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United States v. Weldon Rushing Payne, Lloyd Earl Taylor
750 F.2d 844
11th Cir.
1985
Check Treatment

*3 KRAVITCH, Before RONEY and Circuit Judges, *, Judge. and ALLGOOD District KRAVITCH, Judge: Circuit Appellants Weldon Rushing Payne and *4 Lloyd Taylor appeal Earl their respective charges arising convictions on from loans by made the Federal Bank Land Associa Robertsdale, of Alabama, tion between 1977 and 1980. The jury appel found both guilty lants on five misapplication counts of (18 of Federal Land Bank funds U.S.C. § 1), 657 four counts of participa unlawful proceeds tion in the of Federal Land Bank loans, or aiding abetting and (18 the same §§ 23), U.S.C. and 10062 and one count of Helmsing, Mobile, Ala., Frederick G. for conspiracy to violate various false state Payne. ment, misapplication, and partici unlawful Gibson, Fairhope, Ala., W. Kenneth for § pation (18 3714). statutes U.S.C. In addi Taylor. tion, found guilty on one Sessions, III, J.B. Atty., Asst. U.S. Mo- of additional count participation unlawful bile, Ala., Mervyn Hamburg, Dept, proceeds of in Jus- of Federal Land Bank * States, Allgood, W. any Honorable Clarence U.S. entry District the United makes false in Alabama, Judge book, for any the Northern District of report any or statement of or to institution, sitting designation. or, such ... with intent to defraud thereof, any agency the United States or or institution, provides pertinent part: any corporation, 1. § 18 U.S.C. in or re- association section, participates ferred to in this or Whoever, shares officer, being agent employ- an or directly indirectly any in or receives or mon- any capacity or in ee of connected with ... profit, ey, transaction, property, through any or benefits bank, any land bank intermediate credit [or] loan, commission, contract, or embezzles, abstracts, purloins willfully ... or any any corporation, other act of such institu- funds, credits, any moneys, misapplies securi- tion, association, or shall be fined not more things belonging ties or other institution, of value to such $10,000 imprisoned than or not more than pledged or or otherwise intrusted years, five or both. care, to its shall be fined not more than $5,000 imprisoned or not more than five provides pertinent 3. U.S.C. part: § in both; years, or but if the amount or value (a) embezzled, abstracted, against Whoever commits purloined misap- an offense or aids, abets, counsels, $100, the United States or plied does not exceed he shall be fined commands, $1,000 procures induces or imprisoned its not more than or commis- not more sion, punishable principal. year, as a than one both. or provides pertinent provides pertinent part: part: 2. 18 U.S.C. U.S.C. § in in 4. Whoever, officer, agent being employ- persons conspire an or two If or more either to States, any capacity any against or ee of any connected with ... commit offense United bank, States, any agency land bank intermediate [or] credit or defraud the or any any any intent defraud purpose, ... with such institution thereof in manner or for any body company, politic persons any or other corpo- or and one or more of such do act rate, individual, any object any conspiracy, or or effect of each to deceive officer, auditor, agent examiner more im- or of shall fined not than or department years, agency prisoned such institution or of than or both. of more five list of loans, (18 “approved aiding abetting FLBNO placed the same §§ 2), attorneys” 1006 and closing U.S.C. three of counts loan 1974. making Land false statements on Federal became the “retained counsel” for the (18 forms Bank U.S.C. FLBAR on December position a February he held until 1980. A third (1) he appeal, Taylor contends On codefendant, Gulledge, president Robert any capacity with” not “connected Baldwin National Bank in Baldwin purposes Bank the Federal Land County, Alabama, money borrowed from 1006, (2) evidence 657 and FLBAR in 1977 and 1980.5 (3) insufficient, the evi- misapplication was was insuffi- participation dence unlawful A. The Transactions Relevant discre- cient, (4) abused its the trial court charges severance, (5) case in this stemmed grant by refusing to tion right involving several transactions farm land denied him the the trial court (6) Alabama, cross-examination, County, court Baldwin the trial between complete financed, him provided The transactions should have appeal. purposes large part, through of his transcript arranged loans trial the evidence FLBAR Payne contends and the transac- FLBNO. The insufficient, (2) the evi- appeal tions relevant to this include following: aided abetted dence he *5 insufficient, (3) participation was unlawful (1) The Bonner-Dale Taylor-Thead the requires doctrine “exculpatory no” the convictions, Transactions of his false statement reversal (4) questions on the Land Bank the Federal 1975, Jerry and Merrill Bonner bor- “vague ambiguous,” forms were $200,000 FLBAR, using from the rowed insufficient, conspiracy the evidence of was County, 400 acres of land in Baldwin Ala- (6) the trial court abused its discretion bama, the security as for loan. The annual refusing grant a to severance. 1. payments May the loan were due each May 1,1979, Bonners make hold the introduced at On the failed to We evidence 15, payment. May to that ei- the loan trial was insufficient establish scheduled On Taylor Payne misapplied Jerry Payne Federal think- ther or Bonner told that he was funds, portion Bank and we reverse ing selling Land therefore about a of the 400 acres misapplication convictions. appellants’ help payment. the the to make overdue loan claims, remaining reject appellants’ suggested Lloyd Tay- We to Bonner that however, remain- affirm all of their might prop- and we buying lor interested Lloyd Taylor convictions. The erty. Bonners met with brother, Taylor, a and his Dale to discuss I. FACTS 1979, 28, Lloyd possible sale. On June The Federal Land Bank of New Orleans (as Farms, T a secretary of & T (FLBNO) one of twelve Federal Land consisting of and Dale partnership Lloyd by Congress Banks handle the created pur- a Taylor) and the Bonners executed special credit needs of farmers. The agreement portion chase for a 140-acre provides FLBNO loan funds to borrowers $290,000. property September for On through Bank thirty-three Federal Land 3, 1979, right purchase the 140 acres Associations, including the Federal Land Taylor. assigned was to Dale Robertsdale, Bank Association of Alabama June, Meanwhile, (FLBAR). began May sometime Appellant Weldon Payne suggested to Edward Ronald working FLBAR in and be- purchase 140 acres Appellant its Thead Thead president came 1978. 3,1979, Lloyd July Thead Lloyd Taylor, lawyer, Taylor. real was On a estate Cir.1984). Gulledge separate appeal filed a in this case. Gulledge, See States v. (as Lloyd Taylor secretary T of T & Thead also wrote two Tay- checks to Dale Farms) lor, $38,900 one option executed an for the 140 for $3,100. and one for $38,900 $363,000. $2,000 The paid represented acres for check Thead for the remain- proceeds der of the option. July August, Thead the earlier FLBAR loan that Thead had set told that he aside at the did not intend to exer- di- Payne. rection of Lloyd Taylor again option. Payne encouraged cise the Thead served as loan closing attorney for complete purchase and offered to Thead. defer payments or make the loan for Thead in the event Thead could not make those $226,450 paid The to Dale payments himself. Thead on deposited October the trust Lloyd Taylor’s account of law September On Dale com- firm and Taylor. credited to Dale pleted purchase (out of 60 acres of the day, $175,000 same a check was written acres) total of 140 from the Bonners for from the pay trust account to the Bonners. $110,000. Immediately thereafter, Dale check, A $4,500, second payable Taylor resold the 60 acres to Thead for cash, was written from the trust account $135,000. purchase Thead financed his by Lloyd Taylor. was cashed A third portion proceeds $297,000 of a check, $20,000, was written from the loan from the FLBAR. At closing, Taylor. trust account to Lloyd Taylor Dale Payne instructed Thead to set aside and $20,000 endorsed the deposited check and it $38,990.44 save proceeds. out of the loan in the partnership account of T & T Farms. Lloyd Taylor closing served as the loan Between October 5 and Lloyd October attorney for Thead. Taylor wrote three part- checks from the $135,000 paid Taylor by to Dale nership account, payable cash, in the September 26, 1979, Thead on deposit- $4,500, $9,000, $8,000. amounts of ed in partnership account of T & T Lloyd Taylor cashed the three checks. day, Farms. The same cheek These transactions formed basis for was written from partnership account Counts Four (charging Lloyd and Five Tay *6 pay check, to the Bonners. A second for Payne lor and with participation unlawful $11,000, was partnership written from the proceeds in the of Federal Land Bank account to the Lloyd Tay- trust account of loans, aiding abetting same, or and in deposit lor’s law firm. The in the trust §§ violation of 18 2) U.S.C. 1006 and and account was Taylor. credited to Dale On Counts (charging Lloyd Six and Seven Tay September 27, Lloyd Taylor $4,500 wrote a lor and Payne with of Feder check, payable cash, to from the trust ac- al Land Bank in funds violation of 18 September 28, count. Lloyd Taylor On § 657).6 addition, U.S.C. In six of the again $4,500 check, wrote a payable to twenty-five overt acts listed Count One cash, from the Lloyd Taylor trust account. (charging Lloyd Taylor, Payne, and Gul $4,500 checks, cashed both of the which ledge conspiracy with in violation of 18 Taylor were debited to Dale on the trust § 371) U.S.C. were related to these transac ledger account card. Lloyd Taylor tions. Payne and both were Four, Five, Six, convicted on Taylor complet- On October Counts Dale and Seven. purchase ed the remaining 80 acres $180,000.

