United States v. Tyson

Case Information

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Criminal No. 3:24-cr-34

V .

RICHARD SCOTT TYSON,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on the DEFENDANT'S SECOND RENEWED MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT (ECF 102) ("the Second Renewed Motion"). For the reasons set forth No. the Motion was DENIED pursuant to the Court's Order on

below.

January 10, 2025 (ECF No. 110).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY On March 5, 2024, a Grand Jury sitting in the Eastern District of Virginia returned an INDICTMENT (ECF No. 1) against Defendant Richard Scott Tyson, a/k/a Richard Samuel Tyson ("Tyson or Defendant"), charging him with one count of Production of Child \\ in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (a), one count of Pornography, Possession of Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (5) (B) , and one count of Attempted Coercion and Enticement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The INDICTMENT of a Minor, also contained a forfeiture allegation. the Defendant filed a MOTION TO SUPPRESS

On April 26, 2024, EVIDENCE AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT (ECF No. 18) {"First Motion to On June 11, 2024, Three evidentiary hearings ensued. Suppress"). the Goochland County Sheriff's

Detective Traquan Gregory of Office, testified. COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY OF DETECTIVE GREGORY BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. PAYNE (ECF No. 50) ("June ). On June 17, 2024, Detective Danny Joyner, of the Powhatan 11 Tr.

County Sheriff's Office, testified. COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF MOTIONS BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. PAYNE (ECF No. 62) ("June 17 Tr.") On June 24, 2024, Special Agent William Lopez and Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") Matthew Marasco, COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF MOTIONS BEFORE THE HONORABLE testified.

ROBERT E. PAYNE (ECF No. 69) ("June 24 Tr.")

Having heard that testimony, the Court denied the First Motion to Suppress, with leave to re-file because the memoranda in support of, and in opposition to, the First Motion to Suppress were not tethered to the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearings.

ORDER of June 25, 2024 (ECF No. 58) . On June 26, 2024, a SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT (ECF No. 59) was returned against Tyson. It added one count of committing Counts I through III while being an individual required by federal or other law to register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251 and 2422; and, two counts of in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) Obstruction of Justice, On July 31, 2024, Tyson filed the DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION (ECF No. 73) TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 2024, the Court heard evidence ("Renewed Motion"). On August 19, on the Renewed Motion in the form of testimony from Detectives Danny Joyner and Austin Schwartz. COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY OF DETECTIVES JOYNER AND SCHWARTZ BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. ("Sept. 19 Tr."). Following hearings on the

PAYNE (ECF No. 99) the Court denied the Renewed Motion without Renewed Motion, prejudice to the filing of a Second Renewed Motion. (ECF No. 98).

On October 22, 2024, Tyson filed the Second Renewed Motion. The facts surrounding the offense, and necessary to decide the Second set forth in the SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT, the Renewed Motion, as briefs, the exhibits, and the testimony produced at the hearings.

are as follows.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND a. The Initial Investigation and State Search Warrants The investigation into Tyson's conduct began when a concerned grandparent contacted law enforcement in Powhatan County about his ^ The Obstruction of Justice counts are based on allegations that Tyson contacted witnesses with the intent to influence their testimony and to have them destroy evidence. ECF No. 59 at 3. The alleged behavior surrounding those counts does not impact the analysis of the Second Renewed Motion.

teenaged granddaughter, minor female ("MF"), having conversations RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S with adult men online.

RENEWED MOTION TO SUPPRESS ("Resp."), EOF No. 105, at 1-2 (citing Affidavit of Powhatan County Detective Joyner in Support of the August 22, 2023 Search Warrant ("Joyner Affidavit"), ECF No. 73-3 at 10).

The affidavit in support of the state search warrant for Tyson's home outlines in detail how the investigation commenced. 73-3 at 10-12. MF's grandfather became aware that she had

ECF No. been Snapchatting^ with several adults, including Tyson whom the grandfather knew to be a registered sex offender. Id.; June 17 Tr.

at 6:18-7:2; 11:1-12. On June 13, 2023, the grandfather turned ECF No. 73-3 at 10. On June MF's phone over to law enforcement.

21, 2023, Detective Joyner of the Powhatan County Sheriff's Office had, in fact, been interviewed MF, who reported that she snapchatting with Tyson. Id. at 11. However, MF also reported that Tyson had neither sent her explicit images or sexual content. nor Id. at 11. Detective Joyner then requested either from her.

2 Snapchat is a popular messaging application primarily accessed a smartphone that that lets users as an application ("app") on (called snaps) that are meant to exchange pictures and videos disappear after they are viewed. June 17 Tr. at 11:19-23; 12:7- 11. Snapchat is usually accessed and used by way of the app, but users can still use Snapchat by way of computer, without the app.

June 17 Tr. at 12:7-13. to run a Cellebrite^ obtained MF's consent, and that of her mother report on MF's phone, which law enforcement ran later that day. 17 Tr. at 16:19-17:1; 18:1-11. The report revealed

Id. ; June and several adults hundreds of Snapchat messages between MF at 11-12; June 17 Tr. at 38:7-24. The messages including Tyson. revealed that Tyson had arranged meetups between MF and her boyfriend. Id. The boyfriend is an alleged victim of Tyson's, Minor Victim 1 ("MVl"). Tyson offered to let MF and MVl come swim in his hotel pool, Tyson gave MF rides home, and Tyson messaged MF on Snapchat, late into the night on several occasions. Id. Messages according to MVl, Tyson between MF and MVl also revealed that, offered to arrange for MF and MVl to spend time together and Id. Detective encouraged MVl to engage in sexual behavior with MF.

Joyner testified that, based on the content of the messages between MF and Tyson, he believed Tyson was "grooming MF. Id. at 12.

On June 30, 2023, MF was forensically interviewed at the Davis Id. During the interview, Child Advocacy Center in Chesterfield.

MF did not disclose that anything sexual or sexually suggestive had happened between her and Tyson. Id.

^ Cellebrite is a software used by law enforcement agencies through which they scan phones and create a detailed easily readable report of all the information contained within the data on the phone.

June 17 Tr. at 18:1-22:17. convicted sex offenders to register

Virginia law requires any instant message, chat or other Internet communication name or Va. identity information that the person uses or intends to use. § 9.1-903(B). Detective Joyner checked the Virginia State

Code. Police sex offender registry and confirmed that Tyson was a registered sex offender. June 17 Tr. at 61:19-62:8. He then found a registration form signed by Tyson on July 27, 2023 (after the Snapchat messages between Tyson and MF/MVl took place) that did not disclose the Snapchat account. Id. interviewed Randi

On July 7, 2024, Detective Joyner Lanzafama, a supervisor at the sex offender program of the Virginia Department of Corrections, who had supervisory authority over Tyson when Tyson was listed as a violent sex offender there. June 17 Tr. at 62:9-63:15. Lanzafama told Joyner that other sex had a boy living with offenders had reported to her that Tyson and was taking minor boys on trips and driving them to and him from school. Id. at 60:12-21; 63:16-22; 64:25-65:16. the interview with MF,

Based on the interview with Lanzafama, and taking into consideration that Tyson failed to report any Snapchat or other social media accounts. Detective Joyner obtained search warrants for Snapchat's records and for Tyson's home on August 17, 2023. June 17 Tr. at 71:4-8; 72:17-19. The first search warrant addressed to Snapchat sought the contents of Tyson's and MF's Snapchat accounts, and was signed by a Powhatan County General District Court Judge.^ ECF No. 73-2. The second search warrant for Tyson's home was signed by the same Judge, but it was not executed because the warrant contained an erroneous home address for Tyson. 2023 ,

June 17 tr. at 74:5-16. A few days later, on August 22, Detective Joyner obtained another search warrant for Tyson's home, using the same supporting affidavit as with the correct address, the warrant that was abandoned because it listed the wrong address. 17 Tr. at 84:1-6. The corrected

See generally ECF 73-3; June Id. Both the search warrant warrant was signed by a magistrate. addressed to Snapchat and the search warrant for Tyson's home read:

This SEARCH WARRANT is issued in relation to an offense 18.2-472.1. Failure to substantially described as follows: provide registration information as required. t1 ECF Nos. 73-2/ 73- on the face of the warrants, 3 (emphasis added). In other words. and for which the warrants

the only crime being investigated. sought evidence was the failure to register the Snapchat account by Tyson as a registered sex offender. Supporting

b. The State Search Warrant for Tyson's Home: Documents the description of places

On the warrant for Tyson's home and items to be searched and the affidavit setting forth probable

Tyson has lodged no objection to the search warrant addressed to Snapchat, and it is not at issue in the Second Renewed Motion. Attachment A n and attached, respectively, w as

cause were ECF No. 73-3 at 5-9; ECF No. 73-3 at 10-12. Attachment B. Computers and Electronic

Attachment A contains five headers; w Materials Relating to Computer and Internet Records, tt Media, Photographs of Search, Child Erotica and Depictions of Minors, u and "Physical and Forensic Examination of the Seized Items. ECF No. 73-3 at 5-9. The following sections, and their descriptions, the Second Renewed are highly relevant to the disposition of Motion, so they warrant detailed attention. is the widest encompassing Computers and Electronic Media II

\\ section of the search warrant, describing present and deleted data on all computers, computer equipment, cell phones, tablets, external hard drives, floppy disks, peripheral devices such as keyboards and printers, recording equipment, software, codes, data and data fragments, documentation of the above, passwords, slides. microfilms, CD-ROMSs, etc.--basically any computer and electronics hardware and software whatsoever. Id. 1-8.

