22 M.J. 637 | U.S. Army Court of Military Review | 1986
OPINION OF THE COURT
Contrary to his pleas, appellant was found guilty by a special court-martial composed of officer members of attempted sale of military property and wrongful appropriation of military property in violation of Articles 80 and 121, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 880 and 921, respectively. He was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for three months and reduction to Private E-l. The convening authority approved the sentence.
It is alleged that “the military judge erred to the substantial prejudice of the appellant by admitting evidence showing that the appellant exercised his Fifth Amendment rights.” We disagree and affirm the findings of guilty and the sentence.
Appellant was a tactical wire team chief for his unit. On 11 March 1985, appellant, dressed in civilian clothes, entered the Pack
During trial the following colloquy occurred between trial counsel and the CID agent:
Q. Was this conversation, this interview reduced to writing?
A. We started to type up a statement. However, half way through the statement, Staff Sergeant Velez [appellant] elected not to continue.
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Q. This statement form comes to a stop halfway down the page. Can you explain why that happened?
A. Staff Sergeant Velez [appellant] was giving me the chronological order of what happened at the Pack Rat store. He stopped and then I asked him — I was going to ask him a question of how much money did he ask for for [sic] the PRC-77, at which time he discontinued the interview at the point.
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Q. Okay. Now, when you got to the last line here, after setting up the radio, the owner asked me, and then it stops.
A. That’s correct.
Q. What was your question at that point?
A. The question I was gonna ask was, ‘The owner asked me how much I wanted,’ talking — talking Staff Sergeant Velez [appellant]; at which time he just discontinued the interview.
Q. Discontinued the interview. Thank you very much.
There was no objection by defense counsel and the court was not instructed to disregard these comments. Subsequently, defense counsel cross-examined the witness concerning appellant’s assertion of his right to remain silent, elicited testimony from the appellant concerning appellant’s discontinuing the interview and used the fact of appellant’s assertion of his rights in argument. Appellant maintained that he was trying to run his own investigation to catch people selling government radios and people buying them, that he never intended
Military Rule of Evidence 301(f)(3) sets forth the effect of pretrial claiming of the privilege concerning compulsory self-incrimination. It provides:
The fact that the accused during official questioning and in the exercise of rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or Article 31, remained silent, refused to answer a certain question, requested counsel, or requested that the questioning be terminated is inadmissible against the accused.
This rule is based upon United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975), and Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) (Prosecutor impeached accused on cross-examination by eliciting that he remained silent after arrest and Miranda
Having determined that the admission of such evidence was error, we must determine the effect of that error. The standard to be applied is whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Ross, 7 M.J. 174, 176; United States v. Moore, 1 M.J. 390; see also United States v. Remai, 19 M.J. 229 (C.M.A.1985).
In some respects, the case before us is similar to United States v. Frentz, 21 M.J. 813 (N.M.C.M.R.1985), where the accused used invocation of his rights as a defense to establish credibility.
Although there are factual differences in the case before us and Frentz, principally the fact that appellant’s invocation of rights was first raised by trial counsel, we are persuaded that the Frentz rationale should be extended to cases where an
The other assignments of error raised personally by appellant are without merit. The findings of guilty and the sentence are affirmed.
. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. Concerning a similar defense, the Seventh Circuit has held that cross-examination of an accused concerning his post-arrest silence is permissible where the defense alleges or creates an impression of full cooperation with police. United States v. Shue, 766 F.2d 1122, 1129-30 (7th Cir.1984).