from the Bonners for Immedi- (2) The Lipscomb-Dale Taylor- Dial & thereafter, ately Dale resold the 80 Daugherty Transactions $226,450. acres to Thead Thead fi- for purchase, pro- nanced his part, with the August, Payne encouraged Wil- $195,000 ceeds of a the FLBAR. Daugherty purchase loan from liam a 60-acre tract government’s attorney, These also formed the basis for motion 6. transactions who ad- (charging Payne making Count with Seventeen mitted that support the evidence would Land Bank false statements application a Federal loan finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on U.S.C. At in violation of 18 charge making false statements. trial, Count Seventeen on a the court dismissed Matthew Dial and to Dale Law- debited trust of land owned occasion, Payne ledger account card. Lipscomb. On one rence Daugherty would have to indicated that These transactions formed the basis for $1,000 purchase price only out of pay (charging Lloyd Counts Ten and Eleven acres; paid the balance would be for the 60 misapplication of Taylor and FLBAR, would receive part by of 18 Federal Land Bank funds violation part by Lloyd mortgage, and a first § 657) (charging Twelve and Count Taylor, receive a second mort- who would par- Lloyd Taylor and with unlawful gage. ticipation proceeds in the of a Federal Land loan, same, 20, 1979, Taylor paid aiding abetting August Lloyd Bank On 2). In option for an to in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1006and Lipscomb Dial and $100 $102,000. addition, twenty-five acres for On five of the overt acts purchase the 60 24, Daugherty an offer to listed in related to these August executed Count One were Lloyd Taylor Lloyd Taylor purchase the 60 acres from transactions. both Eleven, $132,000 $1,000 Ten, pay- for made a down were convicted on Counts purchase price. ment on the On October Twelve. conveyed Lipscomb Dial and Taylor-Styron The Creamer-Dale directly Daugherty. On Octo- 60 acres Transactions $110,000 Daugherty loan

ber obtained paid the FLBAR and out of 3, 1980, January Lloyd Taylor On exe- Daugh- proceeds Taylor. the loan to Dale option purchase an 318 acres cuted erty mortgage also a second executed $450,000. land from Howard Creamer for $27,000. Lloyd Taylor Dale for Subsequently, Payne contacted Herman closing attorney served as the loan farmer, Styron, and informed him a local Daugherty. property” that the “Creamer sale. Styron Lloyd Taylor then met with December, 1979, Payne Daugher- told Payne. Payne Styron Styron told if loan, ty, who also held an earlier FLBAR payment, was unable to make his first loan outstanding FLBAR loans that his two loan; the FLBAR would reamortize would have to be consolidated. On Janu- furthermore, Styron if to make was unable ary Daugherty obtained an payment, Payne pur- his second loan would $250,000. pro- FLBAR loan for Out property. January chase the On about remaining outstanding ceeds after the two 8, Styron purchase executed a contract off, $27,500 paid FLBAR loans were $534,- Taylor for Lloyd the 318 acres from paid Taylor. Lloyd Taylor again to Dale *7 closing attorney loan for served as the Daugherty. 29,1980, February conveyed Creamer On directly Styron. Styron to the 318 acres $27,500 paid Taylor by The to Dale part, in purchase, financed his with 14,1980, Daugherty January depos- on was $444,000 proceeds loan from the of a Lloyd Taylor’s ited in the trust account of $400,000 proceeds, of the FLBAR. Out loan Taylor. firm and credited to Dale On law $15,000 paid paid to and was was Creamer 15, Lloyd Taylor January wrote two checks addition, Styron Taylor. Dale In exe- to Taylor. from the account to Dale trust $50,000 mortgage for and a cuted a second checks, to- Lloyd Taylor deposited the two $69,240, mortgage third for both to Dale $14,000, talling partnership in the account assigned Taylor. Taylor Dale the second a Lloyd Taylor of T T Farms. also wrote & mortgage Lloyd Taylor to Creamer. cash, $5,000 check, from the payable to attorney closing as the loan served January January 17 and trust account. On Styron. $5,000 Lloyd Taylor checks wrote $15,000 paid Taylor by Styr- cash, trust Dale $3,000, from the payable to and 29, 1980, February deposited on on in the three cashed Lloyd Taylor account. Lloyd cash, the trust account of law all of which payable checks made $650,000. proceeds Taylor. to Dale On loan for firm and credited $5,000 used, Taylor part, purchase Lloyd wrote two loan were March $480,000. checks, Taylor Gulledge Lloyd one to Dale and the other acres cash, from the payable Taylor closing attorney trust account. as the loan served $2,000 Lloyd Taylor March wrote a On for Schoen. cash, check, payable to from the trust ac- Payne It later revealed that had 26, Lloyd Taylor count. On March wrote been, times, partner all relevant at 50% $3,400 Taylor check to Dale from the trust Gulledge March, with the 320 acres. Taylor account. The two checks to Dale $22,732.73 Payne paid half of the deposited partnership in the account mortgage payment annual on the 320 Lloyd Taylor of T & T Farms. cashed the 1978, Payne Gulledge acres. In late and cash, payable checks made both of two signed a document acknowledging that were debited to Dale each owned a interest in the 320 50% acres. ledger trust account card. The document was backdated to March These transactions formed the basis for Finally, 4, 1979, January on Gul- (charging Lloyd Taylor and Count Thirteen $113,646.57, ledge paid Payne representing Payne with of Federal Land profit half realized on the sale of the § 657) Bank funds violation of U.S.C. 320 acres to Schoen. (charging Lloyd Taylor Fourteen and Count These transactions formed the basis for participation in with unlawful (charging Payne Gulledge Count Two loan, proceeds Federal Land Bank of a participation proceeds with unlawful in the same, abetting aiding and viola loan, aiding of a Federal Land Bank §§ 2).7 1006 and In addi

tion of 18 U.S.C. same, abetting the in violation of 18 U.S.C. tion, twenty-five acts list four of the overt At the conclusion 1006 and related to these ed Count One were trial, the court instructed not to Lloyd transactions. both eight consider overt acts related to were convicted on Counts Thirteen deliberating transactions these while on Fourteen. Count One. was convicted on Count Two, appeal and he does not that convic- Estate-Gulledge-Schoen The Clarke tion. Transactions January, Gulledge, Robert (5) The Farms-Baldwin Machine- Bank in president of Baldwin National Gulf Gulledge Transactions Alabama, County, friend of Baldwin and a per Payne’s, submitted a bid of acre $735 17,1979, Lloyd Taylor paid On November a 320-acre tract of land owned 90-day option to to Gulf Farms for a and, accepted Clarke Estate. The bid was $534,000. purchase 320 acres of land for 8, 1977, Gulledge completed the on March January Lloyd Taylor created On $235,200. purchase of the 320 acres for Corporation. Machine Bow- Baldwin S.D. Gulledge purchase his financed designated president man was of Bald- $250,000 loan from the proceeds of a Machine, but Dale owned win 90% Lloyd Taylor served as the loan *8 FLBAR. 14, 1980, February corporation. of the On closing attorney Gulledge. for $5,000 Taylor paid 90-day another Lloyd for option February the 320 acres. On May, talked with on Otto Schoen Lloyd Taylor assigned option to Dale Gulledge purchasing acres. about Taylor. March Dale as- $1,500 On Gulledge price per set a acre. On signed option to Baldwin Machine. FLBAR January closed an Schoen 1006). could not reach a verdict on for 7. These transactions also formed the basis Fifteen, (charging unlawful Count and the a mistrial Count Fifteen with court declared participation Land in of a Federal the benefits that count. as to mortgage U.S.C. Bank of 18 release in violation 31, 1980, (as in management either operations), On March S.D. Bowman Machine) president completed otherwise, of Baldwin or function which con- purchase of the acres from Gulf any part your during sumes time $534,000. Immediately Farms for there- hours, normal business or which after, sold the 320 S.D. Bowman acres might any way in whatsoever con- $768,000. Gulledge Gulledge for Robert your flict with the interest of associ- purchase, part, financed his with the ation and/or Bank and interfere $570,000 proceeds of a loan from the your ability discharge with your proceeds, $534,- FLBAR. Out of the loan duties? paid 000 was to Baldwin Machine. On the The “no” questions answers to these were day, Gulledge, Taylor, same Dale and S.D. false; during period the entire covered (as president Machine) Bowman of Baldwin Form, Conflict of Interest was a agreement providing executed an that Gul- partner Gulledge, with 50% who was a bor ledge pay would not have difference FLBAR, rower of the ownership purchase price $768,- between listed purchased the 320 acres from the Clarke payment Gulledge and the Estate.8 proceeds. agree- made from the loan provided ment Gulledge also would Count Three concerned the 1979 Conflict Taylor two-thirds of the pay profits Dale Form, covering of Interest period from any acres, future lease or resale of the 320 12,1978 April 17,1979, January in which while Dale would make two-thirds Payne following answered “no” to the mortgage payments of the on the 320 acres questions: until such lease or resale. you participated 1. Have in the deliber- These transactions did not form the basis upon any question ations affecting any charges against Lloyd substantive your interest or any person those of Payne. twenty-five Two of the you related to or of a business or- One, however, overt acts listed in Count ganization you in which are interest- related these transactions. ed? you fee, accepted any salary, 2. Have B. The Interest Forms Conflict of commission, honorarium, gift or fa- Payne was also convicted on Counts any parties vor from of the outlined

