United States v. WashingtonUnited States v. Washington
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO DEFINE BURDEN OF PROOF
This matter comes before the Court on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Petitioner Makah Indian Tribe (the “Makah”) (Dkt. #248), Motion for Summary Judgment by Respondents Quileute Indian Tribe (the “Quileute”) and Quinault Indian Nation (the “Quinault”) (Dkt. #251), as well as Motion to Define the Burden of Proof by the Quileute and Quinault (Dkt. #283). Both dispositive motions concern the application of equitable defenses in this subproceeding, specifically whether Ma-kah’s claims are barred by laches, judicial. estoppel, and acquiescence. The Court deems oral argument unnecessary, having fully considered the extensive evidentiary record submitted by the parties, including the parties’ moving papers, attached declarations and exhibits, briefs filed by the numerous participating Interested Parties, and the remainder of the record in this subproceeding. Being fully apprised, the Court grants partial summary judgment on behalf of the Petitioner and denies Respondents’ summary judgment motion. The Court further denies in part and defers in part Respondents’ motion to define the burden of proof in this subproceeding.
BACKGROUND
The Makah initiated this subproceeding by filing a Request for Determination on December 4, 2009, seeking the Court’s determination of the Quileute and Quinault’s Pacific Ocean usual and accustomed fishing grounds (“U & A”). Dkt. #1, ¶ 4. In particular, the Makah assert that the western boundary of the Quileute and Quinault U & A “appears to be approximately 5 to. 10 miles offshore.” Id. at ¶ 3(c)(ix). If the Makah are correct, the Quileute and Qui-nault have been conducting fisheries for salmon, halibut, and blackcod outside their U & A, as well as asserting intentions to enter the Pacific Whiting fishery beyond their U & A’s western boundary. This subproceeding is brought under Paragraph 25(a)(6) of Final Decision # 1, pursuant to which the Court exercises jurisdiction to determine the location of any of a tribe’s U & A’s not specifically determined by Judge Boldt in Final Decision # 1. U.S. v. Washington,
While the procedural history of this sub-proceeding is well known to the parties and shall not be repeated here, a rough recitation of the underlying events and prior related subproceedings is necessary to set forth the factual predicate of the Court’s rulings herein. When this case was initiated over 40 years ago, the case area was limited to waters within the jurisdiction of the State of Washington. Final Decision #1,
The Pacific Ocean customary fishing grounds of the Quileute and Quinault have, however, been implicated in prior federal regulation. The Magnuson Fishery Conservation Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., vests authority in federal regulatory agencies to issue fishery management regulations consistent with the provisions of the Act and other applicable law. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1858—1855. Pursuant to the Act, in 1986, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) adopted western boundaries for the Quinault and Quileute ocean fishing areas for the purpose of describing Subarea 2A-1, the tribal area for halibut fishing. 51 Fed.Reg. 16471 (May 2, 1986). The regulations provide that Subarea 2A-1 “is not intended to describe precisely the historic off-reservation halibut fishing places of all tribes, as the location of those places has [not] been determined” and that the boundaries of a tribe’s fishery within the Subarea “may be revised as ordered by a Federal court.” Id.; see Dkt. # 58, Ex. J, pp. 2, 4.
The Quileute and Hoh Tribes, joined by the Quinault, shortly thereafter submitted a comment letter on the Halibut rule, in which they contested the legal basis for the western boundaries of their ocean fishing areas delineated by NOAA, asserting that “[n]o court, and no agreement, has ever established a western boundary for our treaty fishing areas.” See Dkt. # 58, Ex. A, p. 2; see also Ex. B (letter from Quinault joining in the Quileute and Hoh Tribes’ concerns). The Regional Director of the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) responded by inviting the Qui-leute, Quinault, and Hoh to submit’information to justify a modification of the regulations. Id. at Ex. C.