The "Computer and Internet Records" section included internet and phone records, address and identifying information records.

and records of all chat apps to include stored pictures, messages, and documents. Id. 9-12. Materials Relating to Child Erotica and Depictions of

The section covered any and all visual depictions of minors. Minors n and records of minors visually depicted in sexually names, books. Code § 18.2-374.1, one of

explicit conduct (as defined in Va. all records reflecting Virginia's child pornography statutes), with minors visually personal contact "and any other activities depicted in sexually explicit conduct as defined in § 18.2-374.1, and any and all child erotica. Id. 13-16.

At the June 17, 2024 hearing. Detective Joyner testified that he consulted with the Deputy Commonwealth's Attorney for Powhatan County about this search warrant, and the prosecutor advised him Materials Relating to Child Erotica and Depictions of that the section should be removed from the description of items to Minors // likely be seized because alleged probable cause was 17 Tr. at 82:8-83:23. Detective Joyner insufficient. June testified that he forgot to remove that section, but that, at the time of the execution of the residential search warrant, he believed that it had been deleted. Id. Physical and Forensic and Photographs of Search

\\ set forth that photographs would Examination of the Seized Items tt forensically and any seized items would be be taken on-site. 73-3 17-18. That section of the application

analyzed. ECF No. for the warrant specifically states that the forensic examination contraband, evidence, and of seized items would be to look for w instrumentalities that relate to or constitute violations of [Va● Virginia's child // Code §§] 18.2-374.1:1 and 18:2-374.1 . . pornography statutes. Id. ^ 18 (emphasis added).

c. Executing the State Search Warrant for Tyson's Home and the Continuing Investigation

Police executed the search warrant for Tyson's home on August 24, 2023. June 17 Tr. at 89:21-22. As Tyson was escorted out of his home, he was notified that law enforcement had a search warrant for the premises. June 17 Tr. at 90:10-16. Tyson was taken to a nearby police vehicle where he was questioned by Detective Joyner.

Tyson was in the front passenger seat; Detective Joyner was in the driver's seat; and Detective Schwartz was in the back seat. June 17 Tr. at 90:17-19; September 19 Tr. at 35:2-5. Tyson was not handcuffed during questioning. Id. at 24:13-14. No law enforcement agent provided a copy of the search warrant and the affidavit to Tyson as required by Va. Code § 19.2-56{B). June 17 Tr. at 94:10- 14; June 11 Tr. at 9:18-11:15.

Joyner read Tyson his Miranda rights, and Tyson waived his right to counsel and agreed to answer questions. June 17 Tr. at 184:24-185:1. During the interview, Tyson confirmed that he was a required to register his online sex offender and that he was Id. at 96:8-25. He reported that he had phones in the accounts. 2023, Interview of

house, but no other computers. August 24, Richard S. Tyson (ECF No. 97-2) ("August 24 Tr.") Tr. at 3:2-11.

Tyson confirmed that he had a Snapchat account but claimed that he social media. was not required to register it because it was not at 98:24-99:3. He also admitted to having a Facebook June 17 Tr. and a Discord account.

Messenger account, June 17 Tr. at 98:4-17, which is an online messaging and chat platform centered around video games. June 17 Tr. at 98:18-21.

Throughout the interview, Tyson claimed that he was compliant with the sex offender registry requirements and that he was not hiding his Snapchat application from the detectives. Joyner asked Tyson whether he had to register his phone passcodes with the State Police, and Tyson stated that he did not, but that I can give August 24 [the phone passcode] to you. It doesn't matter to me. bring [his Snapchat app] up on

Tr. at 22:16-20. Tyson offered to the phone and show ^ to [the officers]. Id. at 25:4-6, 26:9-10 If it' 5 on the phone, you can look at ; (referencing Discord, again, ill [sic] bring ^ up. I'll 27:12-13 (referencing Discord, it".) Tyson show ^ to you."); 33:13. (emphasis added to the word Id. at 35:14-16. In then again confirmed the passcode to Joyner.

other words, Tyson voluntarily consent to opening the telephone to secure access to the Snapchat account.

Shortly after, officers executing the search warrant found a everyday" phone to which Tyson had given different phone than the the detectives the passcode. August 24 Tr. at 43:3-7. Tyson there's declined to give the passcode for that phone because . misconstrue. Id. at personal stuff on there that you can . . everyday" phone. 44:1-5; see generally 43:12-45:25. But, as to the there's no social media things. Tyson continued to maintain that can I show it to If that's what you're really looking for, then ... [and] open ^ and show ^ to you myself right here.

you myself Id. at 44:8-11 (emphasis added). Tyson told the detectives to take \v if the [the phone] back to your place and look at it if because w warrant says that you're looking for something to find - find you're not going to find any. Id. at 47:11- social media sites, also 7:8-10 ("No, there's nothing I 14 (emphasis added); see ("You'll see that there's no haven't registered."), 19:1-3 there's no apps or anything that will open up in my name under any ) ; 70:8-9 (emphasis added) social media site on any of my phones.

("I mean, when you get into that phone, you'll see."); 74:10-12 ("I don't believe that anything else you're going to see is going to be - is going to warrant an arrest.")

Thus, the record shows that, on multiple occasions, Tyson stated he did not have issue with the detectives accessing his

everyday" phone to find the Snapchat application and other social Detective Schwartz outlined to Tyson how detectives media sites. of evidence on site to determine evidentiary

perform a "preview if to which Tyson responded "Well, my main phone, I have no value problem with you going through that and looking at it, make sure I don't have any other social media sites. // August 24 Tr. at 48:4- I just gave you the passcode for it, you In my main phone, 6 . \v obviously probably already opened it, you see that I don't have anything but what I've told you. Id. at 46:5-8.

In response to Detective Schwartz, Tyson re-confirmed that he everyday" phone. Id. at 74:19-25 was allowing access into the ("Respectfully, you have two phones. You're, like, yeah, you can get into that phone. You can look all you want. MR. TYSON: Right.

But you understand -- DETECTIVE SCHWARTZ: And then that phone, oh, I'm not giving you the passcode. MR. TYSON: Right.") no, five phones were

During the August 24, 2023 search warrant. seized from Tyson's home. June 17 Tr. at 95:1-11. Later, Tyson's roommate turned over a sixth phone of Tyson's to law enforcement.

Id. at 95:12-17.

On the same day that the state warrant was executed. Detective Joyner interviewed Belynda Payne, one of Tyson's former coworkers, who was present at the scene of the search warrant. June 17 Tr. at 92:7-9. Payne reported that Tyson has been spending a lot of time with MVl. Id. at 92:12-94:5. Payne also reported that Tyson also had been spending time with another minor victim, Minor Victim Two ("MV2"), and that Tyson had even showed Payne pictures of him with MVl and MV2 on a trip to Virginia Beach. Id.

Detective Schwartz took defendant's phones back to everyday Powhatan Sheriff's Office and conducted a preview of the 60:25-61:2. While reviewing phone. September 19 Tr. at 56:14-25; the gallery app that contained defendant's photos, he found child at 56:24-57:6/ 58:5-7. After Detective Joyner pornography. Id. returned to the office, Detective Schwartz told him about the child pornography on Tyson's phone and showed him a picture of a teenage boy, naked in a bathtub and displaying his genitals. Id. at 15:6- 14; 16:3-6. The detectives were later able to identify that teenage boy as MV2. id.

