Norman L. Williams, Michael S. Williams, James Michael Ervin, Hilton J. Smith, Jr., and Deffanie J. Morgan appeal from judgments entered in the district court
The multi-count indictment charged appellants with participation in a heroin conspiracy and distribution scheme, operating primarily in December, 1977, and January, 1978, in Kansas City, Missouri. Norman L. Williams was characterized as the “source” or wholesale supplier; the other appellants functioned as mid-level distributors. Michael S. Williams also stored drugs at his house. As developed through the testimony of a confidential informant, James J. Jones,
Appellants were charged as follows: Count I charged all appellants with conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine from June, 1976, to the date of the indictment (June 12, 1978); Count II charged Ervin with distribution of heroin on December 12, 1977; Count III charged Ervin with distribution of heroin on December "15, 1977; Count IV charged Ervin with distribution of heroin on January 20, 1978; Count V charged Ervin with distribution of heroin on January 24, 1978; Count VI charged Smith and Morgan with distribution of heroin on January 12,1978; Count VII charged Norman Williams with distribution of heroin on January 12, 1978; Count VIII charged Smith and Morgan with distribution of heroin on January 16, 1978; Count IX charged Norman Williams with distribution of heroin on January 16, 1978; Count X charged Smith and Morgan with distribution of heroin on January 18, 1978; Count XI charged Norman Williams with distribution of heroin on January 18, 1978; Count XIII
On December 12,1977, confidential informant Jones initially contacted the Kansas City DEA office and indicated he wanted to cooperate with the DEA. Jones testified that he was then addicted to narcotics and unable to support his habit; had been threatened by his contact, whom he identified as appellant Ervin; and was facing several state and federal charges. On December 12, 1977, Jones, under the supervision of the DEA, telephoned Ervin to arrange a drug transaction. The conversation was tape-recorded and introduced into evidence and played to the jury.
On December 15,1977, Jones again called Ervin to arrange another drug transaction. The conversation was made under the supervision of the DEA and recorded. Jones was fitted with the transmitting device and given prerecorded government funds. He was under DEA surveillance throughout the transaction. Jones met Ervin at a downtown street corner; they exchanged the drugs (heroin and cocaine) and money while shaking hands (Counts III and XVIII).
On January 19, 1978, Jones again telephoned Ervin to arrange another drug transaction. They agreed to meet at 16th and Woodland in Kansas City. Jones and undercover officer Wilson drove to the intersection; Ervin arrived a few minutes later. Jones went to Ervin’s car and gave him the money (prerecorded government funds). Jones testified that Ervin had to pick up the drugs at “his cousin’s house, Norman Lee Williams,” and would be back in about an hour and a half. Jones returned to the DEA car; he and Wilson waited for Ervin to return. DEA surveillance followed Ervin’s car to 2112 East 16th Street (Ervin’s house). A few minutes later, Ervin left and drove to a house at 4146 College. DEA agent James Connor observed Norman Williams leaving that address about five minutes after Ervin arrived.
At this point agent Connor radioed another surveillance unit to follow Williams. Connor then radioed a marked police car to stop Williams. The marked police car stopped Williams and took him to the Linwood Boulevard Police Station for questioning. This stop will be discussed in detail below.
Later that afternoon Ervin returned to the intersection and, according to Jones’ testimony, explained that something had happened and that his cousin had been picked up by the police. Ervin asked Jones and Wilson to go to his house where he would explain further. Jones and Wilson entered Ervin’s house and discussed the situation. Ervin reassured them that they would get their drugs as soon as Norman Williams was released. Jones and Wilson testified that Ervin told them Norman Williams was his source and that he had given Norman Williams their money. The next day, January 20, 1978, Ervin telephoned
The final drug transaction involving Er-vin occurred on January 24,1978 (Count V). Jones informed Wilson that Ervin was interested in selling more drugs. Wilson called Ervin and arranged a meeting. Jones and Wilson met Ervin at his house early in the afternoon, about 1 p. m. Wilson paid Ervin in advance, using prerecorded government funds. Wilson testified that Ervin told him that he had to go to his source and would probably return in an hour or two, certainly before 5 p. m. Jones and Wilson left. Surveillance followed Er-vin from his house to the apartment of Morgan and Smith, and then, about ten minutes later, to a house at 4010 East 123rd Street, the home of Norman Williams. Er-vin then returned to Morgan and Smith’s apartment, stayed only a few minutes and finally went home.
