40 F. 144 | E.D.S.C. | 1889
Tlie defendant is indicted for violating section 5438, Rev. St. The indictment contains two counts. The first is for making and using falso receipts, vouchers, accounts, and so forth, for the purpose of obtaining payment or approval of a false, fictitious, and fraudulent claim against the United States. The second is for presenting a false, fictitious, and fraudulent claim for payment to Gf. I. Cunningham, marshal of the United States for the district of South Carolina. The defendant demurs to the indictment. This necessitates an examination of the language of the indictment. The indictment is brought under the first clauses of section 5488, which are in these words:
“Sec. 5438. Every person who makes or causes to be made, or presents or causes to be presented, for payment or approval, to or by any person or officer in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States, any claim upon or against the government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, or who, for the purpose of obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or approval of such claim, makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, any false bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or deposition, knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry.”
The first count, after reciting that the defendant, a deputy-marshal, was intrusted with the service of a warrant against one John Brooks, charged with violating section 5438, Rev. St., issued by a commissioner of this court, served said warrant, and arrested Brooks, and for the purpose of obtaining approval and payment of a false, fictitious, and fraudulent claim against the government of the United States, did then and there make and cause to be made a certain false, fictitious, and fraudulent account, affidavit, certificate, and voucher as to the number of miles traveled by him, the said L. W. Wallace, deputy-marshal, as aforesaid; and as to the employment of one J. H. Williamson as guard over the said John Brooks; and as to the number of miles traveled by the said L. W. Wallace, deputy-marshal, his guard, and said Brooks, in transporting Brooks from the alleged place of arrest at Elloree, Orangeburg county, to Charleston, S. 0., and as to two meals furnished said Brooks, and to the employment of a guard over Brooks; setting out the account in full, headed: “United States of America to (i. I. Cunningham, United States Marshal, by Deputy L. W. Wallace, Dr.,” accompanied by copy of receipt of J. IT. Williamson, a guard, and of John-Lewis for meals, with an affidavit before J. Wesley Smith, United States commissioner, of the truth of the items. Tlio count goes on to charge the falsity of the account, and specifying the items, concluding with the allegation that defendant knew that they were false. The second count charges that the defendant, a deputy-marshal, did present for payment to George I. Cunningham, he being an officer in the civil service of the United States, — that is, being United States marshal in and for the district of South Carolina, — a claim
The specific grounds of demurrer to the first count are: (1) That it sets out the charge in general terms, and does not state the specific charge, — does not descend to particulars; that is to say, “for the purpose of obtaining approval and payment of a false, fraudulent, and fictitious claim against the government of the United States,” without specifying the nature and details of the false, fraudulent, and fictitious claim, nor the name of the person or officer to whom presented. (2) That it charges a false affidavit, and the copy of the affidavit in the count shows that it was made before a United States commissioner, who had no authority to administer such an oath. So it is not an affidavit.
Let us examine these. “The object of the indictment is: First, to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense, and avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further prosecution of the same cause; and, second, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had; for these facts should be stated, and not conclusions of law alone. A crime is made up of acts and intent, and these must be set forth in the indictment with reasonable particularity of time, place, and circumstances.” Again: “The accused must be apprised by the indictment with reasonable certainty of the nature of the accusation against him, to the end that he must prepare his defense, and plead the judgment as a bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offense. An indictment not so framed is defective, although it may follow the language of the statutes.” U. S. v. Hess, 124 U. S. 487, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 571. This case is quoted at length, because it is relied upon by the defendant, and because it is recognized as controlling authority. Let us apply it to this case. We inquire, what is the offense charged in this first count ? Next, in what manner is the charge made? The first count charges the making and causing to be made by the defendant of a certain false, fictitious, and fraudulent account, affidavit, certificate, and voucher; then states the particular items of these, and declares each of them in detail to be false, fictitious, and fraudulent, and made for the purpose of obtaining payment by the government of the United States of a false, fictitious, and fraudulent claim; that is to say, charging him with a crime, the count recites in detail the facts which it designates to be criminal, and charges the intent, which fixes the criminality. It is not, as seems to be supposed, a charge that he presented a false, etc., claim. Were it so, the species — the details — of the claim must be given. But the charge is that he made and used a certain false account, voucher, etc., for the purpose of obtaining payment or approval of the claim so made up. And in making this charge the specific acts are set out in detail, with the account prepared upon the false, fictitious, and fraudulent assertion of these facts. It seems to me that this apprises the defendant with reasonable
It is further contended that the name of no person or officer in the service of the United States is stated in the count, to whom this claim was to he presented. Is this necessary? The first clause forbids the making or presenting for payment or approval “to or by any person or officer in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States” anyelaim against the government of the United States, etc., -which is known to be false, fraudulent, and fictitious. The second clause forbids the making or using of any false bill, account, etc., for the purpose of obtaining the payment or approval “of any such claim;” that is to say, any claim so presented or to be presented to any officer in the civil, military, and naval service of the United States, and known to bo false, fraudulent, and fictitious. This being so, the omission to state the person to whom the claim was, or was to be, presented is fatal. The preparation of a claim against the government, however false, fraudulent, and fictitious the claim may bo, is not a crime. It must be prepared for the purpose of being presented. Not only so, as the government of the United States is impersonal, acting and acted upon by and through its agents, such claim must be presented or be prepared for presentation to an agent of the United States, and ho must be the proper agent. The presentation of a claim for munitions of war furnished to the United States to the postmaster at Charleston, or for naval stores to the internal revenue collector, or for carrying the mails to the district attorney, however fictitious, false, and fraudulent either of them may be, would not violate this section. To complete the offense, therefore, it must be proved that the false vouchers, etc., were prepared for the purpose of presenting the false claim for payment or approval to or by any person or officer in the service of the United States authorized to approve, audit, or pay the same; and if this is to be proved, it must he alleged. U. S. v. Glover, 32 Fed. Rep. 142.
• With regard to the alleged affidavit, without deciding the question whether a commissioner can administer such an oath, it is enough to say that the count charges the use of a false, fictitious, and fraudulent account, -certificate, and voucher, as well as affidavit, and the account, whether sworn to or not, sot out in the count, will sustain this charge.
Second Count. The indictment charges the presenting for payment of a claim against the United States to George I. Cunningham, marshal, etc. The account set out in the count is “United States of America to George I. Cunningham, United States Marshal, Dr.” Surely this was not presenting a claim against the United States, or any department or officer thereof, to a person in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States. Mr. Cunningham could not pay for the government his own claim against the government, nor was he the proper agent of the government to approve, audit, or pay this claim. This makes it unnecessary to discuss any other ground of demurrer to the count. Demurrers are sustained.
