Lead Opinion
Steven VandeBrake pleaded guilty to two counts of price fixing and one count of bid rigging in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1. The guilty plea was pursuant to a nonbinding plea agreement he reached with the government after the district court
I
In 1994, VandeBrake took over his family’s concrete business in Orange City, Iowa. Fourteen years later VandeBrake sold the family business to Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua (GCC), a Mexico-based corporation which operates close to two dozen cement plants in Iowa. GCC formed GCC Alliance Concrete (Alliance), and VandeBrake thereafter worked as a sales manager for the new company. In March 2009, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) began investigating VandeBrake for his involvement in a bid-rigging conspiracy arising from the sale of concrete products in northern Iowa. The investigation began after one of Alliance’s competitors reported the bid-rigging conspiracy to the DOJ under the Antitrust Division’s Leniency Program.
The DOJ’s investigation confirmed the existence of a bid-rigging conspiracy between VandeBrake’s company, Alliance, and two of its competitors, as well as a price-fixing scheme between Alliance and a third competitor. As a result of the investigation, the government filed a criminal information against VandeBrake charging him with three antitrust violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1, two counts for bid rigging and one count for price fixing. Through his counsel, VandeBrake engaged in extensive negotiations with the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, ultimately reaching an agreement whereby the parties would ask the district court to accept a binding plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The binding agreement, if accepted by the district court, called for VandeBrake to serve a sentence of nineteen months and pay a fine of $100,000 for his role in the bid-rigging and price-fixing conspiracies.
Shortly after VandeBrake entered guilty pleas to all three counts before a magistrate judge, the district court entered an order announcing it would not accept the binding plea agreement. The district court scheduled a hearing under Rule 11(c)(5) to discuss the matter. At the hearing, the district court disclosed the reasons why it was not accepting the binding plea agreement, which included: 1) the leniency of the sentence in light of VandeBrake’s conduct; 2) a policy disagreement with the antitrust guidelines; 3) the presence of codefendants and the need to give fair sentences to each defendant after reviewing all of the applicable presentence investigation reports (PSRs), which the district court had not yet done; 4) the DOJ attorney’s relative lack of experience when compared to the district court’s own sentencing experience; and 5) a reluctance to surrender the district court’s sentencing discretion in light of the other factors just mentioned.
Ultimately, however, the district court did not reject the binding plea agreement, but gave VandeBrake the option of going forward with the sentencing hearing, after which the district court would decide whether to accept or reject the binding plea agreement. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(3)(A) (indicating a district court “may accept [a binding] agreement, reject it, or defer a dеcision until the court has reviewed the presentence report”). Speaking with candor, the district court represented “there’s probably a less than 10
Prior to sentencing, the district court ordered a PSR prepared. The PSR discussed, among other things, the length and scope of the concrete bid-rigging and price-fixing conspiracies. The first bid-rigging conspiracy took place between Alliance and one of its competitors from June 2008 through March 2009. The second bid-rigging conspiracy took place between Alliance and a second competitor from January 2008 through August 2009. The price-fixing conspiracy took place between Alliance and a third competitor from January 2006 through August 2009. The PSR calculated the volume of commerce affected by each conspiracy to be $591,000, $95,000, and $4,845,439.61, respectively, for a total of $5,531,439.61.
The district court conducted a three-day sentencing hearing for VandeBrake and one of his codefendants. Following the sentencing hearing, the district court issued a detailed memorandum indicating it was varying upward from the advisory guidelines range by imposing a sentence of forty-eight months. The two primary reasons given by the district court for the variance were a policy disagreement with the antitrust guidelines and VandeBrake’s lack of remorse for his crimes. The district court’s policy disagreement focused on the Sentencing Commission’s choice to increase the offense levels for antitrust violations less rapidly than the offense levels for fraud violations despite the comparable societal harm targeted by both the fraud and antitrust guidelines. The district court also indicated why it believed the Commission’s explanation for the disparity did not apply in VandeBrake’s situation.