Three, Eight, Nine, charged which him 2160(c)(1)? making with false statements on Conflict you 3. Have entered any into of the annually of Interest Forms filed with the transactions outlined in (18 Federal Section Land Bank 2160(c)(2),wherein the consideration Count Nine concerned the 1978 Conflict $1,000.00? exceeded Form, of Interest covering period April 12, April 1977 to in which you 6. participated Have in a transac- following answered “no” to the involving purchase tion or sale questions: stocks, bonds, estate, etc., real you

7. Have had a business relation- purely speculative purposes, ship any parties outlined might tend to interfere with 2160(f)? in Section proper impartial perform- your ance of you engaged any bring 11. Are duties or discred- other busi- farming activity (including upon ness or it an association or the Bank? 2160(f) Administra- Section of the Farm Credit with a "borrower" ... of the Farm Cred- ____ regulations provided pertinent part: tion employer; it institution which is his officer, 612.2160(f) (1980), agent employee, 12 C.F.R. § A salaried codified in its System: Credit *9 institution of the Farm current form at 12 C.F.R. 612.- relation, (f) 2150(c)(1)(1984). business direct- shall not have a ly indirectly, or

853 2). Lloyd any Taylor and and you received considera- both 10. Have were convicted on Count One. any the sale or transfer of tion from acquired estate for resale? real D. The Sentences questions to these were The “no” answers Taylor Lloyd and each received a false; by during period covered suspended custody years sentence and five Form, Payne a of Interest was Conflict 50% special probation, of with the condition that Gulledge in the 320 partner the sale of with perform community 350 hours of each ser- addition, Payne In re- acres to Schoen. addition, In vice. each was fined a total of $113,646.57 proceeds out of the ceived $50,000, with the amount of the fine to be loan that was used Schoen the FLBAR any reduced the amount of restitution purchase the 320 acres. paid FLBAR or the FLBNO. Eight Count concerned 1980 Conflict II. TAYLOR Form, covering period of Interest February Taylor January any 1979 to A. “connected in ca- Was pacity Purposes “no” the same with” the Bank answered §§ Questions 657 and 1006? appeared 7 and 11 that U.S.C. The “no” of Interest Form. Conflict statute, misapplication Both the false; questions to these were answers § 657, participa U.S.C. and the unlawful during by the Conflict period covered statute, tion 18 U.S.C. under which Form, Payne partner Interest was a Taylor apply anyone was convicted who Thead, was a borrower of the with who officer, agent employee is “an or of or FLBAR, farming operation. Further- a any capacity any connected in with ... land more, Payne partner Daugher- a with was Tay bank intermediate credit bank.” [or] FLBAR, in ty, who was borrower inap lor contends that the two statutes are used car business. plicable he because “connected any capacity govern with” the bank.9 The Conspiracy Charge C. The ment, hand, other contends that Taylor’s dual roles as “retained counsel” One, Lloyd Taylor, Payne, and Count closing for the FLBAR and attorney” “loan Gulledge charged conspiracy to placed for the transactions him relevant offenses, following either as commit the scope squarely within the of the two stat (1) aiders and abettors: principals or as government, agree We with the utes. proceeds participation in the unlawful Taylor hold that was “connected in we Federal Land Bank loans and benefits of purposes capacity with” the bank for of 18 §§ (18 other transactions U.S.C. §§ U.S.C. 657 and 1006. 2); (2) making false statements on Federal §§ (18 Land Bank forms U.S.C. 1006 and undisputed It is served as the 2); (3) making false statements to influence closing attorney” “loan for each of the approval of Federal Land Bank loans transactions relevant to the instant case. §§ (18 Taylor contends, mortgage however, releases U.S.C. that as “loan 2); (4) falsifying, concealing, and mak- closing attorney” represented he the bor agency false statements to an or de- rower and not the bank. He cites United (18 (5th partment Musgrave, of the United States U.S.C. 444 F.2d 755 States Cir. §§ 2); 1971), denied, 414 1001 and U.S. S.Ct. (18 (1973),10 propo- L.Ed.2d 315 Land Bank funds Federal Circuit, in the en banc 10. The Eleventh evidence introduced at trial established decision 9. The Prichard, "employee” City was not an of the bank. Bonner v. addition, government apparently Cir.1981), does not adopted precedent as decisions an "officer" or an contend prior Circuit rendered of the former Fifth "agent” of the bank. October purposes opinion, this "the For bank” re- FLBNO, FLBAR, the fers to the both. *10 closing attorney” quirement, sition is not the Bank relies on that a “loan the attor- any capacity with” the “connected bank ney title. who certifies This reliance on §§ purposes of 18 U.S.C. 657 and 1006. attorney’s professional exercise of Taylor’s Musgrave reliance on We find judgment is the essence lawyer- First, completely misplaced. although the relationship____ client court in reversed the convictions Musgrave closing attorney performs also of a “loan closing attorney” under 18 other services for the Bank besides certi- §§ the decision turned fying examination, the title: title recor- sufficiency of the evidence concern- instruments, mortgage dation of the ing attorney’s “intent to defraud” the preparation notes, deeds, financing bank, attorney was “con- not whether statements, security agreements, any capacity nected with” bank. See sure, agreements. loan To be these ser- Furthermore, contrary at 759-760. id. provide vices also a benefit to the bor- assertion, Taylor’s Musgrave court did rower. And it is the borrower who not rule that a closing “loan attorney” is makes the final attorney selection an the reach of the outside two statutes. pays Nevertheless, for his services. Rather, discussing the “intent to de- it attorney is the reliance on the to fulfill issue, merely the court noted fraud” that legal obligation the Bank’s only to take attorney duty no to the violated bank distinguishes first liens which between “acting closing agent because as a in a loan services which otherwise benefit agency transaction does not create an equally. and the employer-employee relationship bank borrower That between closing agent lending only partial and the institu- the Bank makes choice of tion.” at 760. Id. Nowhere did Mus- attorney its does not alter that the choice state, grave imply, court or even that a belongs Payment to the Bank. closing attorney” “loan is not “connected in attorney’s merely represents services ... any capacity with” the bank. an allocation of the costs of the loan. The borrower remains free to hire an Finally, if even we were to conclude that attorney represent contention, his own Musgrave supported Taylor’s interests support processing application. that would undermined the loan Sibley more recent decision in v. Federal (footnote omitted). Id. at 462-63 light Bank, (5th Cir.), Land 597 F.2d 459 Sibley, simply accept we cannot denied, 444 U.S. closing attorney” that a “loan is contention (1979). L.Ed.2d 308 Sibley, civil case any capacity not “connected in with” the involving the same Federal Land Bank as bank.11 case, explained the instant the court that a argues, however, further closing “loan attorney” represents that his “connection” with the bank was bank and not the borrower: insufficient to sustain his convictions under Analysis played by of the role the out- 18 U.S.C. 657 and 1006. con attorney side who handles the loan clos- tends in order to be convicted under attorney’s primary indicates that the statutes, the two he must have had some duty By is to the Bank. the terms of its wrongful “control” over act statutory mandate, regulatory “[t]he alleges that, caused harm to the bank. He principal function of the Federal Land capacities in his as “retained counsel” and mortgage Bank is to make first loans on lands____” closing “loan attorney,” he farm had absolutely C.F.R. 600.20 (1978). loan-making process. no “control” over the by lending It meets this function Therefore, only security argues is he his where its a first lien. To convictions security ascertain that its meets this re- under the two statutes reversed. should be 11. Because we conclude closing concerning at- attorney” a "loan his role as “retained torney" any capacity "connected in with" the FLBAR. bank, Taylor’s arguments not address we need *11 by Taylor’s makers will not argu policy to ensure that unpersuaded We are essentially that we should ment, is personal influenced their interests but meaning statutory the of ignore plain federally keep insured also lenders fraud____ the two statutes and “read into” language We free construe the Although the requirement. a “control” broadly and hold that statute Kice was im have stated or in cases courts several any capacity “connected with” [the is a defendants’ “control” plied that association]. determining or not the whether factor (citation omitted). at 693 Id. any capaci “connected defendants were bank, see, e.g., States ty with” the United agree We with the Ninth Circuit in Rice Cir.1984), (11th Gregory, 730 F.2d 692 v. statutory phrase, “connected in 3291 petition filed, cert. 53 U.S.L.W. with,” any capacity broadly should be con- (U.S. 26,1984); Dre Sept. States v. United strued order best to effectuate the Con- (9th Cir.1978), itzler, cert. 577 F.2d 539 gressional purpose keeping federal 921, 1246, denied, 59 440 U.S. 99 S.Ct. federally banks insured lenders free (1979); Ed L.Ed.2d 473 States v. United from fraud. We therefore hold that Cir.1970); ick, (4th 432 F.2d 350 Garrett v. sufficiently “connected with” the bank Cir.), (5th States, 489 cert. United §§ purposes of 18 657 and U.S.C. 1006. 952, 374, denied, 21 393 89 S.Ct. U.S. (1968), found no L.Ed.2d 364 we have cases, any, holding nor has cited B. Was the Evidence Sufficient requirement under 18

that “control” is a Taylor Misapplication? Convict contrary, and 1006. On the U.S.C. 657 govern Taylor contends that the reached the that the Ninth Circuit we note produce ment failed to evidence sufficient factually in the analo opposite conclusion him of under 18 to convict Rice, 645 gous case of v. United States 657. The four elements (9th Cir.), denied, cert. 454 U.S. F.2d 691 (1) misapplication are: the accused crime of (1981). 862, 318, 70 L.Ed.2d 160 required have the connection with must Rice, defendant, a consultant for a bank; (2) must have the federal the bank savings and loan associa federally insured statute; particular specified nexus tion, mortgage originate first was hired to (3) willfully misap the accused must have property. of residential loans on units bank; plied belonging to the right approve or funds retained the association an intent the accused must have acted with disapprove the loans. The defendant se association, injure for the or defraud the bank. See United cured three borrowers Christo, 486, (5th F.2d 490 personally charging each borrower a fee of v. 614 States Farrell, Cir.1980); percent of the amount of v. 609 one-and-one-half United States charged (5th Cir.1980); the loan. The defendant was F.2d 818 United States and convicted of three counts of unlawful (5th 1302, 1305 n. 3 Southers, F.2d v. § 1006. He participation under 18 U.S.C. Mann, 517 F.2d Cir.1978); v. States grounds appealed his convictions on denied, Cir.1975), (5th cert. he no “control” over the because had 47 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. U.S. disapproval of the approval or ultimate States, 396 F.2d (1976); v. United Garrett loans, sufficiently he not “connected denied, Cir.), 393 U.S. (5th 489, 491 the association. The Ninth Circuit with” (1968). 21 L.Ed.2d 952, 89 S.Ct. convictions, stating simply: affirmed sufficiency of the challenge to the Taylor’s ex- “willfully the federal mis Because to both relates evidence mar- tensively in the financial involved elements to defraud” “intent applied”

kets, only 1006 was enacted must Section We misapplication.12 the crime Taylor’s momentarily issue, our discussion defer we of this our resolution Because of if, falsely

sustain taking convictions the loans inflated Payne, government, most view favorable to initially per apply reasonable could have found that suaded the borrowers guilt beyond persuaded evidence established a reason loans and later them not to back Bell, United States closing able doubt. allegations, out of the loans. These 1982) (en B adequately proven, might Cir. Unit if have constitut banc), grounds, on other misapplication” 462 U.S. ed “willful of bank funds. *12 aff'd 356, (1983).13 See, 2398, e.g., Riebold, 103 S.Ct. 76 L.Ed.2d 638 United States v. 557 denied, (10th Cir.), cert. F.2d 697 434 U.S. initially We note the term “will 860, 186, (1977); 98 S.Ct. 54 L.Ed.2d 133 fully misapplied” simple has no definition. Schmidt, United States v. (3d 471 F.2d 385 generally Courts have stated that a defend Cir.1972). indicates, however, The record “willfully ant misapplies” by bank funds government that the prov fell far short of use, benefit, converting them to the gain allegations. these party. of the defendant or a third Britton, government’s The States v. 666-67, sole witness with re- 107 U.S. 2 spect 512, 522, (1882); projections, to the income Chris David S.Ct. L.Ed. 520 to, Howse, 490; president the current United States v. Wil 614 F.2d at the FLBAR, son, testified Cir.1974), on direct examination denied, Payne’s projections U.S. first loan (1975). made to reveal, Thead were not L.Ed.2d The cases “reasonable.” how However, ever, substantially that “the Howse by methods used bank recanted offi testimony this misapply on cross-examination and cials funds entrusted to again on only them are redirect examination. He by knowledge limited their admit- banking ted that minor procedures predicted crop variations in vigorous and a yields predicted imagination.” The Federal O’Malley, livestock amounts Liability Criminal major would result Bank Personnel variations in the in- Statute, projections, come Misapplication Under and he further admitted Banking (1982). Payne’s that he could not L.J. characterize esti- Neverthe less, mates on examining after these matters as the- record in “outside the this case, realm of completed we find that the reason.” After Howse evidence was insuffi testimony, his government cient to allow a reasonable moved to to con clude, Seventeen, beyond doubt, charged dismiss Count Tay a reasonable “willfully violating with misapplied” lor false statement stat- bank funds. ute falsifying projection the income original gravamen govern- The of the loan, the first Thead for lack of sufficient against ment’s case both evidence. granted govern- The court Payne, theory present- and the ment’s motion to dismiss. Howse was not government’s ed opening argument upon testify again called for the remain- trial, at was that the two men were instru- der of the trial. arranging mental in loans that should not have been made because the government borrowers did introduce evidence were not credit-worthy and the tending prove that, loans were respect with to three government undersecured. The sought to loans, of the five relevant the statements prove that reports financial filed with of available cash in reports the financial the bank in appli- connection the loan may However, have been inflated. cations contained projections false income small, amounts of cash involved were that had supplied by Payne, been amounting that the in each instance to less than appraised values of the land used to percent secure five assets listed in total Circuit, B,

"intent to defraud" claim. See section II. 13. Decisions of the Fifth former Unit infra C. September binding rendered after are precedent Reynolds in this circuit. Stein v. Se- curities, Inc., (11th Cir.1982). 667 Furthermore, government government’s case-in-chief did in- because reports. discrepancies that the original that the any troduced no evidence not include evidence cash of available would Hickman, the statements appraisals based on the made the decision whether material to have been by Payne, “suggested” values the loans. approve or not to way the “fair and reason- inconsistent with properties. market values” of the able encountered similar dif- evidence about the presenting ficulties stated, Simply the record in this case ease-in-chief, the During its land values. support conclusion that does not Hickman, a field- government called James relevant loans should not have been five appraiser with the representative record, appears in the made. For all that signed the prepared FLBAR who had may perfectly have been ac borrowers all five of the appraisals in connection with ceptable the loans at the candidates for on direct loans. Hickman testified relevant approved time the loans were and made.14 “suggested” had examination that fact, light of this whether or not *13 properties used as value for each of the encouraged the to take out the borrowers security respective for the loans. each Furthermore, import. loans is of no the case, eventually appraised the Hickman record does not establish that the loans “suggest- at the had been land value that Although proper undersecured. were the However, by Payne. ed” Hickman never appraised greatly ex ties were at values “suggested” testified that the values were ceeding prices paid by Taylor acquire the to fact, any way. inflated or erroneous them, alone, discrepancy, standing such a attempted Payne’s attorney to cross- when appraisals does not that the were establish opinion Hickman his of the examine about opinion, equal inflated. In our it is at least properties, actual values of the the court ly likely prices paid by Taylor that restricted the cross-examination because the were given “any testimony low, rel- unrealistically Hickman had not either the because sales property” on ative to the value of this Taylor took ad were distressed or because examination. direct vantage Because the of the sellers. government prove either failed to that the Later, case, part the as of its rebuttal credit-worthy were not or that borrowers Anderson, government called Kermit a sen- undersecured, loans we hold that the were appraiser analyst ior credit with the to the evidence was insufficient establish FLBNO, testimony attempted to solicit Taylor misapplied simply funds that bank actual of a from Anderson about the value arrange by helping to the five relevant particular parcel of land. court refus- permit testimony on rebuttal loans.15 ed to such loans, obligated Taylor government’s argument pay borrow- back the 14. The the creditworthy guilty misapplication. be not seems to be based could still found ers were See, e.g., Krepps, 605 F.2d 101 primarily post that the United States v. on the hoc observation (3d Cir.1979); Kennedy, eventually up v. 564 ended in default. United States borrowers Cir.1977), denied, However, (9th hindsight inappropriate 435 U.S. F.2d 1329 944, cert. the use of (1978). determining making But the of a 98 S.Ct. 55 L.Ed.2d 541 whether or not Gens, (1st 216 misapplication funds. see United States v. of bank loan constitutes by govern Cir. ment, however, All of the cases cited the through involved loans obtained to es

