This is аn appeal from the denial of a motion to expunge the arrest record and to secure the return of fingerprints and photographs, after dismissal of an indictment against the appellant, Zalmon Schnitzer. Count One of the indictment charged Leonard Fortgang and Schnitzer with conspiring to defraud the Federal Insurance Administration by filing a false claim in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 286. Count Two charged only Fortgang with bribing a government оfficial in connection with his claim, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b).
On August 10, 1976, Schnitzer surrendered to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and released on a personal recognizanсe bond. Prior to his release, Schnitzer was fingerprinted and photographed by the United States Marshal.
On September 13, 1976 Fortgang pleaded guilty to Count Two of the indictment. The Government did not seek a superseding *538 indictment against Schnitzer, and instead referred the matter for civil prosecution. 1 Chief Judge Mishler entered an order of dismissal on January 7, 1977.
On February 10, 1977, Schnitzer filed a motion for expungement of his arrest record and for the return of all fingerprints and photographs taken upon his arrest. This motion was filed as part of the original criminal action, rather than as a separate civil action. In the accompanying affidavit, defense counsel requested that the order of expungement be directed to the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These two organizations were neither servеd with the motion nor named as respondents.
On March 9, 1977 Chief Judge Mishler denied appellant’s motion, concluding that under the facts, “the interests of the government in effective law enforcement outweigh those оf the defendant”. (Appendix F at 6).
I.
The appellant, who introduced the motion below, now contends that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Appellant argues that the District Court lackеd jurisdiction because the motion for expungement did not satisfy the requirements for instituting a civil action. Relying principally on
United States v. Huss,
Unlike
Huss,
the District Court had jurisdiction in the instant сase. First, the United States Attorney can capably represent the interests of the Attorney General and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Second, the District Court clearly had jurisdiction over the criminаl portion of the action. A court, sitting in a criminal prosecution, has ancillary jurisdiction to issue protective orders regarding dissemination of arrest records.
Morrow v. District of Columbia,
*539 II.
The appellant argues that the arrest record should be expunged and all photographs and fingerprints should be returned. The Attorney General is required by 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)
3
to acquire and retain criminal identification records. No federal statute provides for the expungement of an arrest reсord.
4
Instead, expungement lies within the equitable discretion of the court, and relief usually is granted only in “extreme circumstances”.
United States v. Rosen,
Retaining and preserving arrest records serves thе important function of promoting effective law enforcement. Such records help to meet the “compelling public need for an effective and workable criminal identification proсedure”.
United States v. Seasholtz,
The government’s need to maintain arrest records must be balanced against the harm that the maintenance of arrest records can cause citizens.
5
The deleterious effect of arrest records on citizens has been well documented elsewhere.
See, e. g., Me-nard v. Mitchell,
“Even if no direct economic loss is involved, the injury to an individual’s reputаtion may be substantial. Economic losses themselves may be both direct and serious. Opportunities for schooling, employment, or professional licenses may be restricted or nonexistent as a consequence of the mere fact of an arrest, even if followed by acquittal or complete exoneration of the charges involved.” Menard v. Mitchell, supra,139 U.S.App.D.C. at 117 ,430 F.2d at 490 . (Footnotes omitted).
In considering these equities, courts must be cognizant that the power to expunge “is a narrow one, and should not be routinely used whenever a criminal prosecution ends in an acquittal, but should be reserved for the unusual or extreme case”.
*540
United States v. Linn,
Any particular request for ex-pungement must be examined individually on its merits to determine the proper balancing of the equities. 6 Schnitzer’s arrest and indictment were both legal, as was the law under which he was charged. The dismissal of the indictment did not concede the innocence of Schnitzer. The indictment constitutes a finding of probable cause by the grаnd jurors; the dismissal means only that the prosecutor did not believe he could establish Schnitzer’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Schnitzer does not claim that his arrest records have been released or that potential misuse of the records is imminent. While courts need not wait for substantial damage to occur before taking remedial equitable action, there is no evidence that harsh damage will indeed аccrue. Schnitzer only alleges that retention of the record would create a poignant problem for him because of his status as a rabbinical student. In short, Schnitzer may be asked to explain the сircumstances surrounding his arrest. However, his situation is not harsh or unique. Such an explanation may be expected from those about to enter a profession, such as a religious or legal profession. The harm, if any, which may result does not fall within the narrow bounds of the class of cases where expungement has been declared appropriate.
Accordingly, the denial of the motion is affirmed.
Notes
. At the date of oral argument, no civil action had been instituted.
. Although the alleged bases for jurisdiction failed in
Huss,
the court noted that it was “[mjindful of the statutory provision that ‘[djefective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon terms, in the trial or appellate courts’, 28 U.S.C. § 1653 . . .
. 28 U.S.C. § 534(a) provides:
(a) The Attorney General shall—
(1) acquire, collect, clаssify, and preserve identification, criminal identification, crime, and other records; and
(2) exchange these records with, and for the official use of, authorized officials of the Federal Government, thе States, cities, and penal and other institutions.
. New York State recently has enacted legislation which provides for the return of photographs and fingerprints to finally exonerated accuseds. New York C.P.L. § 160.50 (McKinney Supp.1976). An exception is made in cases where the district attorney “demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court that the interests of justice requires otherwise.” Id. at 160.50(1).
. The maintenance of arrеst records may infringe on an individual’s privacy. However, mere retention of an arrest record has been held not to violate any constitutional right of privacy.
Herschel v. Dyra,
. The harm to the individual in any particular case may well be greater than the government’s need to maintain that particular arrest record. However, the general need of the government for a system of records must add considerable weight to the government side of the balance, in addition to the probable importance of the particular records in question.