In this case, we address an issue explicitly left open by this court in
United States v. Echegollen-Barrueta,
BACKGROUND
Appellant, Patricio Contreras Vasquez, pled guilty tо illegal reentry into the United States after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) & (b). Under the terms of the plea agreement, the government agreed to recommend Vasquez be sentenced to the lower end of the guidelines range.
The presentence investigation report [PSR] calculated Vasquez’s imprisonment range to be from 77 to 96 months. - At sentencing, the district' court first noted that there were no objections to the PSR, and then invited Vasquez to address the court before the sentence was imposed. Vasquez admitted he had violated the statute by illegally reentering the United States. Vasquez, however, claimed that he was unaware that he would be subject to an enhanced sentence becausе of his previous convictions. The court then explained the effect of prior convictions to Vasquez under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. After explaining the effect of the prior convictions, the district court ordered Vasquez to serve 90 months imprisonment and 3 years supervised release. At no point during the sentencing hearing did the district court expressly invite Vasquez’s counsel to speak on his behalf. Vasquez’s counsel did not object to this oversight. Moreover, Vasquez’s counsel never asked the court’s permission to sрeak on behalf of her client, or brought it to the trial court’s attention. This appeal followed. 1
DISCUSSION
Vasquez argues that his sentence must be vacated and remanded because the district court failed to afford his counsel an opportunity to speak on his behalf before sentencing in accordance with Rule 32(c)(3)(B). We review de novo whethеr a district court complied with Rule 32.
See United States v. Myers,
This court has before ruled that a district court’s failure to communicate unequivocally to a defendant that he has the right to address the cоurt before sentencing is imposed mandates a re-sentencing and is not subject to plain-error review.
See Echegollen-Barrueta,
In
Myers,
-we explained that the right of allocution is one “deeply embedded in our jurisprudence” which weighs against applying a harmless error analysis.
Myers,
Vasquez maintains that the right to have counsel speak on behаlf of the defendant is equally as important as the right to personally allocute before sentencing. ' Vasquez relies on the reasoning in Myers and concludes that the district court’s fаilure to have his counsel address the court is not subject to plain-error review because of the importance of having counsel speak oh behalf of their clients, and the uncertainty of the effect counsel’s statements might have on the sentence imposed by the district court.
Unfortunately' for Vasquez, the language of 32(c)(3)(B) does not dictаte the result this court reached in Myers with regard to the right of allocution. A review of the Rule reveals the significant differences- between the right of a defendant to allocute and the right of the defendant to have counsel speak on his behalf. Rule 32(c) states in pertinent part:
(3) Imposition of Sentence. Before imposing sentence, the court must:
(B) afford defendant’s counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant;
(C) address the defendant personally and determine whether the defendant wishes 'to makе a statement and to present any information in mitigation of the sentence;
Rule 32(c)(3)(C) directs the court to “address the defendant personally” and determine whether the defendant wishes to speak and present information to mitigate the sentence. The rule “envisions a
personal
colloquy between the sentencing judge and the defendant.”
Myers,
Vasquez’s counsel never objected to nor called the apparent oversight tо the district court’s attention. The court is confident that competent members of the bar will speak up during a sentencing hearing on behalf of their clients when counsel has a mаtter they would like to bring to the court’s' attention. The right of allocution embodied in 32(c)(3)(C) reflects the principle that “the court, the prosecutor, and the defendant must at the vеry least interact in a manner that shows clearly and convincingly that the defendant knew he had a right to speak on any subject of his choosing prior to the imposition of sentencing.”
Myers,
Since defense counsel did not object to the court’s failure to give her an opportunity to address the court, Rulе 52(b) plain-error analysis applies. Under this standard, reversal is not required unless there is (1) an error; (2) that is clear or plain; (3) that affects the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
United States v. Olano,
We note that it is in a distriсt court’s best interests to inquire of all defense counsel whether they have anything to add during sentencing hearings, because defense counsel could be able to articulate points more clearly than individual defendants.
See Powell v. Alabama,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. The plea agreement included a waiver-of-appeal provision but the government has specifically waived any reliance on it because the district court failed to admonish Vasquez concerning this waiver and the court advised Vasquez that he could appeal his sentence. Hence, this court need not decide whether Vasquez’s appeal falls within the scope of the apрeal waiver.
See United States v. Myers,
. The right of allocution refers to the defendant's right to address the court and not his counsel’s. See Black's Law Dictionary 76 (6th ed.1990) ("formality of court's inquiry of defendant as to whether he has any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pro *458 nounced against him on verdict of convic-lion”).