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United States v. Urrieta
520 F.3d 569
6th Cir.
2008
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Docket

*1 particularly puzzling this is that Making adopted opposite pre- rule —a

we have

sumption against vesting context —in employment agreements that are not

collectively bargained. Sprague See v. Corp., Motors

Gen. banc)

Cir.1998) (en (“To vest benefits is

render them forever unalterable. Because

vesting plan welfare is not benefits re- law,

quired employer’s an commitment

to vest benefits is not to be such inferred

lightly; intent vest be must found plan documents and must stated in be (internal express language.”)

clear and omitted).

quotation might marks One thought apply that we would or, settings in both we

same rule if were to scales, just

put thumb on one of the we only employee

would do where the so did negotiating

not have the benefit of a union

the contract. inference, point that the salient as shows,

this has pre- case well become a

sumption. say And we should either doing

is what we are spare future —and

panels, litigants the district courts and

confusion the inference has created —or altogether.

abandon the inference America,

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff-Appellee, URRIETA,

Jose Eduardo Defendant-

Appellant.

No. 07-5431. Appeals,

United States Court of

Sixth Circuit.

Argued: Jan. 2008.

Decided Filed: March 2008. *2 Holley,

ARGUED: Michael C. Federal Nashville, Office, Public Defender’s Ten- nessee, D. Appellant. Courtney for Trombly, ASSISTANT UNITED ATTORNEY, Nashville, STATES Tennes- see, BRIEF: Michael Appellee. for ON Small, Holley, Ronald Federal Pub- C. C. Office, Nashville, lic Defender’s Tennes- Hannafan, see, Appellant. for Brent A. Attorney, Assistant United States Nash- ville, Tennessee, Appellee. GUY, GILMAN, Before: McKEAGUE, Judges. Circuit J., GILMAN, opinion delivered the court, J., GUY, joined. in which J., McKEAGUE, 579-84), (pp. delivered a dissenting opinion. separate OPINION GILMAN, LEE RONALD Circuit Judge. appeals

Jose Eduardo Urrieta the dis- sup- trict court’s denial of his motion to press During evidence. routine traffic Lee detained stop, Sheriff reasonably beyond the time neces- citation, sary primarily because issue mistakenly the officer believed that Urrie- ta was not allowed to drive Tennessee with a Mexican driver’s license. that, during Young claims the course stop, the traffic he became suspicious that the vehicles fully packed, the Urrieta was transporting drugs. Eventu- deputy asked Urrieta: moving?” ‘Y’all ally gave Deputy Young written responded that he was moving consent to search his deputy vehicle. The from California and going to Atlanta. *3 discovered drugs, no but found three hand- Over the course of the stop, however, Ur- guns and several fraudulent identification eventually rieta explained that his ultimate Finding cards. Deputy that Young had a destination was Beach, West Palm Florida. to extend the deten- Deputy Young noted that Urrieta was and tion that Urrieta’s consent was volun- smiling and friendly, but that pas- the two tary, district denied Urrieta’s sengers in the car did not eye make con- suppress. motion to For the reasons set with him tact appeared and nervous. The below, forth we judgment REVERSE the officer also noticed that Montes was wear- of the district court. ing a waitress’s shirt. Urrieta produced a Mexican driver’s li- I. BACKGROUND cense and temporary registration papers background

A. Factual from California for the Navigator. The August 2006, Urrieta, On girl- Navigator registered was Montes, to but Maria Montes, friend Ramirez registration and her had expired February in sixteen-year-old traveling son were six east- months earlier. Urrieta then on produced bound 24 in Interstate Tennessee. Ur- paperwork additional showing was driving rieta a 1998 Lincoln Navigator registered Honda was in his an expired with temporary registration name. tag Deputy Young told Urrieta that he was towing and a 1987 Honda sedan could not drive in Tennessee using a Mexi- means of a hоmemade towbar. Both can driver’s vehi- license unless he had a valid fully packed. cles passport, At approximately asked Urrieta if he “legally p.m., ‍​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‍1:45 Deputy Young, an country,” officer in the with and him instructed to the Rutherford County search Interstate his fully packed Crime car to find his Unit, Enforcement passport. on stationed Inter- 24. state Deputy Young was trained in At approximately p.m., 1:53 Deputy using drug-sniffing dogs, interdiction, in Young to returned his vehicle and called in using and highway traffic stops as a El (EPIC) Paso Intelligence Center means to ferret out secondary concealed determine if Urrieta was in legally day crime. On the question, a trained country. provides information EPIC on drug-sniffing dog was in Deputy Young’s licenses, drivers’ registrations, car patrol car. Deputy Young witnessed Ur- whether an individual has the bor- crossed

rieta’s car “swerving” lanes, between de- der at a checkpoint, was deported, or is it, cided to follow notiсed under federal investigation. 2:04 p.m., At Navigator did not registration have valid reported EPIC Deputy Young that sticker and that taillights on the Hon- there was no information in system on da basis, were not working. On that Dep- Urrieta, Montes, or their vehicles. The uty Young pulled Urrieta over to the side lack of suggested information that Urrieta of the road. and Montes not had entered the