Because the completion of the interview with Payne at the scene of the search warrant was done before Detective Schwartz confirmed the presence of the child pornography to Detective Joyner (upon his return to the office), Detective Joyner was already aware MV2 before that confirmation. of Tyson's relationship with September 19 Tr. at 15:6-14. Detective Joyner also testified that Tyson's relationship with MVl had been on his radar long before the execution of the warrant because Joyner's investigation into MF's Snapchat conversations with Tyson dated back several months.

June 17 Tr. at 9:19-10:3; 39:14-41:15. child

Detective Joyner also testified that, before any pornography was discovered, he knew the names of MVl and MV2 from Belynda Payne, knew that Tyson had taken them on multiple trips, knew that MVl had a room at Tyson's home and was regularly staying picking up young boys from overnight, and knew that Tyson was and also taking boys to Kings Dominion. Id. school in Powhatan, at 63:16-22. Detective Joyner reports that he had planned to talk to MVl and his family before the execution of the search warrant.

but that he had delayed doing so to avoid tipping off Tyson. Id.

at 108:21-109:1.

On August 25, 2023, the day after the search warrant was phone was examined by Detective executed and the everyday w n Schwartz, Joyner met with MVl's mother to set up a forensic interview of MVl, which took place on September 6, 2023. June 17 Tr. at 109:2-8; 110:5-7; 113:6-13. During the meeting with MVl's mother, Joyner asked about MV2. Id. MVl's mother provided Joyner with the phone number of MV2's father. Id. at 109:9-22. Joyner Id. He ultimately met began attempting to contact MV2's father.

with MV2's father on August 29, 2023 to set up a forensic interview Id. at 117 :1-22 . In with MV2, which occurred on September 5, 2023.

their forensic interviews, both minor victims reported that Tyson took nude photos of them with his phone. Id. at 113:14-24 (MVl); Id. at 119:7-20 (MV2) . Moreover, MV2, in a second interview, reported that, at Tyson's insistence, Tyson and MV2 engaged in oral and anal sex. Id. at 123:12-129:8. 25-29, 2023, Virginia State Police ran a

From August Cellebrite report on all the phones seized during the execution of the search warrant. ECF 73-4, at 1-8. The scans of the phones which Detective Joyner first produced a Cellebrite report. reviewed on August 27, 2023. June 17 Tr. at 134:18-21. The report MVl, MV2, and showed that Tyson had been communicating with MF, several other minors. Id. at 144:24-145:12. In the Cellebrite report, Detective Joyner saw the complete image file of a thumbnail image that he had previously seen in the chat between Tyson and Minor Female in which Tyson sent her a picture of him holding a fish on his boat. Id. at 35:22-36:11; 144:13-23. Detective Joyner to wit: nude noticed what appeared to be child pornography also pictures of both MVl and MV2, and what was later determined {from MV2 himself during his forensic interview) to be videos of sex acts between Tyson and MV2. Id. at 153:15-16; 154:17-156:3. Id. at 85:20-86:18.

Tyson was arrested the same day that the search warrant was executed. June 17 Tr. at 89:22. The arrest was pursuant to an 2024, for arrest warrant sworn by Detective Joyner on August 22, violating Va. Code § 18.2-472.1, failure to register a "social media" or online messaging account. The probable cause was the July 27, 2023 registry form that Tyson had filled out that did not disclose the Snapchat account and that Joyner observed Tyson using to message with MF and others. June 17 Tr. at 89:6-89:22. So, when 2023, he was in custody Tyson was in custody after August 24, pursuant to that previously-obtained arrest warrant.

d. The Federal Search Warrant

Because the officers executing the search warrant on August 24 had failed to comply with the Virginia statute that required delivery of the search warrant to Tyson upon its execution.

state investigators reached out to special agents at the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") to determine whether the federal authorities were interested in the case. June 17 Tr. at 146:13- 147:1. Detective Joyner sent his case file to the FBI on September 28, 2023. Id. The case file did not include any Cellebrite reports Those were or any pornographic images from Tyson's phones. obtained by the FBI after the FBI had completed its own federal search warrant. Id. at 167:8-17; June 24 Tr. at 37:15-20; 40:1-4.

On November 17, 2023, FBI Special Agent William Lopez applied for and obtained a federal search warrant for the six phones that then in the custody of the Powhatan County Sheriff's Office. were June 24 Tr. at 16:25-17:3; ECF No. 73-6. In the AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AN APPLICATION UNDER RULE 41 FOR A WARRANT TO SEARCH AND SEIZE, ECF No. 73-6 at 2 ("Lopez Affidavit"), Special Agent Lopez set forth the crimes being investigated, the items to be and the probable cause justifying those searches. searched. the Lopez Affidavit states that the warrant would seek

First, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), evidence and instrumentalities of violating: Production of Child Pornography; ^[18] U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2), Distribution or Receipt of Child Pornography; and 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), Attempted Coercion and Enticement of a Minor. Lopez Affidavit HH 4-8. Second, the Lopez Affidavit specifically identifies the six phones taken from Tyson's home as the items to be searched. Id. ^ 3. Third, the Lopez affidavit sets forth (1) Lopez avers three bases of probable cause: probable cause.

that, during the interview pursuant to the execution to the state Tyson admitted to communicating with several search warrant, and to having a personal relationship minors via social media, in a forensic Id. H 15; (2) that with multiple minor males. interview with MVl,^ MVl reported that Tyson had taken nude and that MV2, in his photographs of MVl in exchange for money, forensic interview, also reported that Tyson had taken nude id. t 16-17; and (3) that, after Tyson's photographs of him, arrest, in a recorded jail call, Tyson had said:

I didn't give them [police] the password for the second SIO Plus or the Motorola but I don't think either one of them will be that hard to break into and get stuff off of it and if they can actually take images off of my Gallery I am going to be done. So I probably have 100 counts of child porn because I look at stuff that's underage sometimes, not really bad but like teenagers. It's stupid to keep that shit but who the fuck thought this was going to happen?

Id. ^ 18. The Lopez Affidavit goes on for several pages describing digital evidence and the time in detail the complexity of requirement for properly analyzing it, necessitating the seizure of the items. Id. 21-27. Magistrate Judge Speight signed the warrant that day, November 17, 2023. ECF No. 73-6 at 1.

5 In the Lopez Affidavit, Special Agent Lopez refers to the person and to the minor referred to in this memorandum as "MF" as "MVl, // and MV2 // victims referred to in this memorandum as MVl tt as, So MVl here refers to the person respectively, \\ MV2 II and MV3 . identified as MV2 in the Lopez Affidavit, and, likewise, MV2 here refers to MV3 there.

Case 3:24-cr-00034-REP Document 112 Filed 01/13/25 Page 19 of 60 PageID# 1599

When the FBI searched the phones, they found photographs of MVl and MV2 posing nude and videos of MV2 engaging in sexual acts at 19:8-18. The United States indicted with Tyson. June 24 Tr.

Tyson for the enumerated offenses on March 3, 2024 .

DISCUSSION The analysis of the Second Renewed Motion necessitates an examination of several statutes and rules and of the law governing the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Then, we Constitution. So, first, we will call them to the fore.

will consider Tyson's arguments.

I, Relevant Statutes and Rules

Virginia Code § 9.1-903 provides, in relevant part: B. Every [registered sex offender] as part of the registration shall . . . provide electronic mail address information, any instant message, chat or other Internet communication name or identity information that the person uses or intends to use . . .

G. Any person required to register shall reregister either in person or electronically with the local law-enforcement agency where his residence is located within 30 minutes following any change of the electronic mail address information, any instant message, chat or other Internet communication name or identity information that the person uses or intends to use, whether within or without the Commonwealth. in relevant part:

Virginia Code § 18.2-374.1:1 provides, A person shall be guilty of production of child pornography who:

1. Accosts, entices or solicits a person less than 18 years of age with intent to induce or force such person to perform in or be a subject of child pornography; or 2. Produces or makes or attempts or prepares to produce or make child pornography; or 3 . Who knowingly takes part in or participates in the filming, photographing, other or production of child pornography by any means; or

4. Knowingly finances or attempts or prepares to finance child pornography.

Virginia Code § 19.2-56 provides, in relevant part: B. After entering and securing the place to be searched and prior to undertaking any search or seizure pursuant to the search warrant, the executing law-enforcement officer shall give a copy of the search warrant and affidavit to the person to be searched or the owner of the place to be searched or, if the owner is not present, to at least one adult occupant of the place to be searched. If the place to be adult, the searched is unoccupied by an executing law-enforcement officer shall leave a copy of the search warrant and affidavit in a conspicuous place within or affixed to the place to be searched.

Any evidence obtained from a search warrant executed in violation of this subsection shall not be admitted into evidence for Commonwealth in any prosecution.

