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United States v. Vincent Francis McGee Jr.
426 F.2d 691
2d Cir.
1970
Check Treatment

*2 FRIENDLY, Before SMITH and FEINBERG, Judges. Circuit FRIENDLY, Judge: Circuit McGee, appeals Vincent Francis Jr. judgment a conviction violat ing U.S.C.App. 462(a), following a Judge Murphy jury trial before District Court for the Southern Dis trict of New York. was convicted on all four counts of the indictment and imprisonment sentenced for two years count, on each the terms to run concurrently. charged The indictment refusing him with submit induction (Count 1), physical ex (Count 2), possess amination a valid (Count notice of classification to submit information that requested (Count 4),. military-industrial complex which seems I. dictating policy.” to be our international who Catholic McGee is Roman copy McGee’s local board received Theolog- currently student at Union letter, apparently reopen- considered City. Seminary He in New York ical against his classification and decided in Man- registered Local Board 15 it, and, change event, August and informed hattan *3 II-S classification and deferment. Fol- “a stu- he was a month later board lowing graduation from the Uni- ministry at the preparing dent 1967, versity in of Rochester June his College Joseph’s Sem- of St. Cathedral board sent him a Current Information * ** inary under the direction it un- Questionnaire. McGee returned took a He Church.” Catholic Roman covering an- answered, letter and in a 1963, College in from of absence leave correspondence” that “further nounced during period board classified which “simply be board would from the draft 1964, passed August he him In I-A. unopened,” with his consistent returned physical had that his board preinduction approval.” “cooperation belief later, after en- time A short ordered. 19, 1967, almost two September On Rochester, University rolling in the receipt of this letter months after (student) defer- granted he was a II-S board, I-A. was reclassified McGee temporarily was reclassified He ment. him a notice classi- The Board mailed 1965, September II-S I-A informing clearly a letter fication and shortly there- was renewed classification right to ask for him that he had a 1966, February still after. In while personal appearance within or an II-S, requested conscien- classified days, that the had a Government stating objector status, tious Agent personal Appeal to aid him “with a his “intention continue on actual pro- appearance, appeal, or Priesthood.” clerk ordained right,” Agent Appeal cedural and that wrote him on March 23: give representative him or his This will the recent evi- advise legal on matters counsel Service Selective submitted, your concerning dence case charge. this un- at no McGee returned has been reviewed Local Board. writing opened, envelope on It is the decision of the Board that pursuant previous declara- Returned justify the re- evidence does tion and notification. your opening of case and reconsidera- unopened an order McGee also returned present your tion of classification. physical directing appear him to for a your However, we wish to advise 18, examination scheduled for October Objector will claim as Conscientious appear He re- and it. you longer qual- no be considered delinquency on No- notice sent turned ify for a classification. student open his McGee did vember decision; appeal this McGee did-not he notice, induction which sent Jan- granted requested later and was a fur 11, 1968, uary and did ther classification II-S October pass physical in- examination at duction center. he refused to April still while classified II-S submit to induction. University of and enrolled in the Roch- Johnson, Meanwhile, ester, had matriculated McGee wrote President Theological Seminary enclosing burnt Union as remnants his torn and September student draft letter stated that even full-time card. (stu- though “already accepted At time did a IY-D graduate study ministry) program dent from for the in a where” he theolog- probably qualify that his his draft but he “would for the claims necessary April deferment,” letter to the President ical he felt agents May every FBI interview two “sever link war” with violence grand jury testimony cooperate before a “with the refuse 1967, gave his board suf- II. in November classifying require information to ficient We shall deal first with trial, it was At established him IV-D. exemption was entitled to from Theological Seminary is Union military service as a matter of law under non-denominational, and that McGee’s U.S.C.App. 456(g), provides parish priest him recommended that: Seminary. of McGee’s The chairman [Sjtudents preparing ministry for the presence testified outside the draft board recognized the direction of jury was classi- that before McGee religious organizations, or churches pertinent fied all I-A satisfactorily pursuing who are full- file in his Selective recogniz- time courses instruction in Judge Murphy.found that was reviewed. theological divinity ed schools appel- rejected the board considered * * exempt training shall be objector claim. lant’s conscientious *4 (but and service not registration) from argues act- that his local board under this title. unlawfully classifying him I-A in ed statutory policy McGeecontends that the September he in his view when strong exemption may is so that the not should or I-O. have classified IV-D registrant any be denied who meets the premise he that cannot On that claims he qualifications. He concedes he refusing of to to be convicted submit request exemption the from his (Count 1) because order induction his board, but request claims no such illegal; to for induction was required by regulations. is the statute or refusing of to he cannot convicted any argues In event he the local physical (Count report for a examination knowledge board had sufficient of his 2) properly if he because had been classi- qualification exemption require for the to fied, he would not have been called its issuance. or, called, physical if could have waived penalty; the without It true that 456(g) examination and is section is failing mandatory provision to cannot be convicted of in the sense that possess may draft valid deny of board notice classification a IV-D ex (Count emption 3) qualifies because his to I-A classification one who for it. Oes argues tereich System was invalid. He also that he Selective Service Local supply cannot Board No. be convicted of failure to U.S. 4) (Count (1968).1 However, local L.Ed.2d information his it does substantially not disregard complied may follow because he totally that a procedures its and the because administrative supplied was favorable established Sys- the him. Selective Service attempts bring his case within board was informed of the letter Oestereich, supra, ground on the further President and almost two months after denied IV-D and classified McGee announced his intention to return punishment burning correspondence unopened. I-A as his draft These card, writing hardly Johnson, President the actions of a draft board lawlessly. refusing cooperate acting Moreover, with his local board. Oes Apart considerations, distinguishable from tereich is further because simply appellant sought through the record there does establish redress System the Selective contention. McGee wrote to Service un the Presi and was dent, enclosing justifiably deprived exemption remnants of draft of a IV-D his April card, re which he 1967. His local board obtained. McGee copy applied April ceived a never this letter on for a IV-D classification However, appellant impossible perceive was not I-A classified how the deprived punitively until II-S his could expired following gradua exemption him of deferment his had never re University quested. tion the of Rochester. This was months the almost five after questions rely which tem, trast to “classification own evaluation expertise right do involve or exercise of in the to a IV-D discretion, sup- subsequently hope both the local court will boards that a interpretation. at port McKart boards.” Id. S.Ct. While Thus, 185, 195, 89 at 1665. V. 1657, 1663, (1969), 23 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. * * * objector claims Conscientious cases, states that “[i]n Selective engaged in or deferments for those doctrine must be tailored the exhaustion necessary activities deemed “to the peculiarities of the administra- to fit the health, of the national maintenance Congress created,” system it rec- has tive ** safety, or interest” may ognizes doctrine that the exhaustion pear examples questions applicable like claims well be IV-D quiring expertise rely- McGee’s, where In exercise discretion. clearly presented— on facts never cases, System Selective Service presented local or indeed at all—to his stronger may interest the. courts board. having question decided necessary course, Of it is first instance local board and responsi- has appeal board, then which consid- bility registrants classifying question ers anew. instance, given first the information n.16, at Id. necessary perform its function. distinguishing body further the earlier *5 present the case does not apply which cases the exhaustion registrant present instance where a doctrine, the Court noted that: trying challenge to a cases all [T]hose involved ministerial of facts not to the basis presented objector claims, or case, claims the local board. such a the may pursued functioning system that well may have smooth the of through procedures challenges require administrative the well to classi- provided by the upon properly Selective laws. fications Service based facts not presented to the board be barred. Id. at 89 at 1666. S.Ct. n.15, at 89 at 1665. S.Ct. claim a IV-D ex proper emption depended McKart with the inter- upon dealt here resolution ' surviving

pretation essentially son” “sole of factual issues-which are exemption, U.S.C.App. (o), distinguish conceded. means question McKart, of swpra, the Court found to be a es such cases as where the statutory interpretation “certainly Oestereich, undisputed, and facts were supra, a matter of discretion.” Id. at where the board had rec Accordingly, ognized right registrant’s 89 S.Ct. at it refused the to a IV-D apply the exhaustion doctrine classification.2 the Whatever draft “simply case because there was no over- board’s determination have been whelming applied need” to have Selective McGee it for IV-D status System question supplied information, “resolve this it with full instance, trial, the first at least not where the even the facts adduced at as will process below, administrative is at an end be seen do show he was clearly exemption is faced with so criminal entitled to that prosecution.” Id. at at 1665. S.Ct. draft board could have arrived at but sharp Accordingly, McKart’s claim was thus con- one conclusion. trant) ; Bartelt,