The court further concludes that because of a flaw in U.S.S.G. § 2Rl.l(b)(2), application of that section fails to provide a just and reasoned sentencing range given the facts of VandeBrake’s case. The Sentencing Commission has explained that the offense levels for antitrust violations were increased in § 2R1.1 “to make them more comparable to the offense levels for fraud with similar amounts of loss.” U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 377. The base offense level for antitrust violations begins at a higher level than the base offense level for fraud violations “in order to reflect the serious nature of and the difficulty of detecting such violations.” Id. However, the base offense level for antitrust violations then increases less rapidly than the offense level for fraud violations “in part, because, on the average, the level of mark up from an antitrust violation may tend to decline with the volume of commerce involved.” Id. This assumption is incorrect in this case, particularly with respect to VandeBrake’s price-fixing of concrete sales through [Alliance’s]price list. [Alliance] would establish a price list in January for a given year and then stick to that price list for the remainder of the year. Because [Alliance’s] price list was based on a per cubic yard price, [Alliance’s] price for its concrete did not decrease with volume. Thus, the level of mark up here for VandeBrake’s price-fixing violations did not decline with the volume of commerce involved. Consequently, [Alliance’s] unit cost of production should havе decreased as production increased, thereby increasing the profits to be drawn from VandeBrake’s antitrust activities and increasing the losses to his victims. Therefore, there is no basis in this case for the base offense level for VandeBrake’s antitrust violations to increase less rapidly than the offense level for comparative fraud violations. The court notes that the volume of commerce in this case, as agreed by the parties, is $5,666,439. The commentary to § 2R1.1 indicates that:
It is estimated that the average gain from price-fixing is 10 percent of the selling price. The loss from price-fixing exceeds the gain because, among other things, injury is inflicted upon consumers who are unable or for other reasons do not buy the product at the higher prices.
U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1 cmt. 3. Ten percent of the affected volume of commerce in this case is $566,634. Thus, the estimated loss to VandeBrake’s victims in this ease is more than $566,634. Under such circumstances, the fraud guideline § 2Bl.l(b)(l)(H) directs a fourteen level increase because the resulting loss in this case is more than $400,000 but less than $1,000,000. This is substantially more than the meager two point increase called for by § 2R1.1(b)(2)(A) and leads the court to find that application of that section fails to provide a just and reasoned sentencing range given the facts here. Accordingly, the court finds that the “naturе and circumstances of the offense,” 18 U.S.C. [§ ] 3553(a)(1), “the need for the sentence imposed-to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), each justify the need for substantial punishment above the guideline sentence and warrants a variance of VandeBrake’s sentence above the applicable guideline sentence.
United States v. VandeBrake,
The district court also justified its variance when taking into account “the history and characteristics of the defendant” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), focusing on VandeBrake’s lack of remorse.
What the court finds most disquieting about VandeBrake’s history and characteristics is that VandeBrake was already wealthy when he embarked on and engaged in the charged conspiracies. VandeBrake can make no claim to be a latter-day Jean Valjean, the unemployed protagonist in Victor Hugo’s Les Miserables who was imprisoned for stealing a loaf of bread to feed his widowed sister’s seven children. As this court recently recognized, “[a] crime of fraud by one who already has more than enough — and who cannot argue that he suffered a deprived or abusive childhood or the compulsion of an expensive addiction — is simply a crime of greed.” United States v. Miell,744 F.Supp.2d 904 , 955 (N.D.Iowa 2010). Nearly as disturbing is the fact that VandеBrake fails to believe that he was motivated by greed. Instead, VandeBrake continues to justify and rationalize his conduct. He excuses his criminal conduct by reasoning that he gave [Alliance’s] customers a “great product for a good price.” Sentencing Tr., Vol. 1 at 251. VandeBrake’s self-serving rationalizations reflect a total lack of remorse for his criminal conduct in his case. Also, it has not escaped the court’s attention that VandeBrake initiated the conspiracies charged in Counts 1 and 3. Thus, he cannot claim to have been unwittingly-duped into joining and participating in those charged conspiracies. Equally troubling is the fact that VandeBrake is one of the few white collar defendants I have sentenced where the sentencing record is totally devoid of any community work, participation in any service organizations, or charitable giving. There is no record evidence of even a single good deed done by VandeBrake for anyone other than his family. VandeBrake makes a mockery of the adage that “to whom much is given, much is expected.” Thus, the court finds that VandeBrake’s history and characteristics warrant more significant punishment than the advisory guidelines might mete out, despite VandeBrake’s lack of prior criminal history. Instead, these factors warrant a variance of VandеBrake’s sentence above the applicable guideline sentence.
