UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Aрpellee, v. SHAWN YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 19-4198-cr
United States Court of Appeals FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
DECIDED: MAY 19, 2021
AUGUST TERM 2020; SUBMITTED: MARCH 5, 2021
Before: LEVAL, CABRANES, and MENASHI, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Shawn Young appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Berman, J.) granting in part and denying in part his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391. The district court granted Young‘s motion with respect to his conviction on Count One, a violation of
Because Young has now been released from custody, the parties dispute whether Young‘s appeal from the district court‘s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction with respect to Count Two is moot. We conclude that it is not. If Count Two were a “covered offense” under the First Step Act, Young would be eligible for a reduction in his term of supervised release on that count. In light of the circumstances of Young‘s case, there is more than a remote and speculative possibility that the district court on remand would grant such relief. That possibility is enough to create a live controversy as to Young‘s appeal from the district court‘s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction with respect to Count Two.
On thе merits, we conclude that a conviction for distributing and possessing with intent to distribute an unspecified quantity of crack in violation of
Michael Herman, Thomas McKay, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Audrey Strauss, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.
Sarah Baumgartel, Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., Appeals Bureau, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.
Defendant-Appellant Shawn Young appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Berman, J.) granting in part and denying in part his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018,
In ruling on Young‘s motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act, the district court granted Young‘s motion with respect to Count One and reduced Young‘s prison sentence on that count to
Young appeals from that judgment, arguing that his conviction on Count Two is a “covered offense” under the First Step Act and that, even if it is not, he is eligible for resentencing on that count because it was grouped with and formed an interdependent sentencing package with Count One, which is a covered offense. Young further argues that the district court erred by failing to explain its reasons for declining to reduce his term of supervised release on Count One while reducing his prison sentence on that count to time served. Young asks this court to hold that he is “eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act for both of his crack offenses” and urges us to “remand to the district court for further consideration of a reduction” in his sentence. Appellant‘s Br. 11.
This appeal thus requires us to decide whether a conviction for distributing and possessing with intent to distribute an unspecified quantity of crack cocaine in violation of
Because neither Section 2 nor Section 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties for a violation of
Young‘s argument in the alternative that he is eligible for resentencing on Count Two because it was grouped with and formed an interdependent sentencing package with a covered
We agree with Young that the district court erred by failing to explain its reasons for leaving Young‘s term of supervised release on Count One undisturbed while reducing his prison sentence on that count to time served. In light of the district court‘s extensive positive commentary about Young‘s progress toward rehabilitation while incarcerated, we cannot discern from the record the district court‘s reasons for declining to reduce Young‘s term of supervised release on Count One. We therefore vacate the term of supervised release imposed on Count One and remand to the district court for resentencing with respect to the term of supervised rеlease imposed on that count only. We affirm the judgment of the district court in all other respects.
BACKGROUND
In 2007, Shawn Young was charged in a three-count indictment in connection with his participation in a narcotics trafficking conspiracy. Count One charged Young with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of mixtures and substances containing a detectable amount of cocaine base, also known as “crack,” in violation of
Young‘s conviction on Count One for distributing 50 grаms or more of crack in violation of
Young appeared before the district court for sentencing on April 27, 2009. The district court accepted the Probation Department‘s recommendation that Counts One and Two be grouped for sentencing purposes and imposed a 16-year prison sentence on each count, to run concurrently, followed by ten years of supervised release on Count One and five years of supervised release on Count Two, also to run concurrently. Young‘s sentence was affirmed on direct appeal. See United States v. Harris, 373 F. App‘x 119 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order).
While Young was serving his sentence, Congress adopted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,
To address this lack of retroactivity, Congress adopted the First Step Act of 2018, which authorized “[a] court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense ... [to] impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ... were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.”