The entire stop captured traffic on legally, but confirmed also had Deputy video. Young approached Urrie- not been previously deported. This sig- ta’s car at p.m. 1:49 requested to see nificant illegal reentry because after de- Urrieta’s driver’s Upon license. noticing portation only is the immigration violation “sure,” at which responded car. Urrieta authority to had Young a con- handed Urrieta Young point

enforce. gave form him that the and told form sent Dep- report, the EPIC waiting While search the permission law enforcement citation for Ur- wrote uty Young then Young illegal items. car for committed rieta, that Urrieta noting and to the form to read over told Urrieta violation, taillight a lane offenses: three he wanted Urrieta it, stating that sign violation. registration violation, and form The consent doing.” I’m “know what backup from called for then and stated Spanish English and inwas officers, wanted to stating he other promises, that no further state “I part: the vehicles. search coercion threats, force, or mental physical *4 Young returned to Deputy p.m., At 2:07 have been used any kind whatsoever of of a series him and asked ear Urrieta’s to consent the get me to me to against his im- about questions approximately sign or to this described above search job, status, plans, and moving migration form.” Young did not Deputy history. criminal scene and at the officer arrived Another his driv- or return a citation issue Urrieta speak with over to Young walkеd Deputy Deputy response to In license. er’s approached then two officers him. The evasive Urrieta was Young’s questions, to began and, new officer car and the into the Urrieta’s he came about Deputy Young while change Montes began question to his according Young, to filled out had stat- Urrieta. Urrieta spoke with plans. his Urrieta travel story about Mexico, form, for gave consent back” “going consent that he ed only the Honda. only for in to search stay Atlanta the officer planned that he time, finally to Urrieta explained then then and period of a short Navigator Florida. going to to search he was he wanted that explained put worked him “to ’98 girlfriend too, just that his instructed also stated and He complied En- speak did not Urrieta Wendy’s, she on there.” Navigator’ steady did not have that he and amended Young’s and instructions glish, with “98 Nav.” At notation work. include the form to Depu- stop, an into p.m., half hour 2:19 if Urritea Young asked When began to the other officer Young and ty passport, said had a Urrieta girlfriend uncov- Navigator. The search search the Although Urrieta did not know. that he fraudulent and several firearms ered three a tourist that he had asserted originally passport cards. identification questioning further visa, upon he admitted by police in vehicle was discovered only passport. had he subsequent in a search. his crimi- asked Young then Urrieta he history, and Urrieta said nal background B. Procedural having any ille- denied also none. Urrieta car. In in guns loaded gal drugs 2006, grand jury a federal August of In however, questioning, to further response against indictment a two-count returned did not Young that he told Urrieta posses- being an alien for had “ever” been if sure there know for firearms, 18 U.S.C. in violation of of sion car, did not he but stated that drugs in the of possession §§ 922(g) “think so.” documents, in viola- identification unlawful 1028(a)(6). § U.S.C. tion of 18 p.m., Deputy 2:13

At approximately firearms, docu- suppress moved if he could search his Young asked Urrieta ments, and several incriminating perstein, state- 1224-25 Cir. 1983) ments. The district granted Urrie- (stating that the first question in a suppress ta’s motion to certain of the Fourth Amendment analysis is whether statements, but it seized). denied motion to the party was A seizure is unlaw suppress the evidence officer, obtained ful if an without a suspi (1) search after finding cion, “by means of physical force or show had a to detain authority Urrie- ... way some restraints] (2) ta p.m., after 2:07 Urrieta volun- the liberty of a Ohio, citizen.” Terry v. tarily consented to the search. U.S. n. 88 S.Ct.

entered a plea guilty (1968). conditional in Feb- L.Ed.2d 889 ruary of 2007 that preserved right parties in the present case do not appeal suppression ruling. The court dispute that Urrieta was “seized” during then year sentenced Urrieta to one and the entire encounter. We therefore turn day one in prison, follоwed years two question to the of whether Deputy Young supervised release. This timely appeal fol- had a reasonable suspicion to extend the lowed. stop.