The Quileute again contested the delineated western boundary for the tribes after the Halibut boundaries were incorporated into salmon fishing regulations in 1987. See id. at Ex. D (comment letter from Quileute to NMFS); 52 Fed. Reg. 17264 (May 6, 1987). The NMFS Assistant Administrator for Fisheries responded by noting that the Tribes had not answered NMFS’s 1986 request for information concerning the tribes’ historic boundaries and again solicited information. Id., at Ex. E.
NMFS included the same boundaries in its 1996 framework rule for the establishment of tribal groundwater fisheries. 61 Fed.Reg. 28786, 28789 (June 6, 1996); see Dkt. # 58, Ex. L. The rules’ preamble explains the rationale behind it, as well as 'its limitations:
Under this rule, NMFS recognizes the same U & A areas that have been implemented in Federal salmon and halibut regulations for a number of years. The States and the Quileute point out that the western boundary has only been adjudicated for the Makah tribe. NMFS agrees. NMFS, however, in establishing ocean management areas, has taken the adjudicated western boundary for the Makah tribe, and extended it south as the western boundary for the other three ocean tribes. NMFS believes this is a reasonable accommodation of the tribal fishing rights, absent more specific guidance from a court. NMFS regulations, including this regulation, contain the notation that the boundaries of the U & A may be revised by order of the court.
Id. In the response to comments, the agency agreed with the Quinault that “this rule is without prejudice to proceedings in United States v. Washington. As stated above, NMFS will modify the boundaries in the regulation consistent with orders of the federal court.” Id. at p. 9.
Subarea 2A-1 became the subject of further dispute when the Makah filed suit in 1985 against the Secretary of Commerce under the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”) seeking judicial review of the Secretary’s regulations setting harvestable fishing quotas for halibut between treaty and non-treaty fishermen. See Makah Indian Tribe v. Mosbacher, C851606. In 1992, the Mosbacher court ruled on cross motions for partial summary judgment that the threshold issues in the case concerning the nature and extent of the Ma-kah’s treaty right to take halibut had to be resolved in the context of the continuing jurisdiction of the U.S. v. Washington court, and accordingly transferred the proceeding into the instant case. See Dkt. # 248-2 — 248-5 (“Joner Decl.”), Exs. K & L. The Makah then initiated Subproceed-ing 92-1, seeking confirmation of their previously adjudicated U & A and their treaty right to take halibut. See id. at Ex. M, pp. 1-2.
Makah subsequently moved for preliminary injunction in Mosbacher, seeking to prevent the Secretary from allocating less than 35% of the total allowable catch of halibut in the larger Area 2A to the Subarea 2A-1 Indian treaty fishery. The Ma-kah argued that the Secretary’s halibut regulations set forth the fishing areas of each of eleven tribes in addition to the Makah within Subarea 2A-1, and that these regulations had never been challenged by the States of Washington or Oregon. See Id. at Ex. Q, pp. 14-15 (citing 50 C.F.R. 301.5(c), 301.19 (1992)). The Makah further argued on reply, responding to opposition from the State intervenors, that because Mosbacher was an APA case, Washington had the burden to prove that the regulations were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, which it had not done. The Makah also asserted that “substantial evidence” supported the Secretary’s determination on tribal treaty rights in the Subarea. Id. at Ex. R, pp. 4-5.
Following consolidation of Mosbacher and Subproceeding 92-1, the Court entered an order on multiple pending motions, including the Makah’s request for preliminary injunctive relief. Noting that several tribes had joined in the Makah’s request for determination, Magistrate Judge Weinberg recommended that the Court find that only “[t]he issue of the Makah’s treaty rights is properly before the Court.” Id. at Ex. U, pp. 9-10 (explaining that “no tribe other than the Ma-kah has filed a request for determination, or has specifically moved for a ruling seeking such relief. Nor has any other tribe made a timely and complete evidentiary showing comparable to that made by the Makahs.”). As to tribes other than the Makah, Judge Weinberg recommended that “the determinations of the responsible agency are binding upon the parties unless and until there has been a timely application for review to a court with jurisdiction to hear it.” Id. at p. 10.