VandeBrake,
Finally, the district court gave a detailed explanation of the fine amount it chose, considering all the factors listed at 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a)
VandeBrake is an extremely wealthy individual, with a net worth over $10,000,000. VandeBrake’s wealth and assets are particularly pertinent to consider in determining the рroper amount of his fine because a $829,715.85 fine, while in the abstract is a large sum of money, is quite modest when compared to VandeBrake’s overall wealth. Only by imposing a fine of such a large amount does the fine become sufficiently proportionate to VandeBrake’s wealth to properly reflect the gravity of his offenses. Given VandeBrake’s wealth, the court finds that a $829,715.85 fine is appropriate in order to ensure that it is “sufficient to ensure that the fine, taken together with other sanctions imposed, is punitive.” U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d)(2); see United States v. Koestner, 628 F.3d978, 979 (8th Cir.2010) (affirming the imposition of a $100,000 fine which was $70,000 above the advisory guidelines range where the defendant was a “millionaire” and such a fine was appropriate to ensure that the sentence was punitive to the defendant).
VandeBrake,
VandeBrake filed a timely appeal. On appeal, he contends the district court abused its discretion by not accepting the binding plea agreement. He also contends the sentence of forty-eight months and fíne of $829,715.85 are substantively unreasonable.
II
VandeBrake contends the district court abused its discretion by not accepting the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) binding plea agreement. The government responds by contending VandeBrake waived this claim when he chose to plead guilty to a nonbinding plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(B). We agree with the government.
We first note the district сourt did not actually reject the binding plea agreement. The district court has three choices when presented with a binding plea agreement proposed by the parties. It may accept the binding plea agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until after reviewing the presentence report. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(3)(A). Here the district court chose the third option by deferring its decision. VandeBrake then chose to enter a nonbinding plea agreement with the government. The new plea agreement did not preserve VandeBrake’s right to challenge the district court’s nonacceptance of the binding plea agreement; it was unconditional.
“[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process.” Tollett v. Henderson,
The district court gave two primary reasons for varying upward from the guidelines range: (1) a policy disagreement with the antitrust guidelines, and (2) VandeBrake’s lack of remorse. Both were permissible reasons for varying from the guidelines. See United States v. Battiest,
VandeBrake’s primary complaint regarding the substantive unreasonableness of his sentence is that its length equals the longest sentence ever imposed in an antitrust case. He argues the volume of commerce and duration of the conspiracies involved in his case pale in comparison to the only other forty-eight month sentence imposed in an antitrust case. The length of VandeBrake’s sentence, however, results in large part from the district court’s policy disagreement with the antitrust guidelines. The district court believed the antitrust guidelines are too lenient, and consequently gave VandeBrake a more severe sentence than the within-the-guidelines’ sentence VandeBrake cites for comparison purposes. Because the district court varied from the guidelines, VandeBrake’s sentence will necessarily differ when compared to a within-the-guidelines’ sentence. That mere fact does not ipso facto make the sentence substantively unreasonable. See, e.g., Kimbrough,
VandeBrake also claims the district court gave invalid reasons for its policy disagreement with the guidelines. We disagree. The district court gave cogent reasons for its policy disagreement by comparing the antitrust guidelines to the fraud guidelines which attack a similar societal harm. The district court also tied its policy disagreement to the specific facts involved in VandeBrake’s case, noting VandeBrake’s prices for concrete did
We respectfully disagree with the dissent’s view that the district court’s policy disagreement with antitrust guideline § 2R1.1 turns on some aspect of the guideline which “exemplifies] the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional role” in light of “empirical data and national experience” such that “closer review” of the district court’s decision “may be in order[.]” Kimbrough,
The dissent’s approach conflicts not only with Kimbrough itself, but with other circuits that have addressed Kimbrough’s suggestion for “closer review” of some district court sentencing decisions. Those circuits have focused on whether the Commission developed a particular guideline “based on research and study rather than reacting to changes adopted or directed by Congress.” United States v. Grober,
