369 F.3d 250 | 3rd Cir. | 2004
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Appeal from the United States District Court Appellant, Martin Williams, is a for the District of New Jersey Nigerian national who filed pro se motions (D.C. Criminal Action No. 96-cr-00587 ) in the District Court of New Jersey seeking District Judge: Honorable William H. dismissal of the detainer lodged against Walls him in May 2002 for violating the terms of _______________ his supervised release. He argued, inter alia , that the period of supervised release
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR included as part of his 1997 sentence 34.1(a) should have been deemed extinguished on February 13, 2004 upon his subsequent deportation. After the District Court denied his motion, Williams
Before: SCIRICA,Chief Judge, ROTH pleaded guilty. On appeal, Williams raises and MCKEE, Circuit Judges this same issue, one of first impression in this Circuit. After careful consideration,
(Filed: May 21, 2004 ) we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. and (b)(2). After pleading guilty, on
I. Factual and Procedural History October 3, 2002, Williams was sentenced to seven months imprisonment and two On September 27, 1996, Williams years of supervised release. pleaded guilty to bank fraud in violation of On May 31, 2002, the District Court 18 U.S.C. § 1344 and obstruction of for the District of New Jersey issued an correspondence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § order to show cause why Williams should 1702. Pursuant to the sentencing not be found in violation of the conditions guidelines, the United States District Court of the supervised release imposed on him for the District of New Jersey sentenced in connection with his 1996 bank fraud Williams to 16 months imprisonment and conviction. After a detainer was lodged five years of supervised release. The terms against him, Williams moved to dismiss and conditions of Williams’ supervised the detainer arguing, among other things, release included that (1) “the defendant that his period of supervised release had shall not commit another federal, state, or ended upon his deportation. local crime,” and (2) “[i]f deported, the defendant shall not re-enter the United The United States District Court for States without the written permission of the District of New Jersey denied the Attorney General.” Williams’ motion to dismiss the detainer.
Subsequently, on April 29, 2003, Williams After Williams completed his term pleaded guilty to violating the condition of of imprisonment on July 18, 1997, he was his supervised release which prohibited released into the custody of the him from committing another federal, Immigration and Naturalization Service. state, or local crime. That same day, the On July 23, 1997, he was deported to District Court revoked Williams’ Nigeria. previously imposed term of supervised
release and sentenced him to seven months Sometime after his deportation, but imprisonment. before his term of supervised release was to end, Williams re-entered the United On appeal, Williams contends that States. On September 6, 2001, he was his term of supervised release terminated arrested under an alias in the Northern upon deportation in 1997, thereby District of Illinois. Charged with credit depriving the District Court of jurisdiction card fraud, Williams pleaded guilty and to revoke the term of supervised release. was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment and three years of supervised release. II. Jurisdiction and Standard of
Review On April 30, 2002, Williams was indicted for illegally re-entering the United The District Court had jurisdiction States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) in this criminal matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, which confers original States. Id. at 670-71. Williams alleges that jurisdiction over all offenses against the the reasoning underlying Porat is equally laws of the United States, and, more applicable in the instant case and that specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i), which probation cannot supervise a defendant governs the authority of a court to revoke who has been deported. a term of supervised release. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 We disagree. Williams’ reliance on U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). United States v. Porat is misplaced. Porat
dealt with a defendant whose supervised Our review of issues of jurisdiction release included home detention and is plenar y. S ee G rand Un ion therefore required active supervision. See Supermarkets of the Virgin Islands, Inc. v. 17 F.3d at 670-71. In contrast, a condition H.E. Lockhart Mgmt, Inc., 316 F.3d 408, of supervised release requiring that a 410 (3d Cir. 2003). defendant not commit any federal, state, or
local crime can be easily enforced against III. Discussion a defendant who after deportation illegally re-enters the United States and commits Williams contends that his term of another federal, state, or local crime during supervised release terminated on the date the term of his supervised release he was deported from the United States. (including the offense of illegal reentry). He bases this argument on our decision in Enforcement of the condition in this case United States v. Porat, 17 F.3d 660 (3rd does not require supervision in a foreign Cir. 1994), where we held that a defendant country. whose period of supervised release was conditioned on home detention in Israel Moreover, the language of § 3583 must serve that period of supervised does not provide for automatic termination release in the United States. Id. at 671. of supervised release upon deportation. To The decision in Porat was based on the the contrary, the statute provides that in fact that home detention is perhaps the such cases “the court may provide, as a most serious and constraining condition of condition of supervised release, that [the supervised release and therefore proper defendant] be deported and remain outside supervision is required. Id. at 670. We the United States, and may order that he be reasoned that, because there was no delivered to a duly authorized immigration ongoing contact with a probation officer official for such deportation.” Id. § 3583 and the defendant could decide to end (d) (3). We see from the language of § cooperation with the District Court, 3583 that Congress was aware that some making it difficult or even impossible to defendants sentenced to supervised release bring the defendant before it to impose would be deported yet chose not to provide remedial measures, the defendant had to for automatic termination of supervised serve his complete sentence in the United release when the defendant was deported. The omission of such language defeats William’s contention. See United States v. Ramirez-Sanchez, 338 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Had Congress intended for deportation to terminate a term of supervised release, it could have provided so”); United States v. Brown, 54 F.3d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1995) (“If Congress intended for deportation to terminate this sentence, it could have specifically provided for such to occur. However, Congress has not done so . . . ”). Indeed, it would be inconsistent for Congress to authorize a district court to order a defendant to “remain outside the United States” following deportation as a condition of supervised release but concurrently intend that condition to extinguish upon deportation. See Brown, 54 F.3d at 239 (“This is a clear indication that a term of supervised release remains in effect after the defendant is deported.”).
We will follow the other courts of appeals that have held that supervised release is not automatically extinguished by deportation. See Ramirez-Sanchez, 338 F.3d at 980; United States v. Cuero-Flores, 276 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Akinyemi, 108 F.3d 777, 779 (7 th Cir. 1997); Brown, 54 F.3d at 238-39.
IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