Judge Rothstein adopted Judge Weinberg’s recommendation regarding judicial confirmation of the Makah’s treaty right to fish for halibut and its U & A for halibut, and reached a similar confirmation for four of the eleven Subareas 2A-1 tribes’ treaty rights for halibut fishing purposes. Id. at Ex. U, pp. 2-5. The Court made no such ruling for the Quileute, Quinault, or Hoh. The Court also confirmed that, in formulating its allocation decisions, the Secretary is obligated to accord treaty fisherman the opportunity to take 50% of the harvestable surplus of halibut in their U & A’s. Id. at p. 56.
(3) Negotiated Management Plans
Although the Makah supported the Quileute and Quinault’s asserted customary
For instance, in 1996, the Quinault, Ma-kah, and Hoh filed an RFD asserting that the Quileute’s use of highly efficient pot gear threatened to preempt the Makah and Quinault’s longline fisheries for black-cod. See Joiner Decl. at Ex. X. Previous to filing, the Makah had threatened the Quileute that failure to resolve the dispute would lead them to challenge Quileute’s fishing beyond the western boundary of its previously adjudicated U & A. Id. at Ex. X, p. 3. The Quileute responded that a “Makah attack on the Quileute ocean U & A would result in irreparable damage to the relations between the costal tribes.” Id. at Ex. Z, p. 1. The RFD ultimately filed asserted that the Quileute were fishing beyond their adjudicated north and south boundaries but did not specifically challenge Quileute’s western boundary.
The parties entered into a 1997 settlement agreement, which memorialized the tribes’ accord not to challenge any other tribe’s right to fish in marine fishing areas during the term of the agreement. Id. at Ex. BB (Ex. A, p. 3). The agreement purported not to represent any parties’ view with respect to usual and accustomed fishing areas and provided that it was “without prejudice to the parties’ respective claims regarding usual and accustomed fishing places.” Id. at pp. 3-4. The agreement terminated in 2001, upon which the tribes entered into a series of new agreements for management of the treaty blackcod fishery. The 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2006 agreements provided a similar limitation that they do not “necessarily represent the view of any Party with respect to ... the Parties’ usual and accustomed fishing areas.” Id. at Ex. DD-GG.
(4) Whiting Dispute
The instant dispute arose following the Quileute and Quinault’s assertions of intent to enter the Makah’s valuable Pacific whiting fishery. The Makah have been fishing Pacific whiting in their adjudicated U & A since 1995 under allocations determined by NMFS. See Midwater Trawlers Cooperative v. Dept. of Commerce,
In response, Makah’s Chairman McCarty proposed that the Quinault and Quileute seek allocations from NMFS on top of the 17.5% allocation being requested by the Makah, which McCarty stipulated did not represent the full treaty entitlement in the whiting fishery. Id. at Ex. F. McCarty expressed concern with the proposal that the Quinault and Quileute fish under the Makah allocation, as it would disrupt the Makah’s established treaty fishery and hinder its efforts to manage bycatch, in accordance with NMFS requirements. At the same time, McCarty informed the tribes that the Makah “will continue to support [ ] your requests for allocations to support your fisheries.” Id.
Quileute Chairperson Hatch promptly rejected the proposal for separate alloca
NMFS issued a proposed rule for 2009-1010 harvest specifications in the whiting fishery on December 31, 2008, in which it adopted the proposal of the Pacific Fisheries Management Council to create a total tribal allocation of 50,000mt, 42,000mt of which would be managed by the Makah and 8,000mt of which would be managed by the Quileute. The proposed regulation provided:
These interim individual Tribal set-asides for 2009 only are not in any manner to be considered a determination of treaty rights to the harvest of Pacific whiting for use in future fishing seasons, nor do they set precedent for individual Tribal allocations of the Pacific whiting resource: the amounts being set aside for each tribe for 2009 are based on the timely requests from the tribes at the June Council meeting.