II. ANALYSIS suspicion 2. Reasonable of criminal activity A. Standard of review A law enforcement may officer We a district review court’s decision on permissibly conduct an investigatory stop a motion suppress evidence under two when he or she has “a particularized and “complementary standards.” United objective” suspicion that activity criminal Miller, (6th 265, States v. 314 F.3d 267 is afoot. Cortez, United States v. 449 U.S. Cir.2002). The district court’s factual find- 411, 417-18, 690, 101 S.Ct. 66 L.Ed.2d 621 ings will be upheld unless are clearly (1981). To standard, meet this the govern erroneous, its legal but conclusions are ment point must “specific and articula- reviewed de novo. United States v. facts, ble together taken with ration Combs, 925, (6th Cir.2004). 369 F.3d 937 al facts,” inferences from reasonably those A factual finding is clearly erroneоus suggest than criminal activity has occurred when, reviewing after evidence, the entire or imminent. is 21, 392 Terry, U.S. at 88 we are left with the definite and firm S.Ct. An 1868. officer must not act on an conviction that mistake has been commit- unparticularized “inchoate and suspicion or ted. United Navarro-Camacho, States v. ‘hunch,’ but specific [on] 701, (6th Cir.1999) (citations 186 F.3d 705 from inferences which he is entitled to omitted). draw from the light facts in experi of his ence.” Id. at 67 S.Ct. 13. Courts B. The Fourth Amendment and the determine whether a suspicion reasonable-suspicion standard exists by looking at the “totality of the I. Seizure circumstances” and considering “all of the information available law enforcement The Fourth is Amendment violated officials time.” Aey, Feathers v. 319 when an individual is unlawfully seized. (6th Cir.2003). F.3d 848-49 Bostick, Florida v. 429, 434, 111 (1991) S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (holding parties The in the present case do not that the Fourth by Amendment is dispute violated that the initial traffic stop seizure); an unlawful United States v. whether, Sa vаlid. At issue is at the conclu- de- extended nally argued that p.m., Deputy- at 2:07 stop traffic sion of that grounds on justified tention was nonimmigration- a reasonable Young invalid license driver’s his Mexican investi- continued for the related to sus- had reason that of Urrieta. gatory detention an undocumented that Urrieta pect any longer a motorist detain To withdrew government immigrant. issue necessary to reasonably than however, conceding after arguments, these a rea citation, must have an officer traffic Tenn. law. See they misstated ‍​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‍that has individual sonable 55-50-304(4) (providing §Ann. Code con criminal more extensive engaged may or any state a resident Townsend, 305 v. States United duct. with in Tennessee vehicle a motor operate Cir.2002) (6th (finding 537, F.3d home person’s issued license a valid suspicion of a reasonable lacked police §Ann. 40- country); Tenn.Code or state investigato an continue activity to criminal 7-103(a)(l) conduct (allowing officers stop was com traffic after the ry detention viola- immigration arrests warrantless has determined This Court pleted). continuing viola- only for felonies tions stop purpose “[o]nce arrests tions, warrantless prohibiting thus further cannot be a motorist completed, entry an such as for misdemeanors something that occurred unless detained presence in the not committed that was to have the officer stop caused during the Ash, officer); 12 S.W.3d v. State and articulable a reasonable (finding that the (Tenn.Crim.App.1999) United activity was afoot.” criminal arrests for may conduct warrantless police Hill, Cir. only if the misdemeanor misdemeanors a rea 1999) officer had that the (finding an offi- *6 presence the committed in was activity, criminal suspicion of sonable § 1325 law); see also U.S.C. of the cer in detain a motorist him to allowed entry into the (establishing improper that a dog to conduct drug-dеtection for a order a inspection is by avoiding United States search). sniff 103(a)(10) and misdemeanor); §§ 8 U.S.C. Young Deputy argument Urrieta’s local law enforce- (stating that 1357(g) § the to suspicion extend reasonable lacked a completed vi- cannot enforce officers ment is two-fold. detention scope Urrieta’s (i.e., illegal immigration civil law olations imper- asserts He first to specifically unless authorized presence) beyond scope the missibly detained him spe- under Attorney General so the do deputy’s the mistak- stop due the traffic to in applicable not are conditions that cial (i.e., that Ur- understanding of law the en case). present not license was driver’s rieta’s Mexican and that Urrieta passport valid without de extended justify To Urrieta’s in passport order produce had to then, point to government must tention Tennessee). fur- in legally drive Deputy demonstrating that facts spеcific that, at the time the argues ther that Ur suspicion had a reasonable (2:07 completed have been stop should nonimmigra engaged some was rieta Young lacked a reasonable p.m.), govern activity. The tion-related activity any criminal other suspicion that, the traffic at the time contends ment afoot, remainder of so that was effectuated, Young had was stop Fourth Amendment. violated the stop that Urrie a reasonable acquired was distinct drugs that transporting to ta was response to Urrieta’s motion In its understanding mistaken the officer’s evidence, origi- from government suppress relating right of the law to Urrieta’s passengers appeared nervous, he was trav- drive Tennessee. eling drug-source state, from a and the Navigator and the Honda had different Deputy Young’s testimony actions, (5) values, Urrieta had been dishonest however, governments’s belie the assertion immigration status, (6) аbout his Ur- that he had a nonimmigration-related rea- rieta could not find passport. son for Urrieta’s continued detention. The deputy’s testimony at the suppression factors, Based on these the district court hearing made clear that he conducted the that “a determined concern about [Urrie- stop under entire mistaken belief that general ta’s] dishonesty” and the need to Urrieta’s Mexican driver’s license in- was “if something determine else going was on belief, valid. Based on this Dep- mistaken in the car other than ... traveling (1) uty Young incorrectly informed Urrieta Atlanta” provided a (Deputy that he Young) required was to to extend Urrieta’s beyond detention inquire status, into immigration Urrieta’s traffic stop. respectfully We disagree. (2) told Urrieta that produce he had to government Although it suspi- finds Tennessee, to drive passport legally and cious that Urrieta’s cars “fully (3) ordered Urrieta to search his fully packed” and that he towing another packed car passport. for his car, puzzled we why are as to either of Young’s actions strongly suggest that his these suggests factors that Urrieta was mistaken understanding of the law transporting drugs. Towing a second car true reason that he detained Urrieta be- while traveling with girlfriend one’s yond p.m. 2:07 day on in question. her fully son in packed automobiles seems proof Further that Deputy Young lacked far more consistent with moving very —the that Urrieta explanation gave for his involved in a drug-related crime trip can be drug with running. Because —than found in Young’s decision not these two wholly factors are innocent and use trained drug-sniffing dog that was more in line with explanation sitting patrol in his car during the course trip than with the deputy’s assertion stop. entire If Deputy Young had courier, Urrieta was a suspected drug-related crime, Urrieta of a should be any entitled to little if weight in *7 logical the most thing for the to deputy the reasonable-suspicion calculation. have done would been to have use the Other factors cited government— the dog trained to confirm his suspicions. that Urrieta had a Mexican li- driver’s Deputy Young’s to strongly failure do so cense, unable passport, was to find his and suggests that he did not have a reasonable expired had an registration largely —-are suspicion that Urrieta was transporting irrelevant to the determination of whether drugs. Deputy Young had a suspicion reasonable government, however,

