Defendant-appellant David C. White wants to regain his interest in a parcel of real estate known as “the Farm.” The government seized White’s interest in this tract after Bn and several others pled guilty to charges /that they collogued to distribute marijuan^) White acknowledges thаt his eo-eonspirators used the Farm to carry out the conspiracy’s nefarious objectives, but he insists that the government cannot seize his interest in the property without first showing that he personally used it to further the illicit activity.
This is an argument which requires red meat and strong drink, but the appellant offers little in the way оf sustenance for it. Consequently, we reject his theory and instead hold that the nexus between White’s involvement in the marijuana conspiracy and his coconspirators’ use of the Farm permits forfeiture.
I. BACKGROUND
White was indicted along with several others for conspiring to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846. The same indictment sought criminal forfeiture of the Farm pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853. White pled guilty to the conspiracy count and waived his right to a jury trial on the forfeiture count. In conjunction with this waiver, the parties stipulated to the facts underlying the forfeiture count. We summarize these facts.
The Farm is located in Mansfield, Massachusetts. White inherited his interest in it from his mother. He owns an undivided one-fourth interest, as does each of his three siblings. During the course of the conspiracy, White did not live on the Farm, but he knew that his sister and cocоnspirator, Rebecca White, resided there with another co-conspirator, Gary Dethlefs. White also was cognizant of the fact that Rebecca and Gary were using the Farm to facilitate the business of the conspiracy. Although White did not attempt to prevent his coeonspirators from storing drugs on the Farm, he never personally conducted illicit activities in that venue.
After the district court adjudicated White’s guilt, White filed a motion for judgment, asseverating that forfeiture is improper when there is no proof that the defendаnt/property owner personally used the targeted property to carry out criminal activity. The district court rejected White’s “personal use” argument and denied his motion.
See United States v. Dethlefs,
Because this matter does not implicate factual disputes, but only requires us to assay the appellant’s legal theory by resort to the drug-trafficking forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853, our review is plenary.
See United States v. Pitrone,
II. PRINCIPLES AFFECTING CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
The applicable statute, which permits the government to seize drug-related property, provides in pertinent part that any person who is convicted of a federal felony drug violation
shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law—
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any prоceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;
(2) any of the person’s property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or *950 part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation....
21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1994). This statute contemplates both “property obtained” and “property used” forfeitures; that is, it allows the government to confiscate a criminal defendant’s property where the property either is the fruit of drug-related criminal activity or has been used to further drug-related criminal activity.
The legislative history of section 853 is significant. Congress enacted the statute as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. See Act of Oct. 12,1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S.C.O.A.N. (98 Stat. 1837). Congress expressed high hopes for this legislation, intending it as a vehicle “to make major comprehensive imрrovements to the Federal criminal laws.” S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3184. To bolster federal crime prevention efforts, Congress “enhance[d] the use of forfeiture, and, in particular, the sanction of criminal forfeiture, as a law enforcement tool in combating two of the most serious crime problems facing the country: racketeering and drug trafficking.” Id. at 3374.
To implement these sentiments, Congress expanded the preexisting Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) forfeiture provision, embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 1963, and simultaneously created the drug-related forfeiture provision now codified in section 853. Congress took pains to note that “[t]he provisions of this new criminal forfeiture statute for major drug offenses closely parallel those of the [amended] RICO forfeiture provisions_”
Id.
at 3381. Since then, courts consistently have construed the RICO forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1963, and the statute governing drug-related forfeitures, 21 U.S.C. § 853, in
pari passu. See United States v. McHan,
The Supreme Court has held that criminal forfeiture is less a substantive offense and more an element of the offender’s sentence.
See Libretti,
- U.S. at-,
The exact dimensions of this nexus requirement are largely uncharted. In
United States v. Desmarais,
III. ANALYSIS
White posits that, in this ease, forfeiture is proper only if there is a watertight *951 nexus between the Farm and his criminal conduct and that, therefore, the government must show that he personally used the Farm to commit the conspiracy. He relies upon two distinctions in forfeiture law to support this construct. First, he points out that although civil forfeiture is a proceeding against the property, criminal forfeiture is a proceeding against the person. This distinction, according to the appellant, highlights the criminal law’s traditional focus on individual culpability. Second, he hypothesizes that a “property used” forfeiture is distinguishable from a “property obtained” forfeiture in that the former requires a showing of criminal use. The appellant then adds these two distinctions together, like numbers in an equation, to produce the desired sum: the supposed requirement that the governmеnt must show that he personally used the Farm to conduct illegal activity.
We agree with the appellant’s two premises, and we recognize the distinctions that he delineates. We disagree, however, with his conclusion because we believe that these distinctions, sеverally and in combination, fail to make a material difference in the outcome of this ease. In short, the appellant’s equation is out of balance.
Courts have declined to bootstrap into the appellant’s first distinction — criminal versus civil — the proрosition that a criminal forfeiture proceeding must be viewed through a highly individualized lens. In the context of “property obtained” forfeitures, for example, several courts of appeals have refused to limit criminal forfeiture-to proceeds defendants personally obtained and have held defendants jointly and severally liable for the proceeds obtained by their co-conspirators.
See McHan,
This court adopted the same approach in
United States v. Hurley,
Under established case law, members of a conspiracy are substantively liable for the foreseeable criminal conduct of the other members of the conspiracy. Pinkerton v. United States,328 U.S. 640 ,66 S.Ct. 1180 ,90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). Using the same concept, the Sentencing Guidelines attribute to a dеfendant at sentencing the foreseeable conduct of co-conspirators. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). It would be odd ... to depart from this principle of attributed conduct when it comes to apply the forfeiture rules, which have aspects both of substantive liability and of penalty.
Id.
at 22. Thus, contrary to the appellant’s assertion, traditional notions of criminal law do not preclude courts from holding defendants in forfeiture proceedings liable for their coconspirators’ behavior.
See McHan,
White’s second distinction likewise fails to support his “personal use” argument. There is simply no analytical grounding for
*952
the proposition that “property used” forfeiture requires a showing that defendant personally used the property for illicit reasons when, as the appellant concedes, “property obtained” forfeitures do not require a similar showing. The
Pinkerton
principle,
see Pinkerton v. United States,
In fine, the sum of the appellant’s arguments is no more than the sum of its parts — and that adds up to very little in the contеxt of this case. White cites no apposite authority for his views, 1 and neither of his proffered distinctions, standing alone or added together, support his vision of a “personal use” requirement for “property used” forfeitures. By its terms, section 853(a)(2) requires only that the defendant be convicted of a drug-trafficking offense and that 'his property be used to facilitate the commission of that offense. These requirements are fully satisfied in White’s case.
IV. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. Forfeiture under section 853, whether of the “property obtainеd” or the “property used” variety, requires a court to find a nexus between the targeted property and the defendant’s underlying criminal activity. This nexus exists here inasmuch as the appellant owned an interest in the property that his coconspira-tors, to his knowlеdge and with his tacit acquiescence, used in facilitating the business of the marijuana conspiracy.
See generally Pinkerton v. United States,
Affirmed.
Notes
. White cites
United States v. Ragonese,