1 N.M. 553 | N.M. | 1873
By Court,
This is an action of debt, brought in the district court of the United States for the first judicial district of New Mexico, against John S. Watts and others as sureties on the official bond of James L. Collins as receiver of public moneys for the district of lands subject to sale at Santa Fe, and depositary to receive payment of moneys due the United States, for the purpose of recovering the amount of an alleged defalcation on his part as such receiver and depositary by omitting to safely keep and pay over, according to the terms and conditions of such bond, certain moneys belonging to the United States which he had received by virtue of his office. Before the commencement of the action, said Collins, the principal, and one of the sureties on the bond had died. The action, therefore, was brought against the surviving sureties, who- have appeared to defend the suit. The pleas of the defendants admit the execution and delivery of the bond, with the conditions thereof, as alleged in the petition of the plaintiffs, but traverse the allegations showing a defalcation on the part of said Collins, and allege full performance of the terms and conditions of the bond by him to be kept and performed. And for a further and fourth plea, they allege the murder of said Collins while defending the public funds in his possession as such receiver and depositary, and that the depository was thereupon robbed of such funds to the amount of the alleged defalcation without fault on his part and by irresistible force.
This fourth plea was demurred to on the ground that it did not allege facts constituting a defense. The demurrer was sustained by the court below, and thereto the defendants excepted. Exceptions were also taken by the defendants to the ruling of the court below in refusing to grant a continuance on affidavits and motion, in refusing to allow the defendants to file additional pleas after the time they had been ruled to plead had expired, in sustaining a motion of the plaintiffs to amend their petition, in refusing to give instructions to the jury asked for by the defendants, in overruling a motion of the defendants to require the plaintiffs to file an itemized account, in refusing permission to the attorneys for the defendants to address the jury, and in refusing the introduction of evidence of facts already admitted by the plaintiffs. The defendants also excepted to the charge of the court to the jury. The foregoing facts and exceptions cover substantially all the grounds of error assigned by the appellants.
The cause has been brought to this court for review on bill of exceptions and appeal. Neither the instructions given to the jury by the court below, nor the instructions asked for by the defendants, can be reviewed by this court, for the reason that the record does not contain the evidence before the jury on which proper insti’uetions to the jury must be founded. In the absence of the evidence, the presumption of law is that there was no conflicting evidence, and that the" positive instructions of the court to the jury were in accordance with the legal effect of the evidence submitted: 13 Wall. 56.
The principal question before this court in this case is as to the correctness of the ruling of the court below in sustaining the demurrer to the fourth plea. The facts alleged in this plea are not in all respects identical with those of any other adjudicated case. The theory of the counsel for the defendant is that Collins having been murdered, a vacancy in the office of receiver and depositary immediately ensued, and that the depository having been robbed during such vacancy so brought about, the liability of the sureties on the deceased’s official bond are discharged from liability to tlie extent of the public funds of which the depository was robbed. It is only by reference to well-established principles of law, defining and regulating the nature and extent of obligations like those contained in the official bond in question, that we are enabled to test the soundness of this theory. Nothing seems to be better settled than that a receiver and depositary of public funds under the laws of congress and regulations of the treasury department is not merely a bailee of the government, and bound only to ordinary care in keeping the public moneys: he stands in the relation of a debtor to the government to the full amount of public funds received by him, and this indebtedness can only be discharged by actually paying over the money on orders from the proper authority. The obligations which such an official assumes by the express terms and conditions of his bond are those of an insurer of the safe keeping of the moneys intrusted to his care until they shall have been paid over as required by law, and the sureties on his official bond become sponsors for the discharge of all these obligations assumed by their principal: 13 Wall. 17, 56. How, then, is it possible for such a vacancy in the office to occur as will discharge the sureties from liability prior to the actual paying over of all the moneys received on proper orders ? Will murder and robbery under the circumstances alleged discharge an indebtedness or an unconditional contract of insurance against all casualties? Clearly not.
The application of this rule of law to receivers and de-positaries of public funds may at first sight seem harsh and unjust. But when Ave reflect that any rule less rigid and arbitrary would afford the greatest temptation to pretended robberies and consequent defalcations, we can not but be convinced of its justness in principle, as well as of its necessity on grounds of public policy.
All the remaining questions presented in the bill of exceptions relate to matters of practice resting in the sound discretion of the court below, and therefore are not subject to review on appeal to this court.
Judgment affirmed.