Likewise, here the district court not only explained at great length why it was concerned about § 2R1.1 in general, but more importantly, explained how the guideline applied to (or rather, did not adequately account for) VandeBrake’s particular offense conduct. The crux оf the district court’s policy disagreement with § 2R1.1 was the Commission’s assumption that the level of mark-up from an antitrust violation may tend to decline with the volume of commerce involved. The district court explained why such an assumption did not apply to VandeBrake, because VandeBrake’s concrete prices did not decrease with volume. Thus, in this case, the only aspect of § 2R1.1 which is relevant when considering the guideline’s development is the volume of commerce gradations set forth therein. Even if that aspect of § 2R1.1 were the product of the Commission’s institutional strengths,
We also respectfully disagree with the dissent’s view that Kimbrough's, “closer review” language necessarily equates to de novo review, as opposed to still falling somewhere within our well-accepted post-Booker review for substantive reasonableness. The facts and circumstances involved in this case well exemplify that point. Contrary to the dissent’s view, the district court committed no procedural error when it sentenced VandeBrake. The district court properly calculated the advisory guidelines sentencing range at step one of the sentencing process, and limited consideration of its policy disagreement with the antitrust guidelines to step three of the sentencing process. See, e.g., United States v. Shannon,
In such a situation, when reviewing one final, indivisible sentencing decision which reflects a mix of the comparative institutional abilities of both the trial court and the Commission, we would follow the lead of at least one member of the Supreme Court who would still categorize Kimbrough’s closer review as falling within the “framework for evaluating ‘reasonableness.’ ” Pepper v. United States, — U.S. -,
In this case, the district court’s policy disagreement was based in large part upon case-specific circumstances, and the end result was an antitrust sentence more comparable to a fraud sentence based upon a similar amount of loss. As such, the district court’s final sentence seems eminently consistent with the very rationale used by the dissent to attack it. See Post at 1046 (“Since ‘[t]he Commission ha[d] long recognized the similarity of antitrust offenses to sophisticated frauds,’ the Commission amended § 2R1.1 to ensure ‘that penalties for antitrust offenses will be coextensive with those for sophisticated frauds sentenced under § 2B1.1.’ ”) (quoting U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 678).
In sum, we find no basis for concluding the final sentence is substantively unreasonable. The district court considered appropriate factors in varying from the guidelines, and adequately explained its sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Hill,
Ill
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
Notes
. The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa.
. For more information on the Antitrust Division’s Leniency Program, go to www.justice. gov/atr/public/criminal/leniency.htm.
. For a more extensive discussion and explanation of the three conspiracies and additional factual background involved in this case, see the district court's reported decision at United States v. VandeBrake,
. The district court considered:
VandeBrake’s income; earning capacity; financial resources; the burden on VandeBrake and his dependents; pecuniary loss inflicted on others as a result of the offense; whether restitution is ordered; the need to deprive VandeBrake of illegal gains; the expected costs of VandeBrake's imprisonment and supervised release; and the need to promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, and adequate deterrenсe.
Id. at 1011 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a)).
. Based on our conclusion that VandeBrake waived the right to challenge the district
. We are not willing to accept the dissent’s view that the district court's decision must be given "closer review,” however, because to whatever extent the volume of commerce gradations were actually based on empirical data (a point the dissent never explains), the Commission itself put so many qualifications on its assumption that it should be given little weight. See U.S.S.G. app. c. amend. 377 ("[T]he offense levels for antitrust offenses based on volume of commerce increase less rapidly than the offense levels for fraud, in part, because, on the average, the level of mark-up from an antitrust violation may tend to decline with the volume of commerce involved.”) (emphasis added).
