UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roderick Lamar WILLIAMS, a/k/a Rox, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 06-4044
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
April 17, 2007
Submitted: March 7, 2007
No. 06-4044.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Submitted: March 7, 2007.
Decided: April 17, 2007.
Before WILLIAMS, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Roderick Lamar Williams appeals his conviction by jury and sentence on charges of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine and at least fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of
This court reviews the imposition of a sentence for reasonableness. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-61, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005); United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir.2005). After Booker, courts must calculate the appropriate guideline range, making any appropriate factual findings. United States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d 366, 370 (4th Cir.2006). The court then should consider the resulting advisory guideline range in conjunction with the factors under
Here, Williams contends that his sentence is unlawful because the district court made findings that increased his sentence beyond what it would be based only on facts found by the jury. He objects to the enhancement because no evidence was presented at trial relative to the enhancement and the murder was not charged in the indictment in his present case, nor had he been tried on the murder in any other case, as of the date of his sentencing. However, this general argument was rejected in Booker. After Booker, the sentencing court is authorized to make factual findings in order to appropriately determine the defendant‘s advisory range under the guidelines. See Davenport, 445 F.3d at 370; see also United States v. Martinez, 136 F.3d 972, 979 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that a sentencing court may enhance defendant‘s sentence based on its findings of conduct by a preponderance of the evidence, even where jury acquitted defendant of that conduct). Under our now advisory sentencing guidelines, these authorized factual findings would include a finding as to whether “a victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under
We specifically find that the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing supported the district court‘s conclusion, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Williams was involved in the drug-related homicide of Houston, a confidential government informant. Agent David
The Government also presented testimony of two other witnesses that support the conclusion that Williams murdered Houston. One witness housed with Williams in jail in 2003 related that Williams had confessed to him that Williams had murdered Houston, and further attested that Williams had provided him with details regarding the murder. Another witness testified that Williams had confessed to having killed a “snitch.”
This evidence fully supports the district court‘s determination, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “a victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under
In addition, we have reviewed Williams’ sufficiency of the evidence claim, and conclude that the claim is without merit. In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction on direct review, “[t]he verdict of the jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). Substantial evidence is evidence “that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 693 (4th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1113, 126 S.Ct. 1925, 164 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006) (internal quotation and citation omitted). We consider circumstantial and direct evidence, and allow the Government the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought to be established. Id. at 858; United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir.1982). In resolving issues of substantial evidence,
Ample evidence was presented at trial in this case to support the jury‘s findings that Williams was involved with others in an established conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute significant amounts of cocaine and cocaine base, that he possessed firearms during and in relation to drug trafficking crimes, and that he aided and abetted the same. Several witnesses, including co-conspirators and Government agents, attested to Williams’ trips out-of-state and out-of-the-country with others to purchase large amounts of cocaine and cocaine base and transport it back to North Carolina where it was prepared, packaged, and distributed. Williams was identified as a member of “The Cream Team,” an established narcotics trafficking organization operating in and out of North Carolina. A number of such witnesses also testified that Williams often carried a firearm on or immediately near his person while he conducted drug trafficking transactions. The evidence introduced at the trial of this matter clearly supports the jury‘s determinations with regard to the offenses charged, and we reject Williams’ claim that the evidence was insufficient. See United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir.1996).
Accordingly, we affirm Williams’ conviction and sentence. We further deny Williams’ motion for writ of mandamus, as well as his motions to proceed pro se on appeal, to relieve his attorney from representation, to file pro se briefs, supplemental and oversized pro se briefs, supplemental and oversized appendix, and pro se reply brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED.