United States v. Wallace Dale Lowery

GERSON, Circuit Judges.

WALLACE, Judge: Circuit Lowery appeals the district court’s denial his rule motion a correction and reduction of his sentence under Act, Youth Corrections 5005- U.S.C. court, (YCA). 559 F.Supp. district young held that a adult offender guilty felony may of a receive an indeterminate sentence, as al- though the maximum sentence for of the same guilty felony would be shorter. We affirm.

I male, Lowery, twenty-three old guilty involuntary manslaugh- was found ter 1112. The under U.S.C. district court decided that would benefit from treatment under the YCA. The YCA defines offenders” its “youth covered as provisions persons age * Tuttle, sitting by designation. Honorable Elbert Parr Senior United Circuit, Judge States Circuit for the Eleventh by magistrate, than those tried held twenty-two at the time conviction'. 18 we limited the YCA 5006(e). implicitly An offender between the U.S.C. § be imposed by sentences that could twenty-two twenty-six, how- ages ever, judges by magistrates. as well as also be sentenced at 1027. Thus construed the one year if “the “young adult offender” court for young misdemean- that there grounds finds are reasonable ants 18 as a by established U.S.C. § the will benefit from believe that specific exception to the indeter- treatment under the provided the [YCA].” im- four-year generally minate sentence Lowery was 18 U.S.C. 4216. therefore § in posed YCA cases. custody of Attorney committed to the the supervision for and General un- Amidon controls Lowery asserts 5010(b) 18 until discharged by der U.S.C. § sentencing felony YCA for offenses well as Parole in accordance the Commission He portion for misdemeanors. cites that 5017(c). provisions 18 U.S.C. These two § of Amidon where we stated: the peri- of YCA mandate an indeterminate it implicit We therefore find in the Fed- incarceration, od of not to exceed four Magistrate eral Act of 1979 that Congress years, possible two-year and a additional intended that neither a district court of conditional period supervised, release. a judge magistrate nor a sentence may Lowery objected imposition youth of this under the Youth Act to Corrections sentence and moved for its correction or term it longer a of confinement than pursuant 35 of the an impose reduction to rule could on adult. asserted, of Rules Criminal Procedure. He Except applies as it to on language prior based decisions misdemeanors, language this re- must be on an of alleged equal protection and denial in garded as dicta. The sole issue us before process, due and that the sentence was ille- Amidon was whether a specific portion gal because it did not that the specify peri- implic- the Federal Act of 1979 potential of his od incarceration was limited itly imposed the sen- same misdemeanor by three-year statutory maximum an magis- on tencing judges restrictions and adult could receive for same offense trates. Neither the facts of Amidon nor 1112(b). under 18 U.S.C. district § construing the statute we were us required court denied motion. Lowery’s We have to determine whether indeterminate YCA 28 jurisdiction pursuant to U.S.C. 1291. § sentences should limited maxi- by