Virginia Code § 18.2-374.1:1 provides, in relevant part, that A. Any person who knowingly possesses child pornography is guilty of a Class 6 Felony.

Finally, Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 provides, in relevant part: {f) Executing and Returning the Warrant.

(1) Warrant to Search for and Seize a Person or Property

(C) Receipt. The officer executing the warrant must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, property was taken or leave a copy of the warrant and receipt at the place where the officer took the property. . . . Service may be accomplished by any means, including electronic means, reasonably calculated to reach that person. with Rule 41(f)(1)(C)

Failure to comply IS a non¬ constitutional violation that does not require suppression of the to the defendant or an evidence unless it was prejudicial intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision in the Rule.

United States v. Boker, 807 Fed. App'x 232, 235 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 403 (4th Cir. 2000) .

II. The Fourth Amendment persons, houses, papers, and

The Fourth Amendment protects effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. ff U.S. Const. no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable

Amend. IV. Therefore, u and particularly supported by Oath or affirmation. cause, describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to Id. This amounts to a default rule that "law be seized. ff enforcement must obtain a warrant. grounded in probable cause, United States v. Harris, No. before seizing or searching . . 3:21-cr-18, 2021 WL 2384554, at *3 {E.D. Va. June 10, 2021) (citing United States v, Yengel, 711 F.3d 392, 396 (4th Cir. 2013)) . When a violation of this rule occurs, any evidence derived therefrom can be found to be inadmissible under the exclusionary rule, a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment United States v. rights generally through its deterrent effect. n Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (extending the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).

Without probable cause, a search warrant may not be issued. (4th Cir. 2020) United States v. Blakeney 949 F.3d 851, 859 a 'practical. Whether probable cause for a search exists IS fair

common-sense' question, asking whether 'there IS a probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. in a particular place. / // 213, 238 (1983)). fulfill the particularity

A search warrant must also [a]t its core, he Fourth Amendment protects requirement because 'exploratory rummaging in against general warrants that authorize a person's belongings ... by requiring a particular description United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d of the things to be seized. / n 511, 519 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. The particularity requirement is fulfilled when

463, 480 (1976) ) . \\ the warrant identifies the items to be seized by their relation to designated crimes and when the description of the items leaves nothing to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. n Unlike the probable cause requirement, which concerns the Id.

showing made by an officer seeking a search warrant, particularity requirement is focused as well on the officer executing a warrant, and ensures that the search 'will be carefully rather than becoming a 'wide tailored to its justifications' ranging exploratory search[]' of the kind the 'Framers intended to 949 F.3d at 861 (quoting Maryland v. prohibit. Blakeney, / // Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)).

When a search and seizure is effectuated pursuant to a is limited in scope by the terms of the warrant's warrant, it United States v. Phillips, 588 F.3d 218, 223 (4th authorization. // But the terms of the warrant are not to be interpreted Cir. 2009) . they should be read with a

in a 'hypertechnical' manner. Rather, to avoid turning a search 'commonsense and realistic approach,' Williams, warrant into a 'constitutional straight jacket [sic]. / // 592 F.3d at 519 (quoting Phillips, 588 F.3d at 223) . State Search Warrant

III. Tyson contends that there cannot be probable At the outset, social media" platform covered by cause because Snapchat is not a Second Renewed his registration requirement as a sex offender.

Motion at 13. That argument misses the mark. Virginia Code § 9.1- Every [registered sex offender] 903(b) provides that u as . provide electronic mail part of the registration shall . chat or other Internet

address information, any instant message. communication name or identity information that the person uses or (emphasis added). Snapchat is covered by the plain intends to use. tt text of the statute because it is an instant messaging platform, social media" does not even appear in the and because the term w The analysis will now turn to the merits of the Second statute.

Renewed Motion. The State Search Warrant Lacked Probable Cause

a. Tyson argues that there was no probable cause to justify the search of his cell phones and electronic devices for extensive child pornography and child erotica because the warrant was directed only to a failure to register a Snapchat account. Second Renewed Motion at 14. The Court agrees.

The state search warrant set forth one statute that Tyson was believed to have violated: Virginia's sex offender failure to register statute, Va. Code § 9.1-903(b). That statute is violated (2) (1) Tyson is a registered sex offender. upon a showing that: who had an online messaging account; and (3) he did not register that account with the appropriate state office within thirty minutes of its creation. Va. Code § 9.1-903(g). Here, the affidavit clearly demonstrates probable cause for the sex offender failure registration violation. ECF No. 73-3, at 10-12. In the probable (1) the interview cause attachment, the Joyner Affidavit outlines: completed with MF in which she stated she had used Snapchat to (2) the report that was run on MF's phone communicate with Tyson; revealing hundreds of Snapchat messages between MF and Tyson; and (3) the registration form signed by Tyson, a sex offender, on July Id. Thus, 27, 2023, which did not disclose any Snapchat account.

the Joyner Affidavit's factual recitation would lead a reasonable a sex offender, was operating a person to believe that Tyson, Snapchat account and had not registered according to requirements of Va. Code § 9.1-903 (g) . United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 530 (E.D. Va. 2016), aff'd, 721 F. App'x 304 (4th Cir. 2018) ("There is probable cause for a search when 'the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of ) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 a crime will be found. t n U.S. 690, 696 (1996) ) .

However, the Joyner Affidavit, and its description of items to be seized, encompassed far more illegal conduct than Tyson's failure to register a Snapchat account. In paragraphs 13-16 of the the warrant authorizes the description of items to be seized.

search and seizure of "materials relating to child erotica and ECF No. 73-3 at 8. Paragraphs 14 and 15 depictions of minors. the warrant was seeking illegal child

specify that, in fact, as defined in [§] 18.2-374.1, pornography evidence a separate statute from Virginia's failure to register statute. absolute

Probable cause does not require that there be an that evidence of a crime will be found. United States certainty Gary, 528 F.3d 324, 327 (4th Cir.2008). Rather, it requires V . fair probability that such evidence will be

that there is a n u found. United States v. Blakeney, 949 F.3d 851, 859 (4th Cir. 2020) 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Here, the (quoting Illinois v. Gates, Joyner Affidavit does not tell that materials related to child found on Tyson's electronic pornography or erotica would be this devices. In fact, Joyner Affidavit contradicts in her interview, she and Tyson did possibility by reciting that not share any sexually explicit materials with Tyson, and that she 73-3, at 11- did not have any sexual relations with him. ECF No.

12.

Although the Joyner Affidavit does show the possibility that that, standing Tyson had encouraged MVl to engage MF sexually. of child

alone, does not amount to suspicion of possession 650 F.3d 460 (4th Cir. pornography. In United States v. Doyle, 2011), a search warrant authorizing a search for child pornography in the defendant's home was found to be unsupported by probable cause. Id. at 470. There, the affiant to the search warrant did not participate in the investigation, and, more pertinently, the defendant's three minor victims told law enforcement that the defendant sexually assaulted them but said nothing about child pornography or being shown sexually explicit images. Id. 464-66. remarkably scant evidence The Fourth Circuit held that there was \v . to support a belief that Doyle in fact in the affidavit . let alone evidence sufficient to

possessed child pornography, his home, nexus between the place to be searched, establish a as required. Id. at 471 (quoting and the items to be sized, W 1988) ) . 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir. United States v. Anderson, there is even less cause than the affiant provided in Doyle Here, to believe that Tyson possessed child pornography. This lack of further bolstered by testimony of Detective probable cause is Joyner that the Commonwealth Attorney Powhatan County advised him materials relating to child erotica" language not to include the w due to a lack of supporting probable cause. June 17 Tr. at 82:8- 83:23.

For the foregoing reasons, the state search warrant lacked probable cause to support a search into Tyson's electronic devices for child erotica and pornography.

b. The State Search Warrant Fails the Particularity Requirement and is Overbroad search warrant fails the particularity

Moreover, requirement and is overbroad in what it allowed to be searched and seized. Search warrants must meet the particularity requirement. the Fourth Amendment protects against

because \\ [a] t its core. exploratory rummaging in a general warrants that authorize . by requiring a particular description of person's belongings . . United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511,

the things to be seized. blanket suppression is warranted 519 (4th Cir. 2010) . Indeed, fishing expedition for where the officers engage in a United States v. Uzenski, discovery of incriminating evidence.

