OPINION OF THE COURT
The wiretap provisions in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act create a tension between the efficient pursuit of organized crime and the right of privacy. Title III obliges the courts to measure the per.missible use of sophisticated electronic investigative tools against the specific restraints imposed by Congress to avoid undue intrusions upon privacy. This balancing process has engendered a growing literature on the law of electronic eavesdropping. Our decision represents another gloss on that text.
The prosecution of the defendants in this alleged conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine depended in large measure upon evidence from intercepted telephone conversations. Defendants claim that the gathering and use of such evidence against them was infested with error and that it was consequently inadmissible at the trial.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Although the Justice Department had some prior interest in the alleged narcotics activities of Steven Vento, the central figure in this litigation, a serendipitous discovery led to the convictions before us. On June 20,1973, the Philadelphia Strike Force of the Department of Justice applied to Judge Hannum for an order authorizing the installation of a pen register
The Gregorio wiretap furnished the Strike Force with information that led to the indictment of Gregorio for theft of interstate shipment, but it also resulted in the interception of conversations respecting dealings in controlled substances. The conversations regarding controlled substances were relayed by the F.B.I. to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). At the conclusion of the Gregorio surveillance a warrant for the search of his premises was obtained. While,this search did not produce any evidence of value to a prosecution for theft from interstate shipment, the searchers did discover six ounces of methamphetamine in Gregorio’s house.
Employing intercepted conversations from the Gregorio wiretap, as well as information obtained from DEA agents and informants, the Strike Force then applied to Judge Newcomer for a wiretap on a telephone located in the home of, and allegedly used by, Vento. In connection with this application, the material from the Gregorio wiretap was utilized without first securing permission from Judge Hannum for its disclosure.
Judge Newcomer authorized a wiretap and the use of a pen register on Vento’s telephone line on July 12, 1973, and the monitoring began the same day. A five-day report, though not required by the terms of the order, was submitted on July
On the last day of the continued surveillance of Vento’s communications, DeLuca was observed entering the Vento home empty-handed and then reappearing with a small brown paper bag. Wiretapped conversations indicated that DeLuca had gone to Vento’s house to consummate a transaction in methamphetamine. After he left Vento’s house, DeLuca’s car was stopped and both he and it were searched. DEA agents discovered in DeLuca’s car a paper bag containing several ounces of methamphetamine, worth approximately $16,800 “on the street.”
A four-count indictment of the eight defendants, based in part on the Gregorio wiretap, was returned on November 7,1973. On January 28, 1974, the Strike Force obtained a disclosure order from Judge Hannum to permit the use of the Gregorio wiretap evidence at trial. Subsequently this wiretap evidence was submitted to the grand jury and a supplemental nine-count indictment was returned on January 30, 1974. The eight defendants were charged with conspiring knowingly and intentionally to distribute quantities of methamphetamine, and with knowingly and intentionally using a communications facility, a telephone, to expedite distribution of a controlled substance. In addition, Vento, De-Luca, and Gregorio were charged with distribution and possession of methamphetamine. The original indictment was later dismissed at the request of the government.
Motions to suppress with respect to the Gregorio wiretap, the search of Gregorio’s house, the Vento wiretap, and the search of DeLuca’s car were all denied.
Trial before a jury began on June 7,1974, with Judge Green presiding. The prosecution sought to establish a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. To this end, testimony concerning more than fifty telephone conversations was introduced by the government. Agents familiar with the voices on the tapes identified the participants, then agents conversant with the language of the narcotics trade interpreted each communication for the jurors. The government also produced evidence of the physical surveillance of the defendants and evidence obtained by the searches and seizures. On June 28, the alternate jurors were dismissed and the case was submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict convicting each defendant on all applicable counts.
Weeks after the trial ended, Vento and his lawyer learned that an alternate juror, Mrs. Elizabeth Bewley, might have possessed injurious information about Vento: Vento had been accused, but acquitted, of the murder of Reginald Cullen, who was the brother-in-law of Mrs. Bewley’s brother. The defendants suspected that Mrs. Bewley had prejudiced some of the other jurors by conveying this tainted information to them. On July 31 a hearing was held to question Mrs. Bewley and Mrs. Bewley’s nephew, Richard Costello, who was identified as the original source of the tip about Mrs. Bewley. After hearing their testimony, Judge Green denied a request by counsel for leave to interrogate the other jurors.
Of the eight defendants, only Vento, De-Luca, Mengini, and Mastrangelo perfected appeals.
WIRETAP EVIDENCE
At the heart of this prosecution is wiretap evidence. There is little reason to believe that the government could have obtained convictions here if the recorded conversations had not been introduced. The defendants object strenuously to almost all steps in the interceptions as well as to the use of the wiretapped conversations. Consideration of these objections requires us to join the continuing review conducted
A. Probable Cause for the Gregorio Interception
To obtain authorization for an interception of a wire communication, the government must show that:
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in section 2516 [including theft from interstate shipment]
(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception . . .4
If the government’s application did not present probable cause for the authorization of the interception, then the authorization and any surveillance pursuant to it were improper. And, if the surveillance was improper, the government could not use the fruits of that surveillance at trial or to further its investigation.
The application relied on information from five unnamed persons and on the results of independent investigations that the government had made pursuant to two of the “tips.” Insofar as the application rested upon informants to establish the central element of probable cause, it is to be tested by the standards enunciated in Aguilar v. Texas and Spinelli v. United States
Initial interest in Gregorio arose in connection with theft from interstate shipments, and all of the government’s sources provided information about such activity. The first source related that Gregorio had received 200 cartons of stolen margarine. This information was confirmed by physical surveillance of Gregorio’s premises and notice of the theft of a like amount of margarine from a railroad boxcar travelling in interstate commerce. Consequently, the
Another informant, who had furnished reports leading to the arrest of three persons and the conviction of one, linked Gregorio to a theft of silver bars from a metal refining company and to the receipt of antique guns stolen from a private residence. This third source was able to supply detailed data about each crime. The connection between Gregorio and the theft of the silver bars was supported by still another informant, who over the years had given information leading to the arrest and conviction of four persons. His representation identified some of the participants in the theft and tied Gregorio to the receipt of the silver bars. A final source implicated Gregorio in the planning of a hijacking of an interstate shipment. Reports from this informer had previously led to the recovery of stolen merchandise, and his account of the planned hijacking was detailed.