15. We also find the evidence insufficient applications be filed "straw man” borrowers Taylor misapplied funds under bank tablish that the real borrowers could not have secured cause theory misapplication. For exam other Here, directly from the bank. loans prove government that the ple, the failed hand, named used the loan other the borrowers pay obligated the back borrowers were not purchase respective proceeds the themselves to See, King, F.2d e.g., v. 484 United States loans. Taylor. properties this case does denied, Because Cir.1973), 416 U.S. cert. 924 borrowers, the cases not involve "straw man” (1974); L.Ed.2d government inapposite. cited the are (3d Cir.), Moraites, States denied, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d government U.S. Finally, evi- the introduced no argues appeal (1972). great- dence that the amounts of the loans were credit-worthy were prices paid by borrowers if the the even er than the borrowers Taylor’s unusual, at unprecedented. do not condone conduct was least if We not Although Lloyd Taylor connection with the transactions involved both Dale and testi- Taylor may guilty this ease. of defraud fied that the cash turned .over to Dale. properties, Taylor, jury and at purchasers of the the was entitled to discount very engaged testimony. least in unethical self- such We find that a reasonable dealing. jury beyond But involves could have concluded a reason- bank, against against Lloyd Taylor “partici- crime able doubt opinion, pate[d] directly In our in or bank’s customers. share[d] receive[d] support indirectly” portion proceeds record does not the conclusion that “willfully misapplied” funds Taylor bank relevant loans. meaning of 18 U.S.C. within element, respect With to the “intent”' was insufficient to Because the evidence most, all, evidence indicated that if not jury beyond to conclude allow a reasonable negotiations preceding each of the rele- guilty a reasonable doubt by Lloyd vant transactions were conducted misapplication, must we reverse instance, Taylor. In all Lloyd Tay- but one misapplication convictions.16 personally acquired rights pur- lor subject properties. chase the Sometime C. the Evidence Was Sufficient prior closings, Lloyd Taylor assigned to the Convict Partic- Unlawful rights subject properties his to Dale ipation? Taylor. We find that a reasonable govern- also contends that inferred, could have from the manner in produce ment failed to sufficient evidence subject properties acquired, *14 participation to convict him of unlawful Lloyd Taylor “pulling that it who was § specifically, under 18 1006. More strings,” Lloyd Taylor and that used Taylor contends that the failed to evidence personal his brother to conceal his own (1) “participate[d] that he establish or in the involvement relevant transactions. directly or or indirect- share[d] receive[d] on this inference and the aforemen- Based ly” any part proceeds of the of the relevant concerning proceeds tioned evidence of requisite loans and that he had the loans, find that the relevant we a reason- “intent to defraud” the bank. jury beyond have concluded able could Lloyd Taylor reasonable doubt that had the The evidence introduced at trial indi requisite “intent defraud” the bank. We that, shortly proceeds cated after the" of that the therefore hold evidence introduced each of the relevant loans were disbursed at trial was sufficient to establish all of the placed Taylor to Dale in either the partici- elements of the crime of unlawful Lloyd Taylor’s trust account of law firm or pation under 18 U.S.C. 1006. Farms, partnership account of T T& Lloyd Taylor wrote and cashed several D. Was the Evidence Sufficient large payable checks made to cash from Taylor Conspiracy? Convict of the same accounts. The evidence also indi practice writing large Taylor govern cated that contends that the cash from produce checks to those two accounts ment failed to evidence sufficient Here, respective properties. "willfully misapplied" This case is therefore dis- bank funds. Farrell, hand, tinguishable from United States v. other the record contains no evidence Farrell, (5th Cir.1980). F.2d 816 ant, In the defend- greater that the amounts of the loans were than bank, employee an of a state was convicted necessary legitimate purposes to achieve the misapplication. loans, on three counts The defend- namely, purchases respec- of the time, and, ant sold three at the same ar- cars properties. tive ranged pur- to the for the bank to make loans knowledge arguments appeal, chasers of the Without the fifth and sixth on cars. 16. concerning right approval ar- purchasers, the defendant his of cross-examination and of the exceeding ranged greatly right complete transcript, his to a trial relate for loans in amounts cars, solely validity purchase prices and the defend- of his con- up Taylor’s misappli- the excess we accomplice divided victions. Because reverse ant and an ground, proceeds held the evi- cation on The court convictions another we do of the loans. arguments. the defendant not address these dence to establish that sufficient conspiracy in transactions con him of violation when the relevant to convict he that a admits that find reasonable 18 U.S.C. summated. We alleged beyond several of the overt acts committed concluded could have reasonable indictment, argues he that none in the but doubt, inferences drawn from the based illegal. he committed were of the overt acts circumstances, Taylor conspired addition, Taylor admits that his acts Payne and that knew the essential purposes furthered several of the of the conspiracy. We nature of the hold that the indictment, alleged in conspiracy but he sufficient to convict evidence was argues purposes of the he fur that none conspiracy to violate various false state illegal. Taylor contends that thered were participation ment and unlawful statutes as of, knowledge committed he had no no alleged in indictment.17 of, any illegal purposes acts in furtherance conspiracy alleged in the indictment. E. Did Trial Court Abuse Its Dis- First, “it These contentions are meritless. by Refusing to cretion Grant a Sev- settled that acts which are them well erance? legal legal selves their character when lose Taylor contends that the trial they of an become constituent elements by refusing court abused its discretion Haje scheme.” States v. unlawful United grant a severance so the defendants cate, (5th Cir.1982), 896-97 683 F.2d separately. Taylor’s could tried conten denied, 461 U.S. cert. primarily tion is based on the fact that the (1983)(quoting 77 L.Ed.2d 298 Continental conspiracy complicated involved several Corp., v. Carbide 370 U.S. Ore Co. Union transactions, real estate some of which did 1404, 1415, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 S.Ct. not include all of the defendants. How addition, (1962)). need ever, conspiracy mere fact that the “[t]he prove knowledge a defendant had complex multitudinous and trans involved phases conspiracy. of a of all details actions is no reason for this court to re Rather, enough that the defendant it is denial of the verse the motion to sever conspir the essential nature of the knew ____” Wayman, v. United States States, acy. Blumenthal (5th Cir.), denied, 423 U.S. (1947); *15 68 92 L.Ed. 154 U.S. S.Ct. 846, 84, (1975). 96 S.Ct. 46 L.Ed.2d 67 James, 999, 1011 v. 528 F.2d States United refusing discretion of a trial court denied, 959, (5th Cir.), 429 97 cert. U.S. grant a will not reversed on severance be (1976). 382, Finally, 50 L.Ed.2d 326 S.Ct. appeal unless the can show ac defendants government that the need not we note compelling prejudice, outweighing tual and express agreement the prove an between judicial economy. the interests of United alleged conspirators to violate the law. 516, (5th Wolford, v. 614 F.2d 518 States Rather, may in purpose the common be Cir.1980). the ferred from circumstances. Glasser v. States, 62 S.Ct. United U.S. Here, Taylor particu no identifies 469, (1942); James, 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 the of could lar evidence introduction which at 1011. prejudiced said to have him. Further more, the record indicates that the trial case, intro this the evidence frequently jury court cautioned the about Payne at trial that referred duced showed might that have evidence been inadmissible land to potential purchasers sellers and of against some of the defendants. Unit See Taylor, Payne potential that sell persuaded 120, 136(5th Morrow, v. 537 F.2d Taylor, and ed States purchasers ers and to deal with Cir.1976), denied, 956, 97 present cert. 430 U.S. Payne and both by adequate pleadings conspiracy proof misapplication con- of Taylor's Our reversal of validity con- of his victions to commit one of the offenses. United does not affect the alleg- Solomon, 863, spiracy (11th indictment conviction. Where an v. Cir. States 686 F.2d offenses James, conspiracy 1982); es a several to commit 528 F.2d at 1014. States, charge against is sustained the United (“The Nevertheless, L.Ed.2d S.Ct. we find the evidence insuffi- justified is remedy only of severance if support cient to the conclusion Payne joint from a prejudice flowing trial is “willfully misapplied” clear- bank funds within powers ly beyond the curative a caution- meaning of 18 U.S.C. 657. We there- instruction.”)- Finally, ary jury failed Payne’s misapplication fore must reverse Payne Gulledge, to convict convictions. codefendants, on several counts in indictment, indicating that the B. Was Evidence Sufficient give able to of the defendants Aiding individ- Convict and Abet- each ual find that ting consideration. We has Participation Unlawful compelling preju- not shown “actual and Taylor? dice,” and therefore is not entitled to a contends reversal of his convictions on the basis of government produce failed to evidence suf grant the trial court’s refusal to a sever- ficient to aiding abetting convict him of ance. participation unlawful under 18 U.S.C. 1006 and 2. To convict a III. PAYNE aiding defendant of abetting, A. the Evidence Was Sufficient government need not show that the defend Payne Misapplication? Convict “participated ant in every phase of the Payne, Taylor, like contends that criminal venture.” United States v. Hew government produce failed to evidence suf- itt, 1981); 663 F.2d Cir. ficient him to convict un- Diecidue, United States 603 F.2d already der 18 U.S.C. 657. We have dis- (5th Cir.1979), denied, 445 U.S. length Taylor’s cussed at sufficiency of the (1980). 63 L.Ed.2d 781 claim, prior evidence and our discussion Rather, government must show that applicable simply also here. We do not the defendant “was associated with the government believe that the adequately es- venture, participated criminal in it as some Payne “willfully tablished that misapplied” thing about, he bring sought wished to by approving bank funds loans that should by Hewitt, his action to make it succeed.” been made. have 1385; 663 F.2d at United States v. Mar tinez, (5th Cir.1977). addition, we find that the association, prove To the evidence must attempt produce failed its sufficient show that the defendant shared the crimi evidence to establish that received principal. nal intent of the prove partic To “kickbacks,” either from the borrowers or ipation, the evidence must show that the Taylor, approving for his role in defendant committed an designed, overt act See, e.g., five relevant loans. *16 to aid in the success of the venture. Hew Tokoph, States v. 514 F.2d 597 Cir. itt, 1385; 663 F.2d at United States v. only The by evidence introduced Longoria, (5th Cir.1978). 569 F.2d government on this issue consisted of bank Finally, we note that a defendant need not indicating records Payne that made two have a financial in stake a criminal venture large deposits cash in bank accounts he to be aiding abetting. convicted of controlled, one for and the other for Hewitt, 1385; 663 F.2d at United States v. $10,000, shortly after the Thead loan two Harris, 1333, 1336(10th Cir.1971). 441 F.2d closings. We conclude that the bank records, alone, standing were insufficient case, In this the evidence intro to a conclude allow reasonable to be- duced at Payne trial showed that referred yond Payne a that re- reasonable doubt potential purchasers sellers and of land to approv- his role in ceived “kickbacks” for Taylor, Payne persuaded that potential sell ing the loans. purchasers ers and to Taylor, deal with conduct, Taylor’s, cer-