2. For other cases where the claim a stu- United States v. (7 1952) (whether dent to a IV-D classification raised fact- issues, Eagles divinity student) ; ual see United ex v. States was full-time Samuels, 304, 316-317, Levy Cain, rel. ex rel. States (nature (1946) (2 1945) (nature seminary 91 L.Ed. of seminary, regis- studies, registrant’s intentions). motives of exemption say priest failure a even IV-D The man. any he was way supply supervising or from the local board it with McGee’s course of study. According supporting record, information is suffi- the di- ground disposition vinity cient school which that claim. enrolled is McGee may non-denominational contain Beyond plain many students have not who formulated exemption denial aof IV-D entering ministry the intention of would have had a “basis in fact.” Under and are not under the direction 456(g), requirements section at two least organization. religious church or divinity must be satisfied before stu record some of the discloses at least exemp dent becomes entitled a IV-D Catholic students at the come from school preparing He tion: must be student there, Catholic seminaries to take courses ministry for the under direction Indeed, appar- but not. McGeedid recognized religious organiza church or ently had been a student a Catho- at such ; satisfactorily tion pur and he must be seminary, go lic lege left to Hunter but Col- suing a full-time course instruction in University and then the of Roches- recognized theological divinity ter where he receive a Bachelor Sci- latter, school. toAs it is clear that at degree.4 Accordingly, ence McGee’slocal the time McGee refused induction3 board would not have had to conclude was a matriculated student the Union ministry “preparing for he was Theological Seminary who was satisfac the direction of” the Catholic Church. torily pursuing a full-time course Perhaps granted study. dispute, however, What is in exemption had McGeemade preparing whether McGee was for the directly it; perhaps not. But we can- ministry recog under the direction of a say that if had followed the lat- organization. religious nized church or course, ter there would been “no There is evidence in the record that Mc basis fact” for its action.5 isGee a Catholic and that he ul intends timately priest, to become a evi III. studying that he dence under the *6 direction of the Catholic Church when he respect In his contrast to inaction with parish refused induction is slim. His claim, squarely to the IV-D placed McGee had priest testified that he had recommended his 1-0 before the local Seminary, McGee but could that requested board when thought completed he meant more than that he young Special McGeeto a serious and decent Form for Conscientious Ob- only purposes correctly, Theolog- found, We assume for of discus- that Union key date, Seminary sion that this is the than rather is “a ical seminary,” non-denominational time, g., some earlier e. date of reclassifi- he not did treat as dis- positive claim, cation the board. of the IV-D rather proof refused to full-time at- treat University Rochester, 4. While at recognized tendance at a non-denomina- Colgate McGee took some courses divinity supplying tional school as alone Divinity Rochester School. prerequisite exemption. the other for the judge finding in- McGee claims that the trial In other words indicated correctly Theological require- read into statute a that Union Sem- since divinity inary non-denominational, ment that school itself the nature recognized supply direction of the school not could of itself organization religious missing as, “direction,” or- church in element of qualify example, der that its can for students for the case seminary. agree exemption. interpreta- IV-D denominational Such We wrong Eagles tion of the statute Of. would indeed be that conclusion. v. United student, school, Samuels, since it is the States ex rel. applies. language 316-317, to whom that 91 L.Ed. 308 How- (1946) ; ever, judge Levy we do not United States ex rel. believe the trial Cain, misinterpreted 456(g). (2 1945). thus Hav- section

{$7 objector although applicants, February He contends scientious jeetor 1966.6 in deny- undoubtedly could fact have.7 in was no that there basis objector ing his conscientious in this case While we have the benefit was thus as I-A reclassification that his testimony of the chairman of unlawful. any reveal local does denying ap- “basis in fact” McGee’s accept inclined We would be indicated, plication. As the statement argument. step in McGee’s first in his Form 150 beliefs would seem expressed his belief Form his - test, statutory meet and what Being Supreme whom personal “in testimony little there is superior duties of obligation is concerning sincerity chairman McGee’s considered,” and relations human would, anything, support if a conclusion “taking part form in said thought that the McGee was approv military operation indicates an * * He sincere. testified that McGee “had repugnant situation al/consent been offered an alternative to the defer- fellow man.” and service God and love sought, I-O, hospital ment he which was a sincere, statements, if These service. He not choose to him- avail he, “by of reli reason established self of that.” He further testified that training belief, gious conscientious * * * was a “[t]here letter written participation ly opposed war young where we were advised that the 456(j). U.S.C.App. Neither form.” accept man would not or inferred a I-O prior subsequent were. nor his actions testimony wouldn’t.” This assertions, see Unit with his inconsistent inaccurate. The letter referred to was Haughton, F.2d ed States v. Murray, February John A. 1966; dated nothing (9 and we see indicating far from McGee file—all that was before I-O, accept support a. it was of his reasonably put his could board—that sincerity plication.8 particularly issue. This Acceptance significant light of so much of Mc chair of the board argument testimony still Gee’s does lead to man’s conclusion require unless is to be for con- excused interview request protested invite or should never the draft 6. While prior action, meet for an with it interview he ever with- neither did board’s purpose primary application. classification. The Government draw the develop fleeting argument will be the interview further makes a objector longer on which the facts deferment.” desired a I-O “no based, sincerity claim is and the of such with- meant McGee had If this is I-O, claim. does not take incor- interview drawn *7 place personal appearance of