434 F.3d 690, 709 (4th Cir. 2006). In the Fourth Circuit, a warrant generally satisfies the particularity requirement when it to seize only evidence of a particular crime. allows officers 260 F.Supp.3d 530, 546 (E.D. Va. 2017) United States v. Young, (quotation omitted). Particularity ensures that the search is confined in scope to ... evidence relating to a specific crime United States v. Davis, 939 for which there is probable cause. F.Supp.2d 535, 564 (2013) (E.D.N.C. 2016). search and seizure of

The search warrant authorized the virtually all computers or electronic media-related devices. including phones or tablets, that Tyson owned and all the data within without regard to whether it was related to his social media registrations. Attachment A (the description of places and items to be searched and seized) to the state search warrant includes over three pages dedicated solely to setting forth every possible piece of electronic equipment that Tyson could own, and all of the different manners in which electronic data could be stored on those devices with no time limits set as to when the data was created or 73-3 at 5-8. The authorization to search all stored. See ECF No.

the devices for all their data is not properly tethered to the Tyson's failure to offense for which there was probable cause: register his Snapchat account. To prove that Tyson has failed to register his account under Va. Code § 9.1-903(b), the Government must show that Tyson is a registered sex offender, he had an online messaging account, and that he did not register that account with the appropriate state office within thirty minutes of its creation.

Va. Code § 9.1-903(g). A review of relevant decisions teaches that the authorization to search all electronic devices for all of their stored data in relation to a failure to register offense is overbroad. Easley, 321 F. Supp. 2d 776 (E.D.

In Arkansas Chronicle v. Va. 2004), overruled on other grounds, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), the district court found to be fatally overbroad a search warrant authorizing the seizure of: disk

Any and all computer equipment, hard floppy disks, magnetic drives, compact disks, tapes or other magnetic or optical media capable of storing information in an electronic, magnetic or optical format. This information may include, but is not limited to letters, correspondence, memoranda, journals, electronic mail, image files, database files, deleted files, partial files or other types of files found in the media or computer[.] a newspaper reporter was believed to have pictures and In Easley, video of the Oklahoma City bombing on his computer which was relevant to the defense of one of the bombers, and a search warrant id. at 778-85. The district court issued on that basis. See observed that:

[t]o the extent that the warrant provided any it guidance to the officers executing it, of every piece authorized seizure of computer equipment and every type of document that might be stored on such equipment. In these circumstances, such a warrant essentially amounted to a general warrant giving police the authority to rummage through every single computer file and document with no limitations on which documents could be seized. 427 (9th

Id. at 793 {citing United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, business Cir. 1995) {finding that a warrant which sought all files, ledgers, and records, computer hardware and software, lacked particularity because it contained no limitations invoices on which documents within each category of documents could be seized)).

As in Easley, the state search warrant here, is, in essence, because it authorized the search and seizure a "general warrant It of all the electronics in Tyson's home, allowing law enforcement to rummage through Tyson's property in a way not tethered to the suspected violation and with no limitations on what could be seized. Although evidence of the Snapchat account could have been accessed by way of the telephone or computer, and by way of app or that did not render it necessary to seize and search, web browser. fixed hard disks, removable hard disk cartridges, tapes,

e.g. , laser disks, CD-ROM disks, video cassettes, and other media capable ECF No. 23-3 at 7 ^ 7. of storing magnetic or optical coding.

i. Tyson's View

For his part, Tyson relies largely on a decision from the 3d 615 District of Kansas, United States v. Irving, 347 F. Supp.

{D. Kan. 2018) In Irving, the court found that search warrant for a registration offense for Facebook should have been limited to the search of evidence of a registration offense, and that a search warrant allowing a search of the entirety of the defendant's stored data on the Facebook platform was overly broad. 347 F. Supp. 3d at the scope of the warrant should have 623. The court held that been defined by and limited by [the registration offense]. Id. at The teaching of Irving is persuasive when applied to 624 .

similar facts presented here.

ii. Williams and Cobb

The Government argues that contrary Fourth Circuit precedent controls here. In particular, the Government points to United 592 F.3d 511, 519 (4th Cir. 2010), and United States V. Williams, States V. Cobb, 970 F.3d 319, 328-29 (4th Cir. 2020), as holding that a warrant to search a computer may allow the review of every file on the electronic device to determine whether the files can be seized pursuant to the warrant. However, both Williams and Cobb are distinguishable. a search warrant was issued in an investigation

In Williams, sent to a church threatening harm and into messages that were 592 F.3d at 514. The search sexual assault of schoolchildren.

warrant set forth probable cause for two Virginia crimes: Harassment by Computer (Va. Code § 18.2-152.7:1) and threats of death or bodily injury to a person or member of his family; threats to commit serious bodily harms to persons on school property (Va Code. § 18.2-60). Id. at 515-16. The affiant also set forth, based on his training and experience, that adults engaged in this kind of crime often keep images and related documents, including child Id. Based on the affidavit erotica and sexual texts with minors. a magistrate issued a search warrant that authorized

in Williams, any and all computer systems and digital the search and seizure of documents, storage media, videotapes, videotape recorders. indicat[ive] of [i]nstrumentalities photographs, and Id. Law enforcement executed the warrant. [enumerated offenses]. DVD that contained child

seized the equipment, and found a pornography. Id. at 516. The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of the motion to suppress the child pornography. reasoning that the crimes being investigated included using a to communicate obscene computer or computer network or indecent language, or to make any suggestion or proposal of an thus obscene nature, or threaten any illegal or immoral act.

digital data was included within the scope of the elements of the Id. at 520. The Court of Appeals also crime being investigated. instrumentalities" of held that the child pornography images were the Computer Harassment charge because it was directly relevant to that the defendant the prosecution of the alleged offenses possessed images in which children were sexually exploited. Id. the possession of child pornography is in no

In this case, sense is related to, or an instrumentality of, the offense of Code § 9.1-903 (b). The crimes at failure to register under Va.

issue in Williams concerned acts and threats involving minor aged the offense of failure to register does not involve children. Here minor aged children. The link between child pornography and failure to register asserted in this case is fatally attenuated.

Cobb does not aid the Government either. In Cobb, law enforcement officers sought evidence through a search warrant but the nature of relating to the investigation of a murder. evidence was not known when executing the search warrant. All the investigators knew was that, in a jail house call, the defendant had asked his parents to "wipe" or delete his laptop because he on it. Cobb, 970 F.3d at 323-24. The search warrant had some shit n Id. for the defendant's residence included all laptop computers. // A second search warrant sought the inside contents of a laptop that had been seized pursuant to the first warrant. The second search warrant authorized the search of the laptop in evidence for [a] ny material associated with the homicide of [the victim] stored \\ . Any and all other internally on a Gateway laptop computer . . Id. at 323-24. When the executing

evidence of any other crimes. he immediately officer began to look through the computer, discovered pornographic images of minors. Id.

In Cobb, the Court of Appeals relied upon the principles that cannot—scrupulously need not—and in most cases, a warrant delineate each and every item to be seized tf and that when a warrant

does not otherwise describe the evidence to be seized, that gap if the warrant instead specified can be filled, at least sometimes the relevant offense. Id. at 328 {citing Blakeney, 949 F.3d at 862-863). The search of the computer was deemed sufficiently the executing officers particular" because the warrant confined discretion by allowing them to search the computer and seize the murder being evidence of a specific illegal activity. practical nor prudent" to further investigated. Id. It was neither u limit how the police searched through the computer even though the parties could not foretell what evidence would be on the computer.

Id.

The Fourth Circuit in Cobb acknowledged that "some computer may "require more specificity as to the place to be searches n Id. In Cobb, the police did searched or the items to be seized. n not know what they were searching for, or where it may have been located within the computer or its stored data. In comparison to law enforcement knew exactly what they were the present case. the Snapchat application on Tyson's phone. It was

searching for: necessary for the detectives in Cobb to explore through all the computer files to find some undetermined piece of evidence, but for Tyson's failure to register offense the police need only search for Snapchat related information. Here, based on the probable cause relating only to a failure to register, it would have been both practical and prudent for the detectives to limit their search into Tyson's phone.

c. Tyson's Consent (or Lack Thereof) to the Search of the Phones

Alternatively, the Government argues that Tyson voluntarily phone while being consented to the search of his everyday interviewed by Detective Joyner during the execution of the state search warrant. Resp. at 26-30. Tyson, however, contends that under Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), consent could not be given to search his phone after the detectives executed search warrant for his electronics, and alternatively if there was any consent given by Tyson to search the phone, it was specifically qualified to mean consent to search the phone solely for Second Renewed Motion

social media applications and Snapchat[.] at 24-26; Reply at 16-18.

Valid consent is a well-recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against warrantless searches. Trulock v.

Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 401 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Schneckloth v. 412 U.S. 218 (1973)). Consent to search is valid if Bustamonte, given by one with and (2) it is (1) knowing and voluntary, authority to consent United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 554 (4th Cir. 2007) . In determining whether consent to search was the totality of the circumstances freely and voluntarily given. examined. United States v. surrounding the consent must be 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Schneckloth, Lattimore, When analyzing consent, which is a question of 412 U.S. at 227). appropriate to consider the characteristics of the fact, it is education, intelligence, and accused (such as age, maturity. experience) as well as the conditions under which the consent to the number of search was given (such as the officer's conduct; and time of the officers present; and the duration, location. Whether the accused knew Id. (citations omitted) .

encounter). that he possessed a right to refuse consent also is relevant in determining the voluntariness of consent, although the Government need not demonstrate that the defendant knew of his right to refuse Id. (citing consent to prove that the consent was voluntary. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49; United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 938 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 846 (1990)).

Under the standard set by the Supreme Court in Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) and applied by the Fourth Circuit in Trulock V. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001), Tyson contends that he did not consent and that any consent was not voluntary.

The Government responds that Bumper does not provide a categorical bar against consent being provided after a search warrant has been executed, as the Supreme Court clarified in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973), by expressly adopting a totality of the circumstances test.

Tyson heavily relies on Bumper, where the police searched a house that the defendant shared with his grandmother. Upon arrival, an officer told the defendant's grandmother that they had go ahead," and opened a search warrant, to which she responded, 391 U.S. at 547. The Supreme Court held the front door. Bumper, that there was no valid consent because it was given only after the official conducting the search asserted that he possessed a and that acquiescence to an assertion of warrant, id. at 550, lawful authority does not constitute consent under the Fourth Trulock, stating Amendment. The Fourth Circuit agreed in acquiescence to an assertion of lawful authority does not \\ constitute an understanding, intentional and voluntary waiver of rights under the Fourth Amendment". 275 F.3d at 402 (quoting Bumper at 549-50).

But that does not change the fact that the Supreme Court in Schneckloth found that the knowledge of the ability to deny a search is only a part of the analysis to be completed. In the Supreme Court held that Bumper renders consent Schneckloth, if under all the circumstances it has appeared that invalid . granted only consent was not given voluntarily—that it was . .

in submission to a claim of lawful authority. 412 U.S. at 233 proof of The Supreme Court established that (emphasis added). the sine qua non

knowledge of a right to refuse" a search was not Id. at 234. The Fourth Circuit of an effective consent to search.

has adopted this approach, and has held that the question of the product of duress whether consent is voluntary, rather than of fact to be determined express or implied — is one or coercion, United States v. from the totality of all the circumstances. 914 F.3d 319, 324 {4th Cir. 2019) {quoting

Azua-Rinconada, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233). Thus, Tyson's reliance on Bumper and the Court must look at the totality of the alone fails. circumstances to determine if Tyson consented to the search of his phone.

When officers executed the search warrant at Tyson's home on August 24, 2023, Tyson was escorted out of his home, and before entering a police car with Detectives Joyner and Schwartz, he was told that the officers had a search warrant. June 17 Tr. at 90:10- Detective Joyner 19. After reading Tyson his Miranda rights. informed Tyson that they were executing the search warrant at his with Tyson the types of home for electronics and went over electronics that they were looking for. August 24 Tr. at 1:5-21; 2:23-3:24. Detectives Joyner and Schwartz made it clear the search warrant covered his phone and discussed with Tyson the details of what his main phone looked like, and asked if other phones were in the house. Id. at 3:10-4:7. Detective Joyner re-iterated twice to Tyson that they were searching the house for electronic devices, Id. at 6:1-10; 11:12-18, before again discussing what the cell Id. at 13:5-14:8. Detective Joyner phones at issue looked like. searching for his continued to remind Tyson that officers were electronic devices pursuant to the search warrant. See, e.g., id.

at 15:9-14 ("We're going to look at all the electronic devices. . .

that's what we're here for."); see also 16:5-12; 18:15-18.

Detective Joyner eventually turned the conversation to phone passcodes, to which Tyson immediately volunteered the passcode to I can give it to you. It doesn't his everyday phone, stating Id. at 22:16-21. When the officers brought up the it matter to me.

issue of Tyson's use of Snapchat, Tyson responded "I can bring it Id. 25:4-9. Also the Discord up on [the] phone and show it to you. application, Tyson told the detectives [i] f it's on the phone. if you'll bring the phone here, I'll show

you can look at it and tf it to you. // Id. at 26:5-27:16.

Detective Schwartz again re-iterated to Tyson that \\ search warrant is just for electronics so that we can dive into them and make sure there's nothing there. ft Id. at 42:11-16 (emphasis added). Tyson then refused to provide the passcode to a and different phone that the officers had found during the search Schwartz pushed back asking for the passcode so the officers can get into the stuff quickly, without having to use a whole bunch of . I believe it would expedite all of this[.]" forensic software. .

Id. at 43:12-23. Tyson responded by saying the phone may have personal stuff that could be "misconstrue [d] and offered "there's If that's what you're really looking for, no social media things.

then [I] can show it to you myself [.] n Id. at 44:1-11. Tyson expressed his understanding by saying to the officers that they and that the officers can \\ take have a general search warrant [the phones] back to where you take them back, and you look at Id. at 46:20-24. He confirmed to the officers that they them[.] n take [the phone] back to your place and look at it[.] Id. It would \\ at 47:9-18. Again, Tyson told the detectives that \\ I have no problem with you going through that [his every-day phone] and other social media looking at it, make sure I don't have any Id. 48:4-16. But, as to the phone to which he would not sites. n hopefully the warrant is provide the passcode, Tyson stated that more [] specific to, you know, social media sites [.] Id.

Near the end of the interview, Detective Schwartz told Tyson that they are working to confirm and corroborate his failure to if that's what you're doing, register, to which Tyson responded if that's all you're doing, then taking that back to your office [] opening the phone up and finding that under the search and Id. at 74:1-9 (emphasis added). He then again warrant is fine. u when you're looking for something specific, told officers, warrant has to say something specific. Id. at 75:5-17. tt the inquiry becomes: what

With all of these facts in mind. does the totality of the circumstances tell about Tyson's intention to have voluntarily consented to the extensive search that occurred There are facts that point in opposite directions. here?

To begin, there are, indeed, several facts that augur in favor of finding that voluntary consent was given. Upon the execution of the search warrant, Tyson was put in the front seat of the police vehicle to be interviewed by Detectives Joyner and Schwartz without any handcuffs or restrictions placed on him. June 17 Tr. at 90:17- 19; September 19 Tr. at 35:2-5. Tyson was immediately read his Miranda rights before he waived his right to counsel and agreed to at 1:1-24; see United States v. answer questions. August 24 Tr. 245 F.3d 352, 362 {4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the reading

Boone, of Miranda rights factors in favor of finding voluntary consent).

The detectives acted in a cordial manner towards Tyson throughout the entirety of the interview, repeatedly addressing him as sir. at 21:21, 25:24, 26:25, 29:13, 65:2; see United

August 24 Tr. 2022) 736 F.3d 677, 681 (4th Cir. States V. Robertson, friendly conversation characterized by relaxed. (interactions w indicate voluntary consent); United States between the two sides It 506 F.3d 1031, 1037 (4th Cir. 2007) (officers' V. Contreras, suggested absence of coercion). casual phrasing of [his] request n

Further, on multiple occasions, Tyson claimed that he did not have material that he was hiding; and, on multiple occasions. he that they told the officers, in a seemingly nonchalant manner could look inside his everyday phone. Compare August 24 Tr. at 22:16-20 ("I can give [my passcode] to you. It doesn't matter to ) , with United States v. Smith, No. 3:22CR90 (DJN) , 2023 WL me. 2023) ("Defendant's responses to

25349, at *9 (E.D. Va. Jan. 3 Officer Gilbert's requests carry an air of nonchalance —'Yeah, it and ain't nothing.'— suggesting that Defendant felt unbothered, certainly not coerced.") Tyson gave the passcode to the everyday phone but

Also, refused to provide the detectives with the passcode to a second phone that was found in the execution of the search warrant, August it is reasonable to infer that Tyson 24 Tr. at 74:19-25. Thus, knew that he did not have to provide his passcodes to Elie, 111 F.3d 1135, 1146 (4th Cir. detectives. United States v.

1997) ("By revoking his consent to search certain documents in his [the defendant] conclusively demonstrated that he knew of rooms, ) ; Schneckloth 412 U.S. at 249 his right to refuse consent.

