Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.
NYNEX Corporation appeals the district court’s denial of a requested waiver of one of the prohibitions of the consent decree settling the Justice Department’s antitrust suit against AT & T,
see United States v. AT & T,
I.
As part of the consent decree, AT & T transferred its monopoly over local exchange telephone service to the newly-separated Bell Operating Companies (BOCs).
1
The BOCs, in turn, were barred from participating in the markets for interexchange (long distance) service, equipment manufacturing and distribution, information services, and all other non-telecommunications businesses.
See AT & T,
In practice, section VIII(C) has given the BOCs two separate procedural paths to enter markets originally cordoned off by the decree. First, a BOC may ask the court to remove completely any of the decree’s restrictions. To facilitate the district court’s consideration of such motions, the DOJ has undertaken to report to the district court every three years as to the continuing need for the line of business restrictions. The first such “Triennial Review” was held in 1987, at which time all of the BOCs sought complete removal of all of the line of business restrictions.
2
Second, a BOC may request a waiver from any of the restrictions in order to engage in a particular, discrete activity that would not be permitted under the decree. According to the procedure established by the district court in 1984, waiver requests under the decree are first submitted to the DOJ, and if the Department is convinced that the BOC request satisfies the standards of section VIII(C), it requests an appropriate order from the district court, which then reviews the request.
See United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
Following this second path, NYNEX submitted a waiver request to the Justice Department in 1985 that would allow NME, a wholly-owned NYNEX subsidiary, to distribute a variety of products, including telecommunications equipment, to customers unaffiliated with NYNEX. The Department approved the request and moved the district court for an order granting the waiver.
*1208
While that motion was pending, the district court issued its opinion in the first Triennial Review, which,
inter alia,
granted the BOCs’ motions to remove the decree’s prohibition against BOC participation in non-telecommunications businesses.
See United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
The district court denied the DOJ’s motion seeking relief on behalf of NYNEX. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 82-0192 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 1987) (“Order”). NYNEX, supported by the DOJ, brought this appeal.
II.
Appellee AT & T, joined by several amici, argues that we lack appellate jurisdiction in this case because the district court decision was merely an interlocutory order that is not appealable either under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as a final order or under the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) as an interlocutory order that continues or refuses to modify an injunction. AT & T essentially relies on the following paragraph from the district court’s decision:
As a threshold matter, the Court has not been supplied with sufficient facts as to the nature of the products to be furnished. The only concrete example that is given is the NYNEX suggestion that cable will be provided. The Court assumes that the type of cable that would be involved would be a telecommunications product within the meaning of section 11(D)(2) of the decree since if it were any other type of cable, the remaining restrictions would not prevent the company from offering it for sale. Beyond that, it is entirely unclear what other products or services are included in the term “procurement services.” In the face of such an amorphous, open-ended request, the Court is unable to determine what the effect on competition might be. [The motion is therefore denied.]
Order at 2-3. According to AT & T, this ruling denies the motion on a “ ‘threshold’ procedural ground” rather than on the merits,
cf. Williams v. Mumford,
We disagree. As the district court noted in its order, the BOC seeking the waiver under section VIII(C) of the decree bears the burden of showing that “there is no substantial possibility that it could use its monopoly power to impede competition in the market it seeks to enter.”
AT & T,
We have repeatedly held that our standard of review as to the construction or interpretation of the consent decree is
de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
As has already been mentioned, our Triennial Review opinion discussed the section VIII(C) standard at length. Most notably for our purposes here, we construed the phrase “impede competition” to mean the ability to raise prices or restrict output in the relevant market, see id. at 296; stressed that the relevant market is the market to be entered, not the local exchange market, see id. at 296-97; and recognized the institutional legitimacy of deferring to the DOJ on issues of economic analysis, see id. at 297-98. Subjecting NYNEX’s request to this section VIII(C) standard, we see significant merit in NYNEX’s contention that its entry into the telecommunications provision market would be competitively benign. 7 Most compelling is the claim, made by both NYNEX and the DOJ and uncontested by AT & T, that thousands of firms already participate in the intensely competitive telecommunications distribution market. Entry barriers into that market, apparently, are quite low for firms new to the industry as well as for both telecommunications products manufacturers seeking to integrate “forward” and buyers seeking to integrate “backward” into the distribution market. Therefore, it seems that appellants present a powerful argument for granting the waiver, since the only market we are properly *1210 concerned with in considering requests under section VIII(C) is the market to be entered.
Further, it does not appear that the proposed waiver would significantly increase the danger of anticompetitive cross-subsidization in the sense we discussed that problem in the Triennial Review opinion. See id. at 297, 303. To be sure, even when the entered market is competitive, cross-subsidization could impede competition in that market under certain circumstances, particularly when self-dealing bias is a risk and the BOC is able to pass on inflated costs to captive local ratepayers. But NYNEX already has a waiver allowing it to provide telecommunications equipment to its various affiliates through NME. It appears to us that allowing NME to service other customers would actually help prevent such abuse by providing benchmarks that would ease detection of any overcharges.
Although it is within our power to apply section VIII(C) to NYNEX’s request ourselves (assuming that there are no material facts in dispute),
cf. United States v. Loew’s Inc.,
The same is true for AT & T’s second concern: that NYNEX would use its near-monopsony power in the market for telecommunications equipment in the NYNEX region to coerce manufacturers into making NYNEX’s distribution subsidiary their exclusive retail distributor for that region. NYNEX argues both that there is no basis for believing that such agreements will be formed and that, in any event, they would be competitively innocuous because the DOJ would not challenge such exclusive dealing agreements as independent antitrust violations. We are not sure that a showing that the DOJ does not consider a practice serious enough to warrant a separate enforcement procedure automatically satisfies the section VIII(C) standard. In any event, we prefer not to rule dispositively on the issue without the benefit of the district court’s views.
******
For the foregoing reasons, the case is remanded to the district court. 8
Notes
. Under the reorganization plan submitted by AT & T and approved by the court, the 22 BOCs were consolidated into seven Regional Holding Companies, including NYNEX.
See United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
. As we indicated in our Triennial Review opinion, not all motions seeking removal of the line of business restrictions are properly considered under the section VIII(C) standard.
See United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
. The terms of the decree contemplate waiver requests made by the BOCs. In this instance, the motion for a waiver, as has been mentioned, was made by DOJ, which bears the same burden that NYNEX would.
. We do not mean to encourage direct appeals in such circumstances. If the movant believes that the district court simply overlooked a key part of the record, the better course would seem to be pointing out that oversight to the district court in a motion for reconsideration. Choosing to appeal directly carries with it the risk that this court will exercise its discretion to remand the case to the district court, since, as a general matter, it is preferable to let the district court assess the record in the first instance.
. The briefs of DOJ and NYNEX in this case assume the applicability of the section VIII(C) standard, but they were submitted before our Triennial Review opinion was issued.
. Since we choose to remand the case, the district court will determine AT & T’s status in further proceedings on this waiver request.
. Even if the request is properly judged under section VII, the potential impact on competition would, of course, be a relevant factor. As we said in our Triennial Review opinion, "the appropriate question under Section VII is whether the proposed modification would be
certain
to lessen competition in the relevant market.”
Western Elec. Co.,
. We note that NYNEX's original waiver request was first filed in 1985, and we therefore expect the district court to treat the case expeditiously on remand.