. The three steps in the post-Booker sentencing process are: (1) "to determine the [initial] advisory guideline sentencing range,” (2) to determine "any appropriate departures [upward or downward] from the guidelines [,]” and (3) to decide whether "to vary from the advisory guideline range based on the faсtors set forth in § 3553(a), so long as such a variance is reasonable.” Shannon,
. Since VandeBrake was sentenced in 2011, I assume that the single upward variance noted in this appendix represents VandeBrake's sentence.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Early in its lengthy sentencing colloquy the district court, quoting Judge Learned Hand, states, “ ‘[A] judge ... is charged to see that the law is properly administered and it is a duty which he cannot discharge by remaining inert.’ ” United States v. VandeBrake,
As noted by the court majority, VandeBrake was charged with three price fixing and bid rigging offenses in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1. Ante at 1031. He entered guilty pleas to these antitrust crimes, which triggered the use of U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1, the antitrust guideline. At this point, however, the district court (sometimes sentencing court) concluded that this guideline was flawed because, in the court’s view, it is “overly lenient” with respect to all antitrust offenders, VandeBrake,
Apparently in an attempt to avoid a claim of procedural error,
How could this guideline substitution have happened given Congress’s and the Sentencing Commission’s concerns about substantial uniformity in preliminary sentence calculations for identical criminal conduct — into which initial calculations judges would then insert variable, relevant circumstances and characteristiсs of individual offenders and, in this way, construct equitable and reasonable individualized penal judgments? It happened, apparently, because the sentencing court interpreted the Sentencing Commission’s antitrust guideline formulations as being inadequate for use in sentencing antitrust offenders in general,
Where does a sentencing court find such unfettered authority, especially when failure to employ a Commission-designated guideline at the outset will surely result in widely varying sentences for substantially similar wrongdoers? To this inquiry, the sentencing court and court majority reply: Kimbrough v. United States,
But, no such authority can be gleaned from these cases.
The basic holding of Kimbrough (which dealt exclusively with the guidelines’ 100:1 powder/crack ratio) is that a district court has deferential discretionary authority to substantially vary from a correctly calcu
To support my contention, I briefly review the procedural requiremеnts at work in this sentencing dispute. Even though, since United States v. Booker,
Accordingly, the district court’s interpretations of the intrinsic breadth or limitations of § 2R1.1, the court’s rejection, at least in part, of that guideline for use in the sentencing of VandeBrake, and the court’s alternative interpretation, application and use of § 2B1.1 in lieu of § 2R1.1 should all have been reviewed by this court de novo. Further, if the sentencing court’s numerous erroneous acts had been so reviewed, it is my belief that they would have been summarily rejected by this court.
Concluding, for purposes of further discussion only, that the sentence calculation in this case is procedurally sound and survives de novo review, the sentencing court’s bald assumption that it has deferential discretion to substantially vary from all guidelines on policy grounds is reversible error.
Under Kimbrough analysis, you must first determine whether the applicable guideline is the product of the Sentencing Commission’s inherent expertise. Kimbrough’s result only depicts judicial analysis of a guideline that was not the product of the Commission’s institutional strengths. The guideline at issue here, on the other hand, embodies the Commission’s expertise. Thus, Kimbrough does not support the notion that the sentencing court’s policy disagreement with § 2R1.1 is entitled to deferential abuse-of-discretion review.
As a general matter, the Sentencing Commission employed an “empirical approach” to formulate its several guidelines. Kimbrough,
As stated above, Kimbrough provides an example of a guideline that was not a product of the Commission’s expertise. There, the Court found that the guidelines’ 100:1 powder/crack ratio was not based on the Commission’s empirical research; rather, the ratio was simply borrowed from the ratio Congress used to set minimum and maximum sentences in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.
In contrast to the 100:1 ratio at issue in Kimbrough, the antitrust guideline at issue here, § 2R1.1, exemplifies the Commission’s institutional strengths. The legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 994, which outlines the duties of the Commission, provides that, in crafting the guidelines,
the Commission might conclude that a category of major white collar criminals too frequently was sentenced to probation or too short a term of imprisonment because judges using the old rehabilitation theory of sentencing! ] did not believe such offenders needed to be rehabilitated and, therefore, saw no need for incarceration. The Commission might conclude that such a category of offenders should serve a term of imprisonment, or a longer term than currently served, for purposes of punishment and deterrence.