50 C.F.R. pt. 660; Dkt. # 126, Ex. S. In its final March 2009 rulemaking, NMFS explained that the set-asides were driven by concerns that the absence of individual tribal allocations could lead to a race for fish with deleterious impacts on bycatch management:
Without clear management targets for each tribe, a race for fish may occur as whiting migrate from south to north, reaching the Quileute [U & A] before they reach the Makah U & A. A race for fish could result in excessive bycatch of overfished species, and the closure of other groundfish fisheries.
Id. at Ex. U, p. 25. In acknowledgment that fishing rights of the treaty tribes are determined under U.S. v. Washington, NMFS emphasized that its set-asides do not represent “formal allocations, nor do they create precedent for future years.” Id. The rule also provided that NOAA “does not intend to allocate the total tribal whiting allocation to the individual tribes” in the future, and that it would consider initiating litigation should the tribes fail to reach consensus amongst themselves as to intertribal allocation. Id. at p. 26. The Makah initiated the instant subproceeding following the tribes’ failure to reach any such negotiated solution.
(5) Instant Motions
The Makah’s motion for partial summary judgment, as well as the Quinault and Quileute’s motion for summary judgment seek the Court’s determination as to the availability of certain equitable defenses in this subproceeding. The Court previously rejected the Quinault and Qui-leute’s laches argument as grounds for dismissal, noting that Respondents had at that stage failed to allege sufficient facts with respect to delay or injury for the Court to apply this equitable doctrine. Dkt. # 84; p. 4. The Court also noted that the tribes’ laches defense is “incompatible” with their simultaneous defense that this
Also before the Court is the Quinault and Quileute’s motion to define the burden of proof in this subproceeding. These tribes contend that the Makah must carry the burden of proof as the petitioning party. As to the standard of proof, the Qui-leute and Quinault contend that the APA arbitrary and capricious standard applies. If the Court finds that the Quileute and Quinault bear the burden of proof, Respondents assert that they should be held to a lower standard than the normal civil standard of preponderance of the evidence. The Makah and Interested Parties oppose the Quinault and Quileute’s suggestions, arguing that the burden of proof rests with the tribes whose U & A is at issue and that these tribes should be held to the ordinary preponderance of the evidence standard. The instant Order addresses all pending motions.
ANALYSIS
I. Availability of Equitable Defenses
As an initial matter, the Makah, joined by the Interested Parties the Tulalip, Swinomish, and S’Klallam Tribes (see Dkt. # 275) contend that equitable defenses such as laches, acquiescence, and equitable estoppel are unavailable for U & A adjudications under U.S. v. Washington. These tribes draw this rule from then presiding Judge Coyle’s February 15, 1990 decision on cross motions for summary judgment in Subproceeding 89-2, in which the court was asked by several requesting tribes to determine the extent of the Lum-mi Tribe’s adjudicated U & A based on evidence before Judge Boldt. See U.S. v. Washington,
If equitable defenses are available to a tribe that engages in treaty fishing outside its established area, there will be a great incentive for tribes to issue regulations for areas outside their established usual and accustomed fishing grounds and to allow or encourage tribal members to engage in treaty fishing outside those areas in anticipation of being able to enlarge the tribe’s treaty rights by ‘prescription.’... There is neither enough time nor resources to prevent a potential dilution of a tribe’s treaty right by these ‘equitable means’ for it wouldmean constant court filings — most on an emergency basis.
Id. at 1164.
The Court agrees with the S’Klallam that the concerns recognized by this Court two and a half decades ago are no less present in this subproceeding. It remains the case that allowing for equitable defenses could very well have the unfortunate consequence of compelling treaty tribes to flood the Court with requests for immediate adjudication of disputes for fear of losing fishing rights through prescription. At the same time, the efforts of tribes to informally resolve intertribal grievances without Court intervention would be sorely undermined.
