United States v. Van Winkle, 113 F. 903

United States v. Van Winkle

113 F. 903 | 9th Cir. | 1902

GILBERT, Circuit Judge,

after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

We are precluded from considering the interesting and important question principally discussed in the brief of the plaintiff in error, whether the circuit court erred in the instructions given and refused to the jury concerning the meaning of the words “mineral lands,” as used in the statute of June 3, 1878, for the reason that it appears from the record that no exception was taken to the instructions so given or refused. There remain, therefore, for our consideration, only the rulings of the court in admitting certain documentary evidence, and in denying the request of the plaintiff in error for peremptory instruction to the jury to find a verdict in its favor. The defendant in error, to support his defense, offered in evidence a geological map of Boise Basin, in which were located the lands from which the timber was cut, the map having been issued by the authority of the department of the interior as “Part III., P. 1, XCVL, 16th Annual Report of the Director of Geological Survey.” It was admitted in evidence, over the objection of the plaintiff in error, that it was incompetent and hearsay. The map was identified, and shown to be substantially correct, so far as it represented the location of mines thereon. It was used in connection with the evidence of several witnesses. We think it was admissible for that purpose, as well as for the purpose of showing the general nature of the land described in the complaint, its elevation and surroundings, and its situation with relation to lands which were proven to be mineral. It does not in any way purport to show the nature of the precise land in controversy, or to indicate that it was mineral land. We are unable to perceive how its admission in evidence could have been harmful or prejudicial to the plaintiff in error.

*905Error is assigned to the admission of the certified copy made by the surveyor general of Idaho of the “General Description of the Survey” of the township in which the lands are situated. The general description so admitted in evidence contains no reference to the particular land which is the subject of the suit. It refers in general terms to the township in which the land is situated, states that it is mountainous, etc., and that there has been a great deal of placer mining 'done along Grimes creek, and expresses the opinion that undeveloped quartz ledges exist in the ridges. We are inclined to the opinion that in an action such as this, where the nature of the land in controversy was a question in issue involved, reference might properly be had to the records of the land office as prima facie evidence, at least, of their character ; but, in any view of this particular evidence, the plaintiff in error could not have been Dj tired by its admission.

Nor was the plaintiff in error entitled to a peremptory instruction to the jury to find a verdict as requested. The request was that the court direct a verdict for the plaintiff for the full amount prayed for in the complaint, upon the ground that it bad been proven that the lands were public lands, and that the defendant had not only entered and cut timber of the quantity and value manufactured, as charged in the complaint, but that he had done so without authority from the plaintiff in error, and without effort or attempt to comply with the rules and regulations of the secretary of the interior governing the cutting of timber from the public lands. This instruction, as asked for, ignores the right of the jury to take into consideration the question of the good faith of the defendant in error in cutting the timber as he did upon the public lands. There was evidence that in cutting the timber he acted under what he believed to be the lawful authority of the United States. Such being the case, it was the province of the jury to determine whether his action was in good faith, and to measure the damages accordingly. If he acted in good faith, the law required the verdict of the jury to be for the value of the timber as cut, and not as manufactured. Geatry v. U. S., 41 C. C. A. 185, 101 Fed. 51. In the charge which was given by the court, the jury was instructed that in fact the defendant had not complied with the rules and regulations of the secretary of the interior concerning the cutting of timber upon government lands. From the amount of the verdict, which was $35, it is evident that the jury found that the timber was cut in good faith.

Wc find no error for which the judgment should be reversed. It is accordingly affirmed.