(noting that although the accused's knowledge of his right to it refuse consent is not a prerequisite in establishing consent.

is a factor).

Finally, these interactions occurred in the backdrop of Tyson with the criminal law system as a as an individual familiar certainly not a newcomer to the law. This convicted sex offender, Boone, 245 F.3d at factor weighs in favor of a voluntary consent. a convicted felon, which

3 62 (A finding that the defendant was suggests he was not a newcomer to the law", militated in favor of Thus, the decisions cited by the finding voluntary consent). Government, applied to the foregoing facts, tend to support a finding of voluntary consent.

However, each of the cases cited by the Government, excluding Parrish which will be discussed later {pp. 45-46), the finding of voluntary consent occurred in the context of a warrantless search where no assertion was made by the officers that they were acting before any questioning of pursuant to a search warrant.® Here, Tyson commenced, he was immediately informed that a search warrant 1:1-24. was being executed upon his house. August 24 Tr. at Detective Joyner made it immediately and repeatedly clear to Tyson that they had a search warrant for all electronics, including cell 6 See Boone, 245 F.3d at 360 (analyzing consent given through consent form signed after a warrantless Terry stop); United States V. Strache, 202 F.3d 980, 986 (7th Cir. 2000) (analyzing consent given to a warrantless search); United States v. Sanchez- Valderuten, 11 F.3d 985, 990 (10th Cir. 1993) (consent given to warrantless search of vehicle); United States v. Hernandez, 872 F.

Supp. 1288, 1295 (D. Del. 1994) (same). The cases that Court adds in its analysis in the preceding paragraph concern warrantless 736 F.3d at 680-81 (no consent to searches as well. See Robertson, Contreras, 506 warrantless search performed outside bus stop); F.3d at 1037 (voluntary consent to warrantless search of vehicle trunk); Smith, 2023 WL 25349 at *8 (valid consent to warrantless Ill F.3d at 1146 (valid consent to search of bag); Elie, warrantless search of hotel room).

phones, that were present in his house. Detective Joyner made that assertion of authority again and again throughout the interview.

August 24 Tr. at 1:5-21 {"we are doing a search warrant at your house"; 2:23-3:24 ("we're doing the search warrant at your house [] right?"); 3:10-4:20 ("Do you because you do have electronics, have that cell phone on your person right now or is it inside? .

. when we start searching, we want to know whose phone we're when we go in the house and start looking at"); 6:1-10 ("again looking, we want to know what we're looking for as far as if like, there's any computers"); 11:12-18 ("we need to make sure.

the search warrant is for electronic devices. So, we'll look through all the electronics"); 15:9-14 ("You say you have some old ); 16:5-12 phones. Do you remember what kind of phones they are?" (the only way to make sure you don't have anything else is to — to look at those devices. And that's all look at the electronics.

we're doing."); 18:15-18 ("What we'd like to do is to just quickly make sure there's nothing on any electronic devices"); 42:11-16 ("the search warrant is just for electronics so that we can dive into them and make sure there's nothing there"); 46:20-24 (Tyson you guys have a general confirming to Detective Schwartz that: and then you take them blanket search warrant for electronics.

back to wherever you take them back, and you look at them"). instinct with coercion

Like in Bumper, this situation was [w]hen a law enforcement officer claims authority to because search a home [or telephone] under a warrant, he announces that the occupant has no right to resist the search. If 391 U.S. at 549- The Government cannot discharge its obligation to prove free 50 . evinc[ing] nothing more than and voluntary consent by acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. // United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 653 {4th Cir. 1996) (citing Bumper, 391 U.S. at 549) ; Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001) . in violation of a Virginia statute. Tyson was never

Further, provided with a copy of the search warrant that stated the officers were searching for child erotica. Thus, he had no reason to object to the search on that basis. That is significant because, during Tyson continually asked officers what the search the interview In view of how clear it was made to Tyson that the was about. officers were going to search his phones under the search warrant. is more akin to an

Tyson's giving of the phone passcode In this acquiescence of authority than it is to voluntary consent. the consent claimed by the Government is not borne out by

case. the record. And, this factor weighs heavily in assessing the totality of the circumstances.

The Government cites a single out of circuit case where a court found voluntary consent to a search after the execution of a search warrant: United States v. Parrish, 942 F.3d 289 (6th Cir.

2019) . The facts of Parrish are quite different than those In Parrish, the Sixth Circuit found that presented on the record. to search his phone after gave voluntary consent

a man execution of a search warrant for child pornography in the man's The man was given the search warrant before going into a house. congenial interview in which he removed and changed the passcode to his phone before handing it over to police officers. Id. at 292-293. The Sixth Circuit focused this holding on the fact that . that the officers told the "record contain[ed] no evidence. .

Parrish the warrant covered the cell phone before asking for his Id. at 294. Here, Detective Joyner made it consent to search it. abundantly clear the phones were subject to the search warrant before Tyson volunteered his passcode. Also, unlike the defendant in Parrish, Tyson was also never provided with the search warrant the search and could not have reviewed it to understand what warrant covered. the records

Considering the totality of the circumstances. shows that Tyson acquiesced to a claim of lawful authority. Thus, the Government's alternative consent argument fails.

d. Good Faith Exception

The Government argues that, if the state search warrant is deemed unconstitutional for lacking sufficient probable cause or the good-faith exception applies. and the for being overbroad, In rebuttal, Tyson argues evidence is not subject to exclusion.

that two exceptions to the good faith exception apply, contending that the affidavit was so lacking in probable cause as to render the officer's belief in it unreasonable and that the magistrate in misled by the language signing the state search warrant was involving child erotica that was mistakenly left in the affidavit.

Judicial review of a search warrant signed by a neutral and detached magistrate must accord certain weight to the magistrate's When reviewing a magistrate judge's probable cause decision. a court looks to whether there was a substantial

determination, United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463 basis for the decision. n After-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the 473 (4th Cir. 2006) . W sufficiency of an affidavit should accord great deference to the Id. (internal magistrate's determination of probable cause. the point of the exclusionary rule

quotations omitted). In fact, officers conduct [] is to deter future misconduct. So, where . warrants [signed by searches in good faith reliance on United the exclusionary rule should not apply. magistrates] , States V. Burton, 756 Fed. App'x 295, 297 (4th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 903 (1984) . This is known as the "good faith" exception. the good faith

The law recognizes four instances where exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply:

(1) if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) if the magistrate wholly abandoned his issuing judicial role in the manner condemned in Lo- ^[47]

Ji Sales, Inc, v. New York, 442 U.S.

(1979) ; (3) if the affidavit supporting the warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) if under the circumstances of the case warrant is so facially deficient--i.e., ±n failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.

United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460, 467 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal 468 U.S. at 923. In quotations omitted) (emphasis added); Leon, Doyle, the Fourth Circuit found that the third exception to the good faith exception was present; that the affidavit supporting the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable. Id. at 470- when considering the application 76. The Fourth Circuit held that. 'should examine the totality

of the good faith exception, courts of the information presented to the magistrate in deciding whether an officer's reliance on the warrant could have been reasonable. t u Id. at 471. There, law enforcement officer relied upon faulty, inconsistent evidence, and moreover, the evidence only supported the reasonable belief that child molestation had occurred, not that any illicit images were taken or possessed. Id. at 472 ("[E]vidence of child molestation alone does not support probable cause to search for child pornography.")

The probable cause alleged in the Joyner affidavit is even more attenuated in its connection to the possession of child pornography than was the affidavit was in Doyle. When looking at totality of information presented to the magistrate, there the \\ is nothing in the Joyner affidavit to show probable cause for Tyson's possession of child pornography. Id. at 471. Tyson's search for an investigation into a failure to register, an warrant was offense which does not by itself involve the possession of child pornography in any manner. Like in Doyle, evidence of failure to register alone does not support probable cause to search for child pornography. See id. at 472. There are no statements in the Joyner affidavit stating that Tyson possessed child pornography or that would indicate in any manner that Tyson would be in possession of Court concludes that an child pornography. Therefore, the present circumstances objectively reasonable officer in not rely on a warrant application so devoid of necessary could Id. at 476/ Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. Because the information. tr reliance on the warrant is not objectively reasonable, the good faith exception recognized in Leon is inapplicable. Leon, 468 U.S.

at 903.