The Quinault and Quileute nonetheless assert that Judge Coyle’s holding is no longer the law of the case, having been unsettled by subsequent decisions within and without U.S. v. Washington. The Quinault and Quileute point out that the Ninth Circuit held that Judge Coyle’s 1990 decision was not final because no separate judgment had been entered. U.S. v. Lummi Indian Tribe,
Needless to say, the status of equitable defense's in U & A adjudications is in a fairly uncertain state. While this Court has reached equitable defenses in supro-ceedings since Judge Coyle’s decision, it has done so without fully-resolving their availability. For instance, although the Court resolved the laches claim on its merits on summary judgment in Suproceeding 05-04, it cautioned that in doing so its order should not be read as reviving its earlier vacated determination as to the availability of equitable defenses. U.S. v. Washington,
The Court also does not find Sherrill and Apache to be controlling on this issue, as the former involved an assertion of tribal authority over land some 200 years after the state began exercising sovereign control and the latter was brought under the National Historical Preservation Act and involved no claim of tribal treaty rights. By contrast, the laches defense in the instant case at most raises a delay of some three and one-half decades. During this period, the Quileute and Quinault were fully aware of the Makah’s contestation of their western boundary, but the tribes were generally able to keep their disputes out of court through informal means of negotiation. Furthermore, the unique nature of the U.S. v. Washington case places the burden foremost on each tribe to fully and finally resolve its usual and accus
The Court notes that it has before it an unusual subproceeding, both in that it was initiated, like Subproceeding 89-2, by a tribe seeking adjudication of another tribe’s U & A and in that it requires determination of a fishing grounds that was not finally adjudicated by Judge Boldt. Both of these features evoke concerns raised by Judge Coyle about the prospect that allowing for equitable defenses could lead to a system in which unadjudicated tribal U & A’s are determined through prescription rather than through the orderly judicial management contemplated by Paragraph 25. While the Court declines to hold that equitable defenses are never available in a Paragraph 25(a)(6) subproceeding, it reiterates the long-held understanding that they do not apply in the typical fashion in this case. The Court farther determines that the Respondents’ equitable defenses are unavailing on their merits.
A. Judicial Estoppel
The doctrine of judicial estoppel codifies the rule that “where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.” New Hampshire v. Maine,
The Court agrees with the Makah that none of these factors are present here. The Quileute and Quinault fail to point to any positions advanced by the Makah that are clearly inconsistent with those taken in this subproceeding. While Respondents point to the Makah’s expressions of support for their customary ocean fishing grounds in Mosbacher and Subproceeding 92-1, the Court does not find any obvious inconsistency with the Makah’s positions in this subproceeding. In the former, a challenge brought under the APA, the Makah had argued that federal regulations recognizing tribal rights to take halibut were controlling where supported by substantial evidence and not properly challenged by the State of Washington. The Makah’s position that federal regulations are binding until appropriately challenged or revised in accordance with a decision by this Court is not inconsistent with its request for adjudication of the Quileute and Quinault U & A’s here based on a de novo determination on a full evidentiary record. Further, the Makah’s statements that substantial evidence supported the Secretary’s determination pertained to the rights of 12
Even if there was an inconsistency in the Makah’s assertion that “substantial evidence” supported the Secretary’s determination, the Makah’s position was never adopted by the Court. To the contrary, the Court only determined that federal regulatory boundaries governed the halibut fishery until properly challenged. The Court specifically declined to address the treaty rights of any tribe other than the Makah, the S’Klallam Tribes, and the Sko-komish Tribe. See Joner Deck Decl. at Exs. U & W. In declining to consider treaty fishing rights of tribes other than the Makah, Judge Weinberg explained:
no tribe other than the Makahs has filed a request for determination, or has specifically moved for a ruling seeking such relief. Nor has any other tribe made a timely and complete evidentiary showing comparable that made that by the Ma-kahs. In short, no other tribe has presented the issue to the court in a manner which might warrant the granting of relief on the pending motions.
