United States v. WalkerUnited States v. Walker
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Henderson
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.
KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge:
Timothy McCrae Walker appeals his convictions on one count of violating
I.
At about 3:00 a.m. on February 9, 2005, Officer Charles Monk, an off-duty Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) patrolman working as a part-time security guard, observed the driver of a black Land Rover sport utility vehicle (SUV) illegally park in a bus zone in the 800 block of 5th Street, N.W. Bryant, 523 F.3d at 351. Monk saw two young black males exit the vehicle. They were both wearing ski masks and, although the weather was “unusually mild” that night, both wore “heavy black winter coats.” Id. Monk watched as the driver (later identified as Walker) reached into the SUV, retrieved a bulky item and slid it into his coat. Id. The driver walked, “kind of limping,” across the street and motioned to the passenger to join him. Id. at 352; see also Transcript of Trial at 50, United States v. Walker, Cr. No. 05-139 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2006) (Tr.). They walked up to a charter bus parked in the 500 block of H Street, N.W. but the bus driver would not let them on the bus. Bryant, 523 F.3d at 352. The two then walked back towards the SUV, passed it and continued into a nearby alley where they stopped and looked around. Id.; Tr. at 53-54. They then returned to the SUV and Walker took the item out of his coat, put it back into the vehicle and the two drove away. Bryant, 523 F.3d at 352. Not more than five minutes later, however, they returned and this time Walker parked the SUV legally. Id. They exited the vehicle, Walker again retrieved the item and put it inside his coat, pulled a ski mask down over his face (as did his passenger, later identified as William Bryant), and both he and Bryant started walking across the street. Id.
Given this suspicious activity, Monk called for back-up to investigate the two men.
Id.
Both men were “looking around nervously.”
Id.
When a marked FBI vehicle drove by them, the two men lifted their ski masks.
Id.
Then two marked MPD vehicles arrived at the scene, one driven by Officer James Burgess.
Id.
Burgess’s partner, Officer Steven Greene, testified that once the two men saw the MPD patrol car, they began to walk away from it and, on turning the corner, began to walk at a faster than normal pace.
Id.
Walker walked stiff legged, with a limp, as if trying to conceal the item inside his coat.
Id.
Burgess and Greene pulled their patrol car up behind the two men and got out to approach them.
Id.
Walker began running away and Greene followed him.
Id.
When Walker was finally cornered, he was ordered to lie down and, as he was lowering himself to the ground, Greene saw him
Both men were arrested at the scene and appeared before a magistrate judge the next day, February 10, 2005. On that day, the government filed a complaint against Walker and Bryant charging each with a violation of
On February 16, 2006, the government filed a superseding indictment charging both Walker and Bryant with one count of possessing an unregistered firearm (the Harrington
&
Richardson shotgun) in violation of
II.
A. Speedy Trial Act
We first address Walker’s claim that both his
Unlike Bryant, however, Walker challenges the
The United States Supreme Court has held regarding the Double Jeopardy Clause that if “the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”
Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932),
cited in United States v. Weathers,
186 F.3d 948, 951 (D.C.Cir. 1999). A violation of
Walker also argues that his
Although here, unlike in
Hemmings,
no indictment was filed within 30 days of Walker’s February 9, 2005 arrest, Walker did not challenge the original indictment as untimely in the district court and therefore “we review the district court’s decision not to dismiss (sua sponte) on [this ground] for plain error only.”
United States v. Taylor,
497 F.3d 673, 676 (D.C.Cir.2007). Under that standard, “we
In
United States v. Bittle,
699 F.2d 1201, 1205 (D.C.Cir.1983), we held that “after the dismissal of a complaint, the Act’s time limits run anew from the date of the filing of the subsequent complaint or indictment.” In that case, defendant Bit-tie was arrested on December 10, 1981 and charged with violating
B. Sufficiency of Evidence
We next address Walker’s argument that there was insufficient evidence
It is undisputed that both guns were transported in or affected interstate commerce and that Walker had been convicted of a felony. Thus, the government need only show that Walker knowingly possessed the Harrington & Richardson shotgun to sustain his
“Criminal possession of a firearm may be either actual or constructive.” United States v. Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 127 (D.C.Cir.2003). To prove constructive possession, the government must show that Walker “knew of, and was in a position to exercise dominion and control over, the contraband, either personally or through others.” Bryant, 523 F.3d at 354-55 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Proximity to a weapon, coupled with some other factor such as “connection with a gun, proof of motive, a gesture implying control, evasive conduct, or a statement indicating involvement in an enterprise” may suffice to show dominion and control over a weapon. Alexander, 331 F.3d at 127 (quoting United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 381 (D.C.Cir.1997)). We have already determined that Bryant possessed both the Harrington & Richardson shotgun and the Stevens .12-gauge shotgun. Bryant, 523 F.3d at 356. In reaching this conclusion, we noted “[Bryant’s] proximity to both guns, coupled with his suspicious attire, his initial evasive conduct towards the police officers, and the evidence that [he] was acting in concert with [Walker,] who was actually carrying one of the weapons on his person.” Id. at 356.
Likewise, there was sufficient evidence to show that Walker too was in “close proximity” to, and exercised dominion and control over, the Harrington & Richardson shotgun. Although the weapon was located on the passenger’s side floorboard of the SUV, Walker, the driver, was in close proximity to it. Moreover, as the driver, Walker “is held to a higher level of accountability for [the vehicle’s] contents.”
United States v. Gibbs,
904 F.2d 52, 57 (D.C.Cir.1990). Indeed, Walker had control over the SUV at all times during the incident (as shown by his driving and parking the vehicle). When coupled with the fact that there was ample evidence that Walker and Bryant were working in concert,
see Bryant,
523 F.3d at 356, a rational juror could find that
C. Walker’s Remaining Arguments
Bryant
disposes of Walker’s remaining arguments that (1) the district court erred in instructing the jury on the element of “control” in the context of constructive possession, and (2) his jury
venire
was not representative of the community in violation of the Jury Selection and Service Act,
In
Bryant,
we held that Bryant failed to show a violation of the “right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes” under the Jury Selection and Service Act,
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Walker’s
So ordered.
Notes
.
. As we noted in Biyant, “[t]his indictment was defective, because it specified that [Biyant] and Walker had possessed both shotguns without properly registering them; however, only the Harrington and Richardson shotgun had to be registered....” 523 F.3d at 353.
.The Speedy Trial Act provides in part:
In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.
. The Double Jeopardy Clause bars any person from being “subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”
.
If any indictment or information is dismissed upon motion of the defendant, or any charge contained in a complaint filed against an individual is dismissed or otherwise dropped, and thereafter a complaint is filed against such defendant or individual charging him with the same offense or an offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, or an information or indictment is filed charging such defendant with the same offense or an offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be applicable with respect to such subsequent complaint, indictment, or information, as the case may be.
Subsection (b) requires “[a]ny information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense” to be filed within thirty days of the date of arrest or the date the defendant was served with a summons.
. Although Walker argued that his
. Although there was plainly sufficient evidence to support Walker’s actual possession of the Stevens .12-gauge shotgun recovered from the window basin, we review the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the Harrington & Richardson shotgun because, at sentencing, possession of the latter increased the base offense level inasmuch as it had been modified to require registration. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(3), (4) (2007); Reply Br. of Appellant at 9 (noting that district court applied base offense level of 22 — subsequently reduced two levels for acceptance of responsibility — but, if this Court determined there was insufficient evidence to support Walker’s possession of Harrington & Richardson shotgun, base offense level would be reduced to 20).