Later in the afternoon, about 4 p. m., Ervin was observed leaving his office and was followed home and then to Norman Williams’ house, 4010 East 123rd Street. Ervin entered the house; ten minutes later Ervin and another man were seen leaving the house. They were followed to an address on the outskirts of Kansas City, to a house identified by Agent Connor as the home of Lorenzo Page. Less than an hour later, Ervin was seen leaving this address and was followed home. A little later Wilson arrived at Ervin’s house; Ervin got in Wilson’s car and delivered the drugs to Wilson.
Meanwhile, after receiving a complaint in early January, 1978, from the manager of the El Capitan Apartments about possible drug activity at the apartment of appellants Smith and Morgan, the local DEA task force began an investigation of the apartment complex using undercover police officers and surveillance. Two undercover officers, Doug Clark and Earl Craven, were introduced by the apartment complex manager, Ms. Janet Flack, to appellant Morgan on January 12, 1978. The undercover officers quickly established their interest in purchasing narcotics and successfully initiated a series of narcotics transactions.
On January 12, 1978, Craven called Morgan to arrange a drug transaction (Counts VI and VII). The conversation was recorded and admitted into evidence. Craven and Clark met Morgan at the manager’s apartment and agreed to buy several grams of heroin for $500. Craven and Clark then left the apartment to get the money; they returned to Morgan and Smith’s apartment. Both Morgan and Smith were there. Craven testified that Smith told them that he would have to leave the complex to pick up the drugs and asked if he could use their car. They decided to use the apartment manager’s car. Smith directed them to a convenience food store and told them to wait here. Craven and Clark paid Smith and waited in the parking lot. Smith was followed by DEA surveillance to Norman Williams’ address, 4010 East 123rd Street. Smith knocked but no one answered. Ten minutes later he returned to the parking lot. Smith returned the money. Craven then testified that Smith said that his man was “not home but, with a little luck,” could be back at the apartment complex. They returned to the apartment complex.
As they were parking the car, Craven testified that Smith said they were “in luck,” that his man was still there, and nodded toward a man standing next to a white 1975 Thunderbird. Craven identified this individual as Norman Williams. Craven and Clark gave Smith the money and arranged to meet in the manager’s apartment. Craven testified that he observed Norman Williams approach Morgan and Smith’s apartment, hand Morgan a white envelope as she opened the door and then went inside. Less that a minute later Smith was seen entering the apartment. A few minutes later Morgan walked over to the apartment and delivered the heroin.
On January 16, 1978, Craven and Clark arranged another narcotics transaction (Counts VIII, IX). This transaction involved the same sequence of events: the recorded telephone conversation, the meet
On January 18, 1978, Craven and Clark arranged a third transaction (Counts X, XI). During this conversation, which had been recorded and introduced into evidence, Morgan said that her source was at her apartment at that time, that she would arrange to have additional grams of heroin if they were interested, and that she would make sure he left before they came over. The surveillance unit at the apartment complex was immediately notified and Agent Connor testified that he saw Norman Williams leave the apartment complex less than an hour later. Craven and Clark arrived at the apartment about half an hour later, paid Morgan and received the heroin from her.
On January 23, 1978, Craven and Clark went to Morgan and Smith’s apartment to arrange another drug transaction. As they were walking toward the apartment complex, they passed Norman Williams walking out of one of the breezeways toward the parking lot. Morgan let them into the apartment; Craven testified that she said her supplier had been arrested by the police and was heing followed. She also said she had ordered their next package of heroin and would call them.