The government’s affidavit furnished an adequate basis to demonstrate the reliability of each source, although not every informant had previously provided information leading to convictions. Three of the sources had proven their credibility by giving information that led to arrests, convictions, or the recovery of stolen property. The other two had proven their dependability by subsequent investigations that confirmed the details of the intelligence they offered. Defendants protest that some of the informants cited in the application are criminals. We cannot share their apprehension. Those with detailed information about the underworld are unlikely to be completely innocent, and the investigation of organized crime is rarely furthered by awaiting tips from respectable citizens.
There was also reason to credit the information that each informant furnished regarding Gregorio’s hijacking activities. Either the information was confirmed by investigation or else the report itself was sufficiently detailed to appear creditable.2 ****
The government’s application also satisfied section 2518(3)(b) by offering “probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception.” Two of the unnamed informants and one named informant indicated that Gregorio used his telephone to conduct transactions in stolen goods. Two of these persons provided the F.B.I. with independent verification of the number of the telephone that the F.B.I. sought to monitor.
B. Exhaustion of Other Avenues of Investigation
In addition to showing probable cause to believe “(a) . . . that an individual is committing ... a particular offense” and “(b) . . that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through such interceptions,”
Congress has established this additional precondition to obtaining a section 2518 authorization in order “to make doubly sure that the statutory authority be used with restraint and only where the circumstances warrant the surreptitious interception of wire and oral communications. These procedures [are] not to be routinely employed as the initial step in criminal investigation.
The government failed to establish, defendants maintain, that “normal investigative procedures” had been tried or appeared “unlikely to succeed.” They suggest that the government should have subpoenaed the testimony of its informants and if necessary offered the informants immunity from prosecution. The defendants then propose that the government could have relied exclusively on the witnesses already available, that it could have conducted extensive physical surveillance, that Gregorio’s co-conspirators were sufficiently known to establish a violation without further investigation, and that undercover agents should have been employed.
This argument, however, relies almost exclusively on the first clause of section —“normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed”-— and ignores the disjunctive language of that provision — “or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” To adopt the defendants’ contention in this respect would be to misapprehend the purposes of Congress in enacting this precondition to authorization of a wiretap. 2518(3)(c)
In United States v. Armocida,
Courts have declared that applications whose sole bases are general declarations and conclusory statements by the affiants will not support authorizations.
Here, the government made an adequate showing that other methods were unlikely to succeed. The anonymous informants categorically indicated that they would not testify against Gregorio. Prolonged physical surveillance of Gregorio’s premises appeared impossible because Gregorio was reputed to be suspicious and had warned his neighbors to be on the alert for panel trucks and strangers in parked cars.
That the government’s application did not mention the use of undercover agents, as defendants stress, is not controlling. In this situation an undercover agent would be incapable of providing the Strike Force with information about the full extent of the criminal operations unless placed in constant touch with Gregorio and his closest confederates: Undercover agents are not readily insinuated into a conspiracy, and may be exposed to unusual danger. The circumstances here do not require that the government justify its failure to plant a spy in the midst of Gregorio’s enterprise. The application of the wiretap in this case comports with the directions of Title III.
Defendants, moreover, take an unreasonably narrow view of the scope of this investigation. Although normal investigative techniques might have been sufficient to implicate Gregorio in thefts from interstate shipment, such approaches could not show the scope of the conspiracy or the nature of Gregorio’s on-going criminal activity. Investigations are not restricted to crimes which can be probed satisfactorily by normal methods. In the proper circumstances, the instrumentalities of Title III may be employed to discover the full extent of crimes and conspiracies.
We conclude that the government’s affidavit was sufficient to meet the preconditions for authorization of wire interception established in section 2518.
C. Minimization In The Gregorio Order
The command of section 2518 that agents reduce intrusion on the communications of those subject to surveillance to the mini
Judge Hannum’s authorization for the Gregorio wiretap directed that it “shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception under Chapter 119 of Title 18, United States Code, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective or in any event, at the end of fifteen (15) days from the date of this order.”
Vento, Mengini, and DeLuca attack Judge Hannum’s authorization as too broad, because it does not confine the interception to gathering evidence of culpability with respect to the crimes specified in the authorization, “the hijacking of interstate shipments, and the purchase and sale of goods stolen from an interstate shipment. . .” The order stipulated that:
such interception shall not automatically terminate when the type of communications described above . . has first been obtained, but shall continue until communications are intercepted which reveal the manner in which Nicholas Gregorio and others as yet unknown, participate in the conducting of the above-listed offenses, and which reveal the identity of their confederates, their places and manner of operation and the nature of the conspiracy involved therein, or for a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of this Order, whichever is earlier.
Because the directive does not offer the investigators detailed instructions on minimization of the interception of Gregorio’s conversations, the defendants claim it permits a general search, condemned by Berger v. New York, and allows unbridled discretion in the agents.
Once again, the defendants’ argument rests upon a misconstruction of the purpose of the criminal investigation undertaken here. The minimization mandated by section 2518 does not compel agents to conclude their interceptions upon finding the minimum evidence necessary to show culpability. In addition, to the minimization requirement, section 2518 requires that
[i]f the nature of the investigation is such that the authorization for interception should not automatically terminate when the described type of communication has been first obtained, a particular description of the facts establishing probable cause to believe that additional communications of the same type would occur thereafter [shall be included in the application]”26
Section 2518 also permits the authorizing judge to include in his order “a statement
Whether a particular order has made provision for appropriate minimization depends on an analysis of the circumstances of each case.
