UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO-CLC v. CROWN CORK & SEAL CO., INC., Appellant (in No. 93-2008). Charles A. THOMAS; Darren Boop; Robert W. Bower; William D. Bridge; James Clingan; Neal B. Housner; Jonathan L. Noaker; Wayne D. Orner; Gerald W. Ranck; Harold E. Van Sickle, Jr.; Richard A. Winter; Eugene L. Witmer, Sr., Appellants (in No. 93-7613), v. NORTH STAR STEEL COMPANY.
Nos. 93-2008, 93-7613
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
Decided Aug. 10, 1994
Argued May 24, 1994.
The Fifth Circuit has aptly summarized the defect we find in Volges‘s argument:
[Plaintiff] fails (or refuses) to recognize the difference between the exercise of a function or power that is clearly outside the statutory authority of the RTC on the one hand, and improperly or even unlawfully exercising a function or power that is clearly authorized by statute on the other. None can question that the RTC is statutorily authorized to sell real estate of an institution which is under RTC conservatorship or receivership.... [E]ven if the RTC improperly or unlawfully exercised an authorized power or function, it clearly did not engage in an activity outside its statutory powers. Yet only the latter type of act could conceivably subject the RTC to injunction or rescission as an exception to the anti-injunction provisions of
§ 1821(j) ....
Ward v. RTC, 996 F.2d 99, 103 (5th Cir.1993) (per curiam). Because the sale of the Volges mortgages is in furtherance of the RTC‘s functions as receiver, the district court did not have jurisdiction to enjoin the RTC from carrying out the planned disposition regardless of Volges‘s ultimate chance of success on his contract claim.
The fact that courts lack equitable jurisdiction over the RTC in the exercise of its statutory functions, of course, does not leave Volges without a remedy. Although
CONCLUSION
The district court‘s injunction and February 17, 1994 order are vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
David I. Goldman (argued), Pittsburgh, PA, for appellee in No. 93-2008, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC.
Robin S. Conrad, Washington, DC, for amicus appellant Chamber Commerce US in No. 93-2008, for amicus-appellee Chamber Commerce US in No. 93-7613.
Paul A. Levy (argued), Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, DC, for Appel
Vincent Candiello (argued), Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Harrisburg, PA, for appellee in No. 93-7613, North Star Steel Co., Inc.
Joseph S. Hornack, Cynthia S. Akers, Healey, Davidson & Hornack, Pittsburgh, PA, for amicus-appellants in No. 93-7613, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO, United Mine Workers of America, Intern. Union, NLG/Sugar Law Center for Economic & Social Justice, Intern. Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agri. Implement Workers of America, UAW.
Before: COWEN and ROTH, Circuit Judges, ACKERMAN, District Judge *.
OPINION OF THE COURT
HAROLD A. ACKERMAN, Senior District Judge.
These two cases present the following discrete issue: In an action brought pursuant to the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act,
For the reasons detailed below, we find that for cases arising under WARN, courts should apply the most closely analo
Background
Both of the underlying cases were filed pursuant to WARN, a federal statute which requires companies with one hundred or more employees to provide their workers with a minimum of sixty days written notice before a plant closing or mass layoff.1 Employers who fail to provide the requisite notice must compensate employees suffering an employment loss for each day of the violation. The statute creates a private civil action for damages in federal court.
On September 9, 1991, the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, filed a complaint in federal court alleging that the North Star Steel Company (“North Star“) had violated the WARN Act by failing to give the union sixty days advance notice of a February 25, 1991 layoff of about 270 people, at the company‘s Milton, Pennsylvania plant. Although the suit was filed more than six months after the layoff occurred, North Star did not raise the statute of limitations as a defense. On April 9, 1992, the district court granted the union‘s motion for summary judgment on liability, holding that the layoff constituted a “plant closing” subject to WARN. In a separate Order, dated December 11, 1992, the district judge determined the number of days for which the company was required to pay WARN damages. United Steelworkers v. North Star Steel, 809 F.Supp. 5, 6-7 (M.D.Pa.1992), aff‘d, 5 F.3d 39 (1993).
