United States v. Victor Arditti, United States of America v. Guillermo Avila

removable, and, therefore, action was period began to run

thirty-day limitations The district court’s determi- against them. regard should af- nation this have been firmed. America,

UNITED STATES Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. ARDITTI, Defendant-Appellant. Victor America, UNITED STATES Plaintiff-Appellee, AVILA, Defendant-Appellant. Guillermo 90-8646, Nos. 90-8721. Appeals, United States Court Fifth Circuit. 27, 1992. Feb.

offense. Avila that his conduct did not violate federal monetary instru- laundering statute, ment in- structions at his trial were inadequate, and government entrapped him and engaged outrageous in in conduct operation. course its undercover challenges jury also instructions and charges entrapment outrageous and con- duct, and he in quashing claims that a trial subpoena deprived the district court him of process. due We affirm.

I. appeals

These arise from an Internal (“IRS”) Revenue Service undercover inves- tigation of money-laundering. The defen- dants separately, were tried but their cases appeal. were consolidated on Because each challenges defendant the conduct of the investigation, present IRS we the facts of together. the two cases We then discuss argument Avila’s that his conduct did statute, violate each defendant’s chal- lenges instructions, to the the issues entrapment outrageous government each, they apply conduct as and the Panetta, II, Stillinger, Mary Bernard J. quashing subpoena. of Arditti’s Paso, Tex., Gabellero, Ortega, El Panetta & in defendant-appellant for No. 90-8646. II. Durbin, Jahn, Jr.,

LeRoy M. Richard L. Jahn, Ray Attys., Asst. U.S. Ronald F. W. Agent In Special Gary IRS Gall- Antonio, Tex., Ederer, Atty., U.S. San for began investigating money laundering man in plaintiff-appellee No. 8646. Paso, Texas, using in El assumed name “Gary portraying W. Adams” and him- Powell, Price, Strusburger Dal- Sidney & as a cocaine dealer. self Gallman started Tex., las, in defendant-appellant for No. Yanez, information that Gabriel who 90-8721. business, money exchange owned a laun- Jahn, Durbin, Morgan LeRoy Richard L. by handling disguise it dered its Ederer, Jr., Attys., Asst. U.S. Ronald F. goal was to source. Gallman’s discover Antonio, Tex., plaintiff- Atty., U.S. San Yanez’s methods and cohorts. appellee No. 90-8721. May Gallman first contacted Yanez 1988, explaining that he wanted Yanez to help large him move amounts cash off- shore, bring then back into the GOLDBERG, SMITH, Before form, intimating United States usable DUHÉ, Judges. Circuit that he and his associates involved in were illegal activity. Gallman Yanez invent- SMITH, Judge: JERRY E. Circuit ed the name “Ricardo Guerra-Battle” and in that Avila and Victor Arditti were established Mexican bank account Guillermo $100,000 conspiracy name. Yanez twice funneled cash convicted of to launder mone- Mexico, money arranged for the tary instruments and of substantive wire-transferred to Gallman’s using bank checks, Mexican cashier’s using Dallas, fee then collected a from Gallman. name, the “Guerra” false making pur- chases the name of the Virgin British arranged Yanez next for Gallman to corporation Islands opened had to fa- open Cayman Islands account in the cilitate Cayman the offshore Islands ac- names, using “Adams” and “Guerra” a let- count. Gallman asked Yanez to recom- ter of introduction from an El Paso attor- mend stock or brokerage houses that the ney Cayman to a attorney. Islands Gall- corporation could use to invest in the stock put man later asked Yanez to him in touch market. help with someone who could him with September,

business in El Paso. In Yanez November,1 Yanez told Gallman about Arditti, introduced Gallman to an El Paso Avila, his friend a securities broker in San lawyer. criminal defense Antonio for the firm of Prudential-Bache (“Pru-Bache”) Securities During introductory meeting who wouldn’t in- Sep- meeting sist on tember Gallman told Gallman “or anything Arditti that he like that.” explained must trust Arditti he Yanez before could reveal that he frequently the nature of his referred explained business and business to Avila and that the two helping “get that Yanez him had fee-sharing was arrangement. mon- When [his ey] get out it back” so that Gallman he could asked what Yanez had told Avila him, use it. Arditti reassured by Gallman men- about Yanez said portrayed that he - tioning attorney-client privilege, his Gallman as mining a Mexican client seek- previous work with ing clients involved in investments. When Gallman further drugs, and his distrustful questioned nature. Avila, Yanez about Yanez said that “he has a lot of clients from Mexico in Arditti told Gallman that since he was you are, same business and he never business,” “into kind of he should questions.” asks During discussion, this fund a chest in preparation war day for the signed Gallman brokerage pro- forms money get he would need to jail out of on vided Yanez as “Guerra.” lawyer. bond and hire a explained Gallman spend any that he couldn’t Yanez introduced Gallman and Avila way right “the it is now and that he had January 1989 at a hotel in San Antonio. get get “to it out and it back.” Although Although Gallman used his undercover Arditti told Gallman that he could not ad- name, “Adams,” signed he agree- client vise him on how to any illegal launder ment and certificate foreign (W- status funds, Arditti advised Gallman on structur- 8) as “Guerra.” The W-8 eliminates bro- ing purchase transactions to real estate kerage house reporting requirements as to El Paso arousing suspicion without and the foreign and, thus, accounts of nationals assured Gallman that effectively prevented would have any would not discover payments made knowing from that Ricardo Gallman to Arditti. Gary Guerra or transacting Adams was October, business with