rect, notified. the Board never so as registrant may request procedures which under then Service Selective 1624.1, a Section after classification such in force make clear now action. withdrawn have had to be would 41, writing. Local Board as Memorandum No. Local Board Memorandum in July 30, 1968, supra 1952, 41, amended, August 15, re- amended note as No. Reporter ported in Service Law Selective may the chairman of the board What (including (“S.S.L.R.”) amend- application have meant was that McGee’s July 30, 1968, not which are of ments for indicated even if he were I-O relevant). Moreover, let- here granted I-O, he would July 23, 1967, board, in to his dated ter service, as re- for alternative civilian policy non- of which he announced quired the Act. “personal cooperation, con- restates his eventuality pass. never came to commitment.” scientious event, on this we would record currently gard System McGee’s statement that he would Service 7. The Selective accept alternate service as a “basis if it determines board that advises denying grant I-O in fact” a I-O classification. the I-A-O or it cannot claimed, encourage available to him appeal others his I-A classifica- failure from so, doing especially to do in so. cases where the no reason seeWe tion. good. of success court seem passages McKart chances from To the 200, another, agree at quoted, add U.S. On we all this find ourselves we Judge opinion at ment with of 1666: the sensitive 89 S.Ct. disagreement Goodrich and in with the holding apply to [T]oday’s does Judge able dissent of Maris a case registrant every ad- who take fails strikingly McGee's, similar vantage of the remedies administrative Palmer, (3 Cir.), Sys- provided Selective States v. denied) cert. 76 S.Ct. many said, For, as we tem. agree 100 L.Ed. 772 also We require exercise dis- classifications ap with the decision of another court expertise; application of or cretion peals, light McKart, made in the require cases, may proper to be these refused to excuse failure to through carry registrant his case hardship deferment, revocation aof Unit process before the administrative Powers, (1 ed States v. 834 Cir. F.2d into court. comes 1969).9 subject just The entire has four factors listed Justice Marshall Mr. exhaustively canvassed the Ninth Cir ordinarily application justify cuit Lockhart v. United 420 F. bar a exhaustion doctrine to defendant 2d decided December challenging a local board’s classifi- agree Judge Ely’s opinion may “judicial (1) review cation: majority a over, of the court More- in banc. litigant hindered failure position taken the two dis- record, agency allow the to make factual senting judges supports “forfeiture of apply its or to its discretion or exercise judicial review” for failure to exhaust may expertise”; (2) efficiency judicial “when the deliberately has “complaining furthered because sought to subvert and evade the adminis- may vindicating party be successful process,” trative here, the situation as rights process”; in the administrative distinguished from a case where the “de- autonomy (3) “notions of administrative merely fault gent.” negli- inadvertent require given agency that the a chance errors”; its discover and correct own possible (4) frequent Feinberg argues Our “it is brother flouting a different deliberate of administrative result on the basis that the processes passed could the effectiveness “never weaken on” the conscien ig- agency by encouraging objector people tious claim. doWe not read the procedures.” way. nore record chairman, at 194- its The called as a three All last defense witness at the trial in present appeal November factors are might here. An 1968, said that when the Mc obtaining objection Gee well have led to McGee’s thought a 1-0 was filed in classification and have avoided “there * * judicial prosecutorial weren’t sufficient facts to moti —and —effort flouting grant processes vate me the Selec- the re System quest sought” tive Service has caused. and that “what he set System given oppor- grant forth did should have been not motivate me to him *8 tunity sought.” to the relief he correct the error of local the He denied in structing sanctioning And the board. de- clerk to write that the con pro- objection liberate scientious refusal to avail himself of claim had not been point cedures which the had made considered—a Government on which the letter determine, McKart, 463, 2025, 9. So we far as have been able to 89 S.Ct. McNeil), (1969), United States 23 L.Ed.2d v. 446 has been (4 1968), again Cir. for vacated remanded decided. light further consideration in the

699 ambiguous. that affirmance reversal of the Local stated also He was prejudice gave Board, a I-A classi- and that on when the board again 1967, a fair what the level is cured consid- reviewed “we fication in file,” appeal,” on “we reviewed eration De Remer v. Unit appeared that the the in States, (8 712, young when ed F.2d 719 man’s case 340 Cir. the record of the 1965) (citing cases). gave pertinent and all See C.F.R. § I-A we him the 1626.26; States, contained,” supra, that McKart v. United therein 16, file be- 395 U.S. at n. the whole “the board considered States, 194; Storey on L.Ed.2d Mr. McGee I-A fore it reclassified 1966) (citing (9 September 19, chair- F.2d While the 1967.” cases); Clay v. United F.2d man “based our also that on testified (5 previous vacated and that his determination grounds, remanded objection de- on for other status conscientious (1969); nied, time L.Ed.2d 297 had alternative we Note, Service, I-A,” give we this as 76 Yale L.J. him a read Selective indicated, meaning only remem- the chairman As .171 good the fact had a factual bered dissatisfaction with the Board’s against way points showing application case in no McGee's taking one; insistence early the on case of 1966 and that