Following the enactment of the First Step Act, Young filed a pro se letter-motion with the district court requesting a reduction in his sentence pursuant to the Act. In response, the district court directed the government and the Federal Defenders of New York to brief “the effect, if any, that recent Federal legislation may have upon Young‘s sentence.” App‘x 73. In his written submissions, Young sought a reduction of his sentence to time served followed by four, as opposed to ten, years of supervised release. The government opposed any reduction in Young‘s sentence.
The district court held a hearing on Young‘s motion. At the hearing, Young‘s counsel argued that Count One was a “covered offense” within the meaning of the First Step Act and that Young was therefore eligible for resentencing on that count. While acknowledging that it was “much more of an open question” as to whether Young was eligible for resentencing on Count Two, Young‘s counsel stated that there was a “plain reading of the statute” under which Count Two could be considered a “covered offense” and offered to provide the court with supplemental briefing on that issue. App‘x 249-50. Young‘s counsel maintained, however, that the district court did not need to address whether Count Two was a covered offense because Young was eligible for resentencing on Count One, which was grouped with Count Two for sentencing рurposes. Later in the hearing, when Young‘s counsel reminded the district court that it had the authority to reduce Young‘s term of supervised release, the court replied, “Yes, I think I wouldn‘t change—if I did anything, I would not change supervised release.” Id. at 258.
Following the hearing, the district court issued a decision and order granting in part and denying in part Young‘s motion for a sentence reduction. The court concluded that Count One—Young‘s conviction under
The district court reached the opposite conclusion with respect to Count Two—Young‘s conviction under
Young filed a timely appeal. After the parties submitted their briefs, Young comрleted his term of incarceration.
DISCUSSION
Because Young has been released from custody, the parties dispute whether Young‘s appeal from the district court‘s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction with respect to Count Two is moot. We conclude that it is not. If we were to hold that Count Two is a “covered offense” under the First Step Act, Young would be eligible for a reduction in his term of supervised release on that count. In light of the circumstances of Young‘s case, there is more than a remote and speculative possibility that the district court on remand would grant such relief. That possibility is enough to create a live controversy as to Young‘s appeal from the district court‘s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction with respect to Count Two.
On the merits, we hold that Young is ineligible for resentencing on Count Two because a violation of
I
On appeal, Young argues that the district court erred in holding that he is ineligible for resentencing under the First Step Act on Count Two for two reasons. First, Young argues that Count Two is a “covered offense” under the First Step Act. Second, Young argues that even if Count Two is not a covered offense, the district court had the authority to resentence him on Count Two because it was grouped with and formed part of an interdependent sentencing package with Count One, which is a covered offense. Young also argues that the district court erred by failing to explain its reasons for leaving his ten-year term of supervised release on Count One intact while reducing his prison sentence on that count to time served.
The letter further informed the court that after the parties’ briefs were filed, Young completed his term of imprisonment and was released from custody, thereby “render[ing] moot Young‘s request for a reduction of his term of imprisonment on Count Two.” Id. While acknowledging that “Young is still subject to a term of supervised release on Count Two,” the government argues that Young‘s appeal from the district court‘s judgment as to Count Two is nevertheless moot because the district court exercised its discretion by declining to reduce Young‘s longer, concurrent term of supervised release on Count One. For that reason, according to the government, there is only “a remote and speculative possibility that the district court could or would impose[] a reduced term of supervised release were this Court to remand the matter.” Id. (quoting United States v. Chestnut, 989 F.3d 222, 225 (2d Cir. 2021)) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The government contends that the only live dispute remaining in this case is Young‘s “separate argument” that the district court erred by failing to explain its reasons for declining to reduce his term of supervised release on Count One, which the government argues “should be rejected, for the reasons stated in the Government‘s brief.” Id. at 2.