In Pru-Bache. Yanez Gallman told channeled another $100,000 Avila that Gallman Gallman’s cash was both “Adams” Gallman’s Dallas “Guerra” account after and that this tinkering was “untaxed mon- with the Cayman ey” arrangements. Islands from the Mexican mining operation. In the meeting discussing transfer, Additionally, according government, to the Gallman directly told Yanez Avila that “he and his knew that group Gallman not a was Mexi- citizen, were in yet the ‘coke business’ can part and his told Gallman that he would money they handle the derived “take you from whatever tell me” when asked the sales.” Yanez and Gallman seemed to whether he felt comfortable about the Mex- agree should follow Arditti’s ad- ican mining Further, story. investor vice in investing in real estate and stocks told Gallman that because client “confiden- 1. The 1956(a)(3), district court instructed the relating charge conspir- that it § to the any prior could not consider acts to November acy to violate the statute. 18, 1988, the effective date of 18 U.S.C. $40,000 check, must,” ap- client la a cashier’s staggered he which Avila tiality is a at home. deposited. and entertained also pointments funds arranged for investment The three request; At Gallman’s Yanez invited Ar- through Yanez to come from Gallman ditti to meet them for lunch March 1989. law and repeated that under Avila. Avila suspi- Arditti discussed methods to avoid not take cash policy Pru-Bache he could tracing money, including cion and the $10,000 did of under and that investments using cash. Gallman offered Arditti reported government. need to be away the chance to “walk from the deal” if new, February, executed back- Gallman “problem Arditti had a with the brokerage change documents dated According Iwhat do.” to Gallman’s testi- Virgin to the name of the British account mony, responded that he when had request. at Avila’s As corporation Islands not asked what kind of business Gallman forms, signed the first Gallman did, clarified, then Gallman “You under- blank, completed them. and Avila forms money,” stand this is coke to which Arditti days February, A later in Gallman few replied, going anywhere, “Yoú don’t see me again. plainly told Avila met Gallman you?” disputes do Gallman’s testi- Avila, “I in the coke business. That’s am mony portion as to this of their conversa- Now, you I do. will not ever be what tion and notes that the failed part Although of it.” Gall- in that involved tape-record exchange, to this did nor Gall- opportunity to back man offered Avila it in his man record memorandum concern- the source away from the deals because of meeting. ing the funds, responded that Yanez Avila May, In Gallman met Yanez and that, long pro him had told Gallman put Arditti. Gallman aside the idea of real form, vided the investment funds check estate investments- El Paso and told Ya- problem that there was as to where “[n]o opportunity nez and Arditti about an to made,” money comes or how it was f[rom] $200,000 invest in an Oklahoma oil deal. “Adams,” corporation, was because money- Gallman revealed that “this we’re Avila’s client. Avila asked Gallman wheth doing right part now is of a ten-kilo deal officer, he a law enforcement which er was now,” getting paid I’m off for ... ... denied. Gallman protecting identity in and stressed his recently purported to have col- Gallman complex oil deal. Arditti outlined a ar- which, $15,000, as- lected rangement preventing governmental for serts, admittedly Avila understood were roy- access to Gallman’s name Avila, proceeds from a cocaine deal. alty payment.mechanism, perhaps setting however, maintains that did not Gallman or, up foreign corporation as Gallman he law Avila that wanted to violate the tell suggested, foreign a trust in a bank to report or that he did not want to the cash. money. and invest Gall- receive Gallman’s stresses that he told Gallman that he repeated money” that “this is coke man anything illegal to and that did not want do know he could and wanted to whether corporation confirmed that Gallman if “I up on Arditti not to talk end ... count “legal” going and that was to was Gallman getting busted.” deposit money.” “clean he would Arditti assured Gallman that repeated he After Avila could not again cash, divulge anything but warned he to handle directed Gallman obtain spending large lumps of against corpora- checks in the name of the Gallman cashier’s agreed draft documents him to do After cash. Arditti to tion and told how so. checks, money memorializing he the “loan” of from obtained the met Avila Gallman Gallman, would gave corporation office and him two the which outside Avila’s $15,000, money, and totaling explain source of payable checks Gallman’s cashier’s establishing account de- to check on an escrow to Pru-Bache care of Avila. Avila it in money and invest corporation’s the funds in the ac- to receive Gallman’s posited March, to Avi- deal. In Gallman delivered Oklahoma count. week, Yanez next Gallman that signature authority told had and the code to loan documents and the

