OPINION
Defendant Will Odom contends on appeal that the district court erred when it elected to sentence him as a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, since his prior felony сonvictions had been “consolidated” for sentencing as contemplated by Application Note 3 to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
On January 9, 1998, defendant entered into a plea agreement with the government. In exchange for a plea of guilty to armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) & (d), the government agreed to dismiss a fireаrms count, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and to make a motion for a downward departure based upon substantial assistance. The government subsequently made such a motion, which the district court granted. Defendant was sentenced to 128 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release.
Defendant contests the determination that he was a career offender as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, which provides in part as follows:
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed thе instant offense of conviction, (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) the dеfendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. If the offense level for a career criminal from the table below is greater than the offense level otherwise applicable, the offense level from the table below shall apply. A carеer offender’s *323 criminal history category in every case shall be Category VI.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (Nov.1997). 1
The only dispute concerns the requirement-for two prior felony convictions. According to the pre-sentence report, defendant was arrested in Memphis, Tennessee, on October 18, 1993. He was charged with five armed robberies, all committed on different days in 1993 and involving fоur different victims. The trial court imposed five concurrent eight-year sentences. Defendant was paroled in 1996.
Defendant argues that his armed robbery convictions should be counted as a single conviction because they were related. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) (Nov.1997) (prior sentences imposed in related cases to be treated as one sentence). Aрplication Note 3 of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 gives the following guidance in determining whether convictions are sufficiently related:
Related Cases. Prior sentences are not considered relаted if they were for offenses that were separated hy an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first offense prior to committing the second offense). Otherwise, prior sentences are considered related if they resulted from offenses that (1) occurred on the same occasion, (2) were part of a single common schemе or plan, or (3) were consolidated for trial or sentencing....
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment (n.3).
The focus of defendant’s argument is the third consideration:' consolidation for sentencing. After receiving a copy of the pre-sentence report, counsel for defendant in the instant action contacted former counsel for defendant in the state armed robbery cases to determine whether they had been consolidated. When former state counsel indicated that they had not been consolidated, federal counsel asked him to file a motion tо do so. On April 1, 1998, a Tennessee state court judge signed an order of consolidation, stating that the cases “were consolidated for plea and sentencing on November 18, 1994, in order for defendant, Will B. Odom, to receive concurrent time, and the records should reflect such consolidation.”
At the federal sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued “that it was the intention of the state court judge that the cases at issue were implicitly consolidated for sentencing.” In his view, the state court order of consolidation simply corrected “omissions in the record.”
The district court rejected counsel’s argument in these terms:
There can be no uniformity and certainty about the imposition of the cаreer offender guidelines if whether a case is related or not is dependent on counsel’s after-the-fact effort to obtain an order of consolidation from a state court judge.
So the Court finds that the cases that Mr, Odom has were not consolidated for sentencing within the meaning of the commentary to the sentencing guidelines, and the after-thе-fact order of consolidation does not change that because it has no effect on what the state court did and was apparently intended only to influence thе federal proceeding.
While we typically review a district court’s findings of fact in regard to whether convictions were consolidated for sentencing under a clearly erroneous standard,
United States v. McAdams,
As the district court recognized, the leading сase in our circuit on the issue of related cases is
United States v. Coleman,
[T]he two 1975 Knox County armed robbery convictions were not consolidated for sentencing. Although final judgment was pronounced in both cаses on the same day, October 3, 1975, the record as a whole reflects that the two convictions were, at all relevant times, treated separately and distinctly. There wаs no order by the trial court expressly or implicitly consolidating the cases for sentencing. In each case, there was a separate criminal complaint and sеparate indictment. The cases proceeded under separate court numbers....
Coleman says his convictions for the two 1975 armed robberies were consolidatеd for sentencing because he was sentenced for both robberies on the same day in the same court and received concurrent sentences. These facts, in and of themselves, simply do not suggest that the cases were consolidated for sentencing.
Id. at 566-67 (citations omitted).
Turning to the case before us, we conclude that defendant’s five armed robbery convictions were unrelated as that term is contemplated by the guidelines. Defendant committed the crimes over a period of months and they involved different victims; thus, they do not constitutе a “single common scheme or plan.” Furthermore, defendant was charged in five indictments that carried different case numbers for which he received separate, albeit concurrent, sentences.
Finally, under the circumstances of this case, the district court was correct in discounting the significance of the state court’s order of consоlidation when calculating the appropriate federal sentence. First, the order itself does not indicate that it is to have nunc pro tunc effect. Second, it appears that the order was obtained in an ex parte proceeding: there is no indication in the record that the state prosecutor’s office agreed to its terms. Third, the order appears to have been drafted by defense counsel and simply presented to the state judge for signature; there is nothing to indicate what background information, if any, was provided to thе judge with respect to defendant. Fourth, defense counsel candidly admits that the order was obtained to help defendant obtain a reduced federal sentence. Fifth, consolidation of sentences is typically a way to provide defendants with enhanced opportunities for rehabilitation. Since defendant had already served his state сourt sentences, the order of consolidation here could have no rehabilitative component. Because of these deficiencies, we conclude thаt the district court correctly assigned it minimal weight in determining whether the state court convictions were related. 2
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Notes
. The 1997 version of the Guidelines was used in this case.
. In reaching this conclusion, we are not saying that an order of consolidation obtained belatedly should never be considered as evidence of relatedness. To have probative value, however, at a minimum the record should rеflect that the prosecution was apprised of the motion to consolidate and that the state court judge was aware of the circumstances of the case, as well as the significance of the order with respect to the pending federal sentencing.