party which seq. et of I.C. der the 31-3401 provisions T. is employed “WILLIAM HARRIS seq. et and 31-3501 Falls Conservation service Twin Soil the in- plaintiff perfected thereafter average and his Ag Department in the presented Three issues are appeal. stant wage appli- monthly is $920.50—that err (1) KAR- did district cants, appeal: T. HARRIS and WILLIAM indi- medical ruling application for or are unable receive EN HARRIS (2) did the untimely; gency benefits from their expect financial assistance the Harrises ruling err in have means district court neither of whom parents, (3) did the medically indigent, and were not render aid.” ruling district court err in its application Uni- Retroactive versity of Utah file 1976 version of I.C. 31-3504 to the in could not gen claim on behalf of stant situation would run contrary the Harrises for medical ap principles disfavoring eral of law indigency benefits. Given our determina- Sutherland, plication. Statutory tion See Con correctly district court ruled struction, (1973). 41.04 Consonant with for medical *3 view, this 73-101 states I.C. § untimely, benefits was the second and third “[n]o retroactive, part compiled of these laws is presented appeal issues need be dis- not expressly Similarly, unless so declared.” cussed. agreement general there is in the case law upon The district court relied 31- I.C. § jurisdiction of a this there must be (1976) ruling appellant 3504 its that the expression legislative clear of intent of pursuing was barred from its claim. The given before a statute will be retroactivity provision reads: Baker, 635, such effect. Baker v. 100 Idaho “An for or on application behalf of a (1979); Walker, 603 P.2d 590 Edwards v. 95 medically indigent person receiving emer- 289, (1973); Application 507 P.2d 486 gency may medical services be made 288, Co., of Forde L. Johnson Oil 84 Idaho (45) forty-five days following time within (1962); Pahlke, P.2d 135 In re 372 person hospi- the of said admission to the 338, (1936). Applied 53 P.2d 1177 retroac furnishing If person tal said care. be- version of 31-3504 tively, the 1976 I.C. § medically indigent subsequent comes to required application the to have would have hospital to a to subsequent admission or by April been made some two and receiving ap- treatment hospital, a half months before the effective date of behalf, plication person, or on his applica such retroactive Clearly, law. thirty (30) days shall be made within of appellant unfairly penalize tion would person medically the time the becomes comply with a statute of for failure indigent. chargeable county or coun- no notice. This court could not which it had practica- ties shall be notified as soon as such a result inasmuch as countenance upon hospital’s obtaining ble informa- of expression legislative is no intent there disclosing patient that a is medically tion version of I.C. 31-3504 be the 1976 indigent.” (Emphasis added.) Nonetheless, it does applied retroactively. statutory provision This became effective version of the not follow that 1,1976 Sess.Laws, 121), (1976 Idaho ch. 1, in effect after would remain subsequent appel a time to the admission and that date forward 1976. From of the from the hos- require release Harrises’ child had fair notice of the lant for medical pital. application of when an ments filed and had benefits had to be contends that the 1976 ver- appellant appli in which make such 31-3504 is inapplicable.1 sion I.C. § cation. Rather, 1974 appellant points point 31-3504, which was in law version of I.C. the relevant case An examination indicates that a jurisdictions the time the medical treatment effect at from other child, merely retroactive be- being applicable law in this not made statute is to its facts antecedent upon an indi- it draws provision case. Under this earlier cause Holt v. Mor- operation. its treat- for receiving emergency medical enactment gent 915 274 P.2d Cal.App.2d 128 gan, aid within one apply county ment could Mont. City Billings, v. 134 (1954); Hill discharge hospital, and the year of Froed- (1958); Earle v. 282, 328 P.2d 1112 timely. would have been instant Thus, only we are con- appellant Sara Harris. not tion of does It is to be noted forty-five applicability medically of the cerned with became contend that the Harrises day in the 1976 version of contained indigent thirty days the time of the within Rather, applica- 31-3504. filing application. I.C. hospitaliza- back to the time of the tion relates