the fake escrow validate wire transfers. When Arditti re- delayed Arditti account would because ceived a check from the corporate broker- being by audited Arditti IRS. told was age $50,000 account for August on he “being he worried about Yanez deposited it in the trust account and told passed When Yanez framed” Gallman. $49,000 the bank to wire to the oil deal this information to Gallman and offered to bank account in Oklahoma. lawyer, contact another Gallman insisted mid-August, gave Gallman a using on Arditti. bill for his services. Gallman found the May, At the end Gallman delivered stout,” “pretty amount adjusted so Arditti $50,000, Yanez which funneled to Gall- it downward but asked pay Gallman not to time, Dallas account. At this Yanez man’s him in appear cash because that would delay procrastination Arditti’s attributed suspicious. The three then devised a more but noted that was “convinced” plan transactions, efficient for future fo- proceed about how to with the bank in cusing on the need to shield Gallman setting up the escrow account. Gallman using the “Guerra” name procuring telephoned repeatedly Yanez over the next deposit funds the trust account weeks Gallman few because wanted Arditti at a Mexican bank the form of a cash- complete the deal. Yanez continued to ier’s check. insist participate Arditti would but planned, $50,000 As Arditti received a wanted to in structuring take care check day next from a Mexican deal.2 exchanger and transferred the The first infusion of funds Oklahoma the oil deal August account. On Ardit- through occurred Yanez’s bank own ac- ti, following procedure, the same deposited June, at the count end of $50,000 another in the trust account and by account as Gallman. escrow envisioned wired it to Oklahoma. help getting Gallman asked for Yanez’s using to Oklahoma escrow III. procedure. mid-July, account Gallman grand jury A charged Arditti with con- Arditti, met in El Paso with Yanez and who spiring with Yanez and Avila in violation of explained agreed that had to the meth- (1) 18 U.S.C. 371 to filing currency avoid § od used in the first transfer because the reports transaction in violation of 31 U.S.C. up had set bank some hurdles establish- 5313(a); (2) filing currency avoid or mon- § ing Departing the escrow account. from etary reports in instrument of idea, violation id. escrow account Arditti offered to 5316; (3) and launder a up. monetary set instru- § a trust whose funds Arditti would ment in (count violation of 18 manage, U.S.C. which would also conceal Gall- § one). Additionally, identity. charged man’s The three indictment formulated an Arditti violating 1956(a)(3) plan to invest with section elaborate from the (counts twelve, fifteen, corporate brokerage eighteen) account into the and and Okla- violating completed by oil and id. arrange- aiding abetting homa deal § violating 1956(a)(3)(counts for the Yanez in ments fraudulent section loan. sixteen). fourteen and The convicted participation, Yanez’s With Arditti Arditti on all counts. opened a bank account in the name “V.R. Trust Account 3” charged several The Number indictment con- Avila with days pre- spiring later. No trust documents were with Arditti and Yanez in violation account, pared for the and Arditti alone of section 371 to commit the three offenses entrapment (2) day; To of buttress his claims and out- 2. Arditti seemed so reluctant to do Gall- conduct, rageous government point- has suggested man’s hiring work Yanez another regarding ed out several facts contacts be- work; lawyer (3) complete Gallman’s May tween Yanez and Arditti after transac- May Gallman contacted Yanez three times on tion, (1) specifically: Yanez Gallman that told and 13 times June to ask Arditti. about every he contacted Arditti or visited his office 1956(c)(5) one). Additionally, (count Section defines “monetary instru- above outlined ments” as follows: violating charged Avila with indictment eight). 1956(a)(3)(counts seven and ‘‘monetary section The term instruments” means (i) ..., motion to granted currency checks, court Avila’s coin or The district travelers’ checks, checks, personal bank his case for trial. and money sever orders, (ii) or securities or investment motion for granted court Avila’s The instruments, negotiable in bearer form or allegations judgment acquittal on otherwise in such form that title thereto conspired to violate one that Avila count passes upon delivery. 5313(a) jury, 5316. The how- sections urges Avila reversal of his conviction ever, remaining alle- Avila on the convicted 1956(a)(3) plain section because the under seven gation in count one and on counts terms of the statute do not criminalize ac eight. cepting cashier’s checks non-bearer argues, form. Avila as he did in a motion IV. acquittal, for that a cashier’s check is not a challenges his substantive and con- check” under the “bank relevant definition ground on the that his spiracy convictions “monetary instrument.” Avila asserts a criminal statute. conduct did not violate Congress did not intend to cover cash 1956(a)(3), “Laundering entitled Section form, ier’s checks not in as evi bearer Instruments,” Monetary makes it unlawful by multiple denced a federal statute and person, the intent regulations plainly federal acknowl (A) spec- promote carrying on of edge the between a “bank distinction activity; ified unlawful check,” i.e., a check drawn a bank on its nature, bank, (B) disguise the account in another and a to conceal or “cashier’s check,” i.e., location, source, ownership, or control of a check drawn a bank on accepted upon See, proceeds itself and issuance. property to be the believed activity; e.g., Bruno Collective Fed. Sav. & Loan specified unlawful Ass’n, N.J.Super. 370 A.2d (C) reporting to avoid a transaction re- n. 2 law, Federal quirement under State or attempt[ to conduct agrees with Avila’s conduct[ ] ] [to] involving prop- financial transaction a characterization of the cashier’s checks as represented by a law enforcement erty accepts instruments and Avila’s non-bearer proceeds specified officer to be the cashier’s checks and distinctions between' activity, property or used to Pointing legislative unlawful checks. to the bank specified 1956, however, or facilitate unlawful history conduct of section activity.... Congress indeed that of the term “mone- intended the definition 1956(a)(3) (West Supp.1988).3 18 U.S.C. § tary to include cashier’s instruments” 1956(c)(4) “financial trans- defines Section “Monetary a checks. instruments are sub- action” as in ‘property’ as used section set of the term (A) (i) involving the move- a transaction (a), intended to be construed a term that is by or other means or. ment of funds wire tangible liberally encompass any form of - (ii) involving monetary one or more in- intangible S.Rep. assets.” No. 99th or struments, any way degree in or which Cong., 2d Sess. 13 commerce, foreign or affects interstate legislative (B) involving responds use of a Avila histo- or a transaction in, ry contextually refers to cashier’s checks engaged institution which is financial affect, passes upon thereto inter- “in such form that title or the activities of which delivery,” cashier’s checks. foreign any way or all Id. state or commerce Moreover, Congress’s in- Avila asserts degree. here, 1956(c)(5) (clarifying, not en- § relevant All references herein are to the 1988 version 3. to, changes acting definition of Congress subsequently substantive amended the §of 1956. instruments”). statute, "monetary provisions one of the but altered statute, holding, is irrelevant when a like this tent and this court has found that the one, capable readings. of two rational encompasses is not statute a wide range of con- States, See, McNally v. United e.g., Gallo, duct. Cf. 2875, 2881, (5th Cir.1991) 97 L.Ed.2d F.2d (transporting (1987)(“before punished, one can be it in the trunk of a car was a financial plainly that his case is must be shown transaction in that it was a “movement of statute”) (citation omitted). within the funds wire or other means ... which any way degree or affects interstate of Despite Congress the facts that foreign (ellipses commerce” in origi- [sic] did not include cashier’s checks in the stat nal)). utory monetary definition of instruments cashier’s action tive section states that he conducted “a financial trans ing “monetary interstate or gaged in, tary use of a financial institution which is en government purposes of the pect involving his offense. A financial transaction for the must fail. section 1956 does not and that utes challenge to his substantive convictions degree” other means or charges eight, have used instruments ... or strictly, involving property 1956(c)(5). Rather, checks, represented by we the movement of funds or the activities of which do not accuse Avila of launder (emphasis Simply, of his foreign see United States v. a statute instrument” as “monetary indictment, ^[2] construe criminal stat (5th Cir.1987), commerce in any way added). require involving plain language to wit: “[1] ^[3] instrument” in with involving count seven The substan a transaction counts seven acy, that the sus defined $15,000 ... mone a law en Although cashier’s checks were the means Daniel, Avila’s affect, wire does not ments checks court need not consider whether cashier’s ier’s guage of the asserts violation of Title U.S.C. 1956. Arditti Avila Avila agreed together, conspired, acy conviction. The first count of dictment ... As “monetary indictment checks, others to the Grand appears “willfully, with the substantive We launder a qualify that he did not charged statutorily raise the issue on argues, similarly uphold combined, which are not did not statute. instrument” under the lan charges knowingly and with each argue monetary instrument, it was to launder cash monetary prove. defined. If conspire Yanez, confederated and that this count of there a crime that monetary § Jury unknown, Avila’s Simply, Avila instruments. counts, Arditti, appeal, unlawfully to launder other, conspir conspir instru this but in proceeds forcement officer to be the conspirators which the were to [specified] ... unlawful activity, in viola funds, launder the objective of the con- Code, tion of Title United States Section spiracy was to launder the cash that 1956(a)(3).” eight similar, except Count is “Adams” claimed to have obtained $40,000 specifies that it as the ques sum in drug his wholesaling Cash, activities. of tion and does not mention cashier’s checks. course, currency is “coin or of the United alleged The acts these plainly counts States” and monetary thus is a instrument. fall language within the section represented Because Gallman to Avila that 1956(c)(4)(A)(i):They were transactions “in- cash, he wanted to launder and Avila ad- volving the by movement of funds wire or vised him how to the convert cash into other means.” The issue of whether cash- cashier’s having present checks without monetary ier’s checks are instruments thus identification, his so that Pru-Bache could counts; is the irrelevant to substantive the accept money, the reject argu- we Avila’s unquestionably checks were “property” ment that no monetary instruments were by and “funds wire or other [moved] involved. means” under the statute. V.