By enjoining termination of the interception upon attainment of its objective — the discovery of the nature and extent of the Gregorio hijacking conspiracy — Judge Hannum’s authorization complied with the dictates of United States v. Cafero. Its terms were clear. “Executing officers [were] not free to intercept beyond attainment of their objective . . . .”
There is no reason to hold that the authorization order for the Gregorio intercept was invalid as not providing for proper minimization.
D. Minimization During the Gregorio Surveillance
While conducting the Gregorio surveillance so as to discover the nature and extent of the hijacking conspiracy, government agents overheard at least thirty conversations implicating Vento in drug transactions. These conversations furnished the grounds for the application to tap Vento’s telephone. Vento, Mengini, and DeLuca contend that these conversations fell outside the scope of Judge Hannum’s authorization for the Gregorio tap. Although such conversations were reported to Judge Hannum in the five-day report, but not in the ten-day report, no additional authorization to intercept drug-related conversations was requested during the course of the Gregorio intercept. According to the defendants, the investigators’ failure to minimize interception of conversations that lay beyond the scope of the authorized investigation constitutes an abuse that invalidates the entire surveillance.
This aspect of minimization has been ably and fully discussed in United States v. Armocida
First, we are concerned with the nature and scope of the criminal enterprise under investigation. We recognize that where the criminal enterprise under investigation is a large-scale conspiracy, it may be necessary for the government to intercept more conversations than where the investigation is of a more limited criminal undertaking. This is especially so where, as here, the judicially approved wiretap is designed to identify other par*853 ticipants in the conspiracy and to determine the scope of the conspiracy. .
Second, we must consider the government’s reasonable expectation as to the character of, and the parties to, the conversations. .
Finally, we are concerned here with the degree of judicial supervision by the authorizing judge. . . .32
The agents looking into Gregorio’s activities were exploring a wide-ranging conspiracy. In the intercepted conversations, Vento appeared to be an active participant in Gregorio’s hijacking schemes. Vento, however, was also engaged in other types of crime. His conversations over Gregorio’s telephone sometimes began with talk of narcotics, and later shifted to stolen merchandise. In this respect the case is similar to Armoeida II,
When communications deal with multiple crimes, agents must often listen to telephone calls that get under way with matters outside the scope of the authorized investigation so as to be certain that they do not miss later references to the crimes they are supposed to investigate. If a pattern of calls that involve only crimes beyond the scope of the order should become apparent, the officers might arguably be obliged to obtain a new authorization to intercept such clearly non-related, albeit criminal, communications. However, the defendants do not claim that such a pattern was apparent here. Hijacking- and narcotics-related conversations were intertwined, and the agents could not be certain whether a particular conversation would deal with drugs only or whether it would shortly turn to matters of interest to a hijacking investigation. Courts have permitted intensive surveillance in like circumstances.
In addition, the surveillance here was subject to judicial supervision. Although section 2518(6) does not require the submission of reports, Judge Hannum directed the government to submit two such statements, and the five-day report related conversations implicating Vento in narcotic dealings.
Section 2518(6) requires only a showing of “what progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized objective and the need for continued interception.” Information on subsidiary matters would be helpful to judicial supervision,
Absent a showing that the Gregorio interception was a subterfuge to obtain the probable cause that was needed to justify a subsequent application to tap Vento’s telephone, there is no reason to believe that the execution of the Gregorio tap was abusive in that the government agents failed properly to minimize their interceptions. The conversations showing that Vento was involved in narcotic dealings were properly overheard in connection with the investigation of the Gregorio hijacking conspiracy, and there is no ground to suppress the evidence that the Strike Force obtained as a result of the Gregorio surveillance.
E. The Gregorio Disclosure Order
The government utilized the information pertaining to narcotics that was collected during the Gregorio hijacking wiretap in order first to obtain authorization for the Vento intercept, and later to secure, from the grand juries, the original indictment and the superseding indictment under which the defendants were tried. These uses, charge the defendants, were improper because the government did not obtain a timely disclosure order from Judge Hannum, pursuant to section 2517(5).
On this footing, defendants construct an argument that absent a legitimate basis for the authorization of the Vento interception, the evidence obtained from the Vento surveillance should be suppressed. Defendants also urge that the original indictment was illegally- obtained because it was based, in part, on the narcotics information from the Gregorio tap that was disclosed without a judicial order. The claim with respect to the superseding nine-count indictment is not clear. But whatever the thrust of the defendants’ complaint, they appear to rely on United States v. Brodson,
Section 2517(5) distinguishes between two types of use that may be made of intercepted communications about offenses other than those specified in the original order of authorization. “Unrelated” communications may be disclosed or used without judicial authorization if such use is in conformity with subsections (1) and (2) of section 2517. Subsections (1) and (2) permit the disclosure of “unrelated” communications to other investigative officers and the use of the communications by the recipient officer “to the extent such use is appropriate to the proper performance of his official duties.” On the other hand, subsections (3) and (5) require judicial approval for the disclosure of “unrelated” communications in connection with “giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any proceeding held under the authority of the United States. . .”
The use of the narcotics data from the Gregorio tap compels the Court to inquire whether an ex parte application for a wire intercept order constitutes a “proceeding held under the authority of the United States” for the purposes of section 2517(3) and (5). We believe that it does not. The legislative history of section 2517 reveals that subsection (3) “envisions . the use and disclosure of such evidence at trial to establish guilt directly, or to corroborate, or to impeach, a witness’ testimony, or to refresh his recollection.” Subsection (2), in contrast, “envisions use of the contents of intercepted communications, for example, ... to establish probable cause to search, or to develop witnesses.”
Since Congress intended subsection (2) to include applications for search warrants, it would appear, equally, that an application for a wiretap authorization was intended to fall within the ambit of subsection (2) as a “use . . . appropriate to the proper performance of . official duties,” rather than within the scope of subsection (3), which focuses on the use of wiretap evidence at trial. Hence, the Strike Force did not need a disclosure order to employ the contents of the Gregorio communications in their application to tap Vento’s telephone, even though the communications in question were not related to the previously authorized hijacking investigation.