mum sentence that could be on felony II adult for the same offense. Our subsequent addressing decisions the limita- first Lowery’s argument We examine on Amidon grounds tion of sentencing have that we must district reverse the court be- implicitly limited its to sen- of our previous Lowery cause decisions. tencing of misdemeanants. See United Amidon, on United States v. primarily relies Glenn, v. 1269, (9th States 1274 667 (9th Cir.1980) (Amidon). 627 F.2d 1023 In United States v. Luckey, Cir.1982); Amidon, construed 18 U.S.C. United (9th Cir.1981); 205-06 3401(g)(1), power which limits the § Lowe, States 654 F.2d Cir. magistrates YCA sentences for 1981). 3401(g), misdemeanors. Under section a of the Federal Act of that our en part Magistrate Lowery contends banc deci Smith, sion in United 96-82, States Pub.L. No. magistrate Stat. cert, denied,- not sentence a offender to a -, (1983) of one 74 L.Ed.2d 962 period custody excess for a S.Ct. (Smith), supports of Ami application for a petty misdemeanor six months of- don Finding subject disagree. fense. no reason to cases. We young impo to a Smith permits a district we held that the YCA by judge misdemeanants tried provided sition of potentially longer period split by incarceration sentences statute, Our recent decision in U.S.C. general probation (9th Cir.1983) specific involved a Like Smith (Bell), does not conflict with the conclusion to the indeterminate statutory exception properly court acted generally imposed sentences sentencing to the full indetermi Lowery contention that indetermi- Lowery’s YCA. term nate U.S.C. should be nate sentences under the YCA 5010(b) 5017(c). In Bell we vacated term an adult limited two-year fixed sentence on a offense is could serve for the same discussing offender. After the sen statu- by any specific not similar supported to the district court tencing options open authority. tory that the YCA we concluded 20 of our also relies on footnote imposition not of maximum permit does which illustrates a form opinion less than the indetermi sentences of full imposition split for use in the specified by nate term the YCA or the YCA Lowery points offender. out on by reasoning as limited Amidon. Our the that the form of sentence uses sample here: “We do not applies equally ques Bell language broad from Amidon that a YCA of tion the soundness the sentence and not exceed that term of confinement imposed by course of treatment the district which an could receive. For the rea- adult sentence, however, in this court case. above, must be language sons discussed this simply among options is not the available dicta, the except considered as it relates to 707 F.2d at 1082. The YCA.” imposition split of sentences on misdemean- Second, Fifth, Tenth Eighth, and Circuits ants. a court may have also held not sentence a to a definite term shorter support We find further for our decision the than indeterminate terms expand application not to Amidon’s in the Carlson, E.g., the YCA. v. 671 Taylor example, decisions of other circuits. For 137, (5th Cir.1982); 138 Watts v. Had Lufkins, v. Van United States den, 1354, (10th Cir.1981); 651 F.2d 1372 construed Eighth the Circuit States, 828, Burns v. United 552 F.2d 830 of the Federal 3401(g) Magistrates Cir.1977); Jackson, (8th United as an narrowly, refusing Act to read it 830, (2d Cir.1977). 550 F.2d 832 Even if implied sentencing powers limit on the of specifically district court had concluded that The court reasoned that if judges. three-year felony maximum. YCA, Congress had intended to amend the Lowery provide optimum that seeks would expressly, it would have done so rather than him, for. imposition rehabilitation including potentially provi inconsistent legal sentence would not have been such a sion in the Federal Act. 676 A three-year under the YCA. 1194; v. Do F.2d at accord United States sentence for a offender “is 583, nelson, (D.C.Cir.1982). 695 F.2d 585-87 un simply among options not available cases, although rejecting These the conclu der YCA.” indi properly sion we reached in existing legis that the cate amendment Ill ambiguous implied lation should Lowery’s argument We turn now to only necessary to the extent language imposing potentially longer YCA sen that gen make the scheme work. See tence on him than could be on an York Ex erally Gordon v. New Stock offense guilty same 659, 685, 2598, change, 422 95 S.Ct. pro and due equal protection denies him 2612, (1975). Because sec 45 L.Ed.2d 463 purpose cess. The of incarceration under incongruity not create tion does penal from the incarcera the YCA differs felo sentencing to YCA respect In Dorszynski tion on adults. 3042, nies, States, 424, our 94 decline to extend 418 U.S. S.Ct. United (1974), reviewing 855 after Amidon to include felonies. L.Ed.2d YCA, history policy the Supreme by Congress tended when it enacted the Court objective concluded that YCA. See F.2d at 1357-58. Particular- “[t]he [sentencing] options these represented a de- ly relevant to our disposition of the present parture from sentencing, traditional and fo- case is the court’s refusal in Watts to order cused primarily on correction and rehabili- the release of the youth offenders incarcer- tation.” YCA; Id. at S.Ct. ated in violation of the instead the Courts have long recognized that this em- court ordered the Bureau of Prisons im- phasis on rehabilitation constitutes a quid plement YCA programs pro quo potential for the intended. Id. at longer incarcer- 1366-67. In view of this ation under enforceable right the YCA. E.g., Young special Hee Choy States, v. United mandated Lowery’s 322 F.2d 65-66 contention (9th Cir.1963); justification that there is no States, Carter v. poten- United for the (D.C.Cir.1962); tially longer YCA sentences is not well Cunningham ' States, founded. United (5th 256 F.2d Cir.1958). Indeed, in one of our recent deci- IV

