333 A.2d 407 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1974
The complaint alleges that the defendant, a professional engineer, in 1965 rendered improper or negligent services to the plaintiff as a result of which it suffered, and continues to suffer, certain damages. Service was made pursuant to General Statutes §
The defendant has filed a plea in abatement setting forth three circumstances which, it is contended, show that the method of service was insufficient to give this court in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. They are: (1) At all times relevant to the complaint, the defendant was a resident of Connecticut; (2) all the events relevant to the complaint occurred prior to October 1, 1969, the effective date of the long-arm statute; and (3) service was made solely by mailing the writ, summons and complaint to the secretary of state. The plaintiff has demurred to the plea in abatement and it is this demurrer with which we are here concerned.
As a preliminary matter, the defendant contends that the plaintiff's demurrer is general and therefore in violation of General Statutes §
In Doherty v. Winchester,
The particular question of law to be decided is one of first impression in this state. The plea in abatement presents a two-tined question: (1) Does §
The second of these questions has, apparently, been abandoned in the brief of the defendant, where he admits that our Supreme Court has indicated that our long-arm statute should be given retroactive effect unless the legislative intent clearly appears to be otherwise. Carvette v. Marion PowerShovel Co.,
The first question is more difficult. The precise wording of our own statute is, of course, of paramount importance here, but it is useful to see what other jurisdictions have done when confronted with the same problem.
New York's long-arm statute, subdivision (a) of § 302 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (1963; as amended, 1966), has language similar to our §
In Hoen v. District Court,
There are several states which have reached contrary results. In Fagan v. Fletcher,
This review of the decisions in other jurisdictions illustrates that a finding of jurisdiction would be entirely compatible with the wording of our statute. The paramount consideration is, of course, whether the legislature intended this result.
In these times, when travel is fast and distance scarcely separates, long-arm statutes should be liberally construed. A Connecticut citizen should not be required to travel to a foreign state merely because his defendant has done so after allegedly committing, while a resident, a tortious act within Connecticut. The New York rule contains language essentially similar to the broad language of our statute, and the court thinks that the latter permits the service that was made here.
The plaintiff's demurrer is therefore sustained.