Appellants were non-unionized employees of North Star, unrepresented by the union and hence unaffected by the union‘s successful lawsuit against North Star. They there
United Steelworkers of America v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. (“Crown Cork“), arises out of an event that took place on September 30, 1991. On that day, the company ordered a reduction-in-force and shutdown of its Perry, Georgia plant. As a result of this reduction in force, about 85 employees were terminated. On October 15, 1992, the United Steelworkers of America (the union) filed a complaint, alleging that the company violated WARN by failing to give it 60 days notice prior to the shutdown. Crown Cork & Seal then moved for summary judgment, contending that the action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The district court denied the motion on August 24, 1993 but in an order dated September 26, 1993, certified the August order for immediate interlocutory appeal pursuant to
We have jurisdiction over the appeal in Thomas v. North Star Steel pursuant to
Discussion
In this case we visit a general question of federal law that we have repeatedly addressed: When a federal statute does not contain an explicit statute of limitations, when is it appropriate to borrow a statute of limitations from elsewhere in federal law rather than adopting the most closely analogous state statute of limitations.
The companies argue that in this case, a federal statute—the six-month statute of limitations contained in
The two district court opinions before us now reached contrary conclusions. The district court in North Star Steel adopted the six-month statute of limitations set forth in
Our analysis must begin with the general assumption that when a federal statute is silent as to a statute of limitations, the court should apply “the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law.” DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2287, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983); see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 355-56, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 2778, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991); Haggerty v. USAir, Inc., 952 F.2d 781, 783 (3d Cir.1992). This general rule is not set in stone, however.
In following the principles enunciated in DelCostello and Reed, we repeatedly have recognized our duty “to take seriously [the Supreme Court‘s admonition] that analogous state statutes of limitations are to be used unless they frustrate or significantly interfere with federal policies.” Reed, 488 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 627. For instance, the mere fact that a statute touches upon issues of labor law does not mean that the Court must resort to the statute of limitations contained in
The primary purpose of the NLRA is “to protect the right of workers to join together in labor organizations and collectively bargain for the terms and conditions of employment.” United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 54; see also Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 20-21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 2222-23, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). The statute “is concerned with ensuring an equitable bargaining process, not with the substantive terms that may emerge from such bargaining.” Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 20, 107 S.Ct. at 2222 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985)). More specifically, as the Supreme Court noted in Reed, the NLRA has “effects upon the formation and operation of the collective-bargaining agreement between the employer and the bargaining representative, and upon the private settlement of disputes under that agreement through grievance-and-arbitration procedures“. Reed, 488 U.S. at 329, 109 S.Ct. at 628. The NLRA, then, is concerned with the importance and integrity of a process. From the NLRA‘s perspective, “minimum terms of employment” that may arise from another federal statute—or from the process of collective bargaining itself—are irrelevant so long as the process is fair.
The six-month statute of limitations set forth in
In DelCostello, the parallels between the cause of action and the policies behind the NLRA were unmistakable. In Reed, however, the Supreme Court, while acknowledging that many employment-related statutes affecting labor will in some way affect the collective bargaining process, cautioned that even plausible “tangential and remote” effects upon collective bargaining are insufficient to warrant departure from the general rule. Reed, 488 U.S. at 330, 331, 109 S.Ct. at 629. Thus, the Court refused to borrow the
WARN falls into this latter category—any effects it has on collective bargaining are tangential at best. The benefits of WARN accrue not only to unionized workers but to all workers alike. WARN, like dozens of other employment statutes which bestow substantive rights simply “gives employees something for which they otherwise might have to bargain.” Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 21, 107 S.Ct. at 2222 (addressing Maine plant closing law). That is why in that case, the Supreme Court held that the NLRA did not preempt a Maine statute providing protection to workers from plant closings. Unlike the NLRA, the Maine regulation “provide[d] protection to individual union and nonunion workers alike, and thus ‘neither encourage[d] nor discourage[d] the collective bargaining processes....‘” Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 21, 107 S.Ct. at 2222 (quoting Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 755, 105 S.Ct. at 2397). The WARN protections, like the Maine plant closing law discussed in Fort Halifax, is also properly understood as establishing part of the “backdrop” of rights that the parties bring to the collective bargaining table, and not as affecting the substantive rights that may emerge from the collective bargaining discussions. Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 21, 107 S.Ct. at 2222.
WARN serves a broader purpose as well, that goes beyond the employer-employee relationship addressed by the NLRA. The statute mandates that employers planning a plant closing or mass lay-off must notify the “chief elected official of the unit of local government within which such closing or layoff is to occur“.
