556 A.2d 486 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1989
Opinion by
The University of Pittsburgh (University) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County which affirmed a decision of the City of Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations (Commission) which concluded that Arthur Robinson (Robinson) was discharged from employment by the University because of his race. We reverse.
Robinson, a black male, was employed by the University for approximately fifteen years as a custodial worker until August 13, 1979, when Robinson was suspended pending investigation of an incident wherein he was charged with raping a white female co-employee on August 16, 1979. Donna Dengler (Dengler) the alleged victim, contacted John Shamlin, her supervisor, and in
The University presents three issues for our review. First, the University contends the common pleas court
Our scope of review herein is limited to a determination of whether there was a violation of constitutional rights, an error of law, or whether the findings of fact necessary to support the adjudication are supported by substantial evidence. The task of weighing the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, to credit and discredit testimony, to draw inferences and make ultimate findings of fact as to whether a violation occurred is for the Commission. Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 116 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 89, 542 A.2d 595 (1988).
In employment discrimination cases such as the one presently before us, the charging party is first required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Our state Supreme Court in General Electric Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 469 Pa. 292, 365 A.2d 649 (1976) adopted the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) for establishing a prima facie case. In essence this analysis requires the charging party to establish that he is a member of a protected class, i.e. a racial minority, and that he was treated differently from others who are not members of a protected class. Although McDonnell-Douglas addressed a refusal to hire, the prima facie test is adaptable to accommodate differences in the nature of the alleged discrimination. Allegheny Housing Rehabilitation v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 516 Pa. 124, 532 A.2d 315 (1987).
Clearly, Robinson, a black male, belongs to a protected class. However, the Commission erred in concluding that the action taken against Robinson was racially motivated. The only finding made by the Commission to support this conclusion is set forth in Findings of Fact Nos. 24-26, wherein the Commission found that subsequent to the charge against Robinson in 1979 Dengler complained to her supervisor in early 1981 that another co-worker fondled her breasts and rubbed her legs. No action was taken against the white male co-worker.
This second alleged assault and accusation occurred nearly two years after Dengler’s accusation against Robinson. Federal courts have reasoned that only events occurring prior to or at the time of the alleged act of discrimination are relevant in determining whether the defendant committed discriminatory acts. United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 7 FEP Cases 710 (W.D. Okla. 1973); United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532, 556, 4 FEP Cases 216 (W.D.N.C. 1971); United States v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 38, 428 F.2d 144, 151, 2 FEP Cases 716 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 943, 2 FEP Cases 1121; United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 471 F.2d 582, 5 FEP Cases 308 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 439, 5 FEP Cases 862. Robinson was either discriminated against at time of his discharge or he was not.
We must conclude that the record when viewed as a whole does not provide sufficient relevant evidence to rationally support the Commission’s finding of racial discrimination on the part of the University.
The order of the court of common pleas is reversed.
Order
And NOW, this 23rd day of March, 1989, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County is hereby reversed.