The Court’s decision implicitly contemplated that those other tribes, including the Quileute and Quinault, would initiate proceedings under this case to seek clarification of their treaty fishing rights as had the Makah. Id. at Ex. U, pp. 9-10. The Quileute and Quinault accordingly fail to show that this or any other Court relied on any inconsistent statement by the Makah so as to pose a threat to judicial integrity. See Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
Finally, the Quileute and Quinault fail to show that the Makah have received an unfair advantage as a result of any prior inconsistent position. As the Makah point out, any benefit they received from an increased total treaty allocation has always been offset by the need to share the increase with other tribes. This Court’s determination as to Quileute and Quinault’s western boundaries in this subproceeding does not dictate federal allocations of har-vestable fish. Whichever side prevails before this Court, the total halibut allocations will be adjusted accordingly. The Court is not unsympathetic to the Quinault and Quileute’s concerns as to the waste of resources that would attend a decision by this Court foreclosing their ocean fisheries. At the same time, it must be recognized that any prior support by the Makah of the Quileute and Quinault’s customary ocean fishing grounds has primarily been to Respondents’ benefit, allowing them to expand their fisheries in waters to which they may or may not have a right and to reap the resulting economic rewards. For all these reasons, the Court finds that judicial estoppel is not a defense available to the Quileute and Quinault in this sub-proceeding.
B. Laches
The Court finds Respondents’ laches defense similarly unavailing. “Laches is an equitable defense that prevents a plaintiff, who, with full knowledge of the facts, acquiesces in a transaction and sleeps on his rights.” Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp.,
The Court finds the Respondents’ failure to make a showing under the first prong dispositive of their laches defense in this case. Far from sleeping on their rights, the Makah actively worked with the Quinault and Quileute since the 1980’s to obtain amicably negotiated solutions to conflicts over their respective ocean fisheries, all the while preserving their right to seek adjudication in this Court should informal methods of dispute resolution reach an impasse. The express language in the blackcod agreements from 1997 onward supports the Makah’s argument that the tribes preserved their right to asserts claims and defenses should formal adjudication become necessary. See, e.g., Joner Decl. at Ex. BB (providing that the 1997 agreement was “without prejudice to the parties’ respective claims regarding usual and accustomed fishing areas”). There was nothing unreasonable in the Makah’s decision to decline to investigate the western boundary of the Quileute and Quinault U & A and to wait to bring the issue to the Court for resolution until negotiated pathways broke down with the whiting dispute. The Court is unwilling to punish a tribe for attempting to solve intertribal issues inter-tribally and without judicial intervention, a pathway oft encouraged by the Court.
Indeed, as set forth above, Respondents’ laches proposition would essentially turn the longstanding adjudication system established in this four-decade case on its head. As Judge Coyle explained, the onus is on each of the tribes to “finally resolve their usual and accustomed fishing places as soon as possible. This has nothing to do with equitable defenses. It has to do with the expeditious utilization of a mechanism that has been in place since the Boldt decision was issued.” Coyle Order,
C. Acquiescence
The Ninth Circuit’s test for acquiescence is substantially similar to its test for laches, with the exception that it requires affirmative words or deeds by a party conveying implied consent to another. See Seller Agency Council,
The Quileute and Quinault have identified no actionable representations by the Makah sufficient to meet the first element. The sole affirmative representation pointed to by Respondents is the Makah’s assertion in Mosbacher that the federal' regulations for Subarea 2A-1 were “not taken from whole cloth” but were instead supported by “substantial evidence.” See Dkt. #279, p. 14. These statements are insufficient to give rise to an acquiescence defense for several reasons. First, considered in their appropriate context, these statements were made as part of the Makah’s argument that substantial evidence supported federal halibut regulations. The Makah did not thereby affirmatively represent that the Quileute and Quinault, or any other tribe fishing in the Subarea, had established their ocean U & A’s, but only sought to counter the State of Washington’s contention that the tribes bore the
These statements also do not imply that the Makah would not assert their right to seek adjudication of Quileute and Quinault U & A’s through the proper channels in the future. To the contrary, in response to R & R objections by the State of Washington, the Makah stated that they “agree[d] fully with Washington that, in a proper judicial proceeding to determine the ... usual and accustomed fishing grounds of any tribe ... the Court must apply the treaty-right principles articulated in United States v. Washington.” Jon-er Decl., Ex. V at pp. 7-8. The Makah further emphasized that if federal regulations were inconsistent with tribal rights, as adjudicated previously or “in further proceedings” in U.S. v. Washington, the regulations would be invalid under the APA. Given these and other such counterbalancing statements, any inference that the Makah affirmatively represented that they would not seek adjudication of the western boundary of Respondents’ U & A is far too attenuated to support a viable acquiesence defense. Any such inference is further undermined by the Makah’s express retention of the right to seek formal adjudication if negotiated management solutions reached an impasse and by their threat to put the Quileute’s western boundary before the Court during the blackcod dispute. See Joiner Decl. at Ex. X.
