delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a Workmen’s Compensation case arising under *507 C.R.S. ’53, 81-14-19, invоlving a dispute as to the period within which a claim may be reopened after an award.
It is a case of first impression in Colorado. The plaintiffs in error will be referred to as- defendants as they appeared below; the Industrial Commission will be referred to as the Commission and Ernest E. Nemeth as claimant.
In
University of Denver, et al. v. Nemeth, et al.
(1953),
Claimant’s original award was dated July 20, 1953. The then finding was that he was 15% permanently disabled with maximum imprоvement as of January 1, 1952. Weekly payments of $11.87 were ordered for temporary and permanent partial disability until $3656.22 was paid with interest on all accrued compensation. Claimant was also awarded medical, surgical and hospital expenses. Payments then due were paid on or about July 21, 1953, and weekly pаyments made thereafter until October 26, 1954, at which time on claimant’s petition the Commission ordered a final award of a lump sum with the employer neither apрroving nor disapproving the action. This lump sum was paid by defendants who deducted the statutory four percent discount. Claimant executed a receipt for the final payment which read in pertinent part: “in full payment under * * * Award of Commission * * * for all injuries or disablement * * * received by me on or about April 17, 1950.” The Commission aрproved the receipt by its stamp thereon which included as part thereof the wording: “SUBJECT TO ANY FUTURE CLAIM FOR DISABILITY AS PROVIDED BY LAW.”
On December 12, 1957, claimant petitioned the Commission to reopеn his case on the sole ground of change *508 in his condition. The Commission considered the request and on its own motion ordered the case reopened оn January 10, 1958. On review the District Court affirmed. Defendants are here by writ of error contending that under the statute in question the Commission lacked jurisdiction to order a reopening.
SOLE QUESTION TO BE DETERMINED:
Where a claimant under the Workmen’s Compensation Statute has been awarded compensation and has received a lump sum in settlement аnd executed a receipt therefor acknowledging it to be received in full payment of the award for all injuries or disablement, does the statutory pеriod of time under C.R.S. ’53, 81-14-19, relating to the time within which the Commission may reopen the case due to a “change in condition” begin to run from the date of the payment or from the date when periodic payments would have terminated if such payments had been made in monthly installments as originally ordered?
The correct answеr to this question depends upon an interpretation and construction of provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act involved.
The statutory wording reads:
“Upon its own motion on the ground of error, mistake or a change in condition, the Commission * * * at any time within two years after the date last payment becomes due and payable or within six years from the date of accident, whichever is longer, in cases where compensation has been paid * * * may review any award and on such review, mаy make an award ending, diminishing, maintaining or increasing compensation previously awarded. No such review shall affect such award as regards any moneys already paid.” (C.R.S. ’53, 81-14-19.)
Before discussing our view of the statute as it relates to the question at hand, we point out that the statute grants the exclusive right to reopen to thе Commission and a claimant’s petition is merely a means of calling *509 the attention of the Commission to the fact such action should be taken.
Under the facts hеre presented the order to reopen was made later than “six years from the date of the accident” so claimant’s rights must be determined by what the legislature meant by the statutory words “at any time within two years after the date last payment becomes due and payable.” The words “due and payable” present a slight ambiguity as here used, because the legislature has not stated whether it applies to commuted payments or to periodic payments or to а combination of such payments as occurred here. It is well established, requiring -no citation of authority, that in such circumstances the courts are compelled to construe the law and interpret the legislature’s intent as may appear from a consideration of” the purpose and intent of the entire enactment. In the interpretation of Workmen’s Compensation Laws it is equally well established in Colorado, and only recently reaffirmed, that such statutes are to be liberally construed to accomplish the beneficent social and protective purposes of such enactments.
Industrial Commission v. Havens
(1957),
While it is true in the usual cоntractual sense that when defendants paid the lump sum payment nothing further was then “due and payable” to claimant, it is also true that parties cannot by privаte contract abrogate statutory requirements or conditions affecting the public policy of the state.
In the case at bar, as in every other аgreement permitted under the Workmen’s Compensation Statute, the applicable part of the law is an inherent part of any contract betweеn employer and employee whether mentioned or known, and a fortiori modifies it where in conflict therewith.
The time provided by the statute within which the Commission could reopen this case on any of the statutory grounds became fixed as of the date of the *510 final award regardless of whether the sum was paid periodically or later commuted. So comрuted the deadline did not expire until the last periodic payment would have been due in the fall of 1957. The order to reopen having been entered on January 10, 1958, within the two year period provided, it was within apt time.
Among the several contentions urged by defendants, three have not been answered by the above and they are hereinafter commented upon.
First, their citation of
Daytona Beach Boat Works v. Spencer
(Fla. 1943), 15 S. 2d 256, which is somewhat similar to this case. We choose not to follow it and believe the citations of authоrity briefed by claimant relating to the same problem offer a more logical and enlightened rule. See:
Horowitz v. Rothenberg Hat Co.
(1941),
The rule we apply here is in harmony with the general rule as set forth in
“ * * * Although the' authorities are not in complete agreement, most of the courts which have passed on this question have held that where cоmpensation is com-mutated and paid in a lump sum, payment so made at the time of commutation does not constitute a ‘last’ payment so as to start the running of the statutory period within which review may be sought; the statutory period, in such a case, does not run against a review application until the time when the рayments on the original award or agreement would have run out had they continued to have been paid in instalments. As a reason for such rule, it has been pоinted out that commutation does not in and of itself affect the merits as to whether in a par *511 ticular case further compensation may or may not be аttempted to be secured, but constitutes nothing more or less than an advance payment. * * *."
Secondly, the defendants cite Dr.
Pepper Bottling Company, et al. v. Ind. Com.
(1956),
Thirdly, defendants contend that the statutory wording in C.R.S. ’53, 81-14-19, which provides: “No such review shall affect such award as regards any monies already paid” would prevent them from recovering any sums already paid claimant if he, for example, had died before the last periodiс payment would have been paid, therefore, the commission could not order further sums to be paid a claimant if his case is reopened under this seсtion and these facts. Clearly such a conclusion is a non sequiter. Such an unwarranted and harsh interpretation of Workmen’s Compensation Laws would not be justified.
The Industrial Commission did not lose jurisdiction under the facts presented and the judgment must be affirmed.
Mr. Justice Frantz not participating.