Defendants also assail the use of the wiretap evidence at the trial on the ground that the disclosure order was not obtained “as soon as practicable,” as required by section 2517(5). The last interception in this case occurred on August 10, 1973, and the disclosure order was issued on January 28, 1974, subsequent to the entry of the original indictment.
A determination of whether the order was obtained “as soon as practicable” requires an examination of the purposes of section 2517(5). Section 2517(5) is designed to permit a district judge to ascertain that the evidence to be disclosed was
[I]ntercepted in accordance with the provisions of [Title III] . . . . Such subsequent application would include a showing that the original order was lawfully obtained, that it was sought in good faith and not as a subterfuge search, and that the communication was in fact incidentally intercepted during the course of a lawfully executed order.40
The order here was obtained prior to the presentation of the evidence to the grand jury that returned the superseding indictment and more than two and one-half months before trial under the original indictment was scheduled to begin. The purpose of section 2517(5) appears to have been served by Judge Hannum’s supervision, and there is no allegation that prejudice was inflicted on the defendants by reason of the delay itself.
An alternative, and not inconsiderable obstacle to the defendants’ objection is that section 2518(10) directs suppression of wiretap evidence if the interception itself was improper in some respect;' the Gregorio intercept, however, was properly authorized and executed. A motion to suppress does not appear to lie when the complaint is one of improper disclosure, rather than one of unlawful interception.
The defendants also contend, citing the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Brodson, that the unauthorized
F. Application for the Vento Wiretap
We now turn our attention from the Gregorio intercept to the alleged deficiencies of the Vento wiretap.
The government’s application for the Vento interception was grounded upon information from confidential informants, from an undercover agent, and from the interception of conversations over Gregorio’s telephone. Defendants charge that the Vento application is fatally vulnerable for three reasons: First, it was based upon evidence obtained from the allegedly illegal Gregorio wiretap; second, it failed to supply probable cause for belief that Vento was engaged in criminal activities; and, third, it contained a misstatement of material fact. There is no merit to any of these contentions.
The defendants’ argument with respect to the sufficiency of the showing of probable cause in the application depends upon the legitimacy of the government’s use of the narcotics-related communications overheard during the Gregorio wiretap. Thirty conversations over Gregorio’s telephone indicated that Vento was engaged in trafficking in controlled substances and provided probable cause to believe that Vento was dealing in drugs and was using his own telephone in that undertaking.
Title III clearly contemplates that one interception might provide evidence valuable to law enforcement officers engaged in a different investigation. As discussed above, section 2517 allows an agent to disclose to other agents “communications relating to offenses other than those [disclosed] in the order of authorization”
Defendants attempt to buttress their claim that the application for the Vento wiretap did not supply probable cause to believe that Vento was engaged in criminal activities by arguing that the information in paragraphs 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12 of the application was obtained from confidential
The defendants also maintain that the Vento application was invalid because of a misstatement of a material fact. As the defendants claim, a misstatement of a material fact may be grounds for nullifying an authorization and the surveillance pursuant to it.
It appears to be the argument that without reference to “the meth” there would have been no reason to suppose that any of the conversations overheard during the Gregorio tap pertained to dealings in drugs. Therefore, the defendants say the misquotation was material because it was the key to breaking the code employed by Vento and his associates.
The law respecting misstatement of fact in applications for wiretap authorizations is discussed in United States v. Armocida.
In Armocida the misrepresentation was not alleged to be intentional and the facts misstated were not material; therefore, it was unnecessary for this Court to choose between the two rules.
Accordingly, there was no impropriety in the application for the Vento intercept.
G. The Attorney General’s Authorization
The government attached to its application for the Vento wiretap an electronic reproduction of Attorney General Elliot Richardson’s authorization for the intercept. Apparently by neglect, the original of this authorization was not submitted until the suppression hearing. Relying on United States v. Giordano
In Giordano the Supreme Court stated that:
Congress intended to require suppression where there is failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary investigative device. . We are confident that the provision for pre-application approval was intended to play a central role in the statutory scheme and that suppression must follow when it is shown that this statutory requirement has been ignored.60
The Supreme Court upheld the suppression of wiretap evidence when a departmental authorization was issued by the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General rather than by statutorily designated officials. In the case at hand, however, there is no doubt that the government complied with the statutory authorization procedures. Departmental authority came from the Attorney General himself, thereby serving the statutory interest of restricting control to officials responsive to the political process.
This case bears a marked resemblance to that aspect of United States v. Chavez in which the Supreme Court held that misidentification of the official authorizing the application did not warrant suppression, because the misidentification “did not affect the fulfillment of any of the reviewing or approval functions required by Congress .”
Although introduction of original memoranda would assist in the authentication of the government’s representations to
H. Minimization in the Vento Intercept
Based on the minimization requirements of the Act, three grounds are suggested by the defendants for the suppression of evidence obtained from wiretapping Yento’s telephone. They assert that the authorization order itself was invalid for failure to include minimization language, that the order was illegal because it permitted an overly broad search, and that the officers executing the interception so disregarded the statutory requirements of minimization that all evidence derived from the wiretap should be held inadmissible at trial.
Although Judge Newcomer’s authorization order confined the interception to a maximum duration of fifteen days, only half the period permitted by Title III, defendants argue that it did not include a provision, required by section 2518(5), that the authorization to intercept “shall be executed as soon as practicable [and], shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception . . . The order did, however, comply with section 2518(4) which requires, inter alia, the specification of:
(a) the identity of the person . whose communications are to be intercepted;
(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to which . authority to intercept is granted;
(c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it relates; .
(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized. .
Nonetheless, relying upon State v. Seigel,
In Cafero,
‘[f]ailure to correctly report the identity of the person authorizing the application, . when in fact the Attorney General has given the required preliminary approval to submit the application, does not represent a similar failure to follow Title Ill’s precautions against the unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic surveillance and does not warrant the suppression of evidence gathered pursuant to a court order resting upon the application.’
