United States v. WickhamUnited States v. Wickham
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Kelleher
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
KELLEHER, District Judge.
On August 24, 1971, petitioner Gary Wickham was convicted of one count of bank robbery after a court trial brought pursuant to
Apparently, because petitioner fears that the 1971 conviction is (or will be) considered by the United States Parole Commission as part of its parole determination, petitioner seeks relief from the 1971 judgment of conviction in the form of a writ of
coram nobis.
Specifically, petitioner contends that his conviction under
The facts are simply stated. Defendant obtained money from a victim bank by means of a telephone extortion threat directed to the bank’s manager. The manager, responding to the threat, took money from the bank’s vault and left it in a telephone booth, where defendant picked it up. Thus, petitioner never entered the bank to take the money. •
The Ninth Circuit has held that a
trespassory
taking is required for a conviction under
In the instant case, petitioner — unlike the defendant in
Culbert
— was charged only with a violation of
While there may be an exception to the binding effect which a ruling of the Court of Appeals has upon the district courts of this Circuit in rare and exceptionally compelling circumstances, the better judicial practice for district courts would be to let that court, which announced the decision . . . decide whether or not that case is currently good law, rather than have a district court undertake to do so.
Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States,
300 F.Supp. 1032, 1035 (D.Mass.1969),
aff’d,
423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970). Thus, a trespassory taking should be shown to obtain a conviction under
To state that
A writ of coram nobis is available to bring before the Court that rendered judgment matters of fact which had not been put in issue or passed upon, and which were material to the validity and regularity of the legal proceedings themselves. See United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 68, 35 S.Ct. 16, 59 L.Ed. 129 (1914); 7 J. Moore Federal Practice ¶ 60.14. As such, “the basis of coram nobis is narrow, and oftentimes a case that is beyond its scope is as meritorious as one within its purview.” 7 J. Moore, supra, at ¶ 60.14. Professor Moore’s formulation perhaps understates the scope of coram nobis, for the Ninth Circuit and other courts have held that coram nobis is the appropriate vehicle for vacation of a conviction under a statute that conflicts with the United States Constitution. Navarro v. United States, 449 F.2d 113, 114 (9th Cir. 1971) (Fifth Amendment provided complete defense to statute under which defendant was charged and pleaded guilty); Byrnes v. United States, supra, at 602 (Constitutional controversy required for coram nobis relief); United States v. Summa, 362 F.Supp. 1177 (D.Conn.1972); Lewis v. United States, 314 F.Supp. 851 (D.Alaska 1970). There is also language in the case law indicating that an error need not be constitutional in dimension, so long as it is fundamental and affects the proceedings in such a way that serious injustice would arise absent coram nobis relief. Matysek v. United States, 339 F.2d 389, 395 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. McCord, 166 U.S. App.D.C. 1, 9-10, 509 F.2d 334, 343-4 (1974); United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 1963). The Court concludes that the present-day scope of coram nobis is broad enough to encompass not only errors of fact that affect the validity or regularity of legal proceedings, but in addition, legal errors of a constitutional or fundamental proportion.
The case thus boils down to whether the legal error cited by petitioner is sufficiently fundamental to allow the Court to correct it via
coram nobis.
The Ninth Circuit’s 1977 ruling did not arise from any constitutionally-based analysis, but rather, rested upon its interpretation and construction of
Of course, were petitioner to be tried today for the same offense,
Furthermore,
coram nobis
is not to be used as a vehicle for retrying adjudicated facts. The adjudicated facts in this case show that petitioner’s conduct was unquestionably culpable. His propensity, in 1971, for utilizing violence or threats of violence to obtain money is a factor that
should
be considered by the United States Parole Commission in setting petitioner’s release date. Should the Court now vacate petitioner’s conviction, the Parole Commission would not be able to consider petitioner’s culpable conduct in setting his parole
*117
date.
See
Petitioner’s application for a writ of cor-am nobis vacating his conviction is denied.