175 54, 65, Pomona, tert 5 Cal.2d Malting City Grain & 197 Wash. (1938); Medina, City 952; P.2d 264 Lewis v. Francisco v. School Kline v. San (1975). Wash.App. As the 174, 176, Dist., 104 P.2d Cal.App.2d Supreme California Court reasoned in Holt 362; Robertson, Scheas v. Morgan, supra, contention here 982; “[t]he [as 38 Cal.2d Crothers appellant] made is based on a misun- 606; Co., C.C., 149 F. Ter v. Edison Elec. derstanding legal of ‘retroactive’ as a con- Anderson, 24 L.Ed. 365. ry U.S. cept.” regard, 274 P.2d at 917. In it is to be observed further that there is almost merely A statute is not made retroactive agreement universal statutory that when a existing prior facts because it draws period of limitation is amended to reduce changes proce enactment. Thus to its the limitation whose period, party applicable have been held dural law accrues before the effective date of the effect of existing causes of action. The amendment complain cannot be heard to if prospective actually statutes *4 given he is the full time allowed for action procedure nature since relate to the according to the terms of the amended stat- to be followed in the future. National ute from and after the effective date of the 98 Downey, Automobile & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Weiner, amended statute. Olivas v. 127 962; 586, 590, Cal.App.2d 220 P.2d Ar 597, Cal.App.2d (1954); 274 P.2d 476 Green- Co., gues Superior halgh v. National 67 Cal. Payson (Utah v. City, 530 P.2d 799 1975); 643; Day Ruff, 763, 778, v. Night Heating App.2d & 19 155 P.2d Earle Co. v. 412, Utah 2d (1967); Co., 432 P.2d 43 Malting O’Dono- Froedtert Grain & 197 Wash. ghue State, 787, v. 66 478, Wash.2d 405 P.2d 258 341, 85 P.2d 264.” 274 P.2d at 479. (1965); Earle v. Malting Froedtert Grain & Similarly, in Earle v. Froedtert Grain & Co., supra. Weiner, In supra, Olivas v. the Malting supra, the court stated that statutory time within which a child could prescribed by limitation the new stat- “[t]he file a claim for prenatal injuries against an ute commenced when the cause of action individual his tortious conduct was subjected was first to the operation shortened from until the time the child statute, is, upon its effective date.” 85 reached to six years from the date P.2d at 266.2 appellant, birth. The who apparently appellant argues foregoing the injured had been during the course of his light is the authority inapplicable birth, brought prior suit within the statuto- early court’s decision in the case of Cook v. ry period, but years more than twelve after 264, (1923). 220 P. 1088 Massey, the statutory period In shortened. rul- Cook, judgment ap- In the from which the ing that the suit was timely, not the court 25, 1921, peal April was taken was dated following made the observations: and service of was filed appeal notice of “It has repeatedly been held that the 15, judg- July days 1921. Nine after Legislature may reduce a statute of limi entered, ment was a new statute became