On January 27,1978, they returned to the apartment complex. The officers advanced Smith and Morgan the necessary money, using prerecorded government funds, and were told to return after 5 p. m. Surveillance units observed Norman Williams and an unidentified man leave Norman Williams’ address in a gold 1978 Monte Carlo about 5:30 p. m. That evening Clark and Craven returned to the apartment; Smith informed them there would be some delay while he picked up the drugs. About 7:30 p. m., a surveillance unit followed Smith to 1468 East 78th Street, the address of Michael Williams. The gold Monte Carlo, seen earlier that day, was parked in front of the house. Smith and two men, one wearing clothing similar to that worn by Norman Williams earlier that day, a camel-colored three-quarter length coat and matching golf cap, were seen leaving the house about 7:45 p. m. Smith returned to the apartment complex; the other men got into the Monte Carlo and drove off. Smith delivered the drugs to Clark and Craven. About 8:15 p. m., the surveillance unit at Norman Williams’ address reported that the Monte Carlo had returned. Officer Cullen testified h.e was unable to identify the two men who got out of the car and went in the house but stated that it appeared to be the same individuals who had left earlier in the evening in the same car. About ten minutes later the man without the golf cap was seen leaving the house and driving away in the Monte Carlo.
The last transaction occurred on February 2,1978 (Count XIV). Clark and Craven went to the apartment to set up another drug transaction. Craven testified that Morgan told them the location of the source had been changed but that it was the same man, just in a different place. Clark and Craven accompanied Smith part of the way. Smith directed them to another convenience food store. Craven testified that Smith assured them the heroin would be the same, came from the same supplier, but a different location. Clark and Craven advanced the purchase price and waited in the parking lot; Smith drove off. Surveillance units followed Smith from the convenience food store to 1468 East 78th Street, Michael Williams’ address. Smith was seen entering the house and, a few minutes later, returned to the convenience food store. Smith delivered the heroin. At this point Clark and Craven arrested Smith, searched him and found another package of heroin and part of the prerecorded government funds used in the transaction.
After learning Smith had been arrested, the surveillance team at 1468 East 78th Street was instructed to “move in.” The
The heroin in each of these transactions was an unusual dark brown color, an indication of relative purity, according to law enforcement officers. Craven testified that Smith described the heroin as very good and capable of being “cut” or diluted with other substances as many as three times.
Counsel for Norman Williams and Michael Williams moved to suppress evidence seized following Norman Williams’ stop and arrest on January 19, 1978, and Michael Williams’ arrest following the search of his house on February 2, 1978. The trial court denied both motions after the pretrial hearing.
The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts against all appellants. The trial court sentenced appellants as follows: Norman Williams was sentenced to two consecutive ten-year terms of imprisonment plus a three-year special parole term; Michael Williams was sentenced to a total of ten years imprisonment plus a three-year special parole term; Ervin was sentenced to a total of eight years imprisonment plus a three-year special parole term; Morgan and Smith were each sentenced to a total of ten years imprisonment plus a three-year special parole term.
We shall first discuss two issues raised by Norman Williams and Ervin but which could affect all appellants: the admissibility of coconspirators’ statements and prejudicial publicity. We shall then discuss the issues raised by each appellant individually. Admissibility of Coconspirators’ Statements: Norman Williams and James Michael Ervin
Norman Williams and James Michael Er-vin jointly argue that the trial court erred in its handling of the admissibility of cocon-spirators' statements. Appellants argue that the trial court did not require the government to establish the existence of a conspiracy by a preponderance of independent evidence before introducing coconspir-ators’ statements, and did not make a finding on the existence of a conspiracy, but improperly permitted the jury to determine that issue. In short, appellants argue that the trial court failed to follow the procedural guidelines set forth by Senior Judge Matthes in United States v. Bell,
Our review of the record in this case reveals that the trial court made an explicit finding for the record at the close of the government’s case that there was sufficient independent evidence to establish the existence of a conspiracy. Such a finding constitutes an implicit determination on the record that the coconspirators’ statements were admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). In our view, the trial court’s finding was in compliance with the procedure outlined in the Bell case. We note that “[a]n explicit, on-the-record finding of admissibility [of coconspirators’ statements] has never previously been required in this circuit. . . .” United States v. Bell, supra,
Although the parties, with the approval of the trial court, apparently agreed before trial that the government should be made to first establish the existence of the conspiracy, the government presented its case in roughly chronological order, including coconspirators’ statements. There was no objection by any of the defense counsel.