We relied on Chavez to hold, in United States v. Acon,
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Cirillo,
In Baynes, faced with the inadvertent omission of the minimization provision, Judge Becker decided to follow the example of the Second Circuit in Grillo. The lack of minimization language and the omission of a provision to execute as soon as practicable were deemed a technical insufficiency, subject to correction by affidavit or testimony.
It is possible to have substantial compliance with the requirements of Title III although the minimization language has not been included in the order. Compliance could be proven at a hearing on the basis of testimony, affidavits and the logs of the intercepting agents. A hearing could also show whether the failure to include the minimization language had prejudiced the defendant. Where, despite the want of a provision, minimization procedures were in fact executed, there would be no harm to a defendant. “[Indeed,] the curative effect of a finding of nonprejudice is the touchstone of the holding in Grillo . .
Finally, the minimization clause would appear to be a “less crucial” requirement of Title III. The minimization proviso of section 2518(5) complements the specific requirements of section 2518(4), but it is section 2518(4) that gives “significant directions to law enforcement officials as to how reasonable interception will be minimized.” The failure to include the minimization phrase when the basic guidelines have been supplied and where there exists a means of measuring compliance with the minimization provisions of the statute cannot be said to be fatal. It was not the intent of Congress to mandate the suppression of evidence for every facial irregularity in a warrant.
Applying the substantial compliance test to the facts of this case, we uphold the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the Vento interception. Despite the absence of the minimization provision, the agents were instructed to carry out minimization procedures and the interception of many phone calls was, in fact, terminated. Because of the five- and ten-day reports submitted to Judge Newcomer by the Strike Force, the surveillance was also subject to close supervision, beyond the requirements of both Title III and the order itself. Given this
The defendants next object to the broad scope of the interception directive. Like Judge Hannum’s order for the surveillance of Gregorio, Judge Newcomer’s order for the Vento wiretap permitted the continuation of the surveillance
until communications are intercepted which revealed the details of the manner in which Steven Vento and others yet unknown, participate in the distribution, possession and possessing with intent to distribute controlled substances . and which reveal the identities of their confederates, their places of operation, and the nature of the conspiracy involved therein, or for a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of this order, whichever is earlier.
As we have already held in connection with Judge Hannum’s order,
According to the defendants, even if the order itself was sufficient, it was executed improperly because the agents were given inadequate minimization instructions and too extensive a discretion to intercept. Defendants observe that the agents who conducted the tap were not given copies of the order, and were instructed to listen to conversations involving not only narcotics, but also “all criminal activity.” Defendants, however, neglect to consider that the supervising agent read the order to the agents. It may be the better practice to distribute a copy of the order to each agent, but the reading was sufficient to inform the agents of the limited scope of the investigation.
Moreover, the agents were instructed to minimize interceptions and to listen only to those conversations that pertained to criminal activities. Although there was testimony that the agents were instructed to intercept conversations involving criminal conduct outside the area of the authorized investigation, the suppression judge was satisfied that the agents had complied with the statutory minimization requirement.
As described above
There being no violation of the act in the execution of this interception, there is no need to consider the defendant’s contention that total suppression is the appropriate remedy for a violation of the minimization requirements.
Section 2518(8)(d) provides that:
Within a reasonable time but not later than ninety days after . . . the termination of the period of an order or extensions thereof, the issuing . judge shall cause to be served, on the persons named in the order and such other parties to intercepted communications as the judge may determine in his discretion that is in the interest of justice, an inventory which shall include notice of—
(1) the fact of the entry of the order
(2) the date of the entry and the period of authorized . . . interception
(3) the fact that during the period wire or oral communications were intercepted.
. On an ex parte showing of good cause to a judge of competent jurisdiction the service of the inventory required by this subsection may be postponed.
Defendants protest that the government delayed for greater than a reasonable time before serving the inventories on them, and in any event the service took place after ninety days had lapsed. Actual service of the inventory occurred toward the end of the ninety-day period with respect to all defendants, except DeLuca and Mengini.
The contention regarding delay in service of the inventories is not convincing. It is by no means certain that the ninety-day proviso applies to the service itself; the language of the section would appear to indicate that it applies to the action of the judge in ordering the services of the inventory. Subsection (8)(d) does not say that “the inventory shall be served within ninety days.” Rather, it states that “within a reasonable time but not later than ninety days . . the . . . judge shall cause” the inventory to be served. There is no claim here that the judges’ orders issued outside the ninety-day limitation of the statute.
Even assuming, however, that the ninety-day period is applicable to actual service of the inventory, or that the order here did not issue within a reasonable time even though it was filed within the ninety days, there is no reason to suppress the wiretap evidence in this case. Several times this Court has addressed the issues presented in this argument. In Cafero, we declined the invitation to invalidate ab initio “a search [that] may be deemed reasonable, and therefore constitutional during the various stages of application for authorization, execution, supervision of the interception, and termination, . because of the operation of some condition subsequent, to-wit, failure to give notice of the items seized.”
In the context of traditional search warrants, a failure to comply with certain procedural requirements of F.R.Cr.P. 41 has been held not to amount to deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights necessitating suppression. Thus, failure to deliver a copy of the warrant to the party*864 whose premises were searched until the day after the search does not render the search “unreasonable” in terms of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. McKenzie,446 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971). Similarly, delay in the execution of the warrant does not render inadmissible evidence seized, absent a showing of prejudice to the defendants resulting from the delay. United States v. Harper,450 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1971)80
Where the failure to file the notice of inventory resulted from an act which “on its face deliberately flouted and denigrated the provisions of Title III designed for the protection of the public” this Court has upheld the suppression of evidence obtained from the interception. But “the touchstone of our decision . . . [was] not [that] an inventory was delayed but rather [that] specific provisions of Title III were deliberately and advertently not followed.”