S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 177 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3360. Following Congress’s cue, the Commission’s first version of the guidelines increased the mean sentences of white-collar crimes above then-current averages to reduce the disparity between white-collar crimes and other property crimes, such as larceny. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Supplementary Report on the Initial Sentencing Guidelines & Policy Statements 18 (1987).
As with other white-collar crimes, the Commission deliberately raised the sentences for antitrust violations above preguidelines averages. The background notes accompanying § 2R1.1 state that prison terms for antitrust offenses “should be much more common, and usually somewhat longer, than typical under pre-guidelines practice.” U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1 cmt. background (2010). Indeed, the original sentencing ranges in § 2R1.1 “represented] a substantial change from [then-present] practice. [Under pre-guidelines practice], approximately 39 percent of all individuals convicted of antitrust violations [were] imprisoned” and “the average time served ... was only forty-five days.” U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1 cmt. background (1987).
While the Commission increased offense levels for fraud based on “loss” in U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, the Commission decided to use “volume of commerce” to gauge the scale and scopе, of antitrust offenses under § 2R1.1. As the Commission explained,
The offense levels [in § 2R1.1] are not based directly on the damage caused or profit made by the defendant because damages are difficult and time consuming to establish. The volume of commerce is an acceptable and more readily measurable substitute. The limited empirical data [as to pre-guidelines practice] show that fines increase with the volume of commerce and the term of imprisonment probably does as well.
U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1 cmt. background (1987).
The first significant
The base offense level for antitrust violations starts higher than the base offense level for fraud violations to reflect the serious nature of and the difficultyof detecting such violations, but the offense levels for antitrust offenses based on volume of commerce increase less rapidly than the offense levels for fraud, in part, because, on the average, the level of mark-up from an antitrust viоlation may tend to decline with the volume of commerce involved.
Id.
In 2005, the Commission again amended § 2R1.1 to raise the offense levels for antitrust violations and add additional steps to the volume of commerce table. U.S.S.G. app. C., amend. 678. The amendment was in response to Congress’s enactment of the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, which increased from three to ten years the maximum term of imprisonment for antitrust violations under 15 U.S.C. § 1. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 678. The Act’s legislative history indicates that Congress increased the maximum penalties for antitrust violations to “harmonize[ ] the treatment of criminal antitrust offenders and other white collar criminals” and to send the message to antitrust offenders that “if they are caught they will spend much more time considering the consequences of their actions within the confinement of their prison cells.” 150 Cong. Rec. H3657 (daily ed. June 2, 2004) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). The Commission noted Congress’s “concern about the inherent seriousness of antitrust offenses” and also explained that “[t]he penalties for sophisticated fraud have been increased incrementally due to a series of amendments to § 2B1.1, while no commensurate increases for antitrust offenses had occurred.” U.S.S.G. app. C., amend. 678. Since “[t]he Commission ha[d] long recognized the similarity of antitrust offenses to sophisticаted frauds,” the Commission amended § 2R1.1 to ensure “that penalties for antitrust offenses will be coextensive with those for sophisticated frauds sentenced under § 2B1.1.” Id. According to the Commission, the amendment helped “restore the historic proportionality in the treatment of antitrust offenses and sophisticated frauds.” Id.
The history of and the amendments to § 2R1.1 exemplify the Commission’s institutional strengths. Indeed, in order to craft the original version of § 2R1.1, the Commission used empirical research as its baseline and then increased antitrust sentences in the interests of “greater rationality” and to avoid “inconsistency” between white-collar crimes and other property crimes. Rita,
Cases and commentators have struggled a bit, as do I, with the reach of Kimbrough’s “closer review may be in order” language.
Reading the Supreme Court’s “closer review may be in order” language in context, and mainly applying the first of the two primary meanings of the word “may,”
Today, the court majority does not apply “closer review” or explore its contours in any detail. Instead, the court applies only the deferential standard of review articulated in Feemster and finds that the dis
Because of the sentencing court’s assault on the Sentencing Commission in this case, and by way of epilogue to this dissent, I have used the Commission’s annual source books to gather some statistics and create some tables, two of which I append to this dissenting opinion as examples. Since VandeBrake had a criminal history category of I and should have been sentenced under the current version of § 2R1.1, which became effective November 1, 2005, Table 1 depicts the mean and median sentences for antitrust offenders with a criminal history category of I between fiscal years (FYs) 2006 and 2010. During those years, the mean sentences for antitrust offenders fluctuated between 5.8 and 19.2 months, and the median sentences fluctuated between 5 and 14.5 months. Obviously, VandeBrake’s 48-month sentence is well above the five-year mean and median sentences for other antitrust offenders in the same criminal history category.