tations and period that the new applies restricting effective within accrued causes of action provided a rea appeal could be twen- perfected which sonable time is allowed within which to ty days judgment. from the date of Whiting, assert the cause. Estate of 110 399, 502; disagreed argument with the Cal.App. 294 P. Estate of Ven ners, 417, 419, 544; from the appellant only twenty days had Cal.App. Thompson v. the new statute County Angeles, Los 140 effective date of within 185; Cal.App. perfect appeal, Norton v. which to his and held that by respondents 1,1977). opinion, Judge Attention drawn in their In that Schroeder con- unpublished opinion precise question brief to an this in the case of sidered the now before Planting, applica- The Children’s v. District An excellent discussion of the court. principles opin- Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the ble of law is contained in that Idaho, County, ion, Judge reasoning State of Ada been Hon. Gerald F. Schroeder’s Schroeder, Judge (case April closely opinion. District no. 59455 followed this 604, new time perfection limit for (1973). of an Under I.C. appeal could not 31-3504, be retroactively. as it existed to the effec- 269, Idaho at 220 P. at 1089. amendment, tive date of the 1976 the Har- acquired rises to file for medical view, In our the Cook decision is long- no indigent year benefits within one from Feb- er good First, law. decision rests ruary date of release from the the mistaken assumption that the question Therefore, hospital. to apply I.C. 31- before the court is retroactive versus pro- 3504, 1, as amended to limit the spective application. As we have seen from Harrises’ filing period cited, authority previously this simply is amendment, from the effective date of the not the case. Secondly, opinion in Cook affects their previously acquired right rests upon two nineteenth century Califor- file for benefits within year one cases, i.e., nia v. Reynolds, Melde 120 Cal. date of discharge from hospital. 234, 52 (1898), Burnett, P. 491 Pignaz 119 Cal. (1897), P. 48 apparent- In retroactively amend- applying the 1976 ly have been California, overruled in wit- 31-3504, ment to I.C. also ness Weiner, Olivas v. supra. Accordingly, retroactively Massey, Cook v. overrules the case of Cook Massey, supra, is over- (1923). 220 P. 1088 When the ruled to the extent it is conflict with our plaintiffs filed action for medical indi- holding today. gent benefits, entitled to they were and did act the law consistently with as set forth in In conclude summary, we Cook v. Massey, Weighing the fac- supra. time proper peri measure of the tors to be in determining considered wheth- begins od to run from *5 er to apply opinion prospectively or effective 1976 version date of the of I.C. i.e., purpose retrospectively, of the new forty-five 31-3504. This means that § rule, reliance on prior decisions and the day period August run would have effect of the on the new rule administration ap three months before the approximately Watson, justice, see v. Jones 98 Idaho Thus, pellant’s application. district 608, 284, (1977), 570 quoting P.2d 286 People holding court did not err in that the instant McDaniel, 156, v. 16 127 Cal.Rptr. Cal.3d application indigency for medical 467, 843, (1976); 545 P.2d 848 Rogers v. untimely. was 14, 97 Yellowstone Park Idaho 539 P.2d Order of of dismissal summary judgment (1975), 566 only I can conclude that to de- respondents. affirmed. Costs to prive the their right Harrises of to file for overruling benefits by retroactively the de- DONALDSON, J., concurs. cision in Massey, supra, Cook v. ignores their right to rely existing on law and caus- SHEPARD, J., in the concurs result. es them hardship. undue McFADDEN, J., prior Submitted Finally, majority relies primarily 31, August his retirement on 1982. which, adopted jurisdictions rule in as other Justice, BAKES, dissenting: Chief I it, a stat- understand is as follows: When 31-3504, The majority applying utory period is I.C. is amended to of limitation § 1976, 1, as amended in retroactively period, reduce the the new limita- direct to the Idaho tion the effec- period contravention statute will as of be retroactively applied that no law should be tive even to those date of the amendment so legislature unless the declares. I.C. actions before the effective which accrue 73-101; Cty. Fidelity majority see Lincoln v. date & of the amendment. § Md., 489, Dep. fails, however, two recent cases Co. 102 Idaho 678 to address 338, expressly which is (1981); Pahlke, language In re 53 that contain In above stated rule. (1936). A retroactive when inconsistent with the law is it 641, Carr, operates upon rights which have been ac- v. 97 Idaho Stoner (1976), quired. this Court stated Woolley, See Arnold v. “[t]he m effect only of limitation when the be retroactive application “There could is deemed to accrue some action defines that stat- to the enactment ... where unless legislature provides been 274 P.2d at utory right... obtained.” [had] 643, Id. at added). 550 P.2d at 261. In this manner (emphasis otherwise.” Clements, Similarly, Martin v. 98 Idaho Holt realized of a statute rights. 906, (1978), P.2d 885 if it affects accrued this stated is retroactive Court “if the cause of before action accrued BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting. date amendment], effective then [the the statute of limitation on that effective point A beginning analysis applicable date of accrual would be the unsup- is its bare majority opinion and statute of Id. at limitation.” ported statement that as of at Thus, opinion has the had fair appellant “the notice of the one, effect of but three overruling not of when medi- requirements application for cases, to the inconsist- they extent that are and benefits had to be indigency cal filed ent: Cook expressly supra, is Massey, in which had to make overruled, Carr, supra, and Stoner v. As application.” the author of the Martin v. Clements, supra, are overruled concedes, opinion postulate adopt- implication. ed Judge opinion from District Schroeder’s No. Planting, Children’s My concern over ap- both the retroactive Dist.Ct., (4th 1977), April plication of I.C. wide- 31-3504, involved an action recover similarly sweeping implications overruling the rel- medical benefits. In opinion, his portions evant cases, the above named however, Schroeder, Judge showed compels me to dissent. actually reality. awareness for What he BISTLINE, Justice, concurring plaintiffs with case wrote was in that BAKES, Chief Justice. appellants this) fair (plaintiffs and “have notice, anybody so far aware of statu- I in complete am agreement with Chief law, tory opportunity have an position Justice Bakes’ that I.C. 73-101 act the limitations within established.” precludes retroactive application of added.) (Emphasis Judge opin- Schroeder’s amended version of I.C. 31-3504. This *6 ion quoted following from passage is 73-106, result reinforced by I.C. Greenhalgh Payson City, provides: “Accrued rights pending and ac- (Utah 1975): tions not proceed- affected. —No action or legisla- “It is well established that the ing commenced compiled before the laws reduce may period ture of limitations effect, accrued, take and no right is affect- a new apply and shorter to period provisions, their by ed but proceedings action, accrued previously causes of so therein must requirements conform to the long as a reasonable time is allowed to compiled of the applicable.” laws as far as action; bring an and that the effect added.) (Emphasis No that questions one of the new commences appellants’ right to file for medical indi- effective date of the statute.” 530 gency February accrued on (footnotes omitted) at 803 (emphasis add- child, 1976—the date of discharge of their ed). Harris, facility in Sara medical that, Utah, accrual, not, at the its Judge my time of did according Schroeder year. that extended for one full The reading, the fair question, discuss notice however, majority, concept confuses the of other astutely imply (as than to it seems retroactivity applied did) as right. to an accrued me that few people that he are aware Quoting Holt v. Morgan, Cal.App.2d statutory by suppose of which I would law — 113, 274 P.2d 915 (1954) proposition that he meant drastic in especially changes retroactivity that is a legal however, Judge misunderstood statutory Certainly, law. concept, majority misinterprets Schroeder, itself unlike the majority of opinion Court, the Holt as evidenced a subse- changes statutory was aware that quent statement made court: may trap law be a for the unwary. Simi-