Young filed a letter in response to the government. See Letter from Sarah Baumgartel, Federal Defenders of New York, to Catherine O‘Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, at 1-2 (Mar. 17, 2021) (ECF No. 121). Relying on our decision in United States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660 (2d Cir. 2020), Young argues that “because he ‘remains eligible for a reduction in his term of supervised releаse‘” on Count Two, his appeal from the district court‘s denial of his motion for resentencing on that count is not moot. Id. at 1 (quoting Holloway, 956 F.3d at 661). Young further argues that there is more than a remote or speculative possibility that the district court, acting “[w]ith a correct understanding of its actual authority,” would reduce his term of supervised release on Count Two. Id. at 2. Young urges us to “reject the government‘s argument that [his] appeal on Count Two is moot.” Id.
We agree with Young that his appeal from the district court‘s judgment as to Count Two is not moot. “It is well established that the Case or Controversy Clause of Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts such that the parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” Tanasi v. New All. Bank, 786 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). “A case becomes moot pursuant to Article III‘s Case or Controversy Clause when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Id. at 199 (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int‘l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Accordingly, “[a]s long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013).
Young has a concrete interest in the outcome of his appeal on Count Two because he remains subject to a term of supervised release on that count. Were we to conclude that Count Two is a covered offense under the First Step Act, we would vacate the district court‘s judgment as to Count Two and remand for resentencing on that count. While Young‘s release from prisоn means that it is “too late to reduce his prison sentence” on Count Two, the district court on remand “could still reduce his term of supervised release,” and therefore “it remains possible for this Court to grant [Young] some form of ‘effectual relief’ should he prevail.” Holloway, 956 F.3d at 664 (quoting Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)). In light of this possibility, Young‘s appeal on Count Two “is not moot.” Id.
We do not believe the circumstances of this appeal put Young among those cases in which the possibility of a reduction in the defendant‘s term of supervised release is so “remote and speculative” as to moot the defendant‘s appeal. United States v. Key, 602 F.3d 492, 494 (2d Cir. 2010). The government argues that because the district court did not reduce Young‘s ten-year term of supervised release on Count One, “[t]here is no non-speculative possibility that Young‘s eligibility for a sentence reduction on Count Two would lead the District Court to reduce the longer, concurrent term of supervision associated with Count One.” Government Letter 1. But because we hold, as explained below, that the district court erred by failing to explain why it left Young‘s term of supervised release on Count One unchanged, we vacate Young‘s term of supervised release on that count. We need not speculate as to whether Young‘s potential eligibility for resentencing on Count Two would lead the district court to reduce Young‘s longer term of supervision on Count One.
Moreover, if we were to hold that Count Two is a covered offense and that Young was eligible for release from prison when he moved for a sentence reduction, the district court could decide to reduce Young‘s term of supervised release in light of the excess time in prison that Young served. See, e.g., Holloway, 956 F.3d at 664 (“On remand, if the district court [reduces Holloway‘s term of supervised release], it may factor in how much (if at all) it would have reduced Holloway‘s prison term.“); United States v. Barresi, 361 F.3d 666, 675 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he court should then consider whether it wishes to exercise its discretion to reduce Barresi‘s supervised-release term below three years ... in order to compensate for the fact that Barresi completed his 21-month prison term before his resentencing took place.“). That possibility is neither remote nor speculative given that the district court reduced Young‘s term of imprisonment on Count One to time served and praised Young for his progress toward rehabilitation while incarcerated. We do not find it “impossible to believe that the court would reducе the term of supervised release” in this case. United States v. Blackburn, 461 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 2006).
II
On the merits, we conclude that the First Step Act did not authorize the district court to reduce Young‘s sentence on Count Two because a conviction under
a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act.”
Neither Section 2 nor Section 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act modified
Young‘s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. First, Young contends that the relevant “Federal criminal statute” for the purposes of the First Step Act is “either
[W]e think that Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties for
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) , and that Davis is therefore eligible because he was sentenced for a violation of that statute.
