William Sonsalla pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to one count of making false entries in bank records in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1005. The' district court sentenced him to 18 months in prison followed by five years' of supervised release, and ordered him to pay $142,083.69 in restitution. Sonsalla appeals his sentence, arguing that the record fails to support the district court’s imposition of upward adjustments to -his base offense level for “more than minimal planning,” U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(2)(A), and for “abuse of a position of trust,” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. Because the record contains more than adequate factual support for each of the adjustments, we affirm Sonsalla’s sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
The People’s State Bank of Augusta, Wisconsin hired Sonsalla in July 1981 to oversee commercial and real estate loans and serve as the bank’s compliance officer. During his last 12 years of employment at the bank, Sonsalla was a Vice-President and was responsible for loans, delinquent loans, personnel and payroll. As Vice-President, he also supervised three loan officers and hired and fired the bank’s tellers.
In April 1988, Sonsalla began embezzling money from the bank. Drawing from his understanding of the banking system and his knowledge that the bank’s “Achilles’ heel” was its lax oversight of money orders, Sonsalla concocted a scheme of issuing money orders from customer accounts without authorization and misappropriating cash entrusted to him by customers for deposit in order to purchase money orders for his own personal use. By issuing the money orders to his credit card company, Sonsalla concealed the fact that he was the actual recipient of customers’ funds. He targeted, in particular, customers who had demonstrated their elevated trust in him by personally giving him cash to deposit, as well as accounts exhibiting greater activity or a more substantial cash “float.”
The bank’s Board of Directors began to suspect Sonsalla’s misconduct upon discovering, in January 1997, that some of his loan file documentation was missing. In April 1997, the Board gave Sonsalla 60 days to straighten out his loan files; he failed to comply and in August, the Board placed him on administrative leave. In the meantime, Tom McHugh, one of Sonsalla’s customers, contacted the bank regarding a large discrepancy in his outstanding loan balance. In response, the bank hired an outside auditor to conduct a complete audit. The auditors uncovered $70,511 in money orders that Sonsalla had prepared and charged to various customers’ accounts, $71,589 in cash he received from customers but had not applied to their *907 loans or deposit accounts as directed, and an unauthorized $10,000 transfer between customer accounts. Except for a $5,000 deductible, the bank’s losses were covered by its insurer, Kansas Bankers Surety.
His scheme revealed, Sonsalla admitted to the bank’s President in September 1997 that he had been taking money from Mr. McHugh’s account to cover up his mistakes and for his own personal use. Son-salla maintained, however, that Mr. McHugh’s was the only account from which he had taken money. Nevertheless, the bank then terminated his employment.
In March 2000, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Sonsalla with one count of embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 656 (Count I), and one count of making false entries in the records of People’s State Bank with the intent to deceive under 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (Count II). Count II specifically charged that on October 24, 1995, Sonsalla caused a $25,000 advance to issue from a customer’s loan account without authorization, which he used to purchase a $25,000 money order. Count II further charged that Sonsalla then deposited the $25,000 into another customer’s account from which he had previously made an unauthorized withdrawal. Pursuant to a written agreement, Sonsalla pleaded guilty to Count II in exchange for the government’s dismissal of Count I.
Adopting the calculations in the Presen-tence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the district court calculated the loss caused by Sonsalla’s crime as being between $120,000 and $200,000, and therefore increased Son-salla’s base offense level by seven, in accordance with U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(l)(H). Over Sonsalla’s objection, the court also imposed a two-level upward adjustment for “more than minimal planning,” U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A). The district court accepted this recommendation based on its view that Sonsalla’s “hundreds of transactions” over a period of more than eight years were not “purely opportune.” Additionally, the district court found that Son-salla committed “a very severe abuse of trust” and “used his sensitive position as a bank officer” to perpetrate and conceal a fraud, and thus imposed a two-level upward adjustment for abuse of trust under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. After reducing the offense level by three for acceptance of responsibility, the district court imposed a sentence of 18 months in prison — the middle of the guideline range — and ordered restitution of $142,083.69.
II. DISCUSSION
A. More Than Minimal Planning
Section 2Fl.l(b)(2)(A) permits a sentencing court to increase the defendant’s offense level by two upon a finding that he or she engaged in “more than minimal planning.” Applying the definition of more than minimal planning in the commentary to § 1B1.1, this court has explained that this upward adjustment is appropriate where: (1) there is more planning than is typical for commission of the offense in simple form; (2) steps are taken to conceal the offense; or (3) criminal acts, each of which are not purely opportune, are repeated over a period of time.
United States v. Brown,
By itself, the district court’s determination that Sonsalla’s repeated acts over an eight-year period constituted more than minimal planning is sufficient to support the upward adjustment under § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A).
See United States v. Boatner,
We note additionally that the upward adjustment would have been proper under the first and second factors set forth in
Brown,
B. Abuse op Position of Trust
Section 3B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines permits a two-level upward adjustment “[i]f the defendant abused a position of public or private trust ... in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense.” The sentencing court may not apply this adjustment, however, when abuse of trust is a necessary element of the offense of conviction.
United States v. Sinclair,
1. Double-Counting
Sonsalla first argues that the offense of falsifying bank records, 18 U.S.C. § 1005, necessarily involves an abuse of trust in every case, and therefore it was
*909
double-counting to increase his offense level under § 3B1.3. Although this is a question of first impression in this circuit, other circuits have upheld the application of § 3B1.3 to defendants convicted under § 1005.
See United States v. McCord,
This court has explained that, although
breach
of trust is a necessary element of embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 656 — a statute parallel to § 1005 prohibiting “misappropriation” of bank funds with the intent to
deceive
— abuse of trust is not, and constitutes more egregious conduct warranting an upward adjustment under § 3B1.3.
See United States v. Dion,
Although conviction under § 1005 requires proof of an element (a false entry in bank records) not necessary to § 656,
see United States v. Marquardt,
2. Sonsalla’s Abuse of His Position of Trust Significantly Facilitated His Offense
In order for Section 3B1.3 to apply, the district court must find that: (1) the defendant occupied a position of trust, and (2) the defendant’s abuse of that position of trust significantly facilitated the commission of the crime.
United States v. Stewart,
Contrary to Sonsalla’s argument, the district court did not rely solely on his title of Vice-President in determining that he held a position of trust at the bank. Rather, the responsibilities and privileges that characterized his position were the key to his knowledge of the banking system and the operations of the bank. In addition, as Vice-President, he oversaw
*910
commercial and real estate loans and acted as compliance officer. Thus, regardless of his title, Sonsalla’s actual duties involved substantial discretion and responsibility, and the record amply supports the district court’s finding that Sonsalla occupied a position of trust.
Cf. Hernandez,
The record also supports the district court’s finding that Sonsalla would not have been able to execute his fraudulent scheme had he not occupied such a “sensitive position” with the bank. His position allowed him access to large amounts of cash, including funds customers had given him personally to deposit into their accounts.
Cf. United States v. Christiansen,
III. CONCLUSION
The district court’s findings that Sonsal-la engaged in more than minimal planning, and that his abuse of his position of trust significantly facilitated his offense were not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the two-level upward adjustments under § 2F1.1.(b)(2)(A) and § 3B1.3 were proper. For the foregoing reasons, we Affirm the decision of the district court.