Although we have not previously inter- preted the laundering statute in this Avila further that his behav way, plain the language dictates such a ior illegal was not the because represent presented to him that the was that jury did not could agent have laundering participated beyond were found he a funds reasonable doubt that activity. of criminal Section proceeds represented, “Adams” and Avila under- 1956(a)(3), establishing stood, the basis that the funds laundering were laundering “sting” operations, re- proceeds specified were the illegal government agent repre- that quires activities. in the trans- property involved

sent “proceeds specified unlaw- action is VI. property used to conduct or activity, ful or challenge Avila and Arditti the district activity.” specified unlawful facilitate jury respective court’s instructions at their “repre- term- statute further defines the argument trials. We find their to be with- “any representation made a as sented” out merit. per- or another law enforcement officer of, approval son at the direction or with possesses A district court dis broad of, to investi- a Federal official authorized framing cretion in the instructions to the gate prosecute violations of this sec- jury; will not we reverse unless the in 1956(a)(3). tion.” U.S.C. structions taken as a whole § do not “correct the issues and law.” United ly reflect argues that construction Avila “[s]trict Casto, States v. (5th requires the officer make an af- that ... denied, cert. Cir.1989), defendant,” representation to the firmative (1990) (citation 107 L.Ed.2d 1067 enough merely suggestion, just omitted). This court will reverse for abuse information to create an inference. Nor of discretion a district court’s refusal agent’s perception of can the jury request issue a instruction if the “representation” for satis- substitute “(1) correct; substantively ed instruction of the element. Because Gallman faction (2) substantially covered in the $15,000 plainly did not tell Avila that charge actually jury; delivered to the $40,000 proceeds checks cashier’s were (3) important point concerns an in the trial sales, urges from cocaine reversal of give impairs seriously so that failure to it convictions. ability effectively defendant’s arguments unconvincing. find Avila’s We defense.” United States present given The record shows that “Adams” told Avila Chambers, Cir. that he was the cocaine business and 1991) (citation omitted). $15,000 proceeds the initial was the represent- Because “Adams” court defined the of a collection. The district (count one) drug wholesaling, then conspiracy ed his fense of relevant business follows, tracking represented relationship part essentially his Avi- never Jury Instructions Circuit Pattern involving one funds not derived from la as Fifth (West 1990): industry, illicit could have 2.21 at 89 § $40,000 drug- the later as ostensible viewed govern- You must convinced that the funds, por- related believe Gallman proved following ment has each of the such, trays and Avila viewed them as beyond a ... Second: reasonable doubt money laundering. Avila of thus convict purpose That the defendant knew the agreement joined in it with government agent that a To hold intent illegal purpose further the alleged illegal recite the source of each set So, knowingly and if the defendant ... attempts property at the time he on willfully joins plan in that unlawful “sting” operation it in a would transfer occasion, one that is sufficient to convict extremely make enforcement of the statute conspiracy. him for difficult; unnecessarily “legitimate criminals,” offense agents undercover must The court defined the substantive whom 1956, imitate, sev- undoubtedly charged in counts would not make such under section follows, eight, part in relevant each transaction. In this en and recitations before case, language “You enough tracking that sufficient evidence the of the statute: it is

340 government that sow, must be the convinced has 1153, (5th 754 F.2d Cir.), 1172 cert. proved following beyond each a rea- denied, 908, 474 277, U.S. 106 S.Ct. 88 sonable doubt ... Second: That the defen- (1985). L.Ed.2d 241 The definition of will dant acted the promote with intent to ... requested fulness Avila exception an disguise....” or conceal and the rule traditional and is a statutory ele special ment of requested Avila that treatment jury the of criminal tax instruct- — “willfully” ed that offenses. Cheek, that United States “means the act v. U.S. -,-, committed voluntarily 604, 607, purposely, 111 S.Ct. 112 L.Ed.2d specific (1991). the intent to do 617 something the law forbids; say, that is to purpose with bad The court’s conspiracy district instruc- disobey disregard law”; either to the required jury (1) tion the to find that there and that establish specific intent the “[t]o agreement was an between two more prove that the defendant (2) persons; that joined Avila agree- knowingly did an act forbids, which the law knowing ment purpose its and with the purposely intending to violate the law.” intent to illegal further the purpose; and appeal On that the district (3) that an overt act was committed. Fur- court’s refusal to issue the instructions he ther, instructed, the court “If the defen- requested error, constituted reversible ar- dant knows plan, about knows that it is guing that “willfulness” is a substantive an unlawful plan, and knowingly and will- element a section conspiracy fully joins in plan the unlawful ... that is “specific that intent” is a substantive ele- sufficient to convict him for conspiracy.” ment of 1956(a)(3) section money launder- These instructions cover the necessary ele- ing. ments of the conspiracy offense, including First, find that conspiracy we instruc- requisite mental state. They thus dif- tion, whole, adequately addressed the fer from charges rejected we in United burden the had to bear. The States v. Burroughs, 366, (5th requested instruction as “willfully” was Cir.1989), require which did not necessary. meaning The “willfully” defendant joined have agreement varies depending upon the context. See “knowing its purpose and with the intent to United v. Bishop, States 412 U.S. 356- illegal further purpose,” and United 2008, 2015-18, 93 S.Ct. 36 L.Ed.2d 941 States v. Kerley, Cir. (1973). Supreme The recognized Court has Apr. 1981), BUnit in which we reversed a that in usage common the word “willful” is criminal conviction failing to instruct on synonymous considered with such words as the element of willfulness where such will- “deliberate,” “voluntary,” and “intention- fulness was actually a “critical element” of al” and law the word generally the offense.4 We thus conclude that the refers to conduct that is merely negli- requested instruction on willfulness was gent. McLaughlin Co., v. Richland Shoe correct, not substantially and to the extent 108 S.Ct. that it did accurately law, reflect the it was L.Ed.2d 115 included in adequate instruction that appears “Willfulness” in neither the sec the district gave. court tion 371 definition of conspiracy nor the section monetary-instrument Second, launder we find that extent ing statute, and, as defined in requested Avila’s re Avila’s specific instruction of in quested instruction, it is not an correct, element of tent was it too was included in the conspiracy offense, requires which district court’s instructions. court told state of necessary mind for the substantive members of they could See, crime. e.g., United States Harrel not find Avila guilty unless found that 4. See Circuit Jury also quired Pattern offense); Instructions Fifth substantive §id. 1.36 at 52 2.21, (West 1990) § at (proposed conspiracy ("we attempted clearly have to define what state "adequately instruction require- i.e., addresses the required, of mind is what the defendant specific ment of a "special intent to violate the law” if no must know guilty partic- intend to be of the mind,” e.g., premeditation, state of re- charged”). ular crime attempted to conduct a or Avila asks apply he conducted us to to Buford involving property hand, transaction the case at financial but the reasoning in that officer represented by a law enforcement case and the others Avila cites does not illegal drugs proceeds support of the sale to be such an urges extension. Avila us pro- the to that he acted with intent hold that the district court erred because specified un- carrying the on of the mote it failed to jury instruct the that it could (meaning drug dealing) activity ignorance law, lawful consider Avila’s de nature, disguise spite or “to conceal and the critical distinction that its instruc location, source, ownership tions, control” of applicable statute, and the did not property. parallels instruction require such prove that Avila 1956(a)(3) wording of section and in- intentionally legal violated a duty, known nor, matter, cludes all the elements of intent that Con- for that did the court issue an offense, gress necessary deemed for the jury instruction that presume should apparent language in statute. that Avila knew what the law was. Congress require any higher If wanted to above, As we discussed concept such a requirement, it have mens rea would enact- “willfulness” is not an element of the of- Baker, 807 ed one. See United States v. charged. fenses with which Avila was Be- (5th Cir.1986). F.2d cause requested the instruction Avila is not a “substantially correct” statement of the

