133 F. Supp. 602 | D. Minnesota | 1955
The instant case comes before the court by reason of plaintiffs’ motion to remand.
The action is one for relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act of Minnesota.
The issue raised by the motion will be clarified by a short statement of the facts. Defendant operated a manufacturing plant in the City of Duluth through a subsidiary known as The Coolerator Company. The management of the plant was subject to defendant’s direction and orders. Defendant decided to reduce its force, and in that connection sought to retire the older of its employees. It was subject, however, to certain collective bargaining agreements, one of which covered the two-year period from May 22, 1953, to May 22, 1955.
“The Coolerator Company
“Post Office Box 135 .. Duluth 1,
Minnesota
“March 31, 1954
“The Coolerator Company
“128 West 1st Street
“Duluth, Minnesota
“Gentlemen:
“I have decided that I wish to retire from the employment of the Coolerator Company. It is my understanding that in so doing, upon the Company’s approval of my retirement, I will be eligible for the present retirement benefits. It is my understanding that these benefits are: payment by the Company of Blue Cross-Blue Shield coverage on myself and family for the rest of ..my life and a group life insurance policy in the amount of $2,000 until I reach age 65, and $500 thereafter.
“Yours very truly”
Following the execution of said letters and in reliance thereon, the employees retired from defendant’s employ. On January 1, 1955, defendant’s successor in title to the Coolerator plant ceased operations and defendant refused to hon- or the understanding inferred from said letters. Plaintiff Union thereupon stepped in and paid the Blue Cross and Blue Shield premiums. The insurance policies lapsed. This action followed.
The allegations .in the removal petition are to be taken as true, in absence of motion to remand or plea to the jurisdiction.
The original complaint filed in the State Court named three plaintiffs and two corporate defendants. The- ease was voluntarily dismissed as to one defendant. As presently constituted, there is diversity of citizenship between the plaintiffs and the remaining defendant.
The issue of jurisdiction is based on the contention of the plaintiffs that the matter in controversy is less than $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs, as required by the applicable Act of Congress,
Plaintiffs contend the instant case is. not a class action. That there , are 54 separate causes of action pending and consolidated for convenience. That not one among the 54 plaintiffs have a cause of action seeking any amount in excess, of $3,000. That despite the admitted diversity of citizenship, the case should be remanded because, lacking the jurisdictional amount, the United States District Court is without jurisdiction. Defendant’s response to this is that, even by the amended complaint, plaintiff Union seeks recovery of $5,600, and seven of the remaining plaintiffs seek relief in excess of $3,000.
If jurisdiction of this court has-attached as of the time the action is-filed or removed, it is not destroyed by subsequent reduction of the amount of the claim.
It will be seen from the foregoing that if • there is any doubt about, this court having jurisdiction, good judg
Belated as plaintiffs may be in making their motion to remand, the court must give every consideration to the motion, even though judgment had been entered.
It is of prime importance, therefore, to determine without further delay the cogent question as to whether, at the time of removal, the instant ease- really and substantially involved a controversy within the jurisdiction of this court.
It should be said that defendant is in no way at fault for the delay in bringing the instant case on for trial. By complying with the Rules, plaintiffs could have tried the case at the 1955 May General Term of this Court. The misunderstanding of counsel in that respect, however, does not permit the accumulation of .added damage due to the passing of time to confer the necessary jurisdiction on the United States District Court.
The court is of the opinion that it is its clear duty to remand the case.
It is so ordered.
. 36 Minnesota Statutes Annotated, Chapter 555.
. Plaintiffs concede the instant case is not brought under Section 301 of the
. Highway Const. Co. v. McClelland, 8 Cir., 14 F.2d 406.
. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331.
. Panzich v. Duhart, D.C.Cal., 118 F.Supp. 415; Lissauer v. Bertles, D.C.N.Y., 37 F.Supp. 881; Twin Hills Gasoline Co. v. Bradford Oil Corporation, D.C.Okl., 264 F. 440; Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co. v. Coker, 4 Cir., 219 F.2d 631; cited by defendant.
. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845.
. Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97, 42 S.Ct. 35, 66 L.Ed. 144; McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135; Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 91 L.Ed. 1209.
. American Eire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702; 15 Minnesota Law Review, 721.
. Turmine v. West Jersey & Seashore R. Co., D.C.Pa., 44 F.2d 614; Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 59 S.Ct. 347, 83 L.Ed. 334.
. This case is readily distinguishable from that of Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Coker, supra.
. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 4 Cir., 92 F.2d 321, 324.
. Highway Const. Co. v. McClelland, supra.