sions we concluded that constitutional chal- lenges to We by observing YCA sentences “have conclude been fre- the limita quently tion raised and of YCA sentences uniformly rejected.” seeks Ballesteros, States v. would undermine the policies of the YCA. Cir.1982). Dorszynski States, v. United the Su preme Court found that important “[a]n Lowery contends that opinion in Ami- element of the program was that [YCA] don rejected the conclusion that the rehabil- person once a was committed for treatment itative purposes of the justified its Act, the execution of sentence potentially longer sentences. Although we was to fit the person, not the crime for criticized the Bureau of Prisons’ failure to which he was convicted.” 418 U.S. at implement fully the aims of the YCA in 94 S.Ct. at 3048. Arbitrarily limiting the Amidon, 627 F.2d at we made that duration of a YCA sentence to the maxi criticism in interpretation of the congres- mum period of penal incarceration that sional intention behind could be on an adult convicted of Magistrates Federal Act. We did not the same felony would unduly interfere intend our judicial criticism as a invalida- with this policy of the YCA. Some may tion of the entire legislative scheme of the question the use of indeterminate sentenc YCA. Neither did we intend it to create a ing “treatment” predicate that is the basis for challenging the legality of incar- the YCA. Partridge, See Chaset & El ceration under the YCA where the circum- dridge, The Sentencing Options of Federal stances or conditions of incarceration fail to Judges, District (1980). 84 F.R.D. implement policies. the YCA’s Any changes in the YCA to reflect such subsequent decisions, Our and those shifts in must, correctional philosophy how of other circuits that have addressed the ever, await Bell, action Congress. See issue, indicate that youth offenders sen tenced under the YCA have an adequate AFFIRMED. alternative remedy for administrative non compliance with the rehabilitative aims of PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Smith, example, YCA. For in up I dissent. held youth demands of offenders sen tenced under the YCA to be segregated majority As the recognizes, our circuit during adults any period of YCA in directly has not addressed the issue whether carceration. 683 F.2d at 1240-42. Similar indeterminate Youth (YCA) Corrections Act ly, in Watts v. Hadden the Tenth Circuit sentences for felony offenses should lim- required the Bureau of Prisons to accord ited to the maximum sentences that adults YCA prisoners special in- could receive for the same offense. I be- lieve, however, holding the rationale for our read Amidon as “that district courts in holding youth United States not sentence a offender under reflected in United the YCA to a term of confinement longer (9th Cir.1982) 683 F.2d 1236 than the maximum that could be Bell, (en banc), and United States on an adult for the same offense.” (9th Cir.1983) curiam), (per 10; F.2d 1080 re- F.2d at 1239 n. see also id. at 1242 n. 20. a limitation. quires impose us such And in United States v. (9th Cir.1983) curiam) (per (involving a felo- The district court in Amidon sentenced ny YCA), sentence under the we reaffirmed misdemeanor, appellant, convicted of a this interpretation, summarizing Amidon as six-year to a indeterminate term under the holding “that the indeterminate term of reversed, holding YCA. We that “a permitted 5010(b) confinement under may not to a be sentenced term of confine- could not exceed the maximum term which ment YCA that exceeds the stat- imposed upon could be an adult.” 707 F.2d utory maximum that an adult could re- at 1081. ceive.” 627 F.2d at 1026. Our was enacting based on the belief that Bell, the district court sentenced the Act of sentence, to a two-year YCA

intended “that neither a district court judge though even the maximum allowable sen nor a magistrate may tence for an adult was five years for the under the Youth Corrections Act to a term same felony offense. The issue on appeal longer of confinement than it could impose was whether district courts could on an adult.” 627 F.2d at 1027. We con- “maximum periods sentences for less than that, cluded that it “clear [by enacting was those specified the YCA or allowable for the Magistrates Act,] Congress rejected has adults charged the same offense.” 707 the earlier conclusions this court and (emphasis added); see also id. others that purposes rehabilitative un- at n. We held: “While the district court derlying justify longer the YCA confine- has some discretion to choose between the ” ment (citations .... 627 F.2d at 1026 sentencing options indeterminate set forth omitted). 5010(b) 5010(c), length we Although ruling were on a misde- offender, sentence to be served aby meanor sentence in our conclusions subject to statutory maximum term of logically must to apply felony sentences as years particular offense, less than six for a well. We found that because YCA and may not be set the district court but prison nearly conditions were identi- instead is in the discretion Parole cal, “it is inequitable unjust permit and Commission.” 707 F.2d 1082 (emphasis imposition of the six sentence under added). adult, offenses for which an Both my Smith and Bell reinforce belief juvenile, just could be sentenced to six reasoning Amidon was intended (footnote months.” 627 F.2d at 1026 omit- requires and us to limit indeterminate YCA ted). reason, For the same it would be sentences for offenses to the maxi- inequitable unjust permit and imposition mum sentences that adults could receive for of'the six-year sentence under the YCA for the same offense. which, case, an offense for as in this adult could be sentenced to maximum of

three years.

Two panels (one banc) of this circuit en

have applying treated Amidon as to felony

as well as misdemeanor sentences: In Unit-

ed Cir.

1982) (en banc) (involving both YCA),

misdemeanor sentences under the

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Wallace Dale Lowery

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Date Published: Mar 1, 1984

Citation: 726 F.2d 474

Docket Number: 83-1056

Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.