VII. context, law this we affirm the refusal to include it. Avila next that the district court instructing jury to his erred not Additionally, requested to the extent the ignorance of the law. United States v. instruction might accurately reflect

Davis, (5th Cir.1978), we law, it was included the instructions the court, instructing held that “the trial when district court conspiracy issued. The in- specific required, may intent is that jury struction told the that it could convict ignorance instruct that of the law is no if it joined found that he excuse, ignorance goes because of the law plan knowing unlawful, that it was and the the heart of the defendant’s denial of provided substantive offense instructions specific intent.” the defendant must repre- have had In 1989 this court ordered a new trial for sented him proceeds that the funds were specified defendants who had been convicted of con- from unlawful activities and that spiring tax participated to commit fraud under section he must have with the intent willfully aiding assisting 371 and of to further those or to conceal the activities 7206(2) Lastly, fraud violation of 26 U.S.C. funds. entrap- we note that § because “the district court jury did instruct ment instruction allowed the to consid- should, could, jury consider agent imper- er whether the ignorance missibly breaking the defendants’ of the law.” coaxed Avila into law, Buford, through convincing either him that his (5th Cir.1989). Rather, the district acts would lawful or otherwise. court had instructed the that “the

presumption every person is that knows VIII. what the law forbids.” Id. The Buford challenges en the district court’s court, however, interpreted the term “will- trapment instructions. The instructions fully” purposes of the statute criminal- paralleled Jury Pattern In Circuit izing preparation of fraudulent returns tax Fifth (West 1990),and in structions 1.28 at 40 § “voluntary to mean a intentional violation part provided relevant legal duty” of a known and viewed the corresponding “ignorance absence of a if the leave evidence the case should you the law” instruction as “inconsistent with with a reasonable whether the doubt (cita- specific previous the element of intent.” defendants had the intent or Id. omitted; added). emphasis purpose tion an offense of the commit

342 charged apart ly given charge actually from the induce-

character to delivered jury. persuasion of some officer or ment your agent government, of the then it is Although the district court would not duty guilty.... him not to find issuing requested have erred in instruc- government prove to

burden is on tions, Arditti was not entitled them. beyond that the de- a reasonable doubt say including Allibhai we did an en- entrapped. fendants were not trapment instruction after each count in- government creases the burden the must requested that the district Arditti bear, merely but context the statement immediately a after court include sentence meant that the defendants could not claim monetary its instruction on the elements of prejudice jury because the was instructed laundering explain the link instrument entrapment sepa- to consider the defense entrapment: between the elements and rately as to each count. 939 F.2d at 252. you government “Even if find that the has Allibhai does not mean that the defendant proved beyond of offense each element this placement is entitled to such a in- of the doubt, acquit you a reasonable gave struction. The instruction the court if you defendant find that he was en jury accurately thus reflected Arditti’s First, trapped.” Arditti asserts that rights government’s under burdens charge jury; a confused he as whole the law. jurors’ upon relies affidavits to show that entrapment IX. they did not understand the and, thus, instruction could not consider and Arditti moved to dismiss Second, the defense. Arditti claims that respective prior their indictments to trial because, pri- after the defendant makes a timely judgment acquittal moved for showing entrapment, ma facie the bur upon entrapment outrageous based government prove den shifts to the conduct, motions that the district court de predisposed the defendant was to commit entrapment nied. The defense involves ex offense, Johnson, see United States v. (1) amination of government two factors: 612, (5th Cir.1989),predisposi inducement; (2) 872 F.2d predis the defendant’s position, tion an becomes element the offense. government before contact with government’s agents, that the bur to commit the crime charged. den becomes heavier when the court direct Entrapment as a matter of law ly jury entrapment instructs the to consider is established where a jury reasonable as to each count of the indictment. United could not find that dis Allibhai, 244, (5th States 939 F.2d charged proving its burden of the defen — Cir.1991), denied, U.S. -, cert. predisposed dant was to commit S.Ct. 117 L.Ed.2d 133 charged Nations, crime. United States v. 1073, 1077, 764 F.2d Cir.1985). jury We find that the instruction Once a defendant makes prima facie entrapment adequate. on We first showing entrapment by presenting juror note that the affidavits of confusion “some evidence that Government conduct decision, are not relevant for our as wheth created a substantial risk that an offense er a misunderstands its instructions would person be committed other than not to re-examined after the verdict. it,” ready one to commit the burden shifts 1201, 1206 Corp., Robles v. Exxon prove to the beyond a rea (5th Cir.), denied, cert. 490 U.S. 109 sonable pre doubt defendant was (1989). Second, S.Ct. 104 L.Ed.2d 434 disposed and, thus, to commit the crime may satisfy part the first entrapped. was not United States v. John above, three-part test outlined for the re son, (5th Cir.1989) (citing 65-66, quested substantially instruction was cor States, Mathews v. United rect, satisfy but Arditti cannot the second (1988)). 99 L.Ed.2d 54 element, as the instruction was substantial- Court must look to the evidence “[T]his