The fundamental question, of course, is whether the trial court correctly determined that there was a preponderance of the independent evidence of conspiracy.
[T]he standard for the admissibility of coconspirator statements requires the showing of a likelihood of illicit association between the declarant and the defendant. The trial judge determining admissibility preliminarily has wide discretion and must be satisfied only that there is independent evidence, credible and sufficient to support a finding of a joint undertaking. The independent evidence of illicit association may be completely circumstantial, or may consist of the conspirators’ own conduct and admissions.
United States v. Scholle,
The independent evidence in the present case consists of undercover police arrangements to purchase narcotics and police surveillance of the sellers travelling to other locations, in particular to the house of appellant Norman Williams, immediately before each transaction. This pattern of activity is comparable to that in United States v. Carlson,
In sum, we find sufficient independent evidence to establish the existence of the conspiracy and thus to warrant the admission of various coconspirators’ statements implicating Norman Williams in the conspiracy. “This court has repeatedly held that statements of a coconspirator identifying a fellow coconspirator as his source of narcotics are statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Lambros, supra,
Prejudicial Publicity: Norman Williams and James Michael Ervin
Norman Williams and James Michael Ervin next argue that the trial court erred in refusing to poll the jury about a local newspaper story which developed during trial. This newspaper article appeared on the front page of the Kansas City Star in the evening edition, July 25, 1978, the second day of trial. The next morning, before commencement of trial and out of the hearing of the jury, counsel for appellant Ervin brought the newspaper account to the attention of the trial court. Counsel made a rather vague motion for a mistrial and requested the trial court to poll the jury in a manner which would avoid reference to the particular article but would ascertain whether any member of the jury had read any publication. The trial court refused to grant a mistrial or to poll the jury and noted that the jury had been repeatedly admonished not to read newspapers or listen to the news about the case and would be thoroughly instructed to consider only the evidence presented in the courtroom. The jury was not sequestered.
The newspaper article reported that the infant son of a confidential informant in an unrelated narcotics case had been killed and the mother of the child had been wounded in a shooting which the police believed to have been in retaliation for the informant’s cooperation. In the present case informant Jones testified that Ervin had threatened him and his family. Appellants Norman Williams and Ervin argue that the trial court’s refusal to poll the jury in the face of widespread, prejudicial publicity was “an abuse of discretion of constitutional significance.” We disagree.
We note initially that the present case does not involve a claim of prejudicial pretrial publicity, e. g., United States v. Haldeman,
“The trial judge has a large discretion in ruling on the issue of prejudice resulting from the reading by jurors of news articles concerning the trial. . [E]ach case must turn on its own special facts.” Marshall v. United States, supra,
James Michael Ervin
For reversal appellant Ervin individually argues that (1) the trial court erred in permitting DEA agent James Connor to sit at the counsel’s table, remain in the courtroom when other witnesses were excluded, and then testify; and (2) the trial court erred in refusing to compel production of government material needed for cross-examination.
Appellant Ervin argues that he was denied due process and a fair trial because DEA agent Connor was permitted to sit at the counsel’s table, remain in the courtroom when the other witnesses were excluded, and testify in the government’s case-in-chief. Ervin argues that DEA agent Connor’s credibility was prejudicially enhanced in the eyes of the jury by this treatment. We disagree. Agent Connor was the coordinating or supervisory officer during this investigation. Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence does not authorize the exclusion of a government officer or employee who has been designated as its representative. E. g., United States v. Boyer,
Appellant Ervin next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to compel production of certain government material needed to cross-examine the government witnesses. The confidential informant Jones repeatedly referred in his testimony to the threats against him allegedly made by appellant Ervin; at one point Jones mentioned that the threatening phone calls had been recorded. Defense counsel requested disclosure of any transcripts. The prosecuting attorney assured the trial court that all such information had been disclosed to defense counsel in the government’s file. Subsequently, during cross-examination of Officer Wilson, defense counsel discovered a reference in a government report to a DEA-recorded phone conversation between Ervin and Jones on January 30, 1978. At this point, out of the presence of the jury, the trial court conducted a brief hearing. Defense counsel renewed his request for disclosure and production of the transcript or a continuance or a dismissal for violation of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500. The prosecuting attorney indicated, however, that although the report did refer to a. recorded conversation, neither his office nor the DEA could find such a transcript and again assured the trial court that it was not in their possession.