The argues that a drug Urrieta was courier. As men- the following above, factors demonstrate government tioned the now con- Deputy Young had a suspicion reasonable cedes may legally that noncitizens drive on that Urrieta was in drug involved a crime: roads with a foreign Tennessee driver’s (1) cars fully packed were and he license and without a And passport. even (2) towing car, was a second Urrieta a if Urrieta’s Mexican driver’s license and (3) license, Mexican driver’s the Navigator produce his to passport failure his might (4) expired registration had an tag, provided have a suspicion reasonable to fit profile the of a drug courier because believe that an immigration violation had may be that Ur- officer’s suggests

occurred, factor neither fac include characteristics on based drugs. transporting rieta was as the long so profile, a from tors that Urrieta asserts also The dissent United by other evidence. accompanied a driver’s having valid lying was 8-11, Sokolow, 490 U.S. v. States But neither passport. and license (1989) (relying 104 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. produced have government the Young nor profile drug-courier in a on factors was either document any evidence pro in a factors contained noting that the in fact admitted at invalid. evidentiary independent may file looked аt hearing that he suppression the in the be considered weight and should license of Urrieta’s date expiration circum totality of the context suggested anything that not remember did be stances). should hesitate But courts un- was although And a problem. drug couri on the too much “rely[ing] fore fully in his passport to locate able it lists behavior profile er because Young demanded car packed legal activi perfectly can be attributed road, record shows side of it on the States ties, illicit ones.” United as as well discover- was later passport that Urrieta’s Dol Eighty-Two Fifty-Three Thousand v. expired Finally, Urrieta’s car. ed 245, 249 F.2d Currency, 985 lars U.S. unrepresenta- equally registration car v. (6th Cir.1993); see also United lapsed A activity. tive of additional 1221, 1227-29 F.2d Saperstein, for may reason tag be valid registration Cir.1983) of charac the use (questioning more, not, a valid without it is stop, but profile to drug-courier from the teristics drug crime is that a suspect reason suspicion). a reasonable establish underway. factors relies on three government that a further asserts The government consis- Young asserted that Deputy be- was established (1) Ur- drug-courier profile: tent with training and with his Young, cause (a traveling from California rieta suggesting factors identified experience, (2) Atlanta, drugs) to couri- source state profile fit the that Urrieta ner- appeared car be in the profiles, passengers how- drug-courier er. Standard (3) Navigator vous, value ever, because highly problematic are than greater category driving very large that Urrieta was often “describe towing. travelers, that he was who would the Honda the value of innocent presumably in turn. virtually random seizures each address factor We subject be that as little to conclude Court were the fact First, cites government justify a profile] could [as foundation California, a traveling from U.S. Georgia, Reid seizure.” state, As to Atlanta. this drug-source *8 (1980); 2752, 890 65 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 100 noted, however, between travel court has Millan, 912 v. F.2d States see also United weak indi- relativity a centers population is Cir.1990) (8th (holding that the 1014, 1018 there is activity because cator of not es- by itself profile does drug-courier country could not in city the almost no suspicion); tablish reasonable articulable a major nar- a as either “charaeterize[d] be F.2d Carrasquillo, 877 v. United States city through a center or cotics distribution (same). (D.C.Cir.1989) 76 way to a pass on drug their couriers center.” narcotics distribution major say that factors is not to This Andrews, F.2d v. States by Dep United cited drug-courier profile from the (6th Cir.1979); also United see An weight. to no uty are entitled Young Townsend, 305 F.3d entirely Cir. is consistent with innocent behav- 2002) (holding trip that a Chicago, travelers, between among ior that, and holding Columbus, give Illinois does not Ohio without additional of wrongdoing, evidence to a reasonable rise nervousness is entitled to weight). no drugs); Saper traveler is transporting In present case, there is a clear stein, 723 F.2d at (holding that travel nondrug-related why reason pas- Urrieta’s from a city source is such innocent sengers were Deputy nervous. Young ad- that it weight behavior to little entitled mits that he suspected Urrieta and his analysis). Fourth Amendment girlfriend were in country illegally, populous is the most California state that he asked immigration-relat- numerous country, being the home of more than questions, ed and that he demanded to see people. 35 million Travel between Califor- passport. Urrieta’s immigration-re- The major nia and population Atlan- hub of lated focus of Young’s questioning ta, therefore, any does not significant easily add explains the nervous behavior of Ur- weight Young’s suspicion that girlfriend rieta’s sixteen-year-old her engaged Urrieta was in transporting son. Deputy Young acknowledged as drugs. although And the dissent notes much when he testified that often when that Urrieta’s travel between California “dealing Hispanics, with a lot of they time “relatively and Tennessee was of a quick ... are scared of police.” Under these duration,” we are as to why circumstances, unclear travel- the nervousness of Urrie- ing without interim stops sightseeing passengers ta’s a virtually nonexistent or other diversions is an drug indication of indicator of drug activity. activity. One would hardly expect a lei- government The suggests also that a surely pace of travel three people working-class family driving a Navigator moving are across fully in two towing while a less expensive suspi- car is cars,