The defendants rely on United States v. Donovan,
Certainly Vento and his colleagues have failed to demonstrate prejudice in this case, even assuming that there has been a technical infringement of the statutory provision. Without such a showing, there is no foundation to suppress the evidence obtained by means of the interception.
THE IDENTIFICATION OF MASTRAN-GELO’S VOICE
Mastrangelo raises an issue ancillary to the wiretap arguments advanced by the defendants. He contends that there was insufficient evidence to permit a positive identification of his voice. He also claims that significant portions of the evidence relied upon for identification were obtained by improper subterfuge.
The identification of Mastrangelo’s voice by Agent Miller of the DEA was predicated on two face-to-face conversations and upon telephone discussions between Miller and Mastrangelo on the day of the latter’s arrest. Miller admits that he deliberately served Mastrangelo with the wiretap inventory and engaged Mastrangelo in conversation in order to identify Mastrangelo’s voice. Miller, however, could not remember the precise content of these talks.
Besides Miller’s testimony, the government introduced circumstantial evidence to link Mastrangelo to the intercepted communications: The caller in question identified himself as “Adrian,” Mastrangelo’s first name. In addition, physical surveillance revealed that a man of Mastrangelo’s general physique, traveling in Mastrangelo’s car or on his motorcycle, visited Vento’s home. There was, however, no positive identification of that visitor. The evidence was properly admitted, and Judge
It is permissible to base the identification of a voice heard in intercepted conversations on relatively few conversations between an agent and the accused person,
Furthermore, there was no illegal subterfuge in this respect. Agent Miller personally delivered the inventory to Mastrangelo for the sole purpose of assessing Mastrangelo’s voice, but the defendant knew that he was dealing with a DEA agent and that the agent was interested in him because of a wiretap. Mastrangelo had no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his voice,
In these circumstances, there is no basis to overrule the jury’s verdict and the fact-finder’s implicit identification of “Adrian” as Mastrangelo.
SEARCH OF DeLUCA’S CAR
Vento and DeLuca remonstrate that the August 10th search without warrant of De-Luca’s car was improper because the government could have obtained a warrant to be served on DeLuca at the time of his arrest or could have seized DeLuca’s ear and then obtained a warrant. These contentions are refuted by both the facts and the law.
As a result of a conversation intercepted about 11:25 a. m. on August 10, the DEA was alerted that DeLuca might purchase methamphetamine from Vento. It was not until 3:25 and 3:54 that afternoon, however, that the DEA learned from the wiretap that the sale was definite. Shortly thereafter, DeLuca arrived, empty-handed, at Vento’s house. In a few minutes DeLuca left carrying a small brown paper bag. He then drove off, trailed by the arresting officers, stopped about three blocks away, and hurriedly left his car. At that point DeLuca was arrested and handcuffed by agents of the DEA and the Philadelphia police.
A check of DeLuca’s person having failed to reveal the suspect bag, DEA agents decided to search his car, where they discovered the brown paper bag. Opening the bag, the agents found a white powder that they believed to be a controlled substance and that turned out to be methamphetamine. The car was then moved to permit a further search.
DeLuca asserts that a warrant for the search of his car ought to have been
In the alternative, and conceding that the agents had probable cause to stop him, De-Luca maintains that the agents could have seized his car, but should have refrained from searching it until they had obtained a warrant for that purpose. DeLuca points to Coolidge v. New Hampshire
Coolidge, however, does not restrict police searches of automobiles where the occasion to search the vehicle arises suddenly. The search in Coolidge was declared improper in a situation where “the police had known for some time of the probable role of the . car in the crime,” and where there were “no confederates waiting to move the evidence .” Where “the circumstances that furnish probable cause to search a particular car for particular articles are . unforeseeable,” and where “the opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable,” Chambers v. Maroney permits a car to be searched without a warrant.
The authority to search without a warrant — alluded to in Chambers —depends upon the exigent circumstances that exist at the time the car is stopped by the police:
The car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained. Hence an immediate search is constitutionally permissible.95
If conditions permit, the police may seize the car and hold it pending the issuance of a warrant for its search, but they are not obliged to do so.
For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.98
The circumstances applicable to the search at issue here are similar to those that pertained in Chambers. DeLuca’s car had been stopped on a public street, not
THE SINGLE CONSPIRACY
Leaving the problems of wiretaps and searches, we turn now to the issue of conspiracy.
Mengini and Mastrangelo concede that there was sufficient evidence to link each of them separately with Vento in plans to distribute methamphetamine. They aver, however, that there was not enough evidence to link either of them to a conspiracy involving any of the other defendants, including each other. Each, therefore, claims that any statements made by the other defendants, except for statements made by Vento in conversation with each of them, were not admissible against them as declarations by co-conspirators.
It is a well-established exception to the hearsay rule that out-of-court declarations by one conspirator may be used against another conspirator, but only if such declarations were made “during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy charged . . . ”
In order to introduce the declarations of the remaining defendants against Mengini and Mastrangelo, the government must have established that Mengini and Mastrangelo had taken, or sought to take, a role in Vento’s arrangements for the distribution of a controlled substance. The government must also have furnished information permitting the inference that Vento needed to cooperate with several distributors for his scheme to work and that the distributors had reason to understand this fact. Given such evidence, there could be an inference that Mengini and Mastrangelo were in conspiracy not only with Vento, but also with the other distributors who dealt with Vento, even though Mengini and Mastrangelo may have been ignorant of the identity of such other persons.
Here the government introduced evidence that in the course of nine days Mengini engaged Vento in seven conversations regarding plans to supply methamphetamine. Mengini arranged to act as a distributor for the methamphetamine which Vento would provide; on another occasion he arranged to furnish methamphetamine to Vento. He discussed his other source of supply with Vento, discussed the methods of diluting various drugs, and they talked about an occasion in the past when Vento had sold methamphetamine to Mengini.