“Under the Jencks Act, after a government witness has testified on direct examination, on request the Government is required to produce any statement of the witness in its possession ‘which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness
Having thus disposed of all of appellant Ervin’s points on appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court finding him guilty of conspiracy, distribution and possession with intent to distribute.
Hilton J. Smith, Jr.
In early February, 1978, undercover police officers Clark and Craven arranged a final narcotics transaction with Smith. The transaction itself followed the familiar convenience store surveillance pattern. Smith was arrested immediately after delivery (Count XIV). A search incident to arrest revealed more narcotics and $150 of the $900 in prerecorded government funds used in the transaction in Smith’s possession.
For reversal appellant Smith argues that the trial court erred in (1) refusing to strike the testimony of Officer Earl Craven and (2) refusing to give an adverse inference instruction as requested by defense counsel. For the reason discussed below, we disagree.
Smith first argues that the trial court erred in refusing to strike the testimony of Officer Craven after Craven admitted that he had destroyed his original handwritten notes and those of his partner, Officer Clark, after their reports had been prepared, typed and checked against the notes for accuracy. Smith argues that the destruction of the agent’s handwritten notes prevented impeachment of the agent’s credibility and constituted a violation of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, and Brady v. Maryland,
The Jencks Act has been interpreted to impose no duty upon law enforcement officers to retain their rough, handwritten notes after the contents have been incorporated into more formal reports and the reports .are checked for accuracy, especially when the notes have been destroyed in good faith. See, e. g., United States v. Jiminez,
Smith next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give to the jury an adverse inference (“absent witness”) instruction. Appellant Smith argues he was thus prejudicially prohibited from commenting upon the government’s failure to produce Officer Doug Clark. Appellant further argues that the government’s failure to produce Officer Clark effectively restricted appellant’s scope of cross-examination. Officer Clark served as Officer Craven’s partner throughout this narcotics investigation. Evidently, appellant Smith’s defense strategy contemplated checking the testimony of each undercover officer against that of his partner. Officer Clark was unable to testify during trial because he had been hospitalized for treatment of a back condition and for severe headaches.
The propriety of giving an “absent witness” instruction, directing the jury that failure of the prosecution to produce a witness, who is peculiarly within its power to produce, may give rise to the inference that his testimony would be unfavorable to the government, is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court.
United States v. Johnson,
The judgments are affirmed.
Deffanie J. Morgan
For reversal appellant Morgan argues the trial court erred in (1) denying her motion to dismiss the counts of the indictment charging her with conspiracy to distribute and distribution; (2) admitting into evidence a tape-recorded conversation between herself and Officer Clark; (3) restricting further cross-examination of Officer Craven about the character of Janet Flack; (4) failing to strike a prospective juror for cause; (5) denying her motion for severance; (6) striking the testimony of witness Tonya Leiblie; and (7) refusing to give to the jury several instructions, including an “absent witness” instruction. For the reasons discussed below, we reject appellant Morgan’s points of error and affirm the judgments of the trial court finding her guilty of conspiracy and distribution in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Nevertheless, a defendant’s participation in the conspiracy must be shown, with proof “that the defendant ‘knowingly contributed * * * efforts in furtherance of it. Knowledge of the existence or acquiescence in a conspiracy does not serve to render one a part of the conspiracy. There must exist some element of affirmative cooperation or at least an agreement to cooperate.’ ”
United States v. Brown, supra,
In the present case we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to link Morgan with the conspiracy as a participant and not as a mere associate with its members. In reviewing a jury verdict of guilty, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and accept as proven all reasonable inferences in support of the jury verdict. E. g., United States v. Holder,
Morgan next argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a tape-recorded conversation between herself and Officer Clark on January 16, 1978. Morgan argues that this tape-recorded conversation was hearsay and stresses that defense counsel was unable to cross-examine Officer Clark, who was hospitalized during the trial and unable to testify. This contention is without merit; the tape-recorded conversation was not hearsay because it was admitted to provide a context for Morgan’s end of the conversation, not as proof of the matters asserted therein by Officer Clark. See United States v. Abrahamson,
Morgan next argues that the trial court erred in restricting the scope of cross-examination of Officer Craven about the character and personality of apartment manager Ms. Janet Flack.