packed towing one the other. cious. It *9 hide”); Andrews, 600 (refusing F.2d at 566 stop August of 2006. There is no to consider nervousness in the reasonable- why two working-class reason Mexican cit- calculation suspicion because nervousness izens could not afford such a vehicle. stretches immigration violation than an inherently sus- nothing Likewise, there far. much too Amendment Fourth vehicle on a driving a newer about picious an older towing trip while cross-country testimony at the Young’s Deputy car. con further hearing provides suppression relying imper on an that he was firmation that al- argues government Finally, Urrieta, as missible, that hunch ill-defined factors profile-related the above though immigrant undocumented presumptively a sup- of themselves may not in and Mexico, transporting be likely was from detention, they continued Urrieta’s ported prohibits Amendment The Fourth drugs. a Young with provided and un an “inchoate based on detention for further to detain ” ‘hunch,’ suspicion or particularized in the context considered questioning pro law enforcement requires instead immigra- dishonesty about of facts” show and articulable “specific vide govern- heart of the At the status. tion Terry v. crime has occurred. ing that a that Ur- assertion argument is the ment’s 21, 27, 30, Ohio, 88 S.Ct. engaged drug have been might rieta (1968). Yet 20 L.Ed.2d lied to he running because hearing that suppression at the explained Or, country. in the legal status “up was to some knew that Urrieta he it, “gen- put Urrieta’s the district as way “when I same as thing” illegal sta- immigration dishonesty” about his eral my I look at little in the walk house Young with a reason- provided tus he has done some boy, I know whether “something that else” able district court dis thing wrong.” The car. on in Urrieta’s going as irrelevant missed the officer’s statement calculation. reasonable-suspicion to the however, many as million In as however, we find contrary, To the legal lacked in the United people revealing as quite to be Young’s statement status, million whom 6.2 immigration “hunch,” a very definition Hispanic Pew Mexico. See from a suggests that he lacked reason strongly Center, Characteristics of The Size and drug Urrieta was able Population in Migrant Unauthorized The 88 S.Ct. 1868. courier. See id. at (March 7, 2006), available U.S., at simply does not allow Fourth Amendment http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf. “gut an officer’s feel based on detention statements to Although false evasive good. See suspect up that a to no ing” might officer indicate law enforcement 21, 27, 30, S.Ct. 1868. id. at activity, see United States v. criminal F.2d $67,220.00 Currency, 957 in U.S. implies that government The also (6th Cir.1992), very fact is that few justi p.m. after 2:07 detaining Urrieta likely to immigrants are ad undocumented the extended detention fied because are in enforcement dis reasonably respectfully mit to law We brief. Amendment, rea government’s illegally. the Fourth agree. Under long immi dishonesty about one’s is too soning that the briefest of detentions even running, suspicion of suggests police status if the lack a reasonable gration mil allowing activity. See United therefore, opens specific the door criminal Townsend, 537, 541, 545 immigrants to be States v. lions of undocumеnted Cir.2002) (holding on detain questioning further detained reasonably than is any longer motorist illegal presence To hold one’s basis. citation, an a traffic necessary to issue anything county sign is a more in this *10 McKEAGUE, officer must have reasonable Circuit Judge, dissenting. engaged the individual has in more disagree Because I with the majority’s conduct). extensive criminal In other conclusion that the brief detention at issue words, get law enforcement does not a free here violated Urrieta’s Fourth Amendment pass to extend lawful detention into an rights, I respectfully dissent. simply unlawful one because the unlawful

extension was brief. A. Suspicion Reasonable To Detain analytical The framework assessing Chief Justice Earl Warren once wrote an investigative detention under Terry v. the “demand for specificity in the Ohio, 1, 1868, 392 U.S. 88 S.Ct. 20 L.Ed.2d upon police information which action is (1968), is a analysis two-part of the predicated is the central tеaching of this reasonableness of the stop. See United Court’s Fourth Amendment jurispru- Caruthers, States v. 458 F.3d Terry, dence.” 392 U.S. at n. Cir.2006). The question first is “whether S.Ct. 1868. The factors relied on there was a proper basis for stop, present case are simply vague too judged which is by examining whether the nonspecific support suspi- law enforcement officials were aware of drug running. reason, cion of For that we specific and articulable facts which gave uphold cannot the district highly ‍​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‍court’s rise to reasonable suspicion.” Id. If the nonspecific finding that the extended de- detention is proper, question the second is justified tention was because “something “whether the degree of ... intrusion illegal might else” going been on in reasonably in scope related to the situation Urrieta’s car. Although we do not relish hand, judged by is examining the consequence of allowing person pos- reasonableness the offiсials’ giv- conduct sessing free, prohibited go items to we find en their suspicions and the surrounding unpalatable even more thought put- circumstances.” Id. This court has ex- ting stamp our of approval practice on the plained that: unlawfully extending the detention of Although the standard of review on the traffic violators based on nothing more ultimate reasonable inquiry is than an inchoate hunch. novo, de the district court at an insti-

tutional advantage, having observed the testimony of the witnesses and under- III. CONCLUSION conditions, standing local in making this Because we conclude that the extended Accordingly, determination. “due detention violated Urrieta’s Fourth weight” given should be to the infer- rights, Amendment we have no need to ences drawn from the facts “resident address the district finding court’s judges.” Urrieta’s later consent to the search was Townsend, United States v. 305 F.3d voluntary. judgment of the district (6th Cir.2002) (quoting Ornelas REVERSED, and all evidence States, 690, 698, United 116 S.Ct. acquirеd after p.m. 2:07 must be sup- (1996)). 1657, 134L.Ed.2d 911 pressed poisonous as the “fruit[] Specific 1. and articulable facts for Hill, tree.” United States v. (6th Cir.1999). This case is RE- MANDED to the district court for further Despite majority’s suggestion to the proceedings opinion. consistent with this contrary, the facts in the present case that