Payne’s Payne arranged like that approval probably by fraudulent. tainly unethical and relevant loans the bank. All these of cuit, designed “exculpatory acts to aid in the is whether constituted overt no” doc- respect prosecutions scheme. With to applicable success trine is under 18 § intent, certainly Payne so, to aware If question U.S.C. second instance, Taylor personally in all one but “exculpatory is whether no” doctrine acquired rights purchase subject Payne’s reversal of requires the false state- assigned rights properties and then those ment convictions. We hold that the “excul- Furthermore, to his the evidence brother. patory applicable no” doctrine is prose- instructed, Payne showed that had been § 1006, cutions under U.S.C. but that occasion, more than one about the “conflict require the doctrine does not the reversal of interest” rules of the bank.18 We find Payne’s false statement convictions. jury could that a reasonable have conclud “exculpatory The no” developed doctrine doubt, beyond ed a reasonable based on § exception 1001,19 as an to 18 U.S.C. evidence, inferences drawn from the false statement designed broad statute Taylor’s participation knew prevent persons fraudulently from assert proceeds improper of the loans was but against, obtaining privileges claims or intentionally assisted nevertheless from, employment perverting or legiti completion of the loans. We there of, mate functions any or fore hold that the was sufficient evidence agencies.20 The “exculpatory its no” Payne guilty aiding abetting to find doctrine, by as formulated this circuit’s participation the unlawful under predecessor, excluded from the coverage of 18 U.S.C. 1006 and 2. § negative 18 U.S.C. 1001 “mere responses “Exculpatory

C. Does the No” Doc- questions propounded ... an investi Require trine the Reversal gating agent during question and answer Payne’s False Statement Convic- conference, not initiated the [defendant].” tions? States, rnostro v. United Pate F.2d (5th Cir.1962). original neg contends that his false basis for the doctrine was that such “mere questions ative answers to certain on Fed negative responses” were outside the in forms, gave eral Land Bank which rise to scope of the statutory prohibition. tended his false statement convictions under 18 Subsequently, began courts recog Id. exculpatory were mere deni nize that the doctrine also derives “at least wrongdoing. Payne als of therefore con part applica from latent distaste for an tends “exculpatory that the so-called no” uncomfortably tion of the statute that is requires doctrine the reversal of his false close to the Fifth Amendment.” statement convictions. This contention United Lambert, presents questions. two distinct States v. first n. (5th Cir.1974)(en question, previously banc); unanswered this cir- see United States distinguishable Snyder provides: 18. This case is U.S.C. 1001 19. 18 States, (8th Cir.1971), 448 F.2d 716 Whoever, any jurisdic- matter within the appeal. Snyder, his cites in brief on any department agency tion of of the Unit- the court reversed the defendants’ convictions falsifies, knowingly willfully ed States aiding abetting embezzlement and mis- trick, scheme, up by any conceals or covers application by president grounds a bank fact, false, any device a material or makes that the evidence was insufficient to establish repre- fictitious or fraudulent statements or the defendants’ criminal intent. The court em- sentations, writing or makes or uses false however, phasized, the defendants "were *17 knowing or document the same to contain inexperienced in business matters and were al- false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or totally dependent president] most on bank [the en#y, shall be fined not more than might for advice. Their conduct be viewed as imprisoned years, not more than five or both. perhaps ap- naive and but does not reckless it Here, pear to be criminal.” Id. at 719. 1001, history 20. For a detailed of 18 U.S.C. see § hand, other it would be difficult to characterize Bramblett, 503, United States v. 348 U.S. S.Ct. 75 employee president long-time a bank bank 504, (1955), 99 L.Ed. 594 and United States v. "inexperienced mat- like in business as Stark, F.Supp. (D.Md.1955). ters” or "naive.” 813, Bush, (5th 818-19 provide v. Cir. Amendment does not “license to 1974). government lie.” The cites Bryson v. 64, States, 396 U.S. 90 S.Ct. government contends that the “ex (1969), L.Ed.2d 264 and United States v. inapplicable culpatory no” doctrine is Knox, 363, 24 396 U.S. 90 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d § prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. 1006. It (1969), proposition for the when argues designed the doctrine that governmental truthful answers to inquiries § scope limit the of 18 broad U.S.C. might incriminating, person’s be lawful inappropriate and would in the be context options under the Fifth Amendment are of a narrow false statement statute such as declining limited to answering to answer or § 1006, applies only 18 U.S.C. honestly. We do not read the two cases so persons “connected with” Federal Land broadly. Banks and other similar institutions. The government also notes that no court has In Bryson, argued defendant previously extended the “exculpatory no” the unconstitutionality McCarthy-era of a § 1001, beyond doctrine 18 U.S.C. requiring cites statute union officials to file a the recent case of Haje United States v. “non-Communist” affidavit with NLRB cate, (5th Cir.1982), 683 F.2d 894 cert. de rendered invalid his 1955 conviction under nied, § 461 U.S. 77 18 making U.S.C. 1001 for a false state- (1983), L.Ed.2d 298 in which the Fifth Cir ment in his Supreme affidavit. The Court suggested cuit in dicta that the doctrine “is However, affirmed the conviction. the de- only a creature of section 1001.” Id. at fendant’s challenge constitutional (emphasis supplied). Clause, based on the Bill of Attainder Amendment, First and the Due Process arguments We find these unpersuasive Clause, not the Fifth Amendment self-in- they only because address the first basis privilege, crimination and the Court there- doctrine, “exculpatory no” namely, fore had opportunity no reason or to ad- negative responses” that “mere may be dress the self-incrimination issue. outside the scope particular intended of a false statement arguments Knox, statute. The the Court reviewed the dismiss- second, fail to address the opin- our al charging of an indictment a defendant equally important, ion violating basis the doc- making U.S.C. 1001 trine, namely, that false statement statutes false statements on certain tax forms filed may applied be in a manner that treads with the I.R.S. argued The defendant “uncomfortably close to the Fifth Amend- “compelled” he was or “coerced” into mak- primarily ment.” It is this solicitude for the false statements because federal Fifth Amendment prevents required values that forms, us law him to file the but attaching liability criminal to conduct truthful subjected answers would have him consisting exculpatory of mere prosecution denials of under Texas law. The de- wrongdoing. See United argument States Ander- fendant based his on the Fifth ez, Cir. Unit B Amendment privilege. self-incrimination emphatically reject suggestion We Supreme that The Court reversed the dismissal government should However, be allowed to of the indictment. in the last person coerce a admitting wrongdoing, paragraph into opinion, of its the Court noted pain prosecution on under 18 that the might prevail defendant be able to § 1006, simply person because the is “con- at on trial his claim that the state- false nected “duress,” with” a Federal Land Bank. In ments were made under or were short, simply refusing we see no “willfully.” basis for not made simply The Court to extend the “exculpatory no” doctrine to held that the claim should not have been prosecutions under pleading stage; 18 U.S.C. 1006. resolved at the appears what a frontal attack We find no Bry- indication either the itself, the “exculpatory son or the opinions no” doctrine Knox Supreme that the Fifth argues repudiated Court has also the “exculpatory no”