Morgan next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to strike a juror for cause. Morgan argues that juror Helen M. Dahl should have been removed from the jury because she was employed by the IRS as a tax examiner. We disagree. “Rulings on juror qualifications will not be interfered with on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of the sound discretion that is vested in the District Court.” United States v. Young,
Morgan next argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for severance. She argues that the jury was unable to compartmentalize the evidence and that she was denied a fair trial, especially when most of the testimony concerned alleged narcotics activity with which she was unconnected. We disagree. A motion for severance is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Fed.R.Crim.P. 14; e. g., United States v. Fuel,
In the present case the defendants were charged with an on-going narcotics conspiracy. The evidence was complex but not so complicated that it was unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that the jury would be able to sufficiently compartmentalize the evidence as to each defendant. Moreover, we note that there was clear evidence of Morgan’s participation in several narcotics transactions as well as evidence indicating more than “mere association” with the conspiracy, and that the trial court carefully instructed the jury to consider the evidence as to each defendant individually.
Morgan next argues that the trial court erred in striking the testimony of witness Tonya Leiblie. Ms. Leiblie testified that she saw what looked like a marijuana cigarette in an ashtray in Ms. Janet Flack’s apartment after a visit from Officers Clark and Craven on January 11, 1978. It is evidently the theory of the defense that the undercover officers were themselves drug-users. Upon the motion of the government, however, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard Ms. Leiblie’s testimony about the marijuana cigarette. The trial court noted that there was no foundation whatever connecting the marijuana cigarette with either undercover officer. After a careful reading of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the offered testimony as irrelevant. E. g., United States v. Johnson,
Lastly, Morgan argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give several requested instructions to the jury.. The instructions included an “absent witness” in
Nor do we find any error in the trial court’s refusal to give the other two instructions requested by the defense. The trial court retains discretion in the matter of instructions and it is sufficient if the instructions given to the jury adequately and correctly cover the applicable law. E. g., United States v. Wyant,
Accordingly, the judgments are affirmed.
Michael S. Williams
For reversal Michael Williams argues that the trial court erred in (1) failing to suppress certain evidence and (2) denying his motion for severance. For the reasons discussed below, we find that the search of Williams-’ house on February 2, 1978, was unlawful and the evidence seized during the unlawful search should have been suppressed. We also find that there is insufficient evidence to support the possession with intent to distribute and distribution counts in the absence of the evidence erroneously admitted and reverse. In view of this analysis, we do not reach the séverance question.
On February 2,1978, at about 11:30 a. m., undercover Officers Clark and Craven contacted appellants Morgan and Smith about another drug transaction. The officers met Smith at the apartment complex. They drove to a convenience food store. The officers gave Smith $900 in prerecorded government funds; Smith drove off. He was followed from the parking lot to 1468 East 78th Street, Michael Williams’ address, and was seen entering the house and leaving about five minutes later. He was followed back to the convenience food store. This trip took about ten minutes. Smith met Clark and Craven, completed the transaction and was arrested. Clark and Craven notified surveillance that the transaction had been completed.
Officers from the surveillance team then approached 1468 East 78th Street, under instructions to find out who was inside and to “secure” the residence. The officers walked up to the front door, knocked and identified themselves as the police, and heard a voice say, “Who is it?” They again identified themselves as the police and told the voice to open the door. Upon hearing the sound of “running footsteps,” they forced open the door. The officers found Michael Williams in the dining room, dressed in a bathrobe. Williams was frisked for weapons and $750 of the prerecorded government funds given to Smith by Clark and Craven was found in his pocket. Meanwhile, other members of the surveillance team had made a “security sweep” through the rest of the house and found in “plain view” a set of scales and heroin. After the house was “secure,” one officer was sent to get a search warrant. The officer returned with the search warrant and the house was searched. The officers found more narcotics, packaging materials for narcotics and a gun.