Id. (emphasis added). We thus held that the relevant “statute” is Section
The interpretation of “Federal criminal statute” proposed by Young is also flawed for the separate reason—to which we alluded in Davis—that it would permit any defendant convicted of violating Section 841(a) to seek resentencing under the First Step Act even if the defendant were not convicted of a crack-related offense. Section 841(b)—which was indisputably modified by Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act—establishes the statutory “[p]enalties” for “violat[ing] subsection (a)” оf Section 841. If Section 841 or 841(a) is the relevant “Federal criminal statute” for the purposes of the First Step Act, then anyone convicted under Section 841(a) is eligible to seek resentencing because the “statutory penalties” for “a violation of” Section 841(a) were “modified” by the Fair Sentencing Act‘s changes to Section 841(b). Thus, under Young‘s interpretation of the statute, a person convicted of distributing heroin in violation of
Young next argues that “the Fair Sentencing Act did modify the penalties for
The problem with this argument is that a violation of Section
As a result, Young “cannot point to any circumstance under which someone convicted under [Section 841](b)(1)(C) would have faced different penalties before and after the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act.” Birt, 966 F.3d at 264. Even though the Fair Sentencing Act increased the maximum amount of crack subject to punishment under Section
III
Young argues in the alternative that even if Count Two is not a “covered offense,” he is nevertheless eligible for resentencing on that count because it was grouped with Count One for sentencing purposes and Count One—a violation of Section
Sentences are imposed for specific convictions within judgments of conviction. Judgments of conviction are final judgments that are only modifiable by courts in limited circumstances, including where “expressly authorized” by statute. The fact that multiple sentences may be aggregated for administrative purposes does not authorize a court to treat those sentences as an undivided whole, the authorization to modify one part of which confers authorization to modify the whole. ... Thus, where an inmate is imprisoned upon multiple sentences that are aggregated for administrative purposes, courts require specific modification authorization—either due to a change in the guidelines ranges for a sentence on a particular count of conviction, or because a statute authorizes the reduction of a sentence—for each term of imprisonment contained in an otherwise final judgment of conviction.
974 F.3d 124, 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2020). Because Young‘s conviction on Count Two is not a covered offense under the First Step Act, there was no “specific modification authorization” undеr the First Step Act to support a reduction in the “term of imprisonment” imposed for that count of conviction. See id. at 137 (“The language of the First Step Act is circumscribed, it permits courts only to ‘impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.’ The plain language of the Act permits the limited modification of a specific sentence, it does not give district courts carte blanche to modify terms of imprisonment other than those imposed for ‘covered offenses.‘“) (internal citation and alteration omitted). Young‘s eligibility for resentencing on Count One does not alter his ineligibility for resentencing on Count Two.
IV
Finally, Young argues that the district court erred by failing to give any reason for its apparent decisiоn not to reduce his term of supervised release on Count One. Because Count One is a covered offense and Young‘s ten-year term of supervised release on that count exceeds the new mandatory minimum term of four years for an individual convicted of distributing between 28 and 280 grams of crack, see
The district court should have explained its decision with respect to the
One intact, “[w]e cannot uphold a discretionary decision unless we have confidence that the district court exercised its discretion and did so on the basis of reasons that survive our limited review.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 193 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). Here, the district court “provided no explanation as to why it declined to reduce” Young‘s term of supervised release on Count One. United States v. Christie, 736 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2013). Nor are its reasons for doing so “apparent from the record.” Id. at 196. In explaining its decision to reduce Young‘s sentence on Count One to time served, the district court noted Young‘s “significant strides to change his life around,” his “very produсtive use of his time in prison,” his “genuine remorse ... for his past actions,” and his exemplary disciplinary record in recent years. App‘x 264-65. In light of those remarks, it is unclear why the district court would reduce Young‘s term of incarceration on Count One to time served while leaving his ten-year term of supervised release unchanged. While the district court‘s explanation “need not be lengthy,” without “some indication of the rationale for the ruling, we are precluded from conducting meaningful appellate review.” Christie, 736 F.3d at 196.
For that reason, we vacate the term of supervised release imposed on Count One and remand for the district court to reassess Young‘s term of supervised release on that count only. Should the district court again decide to require a ten-year term of supervised release on Count One, it should explain its reasons for doing so.
CONCLUSION
A conviction for violating