863 tion.”). opinion, already rejected only the In our it is Having such doctrine. “exculpa- argument that the that Fifth Amendment government’s cases values are only prosecu- applies doctrine tory implicated “exculpa no” to the extent that the § 1001, See 18 we hold under U.S.C. tory applicable. tions no” doctrine becomes Anderez, prosecutions applicable v. doctrine is 404, United States the 661 F.2d § 1006. under 18 U.S.C. (5th B therefore Unit We 409 Cir. re “exculpatory no” doctrine hold that the for Fifth Although our solicitude of a false statement quires the reversal requires us to extend Amendment values § only if 18 U.S.C. 1006 conviction under prosecu “exculpatory no” doctrine the answers would have truthful affirmative § 1006, however, the tions under 18 U.S.C. incriminating, or if the defendant can been us to limit same considerations lead reasonably he or she believed establish that involving substantial doctrine to cases affirmative answers would truthful real hazards of self-incrimination.21 Cf. Maness v. incriminating. have been Apfelbaum, 115, United States v. Cf. 445 U.S. Meyers, 449, 461, 584, 95 S.Ct. 419 U.S. 956, 128, 948, L.Ed.2d 250 100 63 S.Ct. States, 592, (1975) (Fifth 42 574 Amend L.Ed.2d Marchetti v. United (1980); 390 protection includes evidence that an ment 697, 702, 39, 48, 19 L.Ed.2d 88 U.S. S.Ct. “reasonably individual believes” could be (1968) (“The 889 central standard against prosecution); used him in a criminal privilege’s application [Fifth Amendment] States, v. United 479, 341 U.S. claimant is confront has been whether Hoffman 486, 814, 818, (1951) ‘real,’ merely 71 S.Ct. 95 L.Ed. 1118 and not ed substantial (same).22 incrimina- trifling imaginary, hazards of distinction, “knowledge” merely upon provides reject in some but an "excuse”

21. We relied 1001, statement, making properly “exculpatory U.S.C. char- § no” cases under 18 the false “investigative” between and "administrative" defense” on which acterized as an "affirmative See, e.g., governmental inquiries. proof. States United the defendant must bear the burden of 894, (5th Cir.1982), Hajecate, difficulty requir- v. 683 F.2d 900-01 We see no constitutional 2086, denied, 927, 103 S.Ct. 77 cert. 461 U.S. ing proving to bear the burden of the defendant Bush, (1983); States v. L.Ed.2d 298 reasonably that truth- that he knew or believed 813, (5th Cir.1974). Initially, we 818 n. 2 would have been in- ful affirmative answers legisla that this distinction is based on note criminating. 1001, see Pater § tive intent behind 18 holding between our We also see no conflict States, (5th 311 F.2d 298 Cir. nostro v. United Pal- decision in United States v. and the recent 1962), inapplicable "exculpa and therefore is Palzer, (11th Cir.1984). zer, F.2d 1350 tory more, U.S.C. 1006. Further § no” cases under 18 of, alia, mak- was convicted inter the defendant unhelpful. We we find the distinction of 18 U.S.C. statement in violation a false our attention on therefore choose to focus answering question falsely "no” to a 1001 for § inquiries governmental created sub whether that asked whether the on a Customs Form real hazards of self-incrimination. stantial and $5,000 carrying more than defendant was currency. ror, government conceded trial er- holding that our does not violate 22. We note grounds appealed on the and the defendant 358, Winship, principles 397 U.S. of In re Jeopardy barred his re- Clause that the Double 1068, (1970), Mullaney S.Ct. 25 L.Ed.2d 368 the evi- contended that trial. The defendant 1881, Wilbur, 95 S.Ct. 421 U.S. v. his first trial was insuffi- dence introduced at (1975). cases hold that Those L.Ed.2d his false statement conviction. cient to sustain proving burden of all government must bear the court, reviewing sufficiency of the with which a de of the crime the elements evidence, stated: York, charged. v. New See Patterson fendant is context, "exculpatory no” doc- this S.Ct. 432 U.S. element of the an additional however, trine creates Here, (1977). proper L.Ed.2d 1001; govern- government’s case under § 18 U.S.C. 1006 is rea element under mens knew that show that the defendant ment must "knowledge” simply the defendant’s legal bring permissible more than it was $5,000 made is false. United States statement Cf. currency country Adamson, before a into the B) (en Cir. Unit - representa- banc), denied, prosecution U.S.-, for a defendant’s false carrying more than tion that he was not (interpreting 78 L.Ed.2d 116 18 U.S.C. can be sustained. nearly false statement stat identical (emphasis supplied). ute). The court con- Id. at 1355 opinion, "exculpatory no” doc In our trine, that the evidence was "sufficient to meet negate cluded which does not the defendant’s *19 Upon reviewing the facts of this you any Have received consideration case, we conclude that the “exculpatory from the sale or transfer real no” require doctrine does not acquired reversal estate for resale? Payne’s false statement convictions. A truthful Question affirmative answer to Payne was convicted on the basis of sever 10 would not have Payne, incriminated al negative false entries he made in re since no regulation statute or prohibits offi- sponse questions to on annual Conflict of cers of Federal Land Banks from engaging Interest Forms filed with the A bank. in real estate most, transactions. At a closer look indicates that truthful affirma truthful Question affirmative answer to

tive answers would not have been incrimi might have led bank officials to ask further nating. questions Payne’s about real estate trans- Question example, 10 on the 1979 For vein, actions. In a similar truthful affirma- Form asked: tive Question answers to 11 on the 1978 government’s proof burden of on the ele- false discussing statement conviction. After knowledge.” ment of Palzer’s Id. history at 1356. "exculpatory of 18 U.S.C. 1001 and the that, The doctrine, court did not hold in all false Palzer no” the court added: “Our conclusion cases, statement must bear the possible also fits the mold of self-incrimination proving burden of that the defendant knew that at least probably in the minds of travelers who truthful affirmative answers would not have illegal $5,000 bring think it is to more than in Rather, incriminating. been court Palzer currency country.” into this Id. at 1213. expressly acknowledged that its discussion con- Finally, Anderez, in United States v. 661 F.2d cerning proof the burden of was limited to the (5th 1981), Cir. Unit B the defendant was context of the case. A review of several former Fifth Circuit cases reveals making statement, a false convicted in viola- why this is so. tion of 18 answering U.S.C. § "no” to Granda, (5th United States v. question the same on the Customs Form as in