Ordinarily the findings of the trial court on a motion to suppress are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review on appeal. United States v. Kulcsar, supra,
The question “whether and under what circumstances an officer may enter a suspect’s home to make a warrantless arrest” remains unresolved by the Supreme Court. United States v. Watson,
Probable cause requires “facts and circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man, in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing the offense.’ ” Gerstein v. Pugh,
Although the probable cause determination makes any discussion of exigent circumstances
Because the arrest was unlawful, the government cannot justify the seizure of the money as incident to a lawful arrest or the set of scales and narcotics as in plain view. The trial court erred in failing to suppress this evidence at trial. See Wong Sun v. United States, supra,
We do not find beyond a reasonable doubt that' the introduction of this evidence at trial was harmless error. This evidence formed the basis for the possession and distribution counts; it also constituted a substantial part of the government’s case against Michael Williams on the conspiracy count. However, because the remedy for illegal arrest is the suppression of any evidence obtained as a result of the arrest, see Gerstein v. Pugh, supra,
Norman L. Williams
For reversal Norman Williams argues that the trial court erred in (1) refusing to suppress evidence seized in connection with an investigatory stop, (2) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, (3) failing to grant a mistrial fallowing evidence of other crimes, (4) restricting the scope of cross-examination of informant Jones, and (5) denying his motion to dismiss on the basis of preindictment delay. For the reasons given below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Norman Williams first argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress evidence seized in connection with an investigatory stop. . Appellant argues that the investigatory stop was unlawful because the police did not have “valid cause” and therefore the evidence should have been suppressed. The government argues that the police officers lawfully stopped Williams’ car on the basis of probable cause but that Williams was not arrested at that time, that Williams voluntarily accompanied the police officers to the station, and that appellant’s arrest in the parking lot of the police station was based upon probable cause.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The record of the suppression hearing indicates that the trial court found there was probable cause to arrest either at the time Williams was stopped or later at
There can be little doubt that, when considered ■ alone, the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant at the police station, based upon their observation of appellant’s behavior in the car during the ride and in the parking lot. Appellant was seen handling a small bag of white powder at his feet; it was unclear whether he was taking it out of his shoe or hiding it in his sock or what. Another small bag of white powder fell to the ground when appellant was taken out of the car. Lawful police observation of these events is dependent upon the validity of the initial stop. In our view, the dispositive questions are whether the investigatory stop was lawful and whether appellant consented to accompany the police to the station for further questioning. We approach the facts in this manner because “any further detention or search [other than the sort of brief questioning characteristic of investigatory stops] must be based [u]pon consent or probable cause.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
The investigatory stop in the present case was lawful if it was made on the basis of “reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.” Brown v. Texas,—U.S.—,
The original investigatory stop was made on the basis of information known to a DEA team. We conclude that the collective information known to the team
Having concluded that the police officers possessed sufficient information to form a reasonable suspicion about Norman Williams to warrant further investigation, we turn to the question of consent as a basis for Williams’ continued presence in the company of the police. Williams argues that he was arrested immediately, without probable cause.
Williams next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. “In considering a motion for acquittal, the verdict of guilty must be sustained if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, there is substantial evidence to support it.” United States v. Frye, supra,
Williams next argues that the trial court should have granted this motion for a mistrial following the testimony of Officer Wilson, during which Wilson stated that Ervin had told him that Williams had spent time in prison. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). The government seeks to justify the reference to Williams’ criminal past as part of an otherwise admissible coconspirator’s (Ervin’s) statement. We note that the trial court immediately directed the jury to ignore the reference and further instructed the jury to disregard it during their deliberations. In view of the prompt striking of the testimony and curative instruction by the trial court, we conclude the-error was harmless. See United States v. Burnett,
Williams next argues that the trial court improperly restricted cross-examination of informant Jones. Appellant argues that because the government’s case depended so heavily upon the testimony of Jones, defense counsel should have been permitted an “unfettered allowance” to prove all relevant facts. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court was most indulgent in permitting cross-examination of the informant. Defense counsel thoroughly explored the informant’s own criminal difficulties, pending charges, prior convictions, and drug history, and was only restricted by the trial court when the questions became obviously repetitious.