Mastrangelo was overheard on July 26 asking Vento to supply him with a quarter pound of methamphetamine for a customer. The wiretap was discontinued on July 27, but was renewed August 2. On August 8 Mastrangelo called Vento four times in order to secure a half-pound of methamphetamine for resale. Vento suggested that Mastrangelo come to Vento’s house to get a sample of the substance for his customer. Vento’s residence was soon placed under physical surveillance, and agents saw a man of Mastrangelo’s physique leave the house and ride away on Mastrangelo’s motorcycle. Less than an hour later, Mastrangelo called Vento to report that his customer was dissatisfied with the sample, and that the deal was off. The transcripts of the conversations indicate that the parties were well known to each other and appeared to recognize each other by voice alone.
The government’s proof also demonstrated that Vento was a large-scale trafficker in methamphetamine and that he dealt only in quantities of about half of a pound or more. He told Mastrangelo to send customers seeking only small amounts to “Tommy,” defendant Ricciardi.
Based on this testimony, the jury returned a verdict of guilty with respect to both Mengini and Mastrangelo, as well as all the other defendants. Thus, we must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
Thus, the government established the existence of a wheel conspiracy, with Vento at the hub and the other defendants, including Mengini and Mastrangelo, on the spokes. Mengini, as a supplier and distributor, and Mastrangelo, as a distributor, could be found by the jury to be in conspiracy not only with Vento, but also with all others who participated on the same basis in Vento’s conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, even if the identification of the other conspirators was unknown to Mengini and Mastrangelo at the time. In view of this, it was not error for the trial court to permit the jury to consider the statements of the other defendants against Mengini and Mastrangelo as declarations of co-conspirators.
THE “TAINTED” JUROR
Mrs. Bewley, an alternate juror, had a brother whose brother-in-law, Reginald Cullen, was murdered some ten years before the trial in this case. Vento had been accused of Cullen’s murder, but had been acquitted. Although Mrs. Bewley did not participate in any of the deliberations of the jury, Vento and the other defendants fear that Mrs. Bewley may have poisoned the minds of those jurors who did deliberate on the defendants’ fate. The defendants aver that when Mrs. Bewley testified at the post-trial hearing to having had no conversations about Vento with the other jurors she was not a straightforward witness. They also claim that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit the defendants’ counsel to interrogate the jurors with respect to any tainted conversations the jurors may have had with Mrs. Bewley. Without such interrogation, it is asserted, it was impossible for the defendants to discover whether the jury had been prejudiced.
The initial motion for a hearing on this issue was denied because defendants’ only information derived from an anonymous tip, and did not identify the suspect juror. When Richard Costello, who was Mrs. Bewley’s nephew, came forward, however, a hearing was granted.
At the hearing, on July 31, Costello recounted a conversation with his aunt which occurred subsequent to her dismissal from the jury. He recalled only that their talk consisted of an inquiry about Mr. Rief, who was attorney to both Costello and defendant Mengini. Costello’s account made no reference to Vento at all. Mrs. Bewley testified that she had discussed Vento with Costello, but denied discussing Vento with any of the jurors. She explained that she had learned of Vento’s unhappy connection with Cullen only after having been dismissed as an alternate juror. Mrs. Bewley denied that she was close to Cullen’s side of the family or that she had been aware that Vento was the man accused of murdering Cullen.
On the basis of this testimony, and the fact that no other jurors, despite thirty to forty warnings to them by the judge, had reported any improper conversations, the court declined to permit an interrogation of the other jurors.
If there is reason to believe that jurors have been exposed to prejudicial information, the trial judge is obliged to investigate the effect of that exposure on the outcome of the trial.
Defendants raise a collateral issue: the failure of Mrs. Bewley to reveal during the voir dire her familial relations to (1) a victim of crime and (2) a policeman. Such concealment can amount to a violation of due process of law.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE INDICTMENT
The nine counts in the superseding indictment alleged offenses under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,
Defendants maintain that a fatal variance between the terms of the statute and those of the indictment was created by the Attorney General’s transfer of methamphetamine from schedule III to schedule II. The purpose of the schedules established in section 812, the defendants contend, is to define the crime and give notice to all that dealing in a particular substance constitutes a violation of law. To permit the Attorney General to add substances and to move them from one schedule to another, defendants argue, is to delegate the responsibility for the definition of crimes to the Attorney General.
It is unnecessary to reach the issue posed by the defendants because the refer
No prejudice could befall the defendants from the surplusage in these indictments. Without reference to the schedule, the indictments complied with the requirements delineated by the Supreme Court in Ham-ling v. United States.
CONCLUSION
There was no pattern in this prosecution of disregard by officials of Title III. The applications for the wiretaps were not invalid, the authorizations were not insufficient, and the executions of the interceptions were not improper. Asserted omissions by the Strike Force or by the district judge prove, upon examination, to be remediable and harmless; in no way were the defendants prejudiced. It was not error to admit the evidence from the physical search and the allegations of flaws at the trial are unsubstantiated.
This is not a case where, although each misstep appears excusable when considered by itself, error upon error acquires significance in cumulation.
The convictions will be affirmed.
Notes
. Defendant Mastrangelo asserts, in addition, that there was insufficient evidence to connect him with any of the conversations that were intercepted. See text accompanying notes 84-90 infra.
. A pen register is a device attached to a telephone line, usually at central telephone offices, that marks on a paper tape dashes equal to the number dialed. The paper tape thus constitutes a record of the numbers called on the particular line. The pen register if automatically disconnected before the line called has had an opportunity to answer. There is no recording or monitoring of the conversation. See United States v. Guglielmo,
. We note that Donald Woodruff, a/k/a “Chips,” was tried separately and convicted. His conviction was affirmed by judgment order on March 16, 1976,-F.2d-(3d Cir. 1976).
. This Court has considered the provisions of Title III in United States v. Armocida,
. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1970). Section 2518(3)(d) provides that the government must show that:
there is probable. cause for belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire or oral communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person.
There is no averment that the government failed to sustain its burden with respect to subsection (3)(d).
. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518(10)(a)(i) (1970). See United States v. Giordano,
. Aguilar,
. Compare Spinelli,
. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (1970).
. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a), (b) (1970).
. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (1970).
. United States v. Giordano,
. United States v. Kahn,
.
. See, e.g., In re Dunn,
. United States v. Pacheco,
. 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 2190. See, e. g., Falcone,
. United States v. Curreri,
. United States v. Kalustian,
. See United States v. Kerrigan,
. See Curreri,
. United States v. Armocida,
.
. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970).
. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1970). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit appears to require such reports in all authorizations, although the statutory language is not mandatory in this regard. United States v. Scott,
. Defendants’ reliance on United States v. Vega,
. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(d) (1970).
. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(e) (1970).
. See United States v. Armocida,
. See United States v. Fino,
.
.
. Id. at 44.
. United States v. Armocida,
. See Armocida I,
. See Armocida I,
. See United States v. Scott,
. United States v. Iannelli, 477 F.2d 999, 1002 (3d Cir. 1973), aff’d,
.
. 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 2188-89 (citations omitted).
. 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 2189. See United States v. Brodson,
. Cf. United States v. Iannelli,
. See id. at 1001; United States v. Denisio,
. See United States v. Ortega-Alvarez,
. Mastrangelo, Mengini, and DeLuca raise an additional point that we do not need to decide on this appeal. They assert that each of them was an “individual” known to the government within the meaning of section 2518, “committing the offense and whose communications [were] to be intercepted . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(b)(iv), (4)(a) (1970). There is some basis for the belief that the three were known to the government and known to be involved with Vento in his narcotics dealings, either at the time of the original application or at the time of the application for an extension. Thus, these defendants contend that the government’s application and Judge Newcomer’s authorization should have identified them.
The legislative history on this point is scant, see 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 2112, 2190-91, and the Supreme Court has not ruled definitively in this area. In United States v. Kahn,
Three circuits have required the identification of all known parties involved in the criminal offense if there is reason to believe that their conversations will be subject to interception. United States v. Moore, 168 U.S.App. D.C. 227,
The Fifth Circuit, however, declined to suppress, although only the person whose line was subject to surveillance — the host — was identified in the application and authorization. United States v. Doolittle,
This case, however, does not occasion entry into the controversy, since the defendants did not raise an objection at the suppression hearing or at trial. We generally do not consider matters of suppression of evidence if the issue has not been adjudicated by the trial court which is better situated to determine the crucial facts.
. Although all the conversations recorded were conducted on Gregorio’s telephone, Vento sometimes called his home to check for messages in connection with his criminal activities and, at one point, left his home phone number as a contact point for a drug supplier in Brooklyn, New York.
. “Bootstrapping” is described as an abuse in United States v. Cafero,
. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5), (1) (1970).
. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(2) (1970). See 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 2188. E. g., United States v. Tortorello,
The employment of the intercepted conversations to justify extension orders for the same tap was also contemplated by Title III, see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970), and has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court, United States v. Giordano,
. See Section A supra.
. See United States v. Armocida,
. Id.
. United States v. Carmichael,
. United States v. Marihart,
. United States v. Thomas,
.
. Cf. United States v. Cirillo,
. E. g., United States v. James, 161 U.S.App. D.C. 88,
.
. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(1), 2518(l)(a), 2518(4)(d) (1970).
.
. United States v. Chavez,
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. Id. at 309.
. Id.
. See 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 2184-85.
. Notes 21-29 supra and accompanying text.
. Compare United States v. George,
. See section D supra.
. United States v. George provided for total suppression, in a context of complete absence of minimization. See also United States v. Focadle,
. Only Vento, however, has a clear statutory right to an inventory. The other defendants, not having been named in the authorization, are entitled to an inventory only as “the judge may determine in his discretion that is in the interest of justice . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970).
. United States v. Cafero,
. Id.; accord, United States v. Hall,
. United States v. Eastman,
.
.
.
. See United States v. Valdes,
. See United States v. Romano,
. See, e. g., United States v. Alper,
. United States v. Barber,
. United States v. Dionisio,
. Id. at 5-7,
. See United States v. Gattie,
.
.
. Texas v. White,
. Chambers v. Maroney,
. Id. But see United States v. Valen,
.
. Id. See United States v. Valen,
. Compare Cardwell v. Lewis,
.
. At oral argument, but not in their briefs, defendants made the further contention that the DEA agents should not have opened the paper bag that was found in the car. Instead, defendants claim, they should have seized the bag and obtained a search warrant to open it. Here the contents of the bag were the very object of a legitimate search under exigent circumstances. The agents had probable cause to believe that the bag contained methamphetamine. In these circumstances, to restrict the agents from opening the bag would appear to strain the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and erode the powers of the police to conduct legitimate searches efficiently.
. Anderson v. United States,
.
. See United States v. Ortega-Alvarez,
. United States v. Kates,
. United States v. Pomponio,
. See United States v. Bujese,
. United States ex rel. DeVita v. McCorkle,
. There is no indication in the record that Mrs. Bewley intentionally withheld this information about herself.
. “Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both
. “(a) Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally — (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.”
. “It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to use any communication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony under any provision of this subchapter . . . .”
. 30 Fed.Reg. 8254 (March 30, 1973). See 21 CFR § 308.12 (1975).
. Even if proper, this delegation is unconstitutional, say the appellants, because the guidelines supplied the Attorney General in the Act are impermissibly vague and overbroad.
.
[A]n indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as “those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.” “Undoubtedly the language of the statute may be used in the general description of an offense, but it must be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offense, coming under the general description, with which he is charged.”
Id. at 117-18,
. Moreover, because methamphetamine, whether regarded as a schedule II or a schedule III controlled substance, has always been a controlled substance under the Act, the defendants had no need to follow the Federal Register with close attention. There has always been notice, from the Congressional enactment itself, that dealing in methamphetamine is in violation of the law, and the defendants have not been prejudiced by the inclusion of methamphetamine in schedule II, rather than schedule III.