Cir.1978), the defendant was convicted of know- Citing Schnaiderman. Granda and Schnaider- ingly $5,000 willfully transporting more than man, the court stated: currency into the United States with- In both of those cases we held unless the filing statutorily out required reports, permissible bring individual knows it is to (now violation of 31 U.S.C. and 1101 §§ 1058 $5,000 country, more than into the a lie to codified at 31 U.S.C. 5316 and agents expected customs to avoid retribution court held that the conviction could not be sus- currency under laws will not lead to section tained because the defendant did not know about punishment____ Unless customs offi- reporting requirement. rejected The court cials disabuse travelers of the belief that government’s argument question that the on the bringing currency country illegal, into the is Customs that asked whether the defendant Form $5,000 solicitude for pre- fifth carrying currency placed amendment values more than attaching vents us liability reporting section 1001 the defendant on notice about the re- quirement: this sort of conduct. effect, any, (citations question merely omitted). if of this is Id. at 409 The court held illegal "exculpatory cause the traveler to think that it is the ever, inapplicable, no” doctrine how- carry large money amount into the coun- government proved because the that the try____ Nor does the untruthful answer informed, defendant had been at or about the question by prove beyond the defendant Form, time he filled out the Customs that it was sup- reasonable doubt that she knew she was illegal $5,000 simply carry more than posed to fill out a form. An untruthful an- currency into the United States. very easily prompted by swer could Granda, Schnaiderman, opinion, In our An- question might on the form which cause the derez, presumption are based on the Palzer country traveler who enters the with more travelers, probably most of whom are unfa- $5,000 possession than to think his or her regulations govern- miliar with the statutes and illegal, itself and who therefore answers assume, inspections, upon Customs will re- untruthfully attempt in order to to avoid be- Form, ceiving reading the Customs that it is ing caught breaking the law. illegal simply carry more than in cur- Id. at 926. rency into the United States. It is because Schnaiderman, In United States v. presumption this that the courts in these cases Cir.1978), the defendant was convict- govern- placed proof have the burden of Granda, charges ed of the same as in but was ment to show that the traveler knew that truth- statement, making also convicted of a false affirmative would not have been ful answers answering violation of 18 U.S.C. § incriminating. We read these cases as question do not "no” to the on the Customs Form. The proof in other "exculpatory court determinative burden of concluded that the no” doc- required trine the reversal factual contexts. of the defendant’s explaining Questions 2 and 6 on statement the situation in 1980 Forms and de- *20 incrimi- Form not have been the 1979 would Likewise, tail must attached. be if the nating. surrounding previously circumstances approved transaction or questions relationship

All the other on Conflict have for Forms concerned activities changed of Interest substantially, a statement ex- approval Payne could have secured which plaining same must be attached. and its board of directors. from the bank placed Payne This on notice that he could Question Form example, 1 on the 1979 For approval already- secure retroactive for asked: completed short, activities. In the record you participated in the delibera- Have Payne shows that even if believed that affecting your upon any question tions truthful affirmative answers would have any person related to interest or those of incriminating, such a been belief would not in organization you or of a business have been reasonable. you are interested? similarity case We note the between this Question 1 mentioned in The activities Anderez, and United States by a Farm Credit Administration prohibited 1981). Anderez, Unit B Cir. regulation appeared at C.F.R. charged making a false defendant was § 612.2160(a)(1980).23 regulation The also § because, under 18 U.S.C. 1001 statement however: provided, States, upon entry his into the United he enjoined by not deemed An act shall be employing negative question insti- paragraph gave if the a false answer to this ... degree in- that the tution determines he a Customs Form that asked whether on relationship question is not terest or $5,000 currency. carrying more than to create but so trivial as substantial defendant on the convicted the probability that the officer’s ... little charge, the trial court statement but false action has impartiality judgment post-trial motion granted the defendant’s affected, such determination been acquittal. appeal, the defendant On di- reported to the board of has been alia, “exculpatory argued, that the inter employing rectors of the institution. statement precluded doctrine his false no” Ques- reasoning applies The same Id. disagreed and rein- The court conviction. Form, 3 on the 1979 see C.F.R. tion the false statement conviction. stated (1980), 612.2160(c)(2)(iv) Question explained that the defendant had court Forms, and 1980 see C.F.R. the 1978 informed, the time he at or about been § 612.2160(f)(6)(1980). statement, that it was not made the false addition, Payne did not establish $5,000 bring than into the illegal to more reasonably he believed that truthful affirm- Moreover, pointed the court United States. have incrimina- ative answers would been may though this information out even anything, supports If the record ting. given to the defendant until not have been example, For on the opposite conclusion. already made the false state- he had after Form, gave affirma- truthful ment, incrimina- he still could have avoided questions of the answers to two tive ting himself: approval he had added that received bring informed that he could more Once engage in the activities men- the bank country into the Anderez than Furthermore, questions. in those tioned told the easily could have recanted and by Payne forms filed contained of the each liability by could truth. He have avoided following provision: original changing cus- his answers of the If the answer NOTE: form____ chose Because Anderez toms “yes” approval questions is above being after to continue his falsehood transaction engaging involved sought to conceal told that the act he previously granted, then a has not been (1984). 612.2150(b)(1) form, regulation, appears at 12 C.F.R. in its current 23. The illegal exculpatory no all of them proven doc- in order to sustain a inapplicable. trine is fraud.”). conviction for (footnote omitted). Id. at 409 E. Was the Evidence Sufficient reasoning find the We Anderez Conspiracy? Convict Anderez, persuasive. Payne, court like contends that chose to “continue his falsehood” al- produce failed to though evidence sufficient to con truthful affirmative answers would conspiracy him of incriminating, vict in violation of not have been either because *21 already U.S.C. 371. questions We have of the nature of the or because discussed sufficiency Payne sought approval could evidence to convict have conspiracy. light of by questions. covered of the evi activities Fur- thermore, Payne therein, dence and inferences did not mentioned establish that he reasons, and for the reasonably same we hold that believed that truthful affirma- tive evidence was sufficient to convict answers would have been of incrimina- ting. conspiracy to violate We therefore hold various false state “exculpa- that the tory participation no” ment and unlawful require doctrine does not statutes as the re- alleged in Payne’s the indictment.24 versal false statement convic- tions. F. Did the Trial Court Abuse Its Dis- Questions

D. on Were by cretion Refusing to Grant a Sev- Conflict or “am- “vague” Interest Forms erance? of biguous” Require so as to the Re- Payne finally contends that the trial Payne’s versal False Statement court abused its refusing discretion Convictions? grant a severance so that the defendants questions contends that the separately. could be tried already We have on the annual Conflict of Interest Forms Taylor’s discussed similar contention. “vague ambiguous.” were He there Payne, Taylor, particular like identifies no argues fore principle under the evidence the introduction of which could be lenity, his false statement convictions un prejudiced said to have light him. der 18 U.S.C. 1006 should be reversed. our discussion of previous conten- argument We find this meritless. In our tion, reasons, and for the same we hold opinion, only questions possi could is not entitled to a reversal of bly be described as way “vague” his convictions on the basis the trial “ambiguous” Question 6 on the 1979 grant court’s refusal to a severance. Question Form and 11 on the 1978and 1980 IV. CONCLUSION questions, Forms. These unlike the others discussion, foregoing Based on the we Forms, required an judg exercise of appellants’ reverse the misapplication con- person ment answering ques victions, but we affirm all of their remain- Payne’s tions. None of false statement ing convictions. convictions, however, solely were based AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED questions. Therefore, his answers to these IN PART. ques even were we conclude that these fatally “vague ambiguous,” tions were RONEY, Judge, specially Circuit concur- Payne’s nevertheless sustain we would ring: false statement convictions. Cf. Vicars, Although v. I States have a serious reservation Cir.1972)(“When misrepresen one or more “exculpatory about whether the no” doc- made, it necessary applicable prosecutions tations are is not trine is under 18 Payne's misapplication spiracy supra reversal of Our con- conviction. See footnote 17. validity does not victions affect the of his con-

«67 § 1006, I neither concur nor dissent Judge portion opin- from that Kravitch’s

ion, necessary to the since it is not decision fully I concur in all of the rest of the

here. opinion.

Court’s MILES,

Mary Plaintiff-Appellant, J. *22 CORPORATION,

M.N.C.

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 83-7309. Appeals,

United States Court of

Eleventh Circuit. 15, 1985.

Jan.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Weldon Rushing Payne, Lloyd Earl Taylor
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date Published: Jan 15, 1985
Citation: 750 F.2d 844
Docket Number: 83-7177
Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.
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