was examined statutory change like McKart dif- their construction Board no reason to saw Judge eighteen fers since on such a matter there is minds months later. witness, positive advantage in resort to courts Murphy, heard the who saw and which alone can decide the issue authori- found the draft board “as a fact tatively uniformly for the benefit defendant’s considered the registrants. all objector Instead McGee’s stiff- status and a conscientious dealings necked with refusal have whole board considered System has Selective Service caused do how not see on We 23." expenditure regarded finding “clearly of countless hours can as grand petit jurors, and prosecutors, erroneous.” judges appellate of the trial and courts. if had even there alone, If we were free to look at his case failure to consider been an inadvertent tempted we still take Sep objection claim dissenting charitable of our view broth- assumes, dissent we tember as the if er. But should do that we would the same conclusion. reach case, obliged every do it in would be thing per precisely kind of that a course similar one. Of seems appearance sonal or a conference with require- “harsh” when exhaustion Agent, Appeal in which McGee was ment conviction refusal results letter vited in the he returned to have by a submit to induction unopened, have certain would been almost good exemp- seemingly with a reveal, the board the result points tion. But of the main one Mc passed would merits have exhaustion doctrine is relieve the Quite possibly it Gee’s claim. would having consider claims courts not, favorably; error acted if it ought first dealt with very likely corrected agencies; instance administrative name, appeal appeal.10 Despite their per- properly cannot be limited to those simply perform a review boards do not fail sons whose claims would court universally “It is held function. anyway. Appeal Board considers matters exceptions to there are its classifica While de novo and objec- instance, requiring rule mere a conscientious tion is one of first *9 developed appeal the local well have board could 10. Communication between true facts. 700 claim, government appeal availability of his appeal a denial of

tor to exhaustion; agent “If him from excused Claimants close to this case. none comes Agent nothing Appeal than does more required administra- to exhaust are not may his lose the con- advise to attack in order tive remedies stitutionality right statute, to contest his classification United of (D. criminally prosecuted in the district Sisson, F.Supp. 520 294 v. States administratively ap- ju- J.), probable Mass.1968) court failure to (Wyzanski, peal, to noted, it would seem be worthwhile.” 396 U.S. risdiction regula- had who But that cannot avail McGee (1969), or 24 L.Ed.2d in no uncertain Branigan, tions, F. advised the v. United States anything (S.D.N.Y.1969) not read terms that they would Supp. ap- ground him, and would not J.), sent (Weinfeld, sensible on the pealed no he was told. While no matter what appeal that since local and boards taking attitude McGee’smotives authority determine constitutional to they may highest, do of the have been claims, for- be a useless exhaustion would ap- the relief not excuse failure to seek qualification mality. Another counte- “exceptional afforded him. To which the law peal requirement to relates needlessly multiply the underlying nance this would already heavy and unusual circumstances cases like appeal,” Thompson burden Unit- v. failure 1967) imposing (10 on the courts. States, 86, 88 Cir. ed 380 F.2d added). (emphasis of cases But that line IV. neglecting appeal is holds judicial of classifica- not a review bar to convic- therefore affirm McGee’s We justi- registrant’s tion if failure refusing to tion Count 1 for submit Examples are v. United Donato fied. States, respect his claims induction. Since with 1962) (9 (regis- F.2d 468 Cir. alleged hinge on the 2 and 3 Counts of notice trant received classification, impropriety we his I-A firefighting duties; by away on while counts affirm the convictions these period for the time he returned the also, what without need consider lapsed); peal v. Glover proper if had held result (reg- States, (8 1961) Cir. light the I-A classification invalid. unsuccessfully pri- appealed a istrant had of the sentences there concurrent classification; when he received conviction under need consider the classification, du- fifth an exact notice here 4 under the circumstances Count fourth, plicate no reason there was presented. through go process expect him to Affirmed. again explanation in the absence notice);11 from the board the new Judge (dissent- FEINBERG, Circuit Powers, (5 v. F.2d 438 |Powers ing) : 1968) (registrant given misinformation respectfully I dissent. secretary the local board recently Supreme The told Court has garding right appeal); United States “it is to remember that use us that well Harris, F.Supp. (D.Ore.1968) exhaustion doctrine criminal knowledge (registrant charged exceedingly McKart can harsh.” cases right edu- he had little since v. United difficulty). The cation and read with 23 L.Ed.2d “exceptional doctrine was circumstances” concept harsh that This case shows how recently perhaps reaffirmed and extended particularly here —it be, when—as can Davis, United States v. unnecessarily. applied record (4 apparently no basis held that the that there was shows denying ob- the conscientious fact board’s failure to advise the from, opinion quoted in this context. must read the dissent language 11. The *10 McGee, jeetor left, testimony Francis claim of Vincent of the board chairman (as this, agree), Jr. we all McGee resolves it in favor of the conclusion that timely presented February-March his claim in fashion 1-0 body draft and that his local claim was not considered on the merits. passed