28 F. Cas. 744 | D. Mass. | 1876
The question raised by the motion for a new trial is, whether a club or association of persons, not incorporated, combining together to promote social and literary objects, are to be considered a retail dealer or dealers in malt liquor under the circumstances proved at the trial, so as to be liable to an annual tax of twenty dollars, under chapter 36, § 18, of the act of 1875 (18 Stat. 311). The club bought lager beer at wholesale, and the members of the club, and no others; were permitted to take beer at the rooms of the club, upon giving as many checks as they received glasses of beer. The checks cost the members five cents each, and the price was intended to cover the cost of the beer, though there was sometimes a small profit.
There seems to me to be no doubt that the club sells the beer to its members. Every element of a sale is present: the delivery of beer on the one part, and the payment on the other. It was argued that, at common law, a man cannot buy of himself and others. This is a mistake. The common law recognizes such a sale, though, if the contract is executory, the common law has no mode of enforcing it.
The true question is, whether such sales make the association a dealer under the statute. The question is one of much importance, from the number of such clubs throughout the country, many of whom, It is said, have conceded the point rather than undertake a contest with the United States. But I am not aware that it has been passed upon by any court.
If I am right in saying that the beer is sold by the club to its members, the club is within section 18, above referred to, and the question is, whether the generality of these words is to be restricted by a consideration of the subject-matter, or by the words of section 16, which speaks of the same persons as dealers and as those “who shall carry on the business.” &e. If the question were merely whether the club carries on the business of beer-selling, there would seem to be great doubt; but section 18 appears to be intended to define such dealers with as much exactness as may be, and, if so, the ordinary definition of dealers, or persons carrying on a business, is of no importance. Take the case of distillers and brewers. They were originally defined as persons who distilled or brewed for sale (12 Stat. 456); but these two words have been left out of
This is a revenue law, and the decisions of the supreme court require us to construe it liberally in favor of the revenue, to prevent evasions. So construed, I think it must be held that any course of selling, though to a restricted class of persons and without a view to profit, is within its meaning.
The only case cited at the argument (Com. v. Smith, 102 Mass. 144) was a decision under a highly penal statute, which creates an artificial nuisance when premises are used for the illegal sale of intoxicating liquors. The supreme judicial court in that case held that the judge at the trial had erred in ruling, as matter of law, that certain facts proved the defendant to be a seller, and that it should have been left to the jury to say whether he was so. The defendant was member and agent of a club; but the evidence was consistent with the' possibility that the agent merely divided the liquors among the members in the precise proportions in which they had paid for those very liquors on their purchase from the importer. No such point is raised by the evidence in this case. The sales here were for checks which cost a certain sum of money, and it was not the intention of the club to divide its beer among those persons who bought it from the dealers. Besides, while I agree that every statute must be construed according to its intent, there is a certain amount of truth left in the old maxim, that penal statutes should be construed strictly; and it may be that a court ought to give the same word a more limited meaning in a statute intended to punish public immorality, than in one intended for raising revenue.
Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that the verdict of guilty was well warranted by the facts, and that the motion for a new trial must be denied. Motion denied.