580 Urrieta, existed to here reasonable suspicion existed reasonable

support v. any that were event. See Whren following facts detain him the included States, 806, 813, Young when he finished S.Ct. United to known (1) (1996) the with EPIC: p.m. (“foreclos[ing] call at 2:04 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (both and the Hon- Navigator rea- vehicles that the constitutional any argument “fully” packed with be- pulled) da it were stops depends on sonableness of (2) did not seem the defendant longings; the individual actual officers motivations was way the Honda to care about involved”). he utilized a homemade (e.g., being towed Deputy Young’s largely ignores Urrieta (3) a towbar); Navigator had six- dishonesty support as reliance on Urrieta’s (4) was a there registration; old month Yet, suspicion. the results for reasonable Navigator in value between disparity suggested check of the EPIC Honda, Navigator was a and the and pass lying having specifically was (5) vehicle; the defen- relatively expensive country legally, and the port, being passport to find was unable dant validity of his Mexican driver’s license. the car he passport for the he looked awareness that the defendant An officer’s car he driv- was towing instead an being dishonest should lying raise (7) nervous; (6) were ing; passengers v. suspicion. officer’s See United States traveling drug from defendant 840, 848-49 Cir. Atchley, 474 F.3d state to a distribution source state 2007) nervous demeanor (finding lying and (8) Atlanta); the intend- (i.e., California tip an combined with informant’s relatively trip was ed duration of the enough justify suspicion). reasonable (9) of the EPIC the results

quick; otherwise, police suggest is to ask To lying about defendant was suggested check eye to what he or officer to turn a blind country being in the passport, having during the traffic stop. she learns validity of his Mexican legally, and the Cf. Erwin, v. United States license. driver’s (“To (6th Cir.1998) simply have sent Erwin the “total- facts under Considering these question without brief further way, on his test, Deputy Young ity of circumstances” least, very would been ing have for the brief de- had unreasonable, inept, police even plainly Ellis, v. States tention. See United work.”). (6th Cir.2007) (holding F.3d 613-14 on a suspicion existed based acknowledge Deputy Young I had While factors). Which is to of six combination authority to arrest no Montes may these not say, any one of facts while nei- immigration for an violation because own, suspicion on its amount to reasonable had reentered the ther them important- they do. More together taken call indi- illegally, EPIC nonetheless analy- ly, totality of the circumstances “M Young. Urrieta lied to cated that disсounting certain prohibits sis us from Therefore, I believe because, merely separately, factors explore untruths ask- entitled those expla- ‘an innocent potentially could questions. additional ing Urrieta some ” (quoting at 614 United nation.’ Id. immediately upon questioning, 266, 267, Almost Arvizu, U.S. (2002)). appropriately gave answers More- 151 L.Ed.2d 740 S.Ct. Young’s suspicions. increased over, irrespective whether First, Urrieta became evasive about understanding of the Young’s “mistaken country, changing the he came into the he detained law was the true reason” that question. that criminal subject upon Deputy Young’s activity might be afoot. In Second, began change story he particular, Deputy Young specialized *12 plans eventually travel ex- about his knowledge that drug dealers often hire that he plained instead of Atlanta illegal aliens' to engage illegal activities Beach, going to West Palm Florida. (e.g., transporting drugs) and providе Third, despite telling Deputy Young that a them car as a bargaining chip. girlfriend he had dated his for two to three Deputy Young’s observations that years traveling great and was distance “fully vehicles were packed” and that the her, with he was unable to confirm wheth- towing defendant was another vehicle also passport er she had a or if she was in the contributed to Deputy Young’s reasonable country legally. inconsistency This led suspicion, if, even as argues, defendant Deputy Young suspect that might these facts were family consistent with a not have known each other and were moving. The Supreme squarely Court placed together purpose for the sole of rejected an analogous argument from a Fourth, transporting drugs. upon being respondent that “the suggested facts record, asked about his arrest ad- family in a minivan holiday on a outing.” being mitted to not having arrested for his Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 122 S.Ct. 744. yet, identification and hе was unable to Supreme Court found that deter- “[a] Fifth, passport during stop. find his this exists, mination that suspicion reasonable explained he did not that however, need possibility not rule out the steady girlfriend work and that his worked of innocent conduct.” Id. It further ex- Wendy’s increased plained that while “each of these factors Young’s suspicions that it would be diffi- susceptible alone is of explana- innocent cult for such a couple Navigator to afford a tion” taken together they suffice. Id. (even used) if and finance such a long Moreover, given Deputy Young’s special- Sixth, trip. distance Urrieta continued to knowledge drug ized about couriers it change story as to whether he had a equally plausible, if not likely, more Last, visa or a passport. ap- story that the “move” awas cover such peared Deputy Young to stall when asked that packing of the cars was a part of drugs whether there wеre ever in the vehi- story way or a to shield items. cles, eventually answering “I don’t think Ellis, (“The totality See 497 F.3d at 613 so.” J.A. 198. analysis permits po- circumstances explore Some latitude to Urrieta’s lies to lice officers experi- to draw on their own Deputy Young particularly appropriate specialized ence and training to make in- here because there existed other indicia ferences from and deductions ‍​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‍about the (albeit not overwhelming) drug activity. cumulative information available to them Indeed, that the defendant had a Mexican might well per- elude an untrained driver’s license and Navigator’s (citation quotation son.” marks omit- registration expired part were ted)).