343 whether, in B. viewing reasonable determine light in the credibility choices ferences similarly argues that Government, a rea to the favorable most government’s predisposition evidence of find, a reason beyond could jury sonable response is the same: short. Our De falls doubt, predis that the defendant was able initiation of contact spite Gallman’s “On the offense.” Id. to commit posed provision oppor of the Avila and Gallman’s jury a conviction wherein appeal from funds, drug Yanez’s tunity to launder testi defense, entrapment rejected has that Avila mony that he told Gallman “has of review is the same standard in from Mexico a lot of clients same sufficiency the evi applies to the which complete you are,” Avila’s lack of business (citing United States v. Du dence.” Id. resistance, energetic partic Avila’s Cir.1988)). (5th vall, 974 846 F.2d “drug” launder mon ipation plan in the jury could have

ey show that a reasonable predisposed engage in found that he was A. entrapment money laundering. de govern Arditti case, cases, in most fense in this “as was predisposi ment “offered no evidence as a matter not resolvable the court involvement in the prior to Arditti’s tion” Nations, 764 F.2d at 1077. law.” offense, district court’s focus disputing the “willing partici and active upon Arditti’s C. as evidence of his pation] in the scheme” charge appellants Both also their Looking the crime. predisposition toward convictions should be overturned because light most favorable the evidence at investigation government constituted though, a reasonable government, to the outrageous conduct. We traced the evolu beyond a reasonable have found could “outrageous tion of the conduct” defense to mon predisposed that Arditti was doubt Allibhai, v. United States entrapped. laundering ey and thus was — Cir.1991), denied, (5th 248 cert. U.S. Nations, F.2d at there As in 764 —, (1991). 112 L.Ed.2d 133 S.Ct. 117 overwhelming evidence of serious “no was plurality Supreme that a We recalled According to the by Arditti. resistance” defense, Court, discussing entrapment testimony, told Ar- agent’s after Gallman may day in 1973 that “we some noted involved ditti that the source of presented with a situation in which the estate investment was proposed real agents conduct of law enforcement is so money,” that if Arditti did not “coke but outrageous process principles that due in such a deal he could to be involved want government absolutely bar the from would away, replied, “You just walk don’t obtainpng] a conviction.” United ... Although going anywhere.” Ardit- see me 423, 431, Russell, 411 U.S. States initially seek out the ti did not 36 L.Ed.2d 366 provided and agent, opportunity “an defense, Although many have asserted the feet,” helping jumped in with both [Arditti] process “a due violation will be found plans to launder the formulate Gallman outrageous in the rarest and most circum advising ways him on “drug” money and Duvall, 846 stances.” suspicion. arousing governmental avoid (citation Cir.1988) omit F.2d (enthusiasm Johnson, evi- F.2d at 621 ted). though govern- even predisposition, denced scheme). prove A defendant must illegal juryA ment initiated testimony only “government overinvolvement could view Gallman’s crime,” has not charged that he recordings recordings of but also tape and video “ in the criminal participant an “active proof that Arditti was an ‘ea- been ” Na gave to his arrest.” activity launder- which rise ger, participant’ active finding no due tions, F.2d at Duvall, (quoting at Na- 1077. ing. panel ob- violation, 1077). process the Allibhai tions, 764 F.2d at litany served of cases in which ated all contacts meetings more “[a] with Avila extreme upheld behavior was and, further, misrepresented the legality of Allibhai, (cita- courts.” 939 F.2d at 248 participation Avila’s and the business of omitted); Duvall, tions see 846 F.2d at 975. corporation. the seemingly confuses A argu- review of Arditti’s and Avila’s predisposition the element of establishing ments on this issue leads to the same con- entrapment defense with the necessary Allibhai, (re- clusion. See 939 F.2d at 249 proof outrageous of conduct. Avila active- jecting argument defendants’ ly participated in the laundering, “government’s approaching conduct in [de- argument and he has far less of an for with the money-laundering fendant] government overinvolvement than does Ar- egregious enough scheme was to constitute ditti. process violation.”). a due D. F. govern Arditti maintains that the Arditti further invokes a Ninth engaged ment in outrageous behavior by argument Amendment person’s that “a lib targeting him without a suspi reasonable erty, right alone, left violated predisposition cion of to launder monetary when the persists in attempts already rejected instruments. We have engage the individual in argument, similar criminal ap however. This court conduct plies prohibition after he against governmental has declined to become involved.” targeting of in an He investigation suggests defendants adopt bright-line that we “only where the government employs a rule that once a subject investigation contingent fee informant and directs him to states that he does not participate wish to implicate specific individuals.” United illegal activity, government agents must Nissen, 690, States v. (5th 928 F.2d 693 leave him alone. Minnick v. Mississip Cf. Cir.1991) (citation omitted). event, — any pi, —, 486, U.S. 111 S.Ct. 112 produced Arditti has no evidence that he (1990)(once L.Ed.2d 489 suspect requests a target was the investigation. IRS lawyer, police stop interrogation and brought He was into the laundering cannot resume it suspect unless initiates plot by his co-conspirator, Yanez. discussion and rights). waives Arditti also govern Nothing law, statutes, the case ment’s overinvolvement in the offense and requires constitution rule, such a how- pressure agents its exerted on him ever. In Allibhai rejected we the claim outrageous constituted conduct. This ar that the right to be left alone forbids the fails, gument quantum also gov government from targeting an individual in activity ernmental did not exceed levels investigation an without a preexisting rea- previously condoned this and other suspicion sonable subject that the has been courts, see, e.g., Tobias, involved in wrong-doing. 939 F.2d at 249 1981), 381 B Cir. Unit Nov. (citing & n. 3 States, Olmstead v. United denied, 1108, cert. 457 2908, U.S. 102 S.Ct. 277 U.S. (1982), L.Ed.2d 1317 actively (1928) L.Ed. 944 (Brandéis, J., participated dissenting)). in the activity by criminal for We then mulating stated carrying governmental out that where investment plans for the excess “drug” money.5 ensnares a nonpredisposed individu- al, entrapment defense should be suffi-