on of the majority correctly the merits claim. points While the out never this, Despite the doctrine exhaustion that the chairman testified that when the remedies, placid application born in area was first filed in “there * * * thereby law, administrative is invoked weren’t sufficient facts to moti- consigning jail years. grant for two McGee vate me to quest the re- sought,” That too for me. “harsh” and that “what he set grant forth did not motivate me to him majority opinion points out, As the Mc- sought,” the relief he he also testified present claim in full Gee his 1-0 rejected application “at that February Exam- his local board * * * young time because the man compels conclu- ination of the record attending college my was judg- local board did not at sion qualification ment he rated a 2S which we 1-0 time consider his proceeded give (Emphasis him.” add- application on the merits. board re- ed.) immediately Almost thereafter the application fused to consider his initial following interchange place: took ground for 1-0 on the that was then eighteen student, later, months Q. you I believe said before classify September 1967, refused to Mc- you was because of his beliefs that ground Gee 1-0 his claim grant failed to him a CO? rejected. been say anything A. I did not all requires “the C.F.R. 1623.2 about his beliefs. You can refer opinion registrant shall be classified in the lowest my record. I said what class which he determined he set forth did not motivate me to eligible.” (student Since defer- II-S grant sought. him the relief he ment) ais lower class than 1-0 accord- following Then interchange came the reg- be- hierarchy forth in set government tween attorney ulation, and the improper would have been (Mr. Lande): board chairman grant long McGee a 1-0 so II-S, unquestion- as he held a which he Honor, Mr. Robinson: Your I think ably presented did at the he first time Mr. Lande has testified that Mr. Mc- his 1-0 claim. Thus it is difficult Gee was a student at that time majority’s understand the contention gave they therefore him a classifi- 2S the local board’s letter to dated cation. “ambiguous” March The Witness: I did state that. whether the 1-0 claim had been consid- ered on the merits at that time. light regulation, the letter re- then held a II-S classification. Under by McGee, ceived and the chair- regulation, therefore, consideration of testimony, man’s own the conclusion the merits of McGee’s 1-0 claim would inescapable seems that when McGee have been a fruitless task the board plied prop- for 1-0 in 1966 his claim was since it liged event have ob- been erly merits, not considered on the but was unchanged. to leave his II-S status denied because he held a II-S classifica- The letter itself advised McGee that tion at that time. “your Objector claim as Conscientious you longer will be quite clearly considered when The record also indicates qualify for a student classification” —in that when was classified I-A in McGee 1967, light regulation, of that seems a state- enough plain rejected ground ment previ- of reason which is on that it had any ambiguity ously me. And if rejected, there were considered not- *11 testify concerning memory. withstanding did the initial not the fact that such true, noted, testify: say It As jection the he did “I did not not on merits. was anything out, trial majority joints that at all the the about his beliefs.” Such as judge “consid- not the local evaluation of was found that board McGee’sbeliefs necessary February application in Mc- the ered defendant’s because ineligible objector and that Gee then status was 1-0 because conscientious by Moreover, on of board the whole his II-S. the chairman’s was considered testimony 23,” the true that made that did dis- September and also clear “re- the board cuss McGee’scase with other members chairman testified young February man’s the the board viewed record the per- gave event, neither him the 1A all the record case when establishes contained.” the therein chairman nor the entire board tinent alone However, na- as the he also testified ever considered whether beliefs McGee’s of a were those conscientious ob- ture of that review: sincere jector to war. my rec- The To best of the Witness: * * * [Sep- time at that Such failure to consider McGee’s ollection no error the was claim on the merits tember longer was clear 1967] previ- our Based on the requires think in school. local which one would setting in- ous that his an order for determination aside objection de- status was duction. The only blunder, failure was board’s nied, time it also a se- we had no alternative at that but violated give regulation, 1A, did. com- him a which we service but lective in- mands it “to consider all receive Q. You didn’t consider the conscien- formation, pertinent the classification again objector tious because registrant, presented it,” of a 32 C.F.R. previously? had been denied (emphasis added), undoubt- 1622.1 § g., [Emphasis edly A. E. added.] as well. violated the statute Yes— (1): App. 455(a) 50 U.S.C. denying Thus it is clear the basis September the 1-0 status 1967 was persons for train- selection The ** previous February-March denial made shall be and service application submitted. when was first manner, impartial in an noted, And, as record even regulations President as the rules and ** clearer that this initial consideration may prescribe *. February-March 1966 did not deal with Yet, or- we are told that board’s application or the the merits of the nature Mc- der should be invalidated because beliefs, sincerity was appellate remedies to utilize Gee failed based the fact he was a student System. I within the Selective not, classification, with a II-S who was agree required to in- do not that we eligible reason, for that for 1-0 status. in this voke the of