totality of circumstances that established it Deputy Young’s While is true that here. Both indicated observations that “story” traveling the defendant’s Urrieta was the cars and his status in from a source state to a were untrue. distribution It implausibility passengers was the state and that the defendant’s ner- story registration about the not carry and the defen- vous are facts that a lot of dant’s lies about country weight, they his status do bolster rea- nonetheless that, part, led to believe sonable in combination with the Yet, acknowledge I suspicion. Soko factors. See United

other total of the that observation been sum 1, 10, low, 109 S.Ct. Young’s suspicions then (“A basis for (1989) sitting to deter L.Ed.2d 1 point would be well taken. On of reasonable mine the existence however, record, it clear present articulate the agent require must sup specific and articulable facts conclusion, but the to that leading factors Young’s suspi ported Deputy forth in may factors be set fact that these cion, supra. Accordingly, as discussed detract from not somehow ‘profile’ does is of no general isolated and statement seen evidentiary significance as their *13 thаt rea consequence to the determination noting It is worth agent.”). trained suspicion existed here. United sonable Cf. Young specifically mentioned Deputy 463, Wagner, Fed.Appx. v. 193 466 trip relatively quick duration of the (6th Cir.2006) (“The test for reasonable suspicion. his level of also raised detaining offi suspicion is not whether the regarding Young’s observation subjectively that the circum cer believes Naviga- in between the disparity value but suspicion, create a reasonable stances of are more indicative tor and the Honda particularized there is ‘a and ob whether Moreover, fact wrongdoing. this criminal wrongdo jective suspecting legal basis for weight light in given should be additional ” Arvizu, 273, (citing at ing.’ 534 U.S. that vehicles specialized knowledge of his 744)). S.Ct. bargaining chips drug- for are used as jobs. courier Reasonably scope 2. related in on one isolated as- emphasis I Because would find that reasonablе testimony regard- pect Deputy Young’s of existed, briefly I address the will description of how he knew ing general part analysis, namely, second in activi- engaged was that Urrieta stop ‘reasonably “whether the related herring. classic red See J.A. 89 ties is a scope justi in circumstances ” he knew that (Deputy Young explained place.’ fied the interference in the first something illegal in 363, Urrieta was involved Perez, United States (6th Cir.2006) I in the house way 20, in the same “when walk at (citing Terry, 392 U.S. my boy, 1868). I I know whether and look at little explained This court has S.Ct. something wrong”). The con- he has done that: makes Deputy Young’s

text statement investigative detention must be [A]n on this clear that defendant’s reliance temporary longer and no than is last refute that rea- statement as a means to necessary purpose to effectuate the is meritless. sonable existed stop. Royer, Florida v. 460 U.S. the isolated state- Deputy Young made 491, 500, 1319, L.Ed.2d 229 103 S.Ct. a question (1983). at the end of an answer to ment investigative means used in posed Earlier on cross-examination. should also be the least intrusive means Young provided answer same reasonably verify dispel available to specific supported suspicion, facts suspicions period the officer’s a short explained he also had those previously Supreme Id. The has time. Court he testimony, facts in his direct and later rejected rigid time limitation on the on re-direct. In- Terry stop, “empha- reiterated those facts lawfulness of a deed, the law en- the isolated statement sized the need consider by the Young’s attempt analogy purposes to draw an forcement to be served counsel, reasonably well as the time stop defense not the reason for his as purposes.” might needed to effectuate those While it seem odd that Sharpe, States v. a drug dog United in his patrol car 84 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. thаt he did not during stop, use Urrie- (1985). To whether a detention assess ta failed to raise this issue to the district justified an long was too to be as investi- similarly fails to raise it on gative stop, courts should “examine appeal Moreover, to this court. at the police diligently pursued suppression whether hearing, defense counsel investigation likely means of asked Deputy Young about having the dispel suspicions quick- confirm or their ear, 87-88, dog patrol see J.A. ly, during necessary which time it was inquire but did not why Deputy about detain the defendant.” Id. 105 Young dog did not use the during stop. S.Ct. 1568. record, On such an undeveloped it not this speculate court’s role to why (alteration original). Id. Deputy Young did not dog use the Here, the short amount of time the offi- disagree therefore I majority’s with the justified. cer detained Urrieta was In to- *14 “strongly conclusion that it suggests that tal, from the time the officer finished his he did not have a reasonable call at p.m. with EPIC 2:04 until the dеfen- Urrieta was transporting drugs.” gave dant his consent to search the vehi- verbally p.m., only cles at 2:13 9 minutes Accordingly, both because the time later, most, p.m. or at in at writing 2:15 relatively frame was short and the officer only passed. when 11 minutes had More- proceeding diligently, I would find over, both parties agree that the relevant that the detention of the defendant did not less, in question actually time is somewhat impermissibly expand scope of the Ter- p.m. from 2:07 should ry stop. able been to return to Urrieta after call and EPIC issue the citation until Voluntary B. Consent p.m., only 2:13 amounting to 6 minutes of I Because would find suspi- detention when gave Urrieta his verbal Urrieta, briefly cion existed to detain I will consent, most, p.m., or 2:15 a mere 8 address the district court’s finding gave minutes of detention when he Urrieta’s consent to search the vehicle was