larly, Judge Schroeder, which, all, opinion whose was after was a 3-2 decision. In also an denying Sheffield, order dismiss motion to Toronto v. 118 Utah predicated upon grounds untimeliness, (1950) the Utah court also wrote in failed to address the time is- reasonable terms of what legislature could do— key sue —a to the Utah court’s statement. how far it go could reducing the time —in majority opinion The accepts this Court limitation in which an action could be without discussion both that brought as to a existing then claim. is a bring reasonable time to an action and case, In this again, it repeated must be appellants had fair notice of the legislature purport did not even change in the law. Both unwarranted and to reduce time existing limitation as to are, however, unsupported assumptions nec- and accrued claims. Just how a court can essary reasoning to the Court’s in order to that, do when it is at apparent once that the reach a conclusion which denial upholds the legislature carefully any attempt avoided at of benefits. shortening claims, the time on accrued will mystery forever be a than that ear- impermissibly amended —other lier authored opinions by some members of the 1976 amendment to I.C. 31-3504 in clearly Court have demonstrated an an- order to suit its own view as to what the tipathy toward the concept huge hospital legislature might have done in order to bills being paid by espe- Idaho’s avoid or limit statutory duty imposed counties — cially hospitals.1 to Utah upon counties to care for the indi- medically gent. so, In doing the Court similarly FAIR NOTICE ignore legislature, chooses to in not how discussing just avoids making provision any against for claims the appellants given were “fair notice” of county which had accrued or would accrue my powers 1976 amendment. If prior to the amendment’s effective date of me, recollection continue to serve not one obviously under the im- to have professed member of this Court has pression that accrued claims would remain question known of the 1976 amendment subject to the limitations which were in preparation argu- to our for the oral effect right giving at the time the rise to Yet, lay appel- ment. it said that these those claims had persons accrued. Most “fair require- lants had notice reason; hence, would so there is no need for 1,1976, when ments” as of the amend- the majority speculate legislate. 31-3504 became effec- ed version I.C. § The legislature avoiding change concept tive. It is unclear whether this might existing alter wiser claims chose the originates “fair notice” in the cliche that just and more approach. excuse,” “ignorance of the law is no or in Greenhalgh, The Utah court in cor- supra, judicial some other fiat that as frequently rectly legislature stated the law that a can justice. as it injustice serves does Even reduce a limitations even were we to hold the Harrises to an exem- action, existing doing claim or cause of *7 but plary awareness of laypersons’ standard providing so is conditional on its a reasona- law, they applicable had checked the bring ble time to such an action. In this daughter’s law at the time of their dis- legislature case the did not do so. The charge hospital, would inquiry Court, however, of the rushes to one-year have informed them of a provision fill the breach with its own —one of limitation on medical claims. indigency self-servingly appellants’ which defeats the How or acquired received should have claim. Nor does the reason knowledge change of the in the law is a around holding of the Utah court —al- proposition compre- which is difficult to though Greenhalgh opinion. it cites its principle hend. I know of no or reason helpful justice requires inquiry