Williams finally argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the ground of pre-indictment delay. Appellant argues that the period of pre-indictment delay (arrest on January 19, 1978 to indictment on June 12, 1978) plus the early trial date (trial began July 20, 1978), taken together, deprived him of the right to a fair and speedy trial. We note that this allegation of error has not been properly preserved for review; appellant failed to raise the pre-indictment delay issue before trial. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b); e. g., United States v. Easom,
Notes
. The Honorable Russell G. Clark, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
. Evidently a combination of personal problems prompted Jones to contact the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Kansas City, Missouri.
. Count XII charged Norman Williams with another count of distribution of heroin on January 23, 1978; this count was dismissed.
. Transcripts of the tapes were distributed to the jury when the tapes were played but were not admitted into evidence. The trial court instructed the jury that the tapes, not the transcripts, were the exhibits. The transcripts were collected from the jury after the tapes were played. See United States v. Smith,
. Counsel for appellant Smith made a running objection on the basis of hearsay early in the government’s presentation of its case, but this running objection did not go to the order of proof.
. We suggest that in those cases where it appears the jury may have been exposed to prejudicial publicity, the better practice is to poll the jurors individually by asking a general question, such as, “Did you read the paper yesterday evening?” See United States v. Word, supra,
. We do not decide whether, in the future, the rough notes of law enforcement officers, even though incorporated into reports disclosed during trial, should be retained and produced at trial. It is the opinion of the writer that such would be a better practice than routine destruction. See United States v. Harris,
. Defense counsel was attempting to develop the possibility that Ms. Flack, not Ms. Morgan, was the seller of narcotics and that Ms. Flack’s relationship with Officers Clark and Craven was more intimate than that of a confidential informant.
. In the opinion of this writer, this circuit answered the warrantless entry to arrest question indirectly in Salvador and Kulcsar by adopting the probable cause-exigent circumstances analysis set forth in the Dorman case. This circuit’s express acknowledgement of this analysis in Houle did not involve much more than recognition of the implications of the analysis followed in those two cases. See United States v. Reed,
. In Dorman Judge Leventhal set forth the following considerations as relevant in determining whether a warrantless entry by the police to arrest a suspect in a private dwelling is reasonable under the fourth amendment: (1) whether a grave offense, in particular a crime of violence, is involved; (2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) whether a clear showing of probable cause to believe that the suspect committed the crime involved is made; (4) whether there is strong reason to believe the suspect is in the premises being entered; (5) whether a likelihood exists that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; and (6) whether the entry, though not consented, is made peaceably.
. The writer views this development with some alarm as yet a further expansion of the very narrow exception set forth in Terry v. Ohio and the border cases, see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra,
. At the suppression hearing Officer Kaestner testified that he frisked appellant for weapons and noticed something in appellant’s pocket at that time. Appellant testified that the police officer found his money and took it. Kaestner further testified that he had taken the money but returned it. In any event, the serial numbers of the money were checked after the police arrested appellant at the police station and ■ seized the money incident to arrest.
. E. g., Brewer v. Wolff,
. We note that the police officers’ version of the nature of the investigatory stop differed sharply from Norman Williams’. Specifically, Williams testified that the police cars blocked the road, that the police officers approached with their guns drawn, and that they informed him that they were investigating a robbery. The police officers contradicted this testimony. The investigatory stop occurred about 1:00 p. m.; Ervin talked to Wilson later in the afternoon, about 4:30 p. m.
. We note that in many respects the custodial sequence of events in the present case parallels that in the recent Supreme Court case Duna-way v. New York: the suspect was not questioned briefly on the spot, he was not handcuffed, he was transported to the police station in a police car (Norman Williams sat in the front passenger seat), he was not told he was under arrest or that he was “free to go.”
. Cf. Brown v. Illinois,