Even if these statements were actionable, the Court does not find that the Quileute and Quinault could reasonably have relied on them, knowing the purpose for which they were uttered during the halibut litigation and in light of the Ma-kah’s retention of their rights thereafter. See Seller Agency Council,
The Quileute and Quinault ask the Court to allow them to explore their equitable defenses further at trial should the Court decline to bar the Makah’s request on summary judgment. The Court finds no reason to do so.
II. Burden and Standard of Proof
Also pending before the Court is the Quinault and Quileute’s motion to de
A. Burden of Proof
The Responding Tribes’ first argument that the Makah bear the burden of proof in this subproceeding has no merit. The Quileute and Quinault fail to identify any U & A subproceeding in the long history of this case where the Court has determined that any party but the tribe whose U & A was at issue carried the burden of proof. In the typical case, as the Quileute and Quinault point out, the burden is indeed “on the petitioning tribe to produce evidence that disputed waters were usual and accustomed fishing grounds.” U.S. v. Lummi Indian Tribe,
Indeed, it is the settled law of this case that each tribe bears the burden to produce evidence to support its U & A claims. See, e.g., U.S. v. Washington,
The Court recently illustrated the limits of Schaffer’s default rule in Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, — U.S. -,
B. Standard of Proof
As to the appropriate standard of proof, the Court rejects the Quileute and Qui-nault’s assertion that anything other than the usual standard for a Paragraph 25(a)(6) subproceeding applies in this case. Respondents first contend that the Makah must carry the burden to prove that the Secretary’s determination of their federal-water fishing areas is arbitrary and capricious. Respondents’ attempt to import an APA standard of review into this Paragraph 25 subproceeding is without merit. This dispute does not involve the sort of challenge to federal regulations that was at issue in Mosbacher. Rather, it arises under this Court’s continuing jurisdiction to determine, in the first instance, the boundaries of a tribe’s customary fishing grounds.
The fact that the federal government has crafted placeholder boundaries for the tribes’ ocean fishing grounds does not alter the standard of proof. As provided above, each time NMFS and NOAA issued a proposed or final rule, they did so with the express qualification that their regulations were neither intended to describe the tribes’ historic U & A’s nor to supplant the
The United States has again emphasized the minimal impact that its regulations should have on U & A adjudications in its responsive brief. See Dkt. # 285, p. 5 (explaining that “NOAA’s regulations addressing the Quinault and Quileute U & A’s were not intended nor should be interpreted to be a conclusive boundary determination. Instead, the regulations are necessary for the agency’s management of the ocean fisheries in the absence of a judicial determination of the boundaries of the Tribe’s U & As.”); see also Dkt. # 58 (brief by the United States explaining that NMFS “has consistently assumed that this Court would be the forum to adjudicate the western boundaries of the Quileute, Quinault, and Hoh usual and accustomed fishing grounds as it has done throughout the history of United States v. Washington in the context of other tribal U & A boundary disputes.”). The Court is in accord. As it has stated before, it is this Court and not NMFS that determines tribal U & A’s. As a consequence, federal regulations in this subproceeding have no bearing on the standard of proof that the Quileute and Quinault are required to carry.