My research reveals that there were only a few hundred offenders sentenced for committing antitrust violations between FYs 1996 and 2011. The statistics also demonstrate that, over a period of 15 years, VandeBrake was the only antitrust offender sentenced above the guidelines range.
While we may no longer employ a “rigid mathematic formula that uses the percentage of a departure as the standard for determining the strength of the justifications required for a specific sentence,” Gall,
Here, VandeBrake’s 48-month sentence reflects a significant variance above his 21-to 27-month guidelines range under § 2R1.1, and his $829,715.85 fine is significantly higher than the guidelines range of $56,663.49 to $283,317.43.
The district court also explained that, if it did not vary upward, it would still issue a 48-month sentence by issuing consecutive sentences. Id. at 1013. It appears that the district court took this action to “bulletproof’ its sentence. After all, we have held that “the district court has broad statutory authority, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3584, to impose consecutive terms.” United States v. Lone Fight,
As earlier noted, the district court committed procedural error and made guideline interpretations which the court majority has not subjected to de novo review. U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1 exemplifies the Commission’s institutional strengths and a “closer review” is in order in this case because the district court varied upward based, in part, on its policy disagreement with § 2R1.1. The greatest flaw in the court majority’s opinion is its failure to apply the “closer review” contemplated in Kimbrough, and its assumption that the standard of review articulated in Feemster applies in cases such as this. VandeBrake’s sentence is the first above-guidelines antitrust sentence in fifteen years because the district court found that the rationale underlying § 2Rl.l’s volume of commerce table did not apply. Under “closer review,” I would reverse VandeBrake’s 48-month sentence and remand for resentencing. Accordingly, I dissent.
APPENDIX
Table 1: Prison Sentences for Antitrust Offenders in Criminal History Category I Between FYs 2006 and 2010
Number of Offenders Sentenced to Fiscal Year Imprisonment_ Mean Months Median Months
2006 8 5.8
2007 11 19.2
2008 10.8
2009 12 18.2 14.5
2010 8 6.6 6.5
Source: U.S.S.C. Sourcebooks at http:// www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/ arehives.cfm.
Table 2: Antitrust Primary Offense Sentencing Trends (Post-Booker)
Fiscal Year Number of Offenders Sentences Within Sentenced Guidelines Range Upward Departure OR Variance Downward Departure OR Variance
2005 (Post-Booker) 11
2006 12 12
2007 15 13
2008 24 20
2009 20 20
2010 16 13
2011 (preliminary data) 10
Total 108 14 121 93
Source: U.S.S.C. Sourcebooks at http:// www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/
. "In reviewing a challenge to a sentence, we 'must first ensure that the district court сommitted no significant procedural error.’ ” United States v. Dace,
. Specifically, the sentencing court started by calculating the "volume of commerce” attributable to VandeBrake at $5,666,348.61. VandeBrake,
. I disagree with the majority's characterization that "[t]he crux of the district court’s policy disagreement" was the Commission’s rationale regarding the level of mark-up involved in antitrust violations. Ante at 1039. Indeed, "at the outset," before ever discussing levels of mark-up, the sentencing court opined that, “in [its] view,” the antitrust guideline was "overly lenient” and categorically "deserving of less deference.” VandeBrake,
. As explained in Kimbrough, the Commission's institutional strengths include its ability to base “determinations on empirical data and national experience, guided by a professional staff with appropriate expertise.”
. To be sure, the sentencing judge's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and, if we find no procedural error, we review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence for an abuse of discretion. Dace,
. For example, the Act set a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for defendants responsible for 5 grams of crack or 500 grams of powder, respectively. Kimbrough,
. Section 2R1.1 was amended in 1989 to "eliminate minor gaps in the [volume of cornmerce] table.” U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 211.