It is to note an earlier Utah case into ex- daily Greenhalgh holding relied isting statutes of limitation. amendment, Fortunately, ing sharing a 1982 medi- a formula for a statewide Sess.Laws, Chap. provid- cal aimed at claims. claim which at the of its accrual was REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY time subject Forty- limitation.2 one-year to a legislature purported Had the to make long five time in most circum- days is not a to accrued applicable the shortened time stances. exceedingly It is an short rights had it it did not do—and —which by happenstance of time in learn which to which the legislation enacted as Court has without legislature fanfare fiat, judicial it would by now establishes be shortened a statute to a bare for- one-year as a uphold difficult rea- ty-five be a days. It cannot said as matter bring sonable time within which to a claim. appellants’ filing law that the on Novem- Although it is legis- uncontroverted that ber approximately two and one-half power length- latures have the to shorten or expiration months after the forty- limitation, statutes of the majority en fails day period creatively five applied by recognize in turn courts will make a Court, is unreasonable. Certainly, four determination of the reasonableness of the months is not an excessive amount of time new time a allowed to assert claim when who plaintiff allow thinks he has one to a retroactively previously ac- year change to discover a in the law and file Indeed, right. crued several cases cited a claim or opinion notice. The Court’s support the Court in of its pre- conclusion impermissibly, effectively, but foreclosed such an scribe examination. In Olivas v. the appellants’ opportunity to recover the Weiner, 127 Cal.App.2d 274 P.2d 476 due statutorily medical indigents, (1954), the qualified its yet no fault has been found against them. a new statute of limitation to an accrued cause of action: “It has repeatedly been the Legislature may

held reduce a

statute of limitations and that the peri- applies

od pro- accrued causes of action

vided a reasonable time is allowed within which to assert the cause.” 274 P.2d at 478 P.2d 476 (emphasis added). instance, In that a new HOLMES, Plaintiff-Appellant, William limitation of six years held not unrea- sonable. After adopting almost identical George IWASA, Optometrist; Berkley language Olivas, as found in Supreme Bio-Engineering International, corpo- Greenhalgh of Utah in Payson Court ration, Inc.; Berkley Bio-Engineering, or City, determined a new one- XV; through through Does I Does XVI limitation to be reasonable. year See also XXX; XL; through Does XXXI Day & Black Night Heating Ruff, Co. v. 19 Utah Corporations through XV; I (1967) (new 2d one-year White Cor- porations XV; reasonable); through limitation held Earle v. Froed- I and Green Cor- porations through tert Grain & 197 Wash. Malting XV, Defendants, I (1938) (new six-month limitation reasonable). held Iwasa, George Optometrist, holding The lack any the majority, Defendant-Respondent. whatever, or discussion regarding the No. 13459. time period reasonableness of the allowed filing, in contravention of the very au- Supreme Court Idaho. thority cited in of its support position, com- 13, 1983. Jan. pels question, me to address the albeit in dissent. I am unable to see wholly that a

forty-five day statute of limitation is a rea-

sonable amount of time to assert an accrued 120-day ty’s cutting days forty-five days, 2. The of the Tort Claims Act frequently “acceptable” proposition propo- condemned unreasonable. To hence even —a days, existing 120-day further shorten it to fifteen as to nent’s of limitation would see as claims, equivalent majori- extremely would be the doubtful.