E. protect cient to above, As him. discussed Avila asserts government’s con- entrapped as a matter of outrageous duct was law, because Gallman initi- government’s behavior here Allibhai, 5. See (discussing 939 F.2d at cussing 248-49 outrageousness government’s conduct cases); Yater, accord States v. United manufacturing drugs only meager as- "with (5th Cir.) denied, 1067 n. 12 cert. sistance from the in United States defendants” (1985) (dis- 106 S.Ct. 88 L.Ed.2d 226 Twigg, (3d Cir.1978)). 588 F.2d outrageous govern does not because it applies rise to the level does not “discovery prior of evidence to trial.” Cer- conduct.

tainly gain Arditti could not discovery to X. subpoenaed material under rule 16. Moreover, he does not establish that even trial, Arditti and at Both before potentially longer 17(c) reach of rule including those documents subpoenaed IRS stretches to those materials. “nature, targets of showing goals and operation,” asserting their relevance its analysis begins Our of this issue entrap his predisposition lack of his States, Dairy Bowman Co. v. United outrageous-conduct defenses. ment and 214, 675, (1951), U.S. L.Ed. 879 that he needed the infor Arditti maintains relationship which discusses the between complete his defense and to sum mation to 17(c). There, rule 16 and rule the Court in that minimally all reliable evidence mon upheld subpoena an antitrust defendant’s by Due regard, guaranteed as the Process directing government produce the to doc and the of the Fifth Amendment Clause uments, books, objects it had obtained the Process Clause of Sixth Compulsory during investigation, the course of its even Following government’s the Amendment. though such materials were not discover that the internal memoranda and statement able under rule 16. The district court held agency are generated by an documents might that the defendant to be able obtain dis privileged subject and thus not to 17(c), some such materials under rule “as granted the covery, the district court long evidentiary.” 219, are at Id. government’s quash motion to the trial Although 71 S.Ct. at 678. rule 17 extends subpoena subpoena constituted because subject to materials not to rule 16 dis request, bordering fishing on a discovery a covery, it provide is intended to an Arditti asserts that because expedition. discovery. additional means of Id. at hearing neither held a on the district court Every subpoena at 71 S.Ct. 679. must be a availed itself of quash the motion to nor evidence,” “good faith effort ... to obtain by government opportunity offered may and the district court ensure that rule camera, the documents in his to view 17(c) is used to that end violated, requests he a rights were subpoe power quash modify court’s or government hearing wherein the will be 219-20, nas. Id. at 71 S.Ct. at 678-79. privilege required to show that its as to party The Court enunciated the burden right should overcome his documents gain must bear to access to materials under present evidence in his defense. Nixon, rule 17 United States v. U.S. grant quash We review a of a motion to 683, 697-702, 3090, 3102-05, 41 94 S.Ct. subpoena for abuse of discretion. Cf. appeal, L.Ed.2d 1039 On Reeves, United States satisfy requirements. three He must Cir.1990) (upholding district (1) is subpoenaed show that document pretrial request to in court’s refusal of relevant, (2) admissible, (3) it has it is government Fed. spect files under requested specificity. adequate been 16(a)). We find that the district R.Crim.P. specific- Id. at 94 S.Ct. at 3103. These quash court did not abuse its discretion ity require more and relevance elements ing subpoena. conjecture than the title of a document and Nixon, 16(a)(1) discovery In the Water- precludes Rule “the or as to its contents. memoranda, reports, gate special prosecutor permitted or inspection of other was government tapes president made audio internal documents obtain retain, trying or other he had shown attorney for the because that each agents in with the “there was sufficient likelihood connection tapes rele- investigation prosecution conversations contained] ” charged in the indict- essentially argues that vant to the offenses case.... by offer- “subpoena subpoena,” a trial ment.” Id. He met this burden at issue is participants in the ing testimony of which rule 16 sworn covered Fed.R.Crim.P. conversations, by giving rea- me recorded obtain the evidence”—but cannot un- a rational permitted entry, sons that inference of lock the for the recitation fails to relevance, by making satisfy demanding requirements as well as a sufficient 17(c). preliminary showing admissibility. I majority Rule concur in the opinion merely write elucidate the distinc- that Arditti did not meet We conclude his tion that I see 17(c) between Rules 16 and rule 17 and burden under Nixon. explain duties, and to the district court’s quashing subpoena, the district court them, evaluating 17(c) I see a Rule sub- only discovery, found that “I think it’s not poena Majority Op. duces tecum. See at fishing expedition.” on a This but borders 345-46. finding supported by argument Arditti’s government’s purpose, “The before us: The issue is whether Arditti satisfied the targeting method and means of and then requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal pursuing Mr. Arditti are relevant to both 17(c), governs Procedure “which the is- process entrapment and the due defens- subpoenas suance of duces tecum in feder- particulars, es. To ascertain these Ardit- al proceedings.” criminal sought ti the documents that would set Nixon, 94 S.Ct. objectives oper- forth the of the undercover (1974). 17(c) L.Ed.2d 1039 provides Rule targets ation and the intended oper- of that subpoena may also command the “[a] added.) (Emphasis ation.” person to whom it is produce directed to books, papers, documents or other ob- Arditti thus has failed to establish with jects designated therein.” Fed.R.Crim.P. specificity evidentiary sufficient nature 17(c). requested of the materials. He has demon- why strated he to wants look into the mate- Certainly 17(c) subpoena a Rule duces rial, he has not set forth but what the discovery Nixon, tecum is not a device. 94 contain, subpoena’s materials forcing the (citing S.Ct. at 3103 Dairy Bowman Co. v. speculate specific court to as to the nature States, 214, 675, United 341 U.S. 71 S.Ct. of their contents and its relevance. Ac- 679, (1951)). 17(c) L.Ed. 879 Rule is not 95 cordingly, appears it that Arditti was at- provide intended “to an additional means of tempting subpoena to use the gain to discovery beyond provided in Rule 16.” knowledge that he could not obtain under Vanegas, 235, United States v. 112 F.R.D. 16(a)(1), evidence, rule as much as to obtain (D.N.J.1986) (citations omitted); 238 see i.e., trying that he was subpoe- “to use the Nixon, 958, United v. States 777 F.2d 968- na discovery device, duces tecum as a (5th Cir.1985); 69 United States v. Marcel Nixon, which it is not.” United States v. lo, 993, (5th Cir.), 423 F.2d 1006 cert. de 958, (5th Cir.1985). 969 In this nied, 959, 2172, 398 U.S. 90 S.Ct. 26 context, the district court did not abuse its (1970). L.Ed.2d 543 This is because a in quashing subpoena. discretion 17(c) subpoena “Rule only reaches eviden- AFFIRMED. tiary materials” —not all discoverable ma

terials. Cuthbertson, 651 GOLDBERG, 189, (3rd Cir.) Judge, Circuit F.2d 195 specially (citing Bowman concurring: Dairy, 679) 71 (emphasis added), S.Ct. at denied, 1056, 604, cert. 454 U.S. 102 S.Ct. closes,