exhaustion doctrine pass mer- At no did the board on the time supra, McKart, con- case. It is true that though, claim, its of as even strong indications, quoted tains found, judge application trial majority, limited failure even the the board “considered” may present to exhaust here sometimes I as But do not read that case be fatal. necessarily majority position The takes the invariably preventing the “the chairman remembered Board’s when of invalid classification defense showing dissatisfaction with McGee’s give did all facts examined board, especially the record where early no Board saw 1966 and applied indicates eighteen change “expertise” their minds in its ultimate decision reason actually consider the classifi- chairman months later.” Compare might appeal also the merits at all. here. The cation on supra, regarded McKart, case, n. 395 U.S. at 198 on the record as then go language known, Glover as a close one which could (8th way Accordingly, either on the facts. may applied though appropriately even review the novo, claim: de have been to McGee’s1-0 the balance way by tipped not to set either a desire general rule as We adhere *12 In aside the action a board. of necessity admin- of exhaustion case, of the claim a a fair determination obtain remedies order istrative by would be on the merits the local board opin- review, judicial are of a and course, precise- And, of that is crucial. ly generally applica- is ion that such rule get. Knox v. did not what McGee necessary. usually and ble (9th States, 398, 402 Cir. United general we of the view that such are argu- met the the Ninth Circuit absolute, and inflexible rule is by appeal ment that de novo review a exception, to be that it is without the failure of the local board board cured extremely excep- only under relaxed supporting a claim to consider evidence The unusual circumstances. tional and objection. re- of The court presented in this case factual situation jected follows: that contention as requires the appropriate for and rule. relaxation of such the local board Classification process indispensable step in the Local Board Selective Cf. Wolff v. The is entitled induction. (2d 1967). 16, 817, No. F.2d 825 Cir. acted his claims considered and have upon claim as McGee’s 1-0 facts the mem- these local bodies sufficiently properly us unusual allow bership composed resi- which is depart exhaustion doctrine: community. An of his un- dents own strong presented 1-0 for a McGee case derlying concept of Selective Serv- classification; did not his local board subject System to call ice is that those prerequi- quire personal interview as a forces are for service the armed claim; processing site for such a neighbors peo- their be classified — reasonably no information file contains contradicting position ple are in a to know best who claim; the chair- backgrounds, their their situation and thought inaccurately man support that a letter activities. the board that advised language in Knox has been cited I-O; accept a McGee would not Circuit, approval by the Ninth most appli- did “consider” the when the board recently States, v. United Welsh cation, it on the inaccurate dismissed it (9th 1078, 1968), cert. F.2d Cir. assumption that claim had 816, 53, granted, 24 L. 90 S.Ct. rejected on merits. own, (1969), our Ed.2d 67 as well as f Finally, perhaps important, most (2d Howlett, 758, Mintz F.2d v. consider the failure local board to distinguished 1953), although claim on the merits could Corliss, latter case in United States v. of an have been called the attention Cir.), (2d 280 F.2d denied, cert. peal know could not board because McGee 5 L.Ed. U.S. nothing error in the rec- about that (claim (1960) procedural 2d 105 un ord would disclose it. It true that consider fairness but not failure to have reversed merits). denial of 1-0 classification McGee compelling rea- It is true that there are thought simply that he because doctrine, the exhaustion sons behind case. But made out sufficient suggest requirement I do not deciding dispositive should not ignores apply doctrine be cast aside when the whether to the exhaustion gives altogether it no would on Count reverse conviction the local board necessary necessary is it does seem for me to consider Nor facts all. briefly. very counts, failure the other case to the issue whether albeit resolve should appeal denial of a I-O to generally charged failing Count 2 McGeewith subsequent crim- at a be fatal report pre-induction physical ex- invalidity of a inal trial to the defense amination in October after he had classification, question has I-A undisputed been reclassified I-A. It is Circuit, recently Lockhart split the Ninth report. However, (9th 420 F.2d 1143 v. United argues that had he received clas- the I-O (in banc) (8-2); 1969) States cf. entitled, sification to which he was (in Palmer, Cir.) (3d failure to could constitute a banc) (4-3), denied, cert. essentially crime. This contention is cor- 100 L.Ed.2d 772 (SSS Report rect. The Order to 223) Form doc- I hold exhaustion by his which was sent to McGee inexorably applied when trine need *13 clearly quite indicates to a could error of the basic registrant report I-O for failure to appeal, not and should be disclosed physical subject a examination would not registrant did not be invoked when the imprisonment, him to fine and as give pertinent to of the all registrants, would I-A and and in- I-A-0 upon passed and it never the local board deed would have no effect all on his at record, Mc- at this the merits all. On obligation perform to Un- civilian work.1 to from the failure board’s Gee’s circumstances, der those a to notice fatal, I-A classification should be report physical I-O for a to be and doctrine should not the exhaustion examination is for benefit and applied that he to I would hold McGee. “duty required a of him” under 50 U.S.C. I-O, classified and should have been App. 462(a). See United States v. on would set aside the conviction Count Mendoza, F.Supp. (E.D.N.Y. 673, 295 1. 