. The majority concludes that the antitrust guideline does not exemplify the Commission's institutional strengths and, therefore, applying closer review in this case "conflicts ... with Kimbrough itself.” Ante at 1038. This conclusion is based on the court’s apparent assumption that a guideline is not the
The majority also contends that applying closer review in this case is contrary to the approach adopted by our sister circuits in United States v. Henderson,
Finally, in Kimbrough the Court held that, because the 100:1 ratio and its "disproportionately harsh sanctions” did not exemplify the Commission’s institutional strengths, district courts could vary downward on that basis without abusing their discretion.
. The Third Circuit has held that, to the extent a district court's sentence is based on a policy disagreement with the guidelines, "such a disagreement is permissible only if a [district [c]ourt provides sufficiently compel
Finally, Third Circuit Judge D. Michael Fisher, in his article Stitt in Balance? Federal District Court Discretion and Appellate Review Six Years after Booker, commented:
The Supreme Court has actually provided further guidance in Gall and Kimbrough in the form of a heightened review. The courts of appeals should remember that these statements are valuable tools for defining the scope of substantive reasonableness, not hindrances to effective appellate review. By employing the heightened review imagined in Gall and Kimbrough, the courts of appeals can characterize "reasonableness” as a continuum, rather than a single point. Consequently, courts may shift to a closer form of reasonableness review when a particular sentence calls for it and to more deferential review when it does not. This tactic will be particularly useful in cаses where district courts attempt to push the bounds of their discretion by imposing sentences well outside the advisory [gjuideline range, or where they try to shoehorn a new policy objection into the Kimbrough framework. By recognizing that a particular sentence may be subject to much closer scrutiny, district court judges will be encouraged to consider all of the relevant factors when making a sentencing determination, rather than imposing sentences that increase disparity.
49 Duq. L.Rev. 641, 672 (2011) (emphasis added).
. The term "may” has two primary meanings. First, "may” is used to denote permission or discretion. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1068 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "may” as "[t]o be permitted to”). Second, "may” could be used to refer to a possibility. See id. When used in this manner, however, "may” should be distinguished from "might”— "may” expresses likelihood whereas "might” expresses a stronger sense of doubt. Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Modem Amencan Usage 529 (3d ed. 2009).
. The preliminary data for FY 2011 indicates that one antitrust offender was sentenced above the guidelines via an upward variance. Since VandeBrake was sentenced during FY 2011, I presume the lone above-guidelines sentence reported in 2011 is VandeBrake's sentence.
. According to the Department of Justice's website, VandeBrake's 48-month sentence for antitrust violations "tied the record for the longest jail sentence ever imposed on a defendant solely convicted of violating the antitrust laws.” Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division Update, Spring 2011, available at http://www. justice.gov/atr/public/division-update/2011/ criminal-program.html. It appears that the other 48-month sentence was issued in United States v. Baci, 3:08-cr-00350-TJC-TEM (M.D.Fla.2008). In Baci, the government charged an executive of a Florida shipping corporation with rigging bids and fixing prices in the shipping industry over a six-year period, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1. Plea Agreement 2-5, ECF No. 18. Baci pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and conceded that the volume of commerce affected by his criminal conduct totaled over $1 billion. Id. at 7. The district court calculated Baci's guidelines range at 87 to 108 months and, based on Baci’s substantial assistance, granted the government's U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 motion for a downward departure. Sentencing Tr. 8, 84, ECF No. 38. Ultimately, Baci was sentenced to 48 months' imprisonment and a $20,000 fine which, at the time, represented the longest jail term ever imposed for a single antitrust violation. Judgment 2-4, ECF No.
. U.S.S.G. § 2Rl.l(c) provides that, "[f]or an individual, the guideline fine range shall be from one to five percent of the volume of commerce, but not less than $20,000.”
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I concur in the general reasoning and the conclusion of Judge Bye’s opinion. I write separately to disassociate myself from the district court’s comments about economic success and status, race, heritage, and religion. I consider those comments inappropriate and not a proper reason for supporting any sentence.