Finally, in anticipation of the Court’s decision to reject an APA standard and allocate the burden of proof to the Quileute and Quinault, Respondents move the Court to adopt a less stringent standard than the typical “preponderance of the evidence” standard employed in a civil case. The tribes point to previous recognitions by this Court and by the Ninth Circuit that evidence of treaty-time fishing practices is particularly hard to come by, and that evidentiary standards in U & A subpro-ceedings should reflect this reality. See U.S. v. Washington,
For several reasons, the Court shall defer its determination as to the precise standard of proof. First, the Court is not persuaded that a relaxing of evidentiary standards is necessarily inconsistent with a preponderance of the evidence standard. For instance, while Judge Boldt observed that “stringent” standards of proof were inapplicable in U & A adjudications, he nonetheless applied the preponderance of the evidence standard in Final Decision # 1. See Final Decision # 1,
In addition, it is unclear to the Court what exactly the proposed lesser standard of proof requires. Is the requirement to show “probable location” indeed less stringent than the requirement to show location on a “more likely than not” basis? If so, to what extent is the typical standard relaxed below a threshold 50% showing? The Court finds that these questions merit fuller discussion and hearing before a determination is reached on a matter that could carry a heavy precedential impact. Accordingly, the Court shall defer its decision on the precise standard of proof to be applied pending an opportunity for oral argument on this question at the opening of the upcoming bench trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby ORDERS that:
(1) The Makah Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Rejecting Equitable Defenses (Dkt. #248) is GRANTED. The equitable defenses of laches, judicial estoppel, and acquiescence do not preclude a determination of the usual and accustomed fishing grounds and stations of the Quileute Indian Tribe and Quinault Indian Nation in the Pacific Ocean.
(2) The Quinault and Quileute Motion for Summary Judgment that Judicial Estoppel, Laches, Acquiescence, and Sovereign Immunity Bar the Makah Tribe’s Request for Determination (Dkt. # 251) is DENIED.
(3)The Quileute and Quinault Motion to Define the Burden of Proof (Dkt. # 283) is DENIED in part and DEFERRED in part. The Motion is denied to the extent that it moves the Court to place the burden of proof at trial on the Makah Tribe. The Motion is deferred pending hearing at bench trial to the extent that it seeks clarification of the precise standard of proof to be borne by the Quinault and Quileute Tribes at trial.
Notes
. The Quinault ultimately decided not to participate in the 2009 fishery but informed the Quileute and the NWIFC that they intended to have five or six catcher boats in the 2010 fishery, with an anticipated harvest of around 7,000 mt per boat. Dkt. # 126, Ex. I, at pp. 50-51.
. The Court declines to reach the Quinault and Quileute’s arguments as to sovereign immunity, as the Court has previously denied this defense and as the issue is currently on appeal before the Ninth Circuit.
. Should this issue remain in controversy between the parties and require resolution within this subproceeding, the parties may bring it to the Court’s attention at their pre-trial status conference and an appropriate briefing schedule will be established.
. The Court also acknowledges the expressed grievances of Interested Parties that the instant Motion was filed with what the S’Klal-lam and Tulalip Tribes term "minimal compliance” with the filing deadlines set out in the Local Rules. While the Motion was filed in technical compliance with LCR 7(d)(3), the Court agrees that it contravenes the spirit and structure of this case. The Quinault and Qui-leute's decision to file their Motion so as to provide for the shortest possible response time has limited the ability of Interested Parties to respond to issues with potential ramifications for the case as a whole. The Court frowns on any appearance of gamesmanship in this or any other proceeding. The Court's decision to defer this issue until trial provides an opportunity for Interested Parties to be heard on the matter. No further briefing shall be submitted until invited by the Court.