1969); Walsh, United States 279 F. majority opinion 115, Supp. (D.Mass.1968). had occasion 118-119 Cf. to on consider convictions Counts Shoemaker v. United necessary (9th Cir.), to denied, did find it and and cert. However, I deal with Count 4. since S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 88 223) Report (SSS 1. The Order Form duction into the Forces. Armed You subject states: will also be im- fine and Registrants: prisonment provisions To Class I-O given Military Training examination for Serv- Universal and you purpose determining Act, whether ice as amended. qualified military for service. If See also Local Board Memorandum No. you you qualified, reported (1969), are found will in S.S.L.R. available, induction, provides: in lieu of to be perform ordered civilian con- work Local Board Subse- Action tributing quent Reg- to the maintenance to Refusal Its Own health, safety If national you or interest. istrants to Submit to Armed Forces * * * report fail for or to submit Examination. subject examination, you (b) I-O, will be If Class perform purposes to be ordered to civilian work consider him for all if he as you physically mentally in the same manner as if had had been ex- acceptable taken the examination been had amined and found for mili- military qualified tary process found for service. service and him thereafter sharp reg- There is a distinction the advice in the same manner as gives the Form I-A to a Class istrant I-O who has been Class registrant; being acceptable I-A-0 he is told that: for found service after you report given physical If fail for examination an armed forces examina- ** directed, you may as de- declared tion. linquent report in- and ordered to McKart, supra, then would have been liable for civilian It is true that presumably dicta alternate at contains service and would report it; suggesting have been invalid ordered to that an today prose- simply whether, despite to a do not defense know ear- “would be a contrary indications,2 pre-in- lier obeyed he would have cution failure order, McKart such an which would have duction examination.” recognized wrongful sincerity denial not deal with his convic- classification, had, con- If he thus did not tions. is difficult to believe prosecution option physical ex- to waive on 3 and 4 sider Counts that have followed.3 regis- And, event, amination which is afforded to there holding question jury Mc- is a substantial trants whether the such a classification. judge penalized or the would have differ- Gee should not because of reacted ently prosecution error, deprived of the benefit of a ob- board’s designed jector procedures Although on Counts 3 selective service Therefore, judge objectors. certainly trial authority acted within his for conscientious on also conviction Count 2 should he sentenced year terms, might concurrent two aside. well be set given prison McGee shorter sen- Having that because thus concluded tence, probation, or even known improperly denied classifica- that McGeeshould have been classified as objector he should tion as a conscientious objector a conscientious and could not be acquitted 2 of 1 and Counts I convicted Counts 1 and am aware grave there indictment, remains that it is proper treatment of issue as to the *14 on rare occasion that have aside set remaining counts. convictions on the two presumably a conviction on otherwise knowingly charged These that McGee “good” counts in the because defects personal possession failed to in his conviction of defendant on “bad” (Count a valid 3) of Classification Notice counts. failed to submit 4). (Count quested his local board Follette, United States ex rel. v. Weems Appellant also attacks conviction 1969); (2d United Cir. cf. counts, arguments partic- (2d these ularly Bottone, v. States 365 F.2d — very per- toas Count 3-—are not Cir.), denied, cert. suasive. 514, 17 L.Ed.2d 437 This case exercising appropriate instance for My problem is of a different sort. v. such discretion. See United States Having 2, I found error Counts 1 1966) ; Barash, (2d F.2d uneasy feeling am left with Hines, v. United States differently out case have turned only 1958). Doing (2d so would not if had been involved. Counts 3 and 4 eliminate doubt that McGee was grew All of offenses out prejudiced in- Counts 3 and operative policy of non- same fact: 2, it 1 and valid convictions on Counts starting cooperation draft with his op- also afford the Government April earlier Yet because of his 1967. portunity to consider whether still request, he classified was entitled press prosecution on Counts wishes If he so I-O. had been classified objec- against and 4 1967—when should divinity tor and student. at least doubt been—there is Accordingly, involved would have reverse the con- become I would law It is true that 2 and direct a criminal at all. victions on 1 and Counts majority though opinion, note 8. McGee re- tion on Count even Gf. obey Gov’t order. fused the induction Indeed, the Selective Service authorities Exs. prosecu- in this case recommend judgment acquittal, and reverse further 3 and for on Counts

convictions dissent-

proceedings with this consistent

ing opinion. America,

UNITED STATES Plaintiff-Appellee, GRIMES, Defendant-Appellant.

Noah No. 28945

Summary Calendar. Appeals, Court of States

Fifth Circuit.

May 18, 1970.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Vincent Francis McGee Jr.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date Published: Mar 31, 1970
Citation: 426 F.2d 691
Docket Number: 177, Docket 33568
Court Abbreviation: 2d Cir.
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