Wе hold that the trust created by Marian Boelson left her tangible personal property and any interest she retained in her individual retirement accounts to her brother and gave the remaining assets to the University of Southern Indiana Foundation.
Factual and Procedural History
In 1996 Marian Boelson created an inter vivos trust. Section 7 expressly declined to make any provision for Boelson's brother, Richard Baker, or any other potential intestate heirs. Section 8 provided a bequest of $50,000 to Faye Rucks, a friend of Boelson's, and Section 9 left the residue to the University of Southern Indiana Foundation ("USIF"). In August 2001, Boelson amended the trust, revoking Sections 7 and 8 and replacing them with new Sections 7 and 8:
7. Upon the death of Trustor, the Trustor's brother, Richard A. Baker, if living, shall receive any and аll proceeds and assets that were held in Trustor's individual retirement accounts, if any, as well as, all of Trustor's automobiles, furnishings and other personal property.
8. After payment of [expenses of trust administration], the Trustee shall distribute to Trustor's friend, Faye Rucks, presently residing at 850 Cherokee Road, Henderson, Kentucky, the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), if living, and if not living, then said funds shall become part of the residue of the Trust and be distributed according to the terms and conditions set forth in Section 9 of this Trust Agreement.
No other substantial changes were made and the provision in Section 9 leaving the residue to USIF remained unchanged. Boelson died on August 29, 2008, leaving a will that poured her assets over into the trust. At death Boelson owned a condo *531 minium in Indiana, a one-acre lot in Florida, bank accounts, certificates of deposit, treasury notes, bonds, and two individual retirement accounts in which her brother was the designated beneficiary. There was also an automobile and tangible personal property (furniture, etc.) in the condominium.
Following Boelson's death, the trustee petitioned for an interpretation of the amended trust. No one challenged the $10,000 provision for Rucks, but Baker and USIF disagreed as to the disposition of the remaining assets. Baker alleged he was the beneficiary of all of the remaining personal property, and that USIF was the beneficiary of Boelson's real property only. USIF responded that the trust left Boel-U 6. son's "personal effects" to Baker but gave all of Bоelson's real property and all intangible personal property to USIF. USIF moved for summary judgment, designating the following affidavits and exhibits: (1) the affidavit of Boelson's attorney stating that "my understanding [was] that Mrs. Boelson intended for her brother to receive the personal property located in her residence;" (2) the affidavit of Boelson's trustee stating that Boelson told the trustee that Boelson hoped she would live long enough to see the gift to USIF grow to be worth one million dollars; (8) the affidavit of Boelson's companion stating that Boel-son had told him shortly before her death that after her death, USIF would receive almost all of Boelson's property, including her stocks; (4) typed instructions given by Boelson to her attorney which state, "Brother is beneficiary of and to receive two IRA accounts, automobile and any furnishings and personal property in the condo that he would like;" and (5) Boelson's attorney's handwritten notes stating "8. Item 7-Brother now gets: 1. Both IRAS / 2. Auto / 8. furniture from residence / 4. other personal property in residence."
Based on USIF's affidavits and exhibits, the probate court concluded that Boelson's intentiоn was to give the bulk of her personal property to USIF and to limit Baker to the IRAs, the automobile, and the household furnishings and personal effects in Boelson's condominium. However, the probate court concluded that because the language of the trust unambiguously devised "personal property" to Baker without limitation, it could not give effect to that intention. Sрecifically, the probate court held that the term "personal property" unambiguously encompassed all of Boelson's tangible and intangible personal property. The probate court therefore granted Baker's motion to strike USIF'"s designated evidence on the ground that the proffered evidence and exhibits were inadmissible parol evidenсe. The trustee was instructed to pay trust administration costs and to distribute $10,000 to Rucks, all remaining tangible and intangible personal property to Baker, and the real property to USIF. USIF appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Boelson v. Baker (In re Boelson Trust),
I. Standard of Review
The interpretation of a will or trust is a question of law for the court. Merrill v. Wimmer,
*532 II. Interpretation of Boelson's Amended Trust
The primary purpose of the court in construing a trust instrument is to ascertain and give effect to the settlor's intention. Hauck v. Second Nat'l Bank of Richmond,
A document is not ambiguous merely because parties disagree about a term's meaning. Kelly v. Estate of Johnson,
USIF also claims that the trust is unambiguous, but that "personal рroperty" means "personal effects" and does not include cash, certificates of deposit or bonds. USIF cites authority for the view that courts should interpret terms in the context of the entire instrument and should not give terms their technical meaning where it clearly appears that the testator did not intend to employ the terms in their technical sense. See Grise v. Weiss,
USIF also argues that extrinsic evidеnce of the surrounding cireumstances existing at the time the trust was amended, and known to Boelson, shows that
*533
Boelson intended to give only the individual retirement accounts, automobiles, furnishings, and other personal effects in her condominium to Baker. Indiana has long recognized that extrinsic evidence of the facts and cireumstances known to the set-tlor and existing at the timе of execution may be considered by a court when construing an instrument. Dougherty v. Rogers,