written consent. voluntary. more, approximately What 3 minutes The determination of “whether а con- EPIC, after the call finished with and al- ‘voluntary’ sent to a search was in fact or immediately upon Deputy Young’s most product was the of or ... duress coercion Urrieta, re-questioning of his answers bol- question is a of fact to be determined from Deputy Young’s grounds stered for rea- totality all the circumstances.” provided sonable support Bustamonte, Schneckloth v. Therefore, the additional brief detention. (1973). 36 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. only the defendant was detained for min- Accordingly, “the district decision court’s utes when officer had additional infor- regarding consent will not be overturned supported mation that suspi- clearly it unless erroneous.” United Furthermore, cion. appeared the officer Bueno, States v. F.3d diligent otherwise in pursuing his investi- Cir.1994) (citation omitted). Indeed, gation. the defendant does not any suggestion contrary voluntary, raise to the To if determine consent was that respect. totality district court must look at the and examine the follow- court’s conclusion that Urrieta’s consent circumstances and ed- age, intelligence, voluntary clearly “the was not erroneous.

ing factors: individual; whether the indi- ucation of the For all of the aforementioned reasons right to refuse to vidual understands and those discussed the well-reasoned consent; the individual under- whether opinion, district court see United States v. rights; constitutional stands his or her Urrieta, 3:06-00154, No. 2007 WL detention; nature of and the length and (M.D.Tenn. 24, 2007), *1 given Jan. punishing use of conduct coercive circumstances, totality of the I would find Worley, police.” United States that reasonable existed to detain (6th Cir.1999) (citation omitted). 380, 386 period the defendant for the after the brief that, argues permitting call and before the results EPIC search, acquiescing he was voluntary consent to search the vehicles Young’s authority giving rather than vol- and therefore the defendant’s Fourth untary contrary, To the the dis- consent. See, rights Amendment were not violated. trict found that consent (“While Ellis, e.g., pro- 497 F.3d at 614 voluntary. agree. I justi- longed may detention not have been Indeed, there is no basis to conclude fied, that, we conclude under these circum- determining district court erred in stances, eight the additional detention of proper age, was of the edu- twenty-one minutes and seconds for fur- cation, intelligence to understand his investigation Trooper ther Topp’s rea- any there rights. Nor is evidence that suspicions sonable was lawful and not a failed to understand *15 violation of defendant’s Fourth Amend- Young’s nature of questions right protected ‘against ment to be unrea- ” request the two to search vehicles. When (quoting sonable searches and seizures.’ asked if he Young Urrieta could Const, added))); (emphasis U.S. amend. IV car, responded search his “sure.” Walton, 06-5297, United States v. No. Deputy Young explained J.A. 199. then (6th Cir.2007) WL *6 (finding sеeking per- Urrieta that he was “that reasonable existed to de- ‍​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‍mission to look items. He also during tain defendant the brief time period provided with a written consent registration after defendant’s license and ” Spanish. form translated into up ‘had come clear’ and therefore the Young proceeded to leave Urrieta alone to defendant’s rights Fourth Amendment read form. sign Although violated). Accordingly, were not I respect- originally gave Deputy Young consent for fully dissent. Honda, only to search Urrieta did not object any way told

him that he also wanted to search the

Navigator.

There is also no evidence that

Young attempt- ever threatened Urrieta or

ed him giving to coerce into his consent to contrary,

the search. To the a review of stop video reveals that polite courteous to Urrieta passengers during stop.

and his the entire

Accordingly, I would find that the district notes Young’s explana- government suggests next that the tion that training led him to believe “nervousness” of passengers Urrieta’s con- that the Navigator might have been a Deputy Young’s tributed to suspicions of “bargaining chip” for drug-courier job. illegal activity. Although nervousness Before completion of the initial stop traffic be may part considered as p.m., however, overall at 2:07 only information giving circumstances to a rise the econom- this court suspicion, has found nervousness status of ic Urrieta and his passengers was inherently unsuspicious, and has therefore his observation that girlfriend given very it limited or no weight uniform, wearing a waitress that all of See, reasonable-suspicion e.g., calculation. passengers likely Hispanic ori- Richardson, United States v. gin, and that Urrieta was Mexican citi- (6th Cir.2004) 630-31 (holding that ner- This zen. information falls far short of “an vousness is unreliable indicator ille- establishing [of gal activity], especially in the context of a was a pro- courier. Urrieta stop,” many because citizens be- vided evidence the 1998 Navigator come nervous when stopped by police nearly eight years ap- old and worth “even when nothing $12,500 to fear or proximately the time of the

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Urrieta
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Mar 20, 2008
Citation: 520 F.3d 569
Docket Number: 07-5431
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
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