OPINION
Matthew Woodard pleaded guilty to the manufacture of 1,000 or more marijuana plants, an offense that carries a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. At sentencing, the district court calculated an offense level of 25 and a criminal history category of III. The district court departed upward two levels to a criminal history category of V — resulting in a guidelines range of 120-125 months. The court then addressed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and granted an upward variance, sentencing Woodard to 180 months’ imprisonment. Woodard appeals, contending that the district court erred by (1) departing upward based on actions that formed part of the same course of conduct as the offense of conviction; (2) failing to explain its placement of Woodard’s criminal history at category V rather than IV; and (3) imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. We affirm.
I.
A.
Woodard first presses his view that the court improperly considered conduct pertaining to his offense of conviction when granting an upward departure for criminal history. Woodard focuses on two factors in particular: his use of his friend Chris Brown as a straw man to purchase real estate on his behalf — including the property used for the marijuana-growing operation — and his pressing Brown to “plead the [Fjifth” when authorities questioned him. Because defendant’s counsel failed to object at the sentencing hearing, we review under the well known plain-error standard.
See United States v. Blackie,
Assuming for analysis purposes that these actions were indeed part of the same course of conduct as Woodard’s offense, we agree that the district court erred in considering them in departing upward. Section 4A1.3(a)(l) permits an upward departure “[i]f reliable information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(l). In describing the type of conduct that may merit such a departure, the guidelines repeatedly emphasize the defendant’s past conduct, directing the court to consider various types of “[p ]rior similar misconduct,” “[p ]rior similar adult criminal conduct,” and “[p]rior sentence(s).” Id. § 4A1.3(a)(2) (emphasis added). The guidelines define “prior sentence” as “any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt ... for conduct not part of the instant offense.” Id. § 4A1.2(a)(l) (emphasis added).
Consistent with these guidelines provisions, this court held in an unpublished opinion that “[i]f a criminal act was part of the ... same course of conduct ... as the offense[ ] of conviction, then, as a matter of law, it was an impermissible ground upon which to base a criminal history departure.”
United States v. Washburn,
No.
*509
94-6292,
Woodard’s argument fails under plain-error review, however, because he cannot show an impact on his substantial rights. “A sentencing error affects a defendant’s substantial rights when there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error, [he] would have received a more favorable sentence.”
United States v. Wilson,
His criminal history offenses include larceny, drugs, violence, he’s violated probation on numerous occasions, many, many traffic violations, 19 misdemeanors in ten years. He’s never spent more than 30 days in jail by his own ... admission. Then we have all of these reports of domestic violence, and the recitation in paragraph 84 [of the PSR regarding anger-related issues] which just goes on and on and on and includes his participation in a confrontation that ended up with someone being killed. There’s report of his driving his car into another vehicle on a couple of occasions, intimidating witnesses or intimidating people who would complain about his conduct.
Cf. Washburn,
B.
Woodard next contends that the district court improperly issued a two-category criminal history upward departure
*510
without adequately explaining why a one-category departure would not suffice. We again review for plain error.
See Blackie,
C.
Finally, Woodard claims that the district court’s upward variance resulted in an unreasonable sentence. We review the substantive reasonableness of the defendant’s sentence for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Houston,
Woodard faults the district court for according undue weight to his history and characteristics and to the seriousness of his offense. With respect to his history and characteristics, the district court wrongly placed him, he insists, in “the very top of the category”:
The defendant has led a life of crime, petty and serious, for the last ten years. He’s a 29-year-old man who lacks a high school diploma. He has two children with two different women but he’s never been married. There is evidence of drug abuse in his history and violence in his criminal history. He has virtually no work history. And his mental and physical health are not particularly good.
Woodard acknowledges that he “does have a history of trouble with the law,” but disputes the seriousness of his past crimes and whether they involved violence. Woodard’s presentence report tells a different story, as detailed by the district court at sentencing. In addition to nineteen misdemeanors, Woodard’s criminal history includes multiple drug- and theft-related convictions as well as an assault- and-battery conviction. His records also list multiple episodes of domestic violence, two incidents of ramming his vehicle into another vehicle, and threatening a neighbor in front of police. With respect to the seriousness of the offense, the district court noted that the “very large amount of marijuana being cultivated” placed Woodard’s case outside “the heartland.” Though Woodard argues that his offense level accounted for this drug quantity, the district court barely mentioned this factor. The district court thus did not accord undue weight to either Woodard’s history and characteristics or the seriousness of his offense.
See United States v. Webb,
The court, moreover, appears to have relied at least equally on two other sentencing factors — the need to afford adequate deterrence and to protect the public
*511
from the defendant’s further crimes. In discussing these factors, the court described Woodard as “a ticking time bomb,” “a violent man,” “a dangerous guy,” and as someone who lacked “any regard really for the law or much of anything except his own needs.” The court also described the need to rehabilitate the defendant, which it characterized as “perhaps the most important ... factor of all because I think that a great deal of remediation or rehabilitation is called for for this man.” In light of the district court’s reasoned consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, we affirm Woodard’s sentence.
See United States v. Collington,
II.
For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.