Citing this doctrine, USIF points to the fact that the trust contained only intangible personal property at the time it was amended in 2001. USIF claims that Boelson did not transfer her Indiana condominium (or the tаngible personal property it contained) into the trust until approximately one month after the trust was amended. Her Florida property was not conveyed to the trust until her death triggered the pourover provision in her will. According to USIF, if Baker is entitled to all of Boelson's intangible personal property, the gifts to USIF and Rucks would have failed because, at the timе the trust was amended, the only source of funds for the gifts to Rucks and USIF was Boelson's intangible personal property. USIF argues we should not adopt a construction of the trust that would defeat the gifts to Rucks and USIF. See In re Estate of Cashen v. Cashen,
USIF makes a final argument that we find more persuasive. USIF points to the internal structure of the trust. USIF contends that the syntax of the provision for Baker limits the scope of property conveyed. Specifically, USIF argues that because "other personal property" appears as a more general item at the end of a list of specific tangible items {automobiles and furnishings), it should be interpreted to include only personal effects of like kind to the automobiles and furnishings. USIF points out that if "automobiles, furnishings and other personal property" means, as Baker contends, "all personal property," there is no need to *534 name any single item. Moreover, the trust as amended called for the "personal property" to go to Baker under Section 7. Section 8 follows, calling for a gift of $10,000 to Rucks to be paid after the payment of the expenses of the trust, but not mentioning any antecedent provision for Baker. This fairly plainly contemplates that the earlier provision for Baker was not thought to have a higher call on available cash than the gift to Rucks, which was subordinate only to payment of administrative expenses. Though it is conceivable that a trust could be set up to give all intangible property to one beneficiary, and then provide for a specific cash devise to another to be funded by sale or borrowing against real property, if that were Boelson's intent, we think it highly probable it would have been spelled out in a far less oblique manner than the language of this trust. It seems at least as likely that "other personal property" meant other tangible property, and the cash bequest to Rucks, establishes an assumption that intangible property would be available to fund the payment for Rucks of $10,000.
We conсlude that the meaning of "personal property" in the trust is ambiguous and reasonable persons could come to different conclusions as to its meaning in this instrument. We agree that the term has the technical legal meaning Baker urges but find that the doeument as a whole creates substantial doubt that Boelson intended this technical meaning. Accordingly, we find the trust ambiguous and must address whether USIF's proffered exhibits and affidavits may be admitted to resolve the ambiguity. USIF argues that its exhibits and affidavits that bear directly on Boelson's intentions are admissible and resolve any ambiguity in its favor. Baker responds that we may not consider USIF's proffered extrinsic evidence because any ambiguity in the Boel-son trust is "patent," not "latent," and under existing Indiana law, extrinsic evidenсe of the settlor's intent is not admissible to resolve a patent ambiguity. Earlier decisions of this Court drew the distinction Baker urges between patent and latent ambiguities.
1
See Dougherty,
We agree with Baker that the ambiguity in the Boelson trust arises from the text of the document and therefore is patent under these authorities See Restatement Third of Property: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 11.1 cmt. b. We agree with USIF, however, that the distinction between patent and latent ambiguities is not usеful, and it is proper to admit extrinsic evidence to resolve any ambiguity. USIF notes that the current version of the Restatement of Property allows for admission of all extrinsic evidence-both direct and cireumstantial-relevant to determining a settlor's intent. See Id. at § 10.2. Consistent with this view, several jurisdictions have abandoned the latent/patent distinction. See, ep., In re Torrеgano,
The extrinsic evidence offered by USIF establishes unequivocally that Boel-son's intention was to give the majority of her property to USIF. Indeed, the trial court so found, but regarded itself bound by earlier precedent to disregard the evidence. Boelson's own notes indicatе "Brother is beneficiary of and to receive two IRA accounts, automobile and any furnishings and personal property in the condo that he would like." Boelson's attorney's affidavit and her notes of her meeting with Boelson reflect the attorney's understanding that Boelson wanted the gift to Baker to be the IRAs and the tangible personal property in Boelson's condоminium and nothing more. Further proof of Boelson's intent is found in the affidavits of the trust officer and Boelson's companion. Both state that Boelson expressed to them her intention to give the bulk of her estate to USIF. There is no conflicting extrinsic evidence of Boelson's intent. There is therefore no genuine issue of material fact. We conclude that Boelson intendеd to limit her brother's share of her estate to IRAs, automobiles, and furnishings and other personal effects contained in her condominium. Baker offers nothing to contradict any of these affidavits, so the issue is resolvable on summary judgment. Oelling v. Rao,
Conclusion
The probate court's order directing the trustee to distribute all of Boelson's per *536 sonal property to Baker and the real property to USIF is reversed. This case is remanded with instructions to order the trustee to pay the trust's administrative expenses, to distribute $10,000 to Rucks, to distribute Boelson's IRAs and any asset that passes under Boelson's will and all automobiles, furnishings and the other personal property contained in Boelson's condominium to Baker, and to distribute the trust's remaining real and personal property to USIF.
Notes
. More recent decisions of the Court of Appeals have followed this precedent. See, eg., Nobbe v. Nobbe,
. The Restatement Third rejects the four corners rule altogether and proposes admitting extrinsic evidence to determine intent even absent an ambiguity. Because we find ambiguity in the contested term in Boelson's trust, we see no need to take that step.