To be sure, it cannot be said that WARN has no effect on collective bargaining. The companies point out, for example, that under the NLRA, an employer must provide notice to represented workers, in order to give the workers the opportunity for meaningful bargaining. See, e.g. First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681, 101 S.Ct. 2573, 2582, 69 L.Ed.2d 318 (1981). This fact does present a superficial resemblance between the NLRA and WARN, but on closer inspection, it highlights the difference. The rights bestowed by the NLRA focus solely on the need for a meaningful collective bargaining process; WARN provides an across-the-board substantive right. The implementing regulations of the statute highlight this crucial distinction by providing that “[c]ollective bargaining agreements may be used to clarify or [to] amplify the terms and conditions of WARN, but may not reduce WARN rights.”
The fact that courts have looked to NLRA cases in interpreting WARN, and the fact that there are some definitional overlaps, does not change this fundamental distinction between the two statutes. At best, WARN has a family resemblance to the NLRA. In Brenner v. Local 514, United Brothers of Carpenters, 927 F.2d 1283 (3d Cir.1991), we rejected the proposition that a family resemblance is sufficient to justify adopting the
As the Second Circuit pointed out in United Paperworkers, courts adopting the
Nonetheless, despite the vast gulf between the respective policies behind the NLRA and WARN, the companies look for relief in our own prior decision of Haggerty v. USAir. Their reliance is misplaced. That case addressed the Employee Protection Program of the Airline Deregulation Act,
In determining whether to apply a federal statute of limitations, we also have considered whether the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make the NLRA statute “a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking“. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172, 103 S.Ct. at 2294; Haggerty, 952 F.2d at 786. The companies argue that WARN requires a single federal statute of limitations, because subjecting the companies to multiple state statutes of limitations would make it difficult for employers to calculate their contingent liabilities.
This case simply does not present serious uniformity concerns. The need for uniformity becomes real only when the federal statute at issue contains numerous types of claims and legal theories or when the prospect of multiple state statutes of limitation presents serious practical problems. Uniformity concerns motivated the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), to apply a uniform limitations period (a state limitations period in that case) to claims arising under
In Haggerty, we relied on uniformity concerns in deciding to apply the
Unlike RICO and
“The term ‘plant closing’ as defined by the Act is limited to single sites of employment, and venue is limited to the district where the violation is alleged to have occurred or where the employer does business; unless a single plant site straddles the boundary between two states, it is unlikely prospective plaintiffs will have a broad choice of fora in which to bring their claims or that doubt will arise as to in which state triggering events occurred. Therefore, geographic considerations do not counsel for the application of a uniform federal limitations period for WARN Act claims.” United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 56 (quoting district court opinion).
Because of these same factors, “courts will have little difficulty in determining which state‘s law to apply and workers will gain few advantages by suing in a court far from the site of injury.” United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 56.4
The companies’ further concern about the effect of a plant closing on service of process, and on the mechanics of litigation, simply do not implicate federal concerns; rather, they are the same concerns at issue in every cause of action, whenever the statute of limitations is longer then a year or so.
On the other hand, a short statute of limitations could very well frustrate the policies behind WARN. As the Second Circuit found, under the complex administrative scheme of the NLRA, in which the NLRB plays a large and active role in prosecuting claims, “[t]he burden on complainants in pursuing a claim is minimal, justifying the short statute of limitations.” United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 55. WARN does not contain
Finally, cases finding that the practicalities of litigation favor adoption of a federal statute of limitations have focused on the problems with the potential state statutes. For example, in DelCostello, the Court pointed out that the two possible state statutes were inconsistent with the relevant federal policy favoring the finality of settlements and the opportunity to attack an unfair result under collective bargaining. The extremely short time periods in state arbitration statutes “fail to provide an aggrieved employee with a satisfactory opportunity to vindicate his rights under
Here, the state statutes of limitations brought to the lower courts’ attention—which range from the two-year period for enforcing civil penalties under
Here, we need not decide which state statute applies, since the actions would be timely under any of the possible statutes of limitations brought to the court‘s attention.
Conclusion
We conclude that, for the reasons detailed above, for actions arising under WARN, courts must apply the most closely analogous state statute of limitations. We therefore will affirm the district court‘s Order in United Steelworkers of America v. Crown Cork & Seal denying Crown Cork & Seal‘s motion for summary judgment. We will reverse the Order of the district court in Thomas v. North Star Steel granting North Star‘s motion for summary judgment in favor of North Star. These cases will be remanded to the respective district courts for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs taxed against the appellant in 93-2008. Costs taxed against the appellee in 93-7613.