When one door fortune will usual- (1981). 70 L.Ed.2d 594 ly open another.6 closes, The Rule 16 However, door so a “[a]ny criminal document or other ma attempts pry open terials, defendant to the Rule admissible as evidence ... is sub 17(c) portal. court, keeper district ject subpoena” 17(e). under Rule Bow 17(c) gate, of the Rule chanting hears the Dairy, man 71 S.Ct. at 679. Rule “open sesame!” incantation7 —“let severely which discovery restricts in crimi- Rojas, trans.); 6. Fernando de La Celestina act Shakespeare, XV. William Macbeth act cf. IV, locks, knocks."). ("Open, sc. i Whoever (A Nights 7. The Arabian Thousand and One Nights) (Galland History Ali Baba —The provision cases, produce not define the outer limits ... not intended to does evi- nal 17(c)subpoe materials”); under a dentiary available of materials see In re Martin 17(c) Rule door will na, wide the nor how Corp., Marietta Indeed, documents and materials open. Cir.1988), denied, cert. not dis possessed by the but 104 L.Ed.2d 169 under Rule 16 can be reached coverable end, party demanding To this materials 17(c) long the doc subpoena a Rule —so 17(c) must unfasten three locks to free the evidentiary. and materials are uments Cf. requires door. The rule at 678. id. admissible, materials be relevant and but motion The rule allows court on “[t]he sufficiently also that the demand must be quash modify or promptly made [to] specific requested. as to the documents subpoena compliance if would be unreason Nixon, (setting at 94 S.Ct. out the 17(c); oppressive.” Fed.R.Crim.P. able showing necessary require production Nixon, at 3108. The also 94 S.Ct. see 17(c)).8 prior to trial under We entrust opening court thus controls the district these decisions to the discretion of the trial 17(c) gate by wielding power “its the Rule necessity subpoena court “since the for the quash modify.” to rule on motions upon most often turns a determination of Dairy, 71 S.Ct. at 678. Under Bowman factual issues.” Id. at 3104. 17(c) standard, then, district the Rule case, ordinary expect In the I would subpoe must determine whether the court district court review material “good-faith na constitutes a effort ... specifici- camera to determine whether Id., obtain evidence.” cited in United ty, relevancy evidentiary nature of the Noriega, F.Supp. States production.9 material warrants its This (S.D.Fla.1991). A party does not have to exception: case is the rare the district 17(c) subpoenaed under use all materials opportunity court did not avail itself of the satisfy this test. Rule evidence to Id. to review the material in camera before 17(c)merely requires moving party deciding quash grant the motion to good a faith effort to obtain evi make Rather, determined, subpoena. the court fishing embarking of on “á dence—instead review, without in camera that Arditti might up.” turn Id. expedition to see what (holding subpoena’s sought path at 679 “catch-all travel forbidden —he Komisaruk, requirements in camera F.2d satisfied Nixon after 8. See 885 documents, (“A (9th Cir.1989) remanding justified quash- production for in court is of but 495 work-product ing subpoena production as to claims of duces tecum if camera review immaterial, unreasonable, Campaign, oppressive privilege); v. LaRouche be United States would (1st Cir.1988) Marietta, (affirming irrelevant.”); and Martin 856 F.2d at 1180 17(c) (“Enforcement requiring production subpoena of a Rule district court’s order 621 governed by thresh- the standards established in United documents for in camera review because Nixon.")-, Cuthbertson, relevancy, showing "admissibility, v. 651 F.2d at 197 States old ("we emphasized sought by subpoena specificity” that the material was not "unrea- meant the Nixon, 17(c) 17(c)); subpoena evidentiary oppressive” rule relevant") under 111 sonable or C.J., (Sietz, (citations concurring) (affirming court’s refusal to F.2d at district 969 omitted); ("relevant Vanegas, production 112 F.R.D. at 239 files under order evidentiary subject subpoena 17(c) under inspection materials revealed because in camera 17(c)”). Cuthbertson, relevant); Rule not that materials were (reversing releasing mate- at order not use its in rials because district court did Nixon, See, (concluding e.g., at 94 S.Ct. 9. the material camera review to "evaluate] likelihood” existed that "sufficient requirement against .evidentiary of rule tapes “admis- content of the sible”); were "relevant" and Poindexter, 17(c)”); F.Supp. Fowler, v. United States v. F.2d United States (D.D.C.1990) (ordering disclosure (4th Cir.1991) (affirming district court’s 311-12 par- briefing of certain documents after application subpoenas because dis- denial of relevan- to determine ties and in camera review properly informa- trict court determined that 17(c)); cy Vanegas, at 239 112 F.R.D. sought under tion was irrelevant and had no evidentia- Marietta, compel production value); (granting ry motion to hand- Martin 856 F.2d at 622 17(c) writing exemplars prior under compelling pro- to trial (upholding district court’s order 17(c) relevancy and admis- determination of of materials under because dis- based on duction sibility). properly subpoena trict determined that court “fishing expedition on a wanted to embark might up” turn on the

to see what other 17(c)gate. If Arditti side of the Rule had is, keys displayed the three Nixon —that showing that the made a threshold demand specific and the material relevant and the district court would admissible—then peering have abused its discretion keyhole reviewing ma- But Arditti did terial in camera. keys “specificity,” brandish the labelled “relevancy” “admissibility.” properly entry court denied because for- open 17(c) tune alone will not the Rule door.

FDIC as Receiver for Thousand Oaks Bank, Plaintiff-Appellee,

National MYERS, Defendant-Appellant. Walter K.

No. 91-5666 Summary Calendar. Appeals, United States Court of Fifth Circuit. March 1992.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Victor Arditti, United States of America v. Guillermo Avila

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Date Published: Jun 2, 1992

Citation: 955 F.2d 331

Docket Number: 90-8646, 90-8721

Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.