II. Federal Search Warrant Tyson argues that the evidence derived even from the federal it is improperly search warrant also must be suppressed because derived from the state search warrant, i.e., it is \\ fruit of the poisonous tree. tt The record is to the contrary.

a. Fruit of The Poisonous Tree and the Independent Source Doctrine

A remedy for a violation of the Fourth Amendment is the suppression of any evidence obtained during the illegal police Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). Courts may conduct. See Mapp v.

also suppress evidence that is the indirect product of the illegal fruit of the poisonous tree. United States v. police activity as It Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 227 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Wong Sun United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). Ultimately, the V . critical inquiry is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which the instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary means (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The taint. tt Id.

Fourth Circuit requires Tyson to show a strong nexus between the exclusion of the evidence and a real deterrent effect on the behavior of law officers:

[I] t is not enough to show that unlawfully seized information 'gives an impetus or direction toward what is to be focused on by the government.' Rather, the nexus must be so direct that application of the exclusionary rule would have a real deterrent effect on the behavior of law enforcement for '[a]s with any remedial device, officers, the rule [should be] the application of [situations] where its restricted to those remedial obj ectives thought most are efficaciously served. / n

United States v. Hoang Anh Thi Duong, 156 F. Supp. 2d 564, 576 (E.D. Va. 2001) (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). where there is an independent and legal source for

However, the evidence that also was secured by an illegal search warrant, Almost simultaneously with [the evidence should not be excluded.

Supreme Court of United States'] development of the exclusionary rule, in the first quarter of [the twentieth] century, [the Supreme Court] also announced what has come to be known as the 'independent source' doctrine. United States v. Murray, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988); see Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). The independent source doctrine provides [w]hen the challenged evidence has an independent source that, exclusion of such evidence is not from an illegal warrant. n warranted. Murray, 487 U.S. at 537; Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, Thus, under the 'independent source' doctrine, when 443 (1984).

the police discover a particular fact by illegal means but later acquire knowledge of that same fact by independent, legitimate evidence of that fact is not excludable as fruit of the means, 513 F.3d 395, 404 police misconduct. n United States v. Mowatt, (4th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds, Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011).

This doctrine applies when a 'search pursuant to [a] warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the information and that would otherwise be subject to exclusion tangible evidence' United because they were found during an earlier unlawful search.

States V. Hill, 776 F.3d 243, 251 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Murray To find the search with a warrant 'genuinely 487 U.S. at 542) . independent, ' the unlawful search must not have affected (1) the (2) the magistrate officer's 'decision to seek the warrant or Id. (quoting Murray, 487 U.S. judge's 'decision to issue [it] . t n at 542) .

The record here establishes that the federal search warrant and the supporting Lopez Affidavit issued to search Tyson's phones that had been originally seized during the state search warrant The results of the illegal are not fruit of the poisonous tree.

state search warrant did not (1) affect Special Agent Lopez's affect Magistrate Judge (2) decision to seek the warrant, or Speight's decision to issue it. The federal search warrant was fully and properly supported by independent sources of probable cause.

b. The Federal Search Warrant Is Not Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Because It Was Based on Sufficient Independent Sources Special Agent Lopez in his supporting affidavit to the federal (1) Tyson's search warrant offered three bases of probable cause: statements in his interview with Detective Joyner, during the August 24, 2023 search and arrest warrants' executions, that he communicated with minors via social media and admitted to having personal relationships with several of them; {2 ) MVl and MV2 ' s statements during their forensic interviews that Tyson took nude photos of them on several occasions; and (3) Tyson's statements in 100 counts of child porn the recorded jail call that he had on [he] look[ed] at stuff that's underage his phones "because . Lopez Affidavit 15-18. Taking each of these sometimes . .

sources of probable cause in turn, it is evident that the Lopez Affidavit did not rely on any evidence derived from the illegal state search warrant.

First, the affidavit points to the interview that Tyson completed with Detective Joyner and Schwartz during the execution of the state search warrant. During that interview, Tyson voluntarily spoke with the detectives and made several statements regarding his personal relationships and various communications with minors, including both FM and MVl. Tyson even stated on August find stuff that he could be arrested 24 that law enforcement would for immediately because we would say it's child porn. June 17 Tr.

at 102:13-19. The execution of the search warrant and the interview with no opportunity for the evidence derived occurred in tandem.

from the search of the phones to have tainted what Tyson voluntarily stated to the officers. MVl and MV2's interview responses are not tainted by

Second, the state search warrant. Detective Joyner's testimony reveals the timeline for how he came to know both minor victims and initiate both of their forensic interviews. Joyner knew of MVl as early as interview with MF and her grandfather. June 2023 because of his and from reviewing the Snapchat conversations on her phone with Tyson and MVl. As early as July 7, 2023, Joyner knew that MVl had a room at Tyson's house from his interview with Randi Lanzafama.

June 17 Tr. at 60:12-21; 62:9-63:22; 64:25-65:16. By August 24, that from his interview with Belynda Payne, 2 023, Joyner knew Tyson had taken MVl and MV2 on a trip to Virginia Beach. June 17 Tr. at 93:17-25. The search warrant was executed on August 24, 2023, too, but Detective Joyner was not apprised by Detective Schwartz that an initial review of the phone found alleged child pornography until his return to the office after the interview 60 :25- with Belinda Payne. September 19 Tr. at 15:6-14, 56 : 14-25, 61:2; June 17 Tr. at 93:5-7. Detective Joyner, as an experienced investigator, had already decided to investigate MVl before learning of the child pornography, and he was made aware of the existence of MV2 before any results of the search warrant could have tainted the likelihood of those interviews occurring.

Finally, Tyson's jailhouse call is not tainted by the state search warrant. Tyson was in custody pursuant to an arrest warrant for violating Va. Code § 18.2-472.1, the failure to register offense. The validity of that arrest warrant is uncontested. Tyson was not arrested based on any probable cause obtained as a result of the state search warrant. While in custody after that arrest. the call and admitted to having and viewing child

Tyson made pornography. Lopez Affidavit ^ 18. This admission on the recorded line is neither tainted by, nor resulting from, the execution of the state search warrant.

All three sources of probable cause for the federal warrant sufficiently independent under the standard set by the Supreme are [t]o find the search with a Court. Under Murray and its progeny, warrant genuinely independent, the unlawful search must not have affected (1) the officer's decision to seek the warrant or (2) the magistrate judge's decision to issue it. // United States v. Banks 2024 WL 2989710, at *2 (4th Cir. June 14, 2024) (quoting United States V. Hill, 776 F.3d 243, 250 (4th Cir. 2015)). Joyner testified that he specifically did not produce any of the FBI. June 17 Tr. at 170:6-171:16. Cellebrite reports to Likewise, Special Agent Lopez testified that, when he received Detective Joyner's reports in September 2023, he did not receive June 24 Tr. at 40:1- or view any of the images on Tyson's phones.

4 . The probable cause statement outlined in the Lopez Affidavit is independent from the evidence that came from the state search and provides more than warrant's dive into the cell phones. sufficient probable cause for Agent Lopez to have sought the the first federal warrant to search the cell phones. Thus, requirement of Hill is satisfied. <

Further, Magistrate Judge Speight was in no manner influenced by the state search warrant in her decision to issue the federal The information that was presented to Magistrate search warrant. independent of the state search warrant and Judge Speight was investigation. Based on that information, Magistrate Judge Speight made the informed decision to issue the federal warrant. None of the allegedly tainted evidence was presented to Magistrate Judge Speight, so it could not have formed any basis on her finding of probable cause when issuing the federal warrant. So, the second \ requirement of Hill is satisfied, and the federal search warrant established through properly based probable cause is on independent sources. 2022 U.S. Dist. Tapia,

Tyson argues that United States v. Second Renewed

LEXIS 83964 (S.D. Ohio May 10, 2022) controls here. Motion at 32-33. In Tapia, the court deemed an affidavit for a subsequent federal warrant to be the tainted fruit of an earlier illegal state search warrant. Tapia, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83964 in Tapia, the probable cause at *56. However, Tyson ignores that. outlined in the subsequent federal warrant was the evidence derived from the state search warrant. Id. Here, Agent Lopez was not using the "tainted fruit" of the state search warrant.

Tyson's claim that the federal investigation was tainted because the FBI received the case file from the state investigation holds no water either. Tyson seemingly conflates the illegality of the state search warrant to mean that entire investigation into Tyson was illegal. Tyson concedes as much when admitting that the

FBI did not technically rely on the cell phone" but deems it was every other part of the state investigation was tainted because ECF No. 106 at 14. The FBI could not rely on the handed over. n illegally derived evidence, but it certainly was entitled to rely on the work that was done before the execution of the state search warrant.

Special Agent Lopez based his application for the federal search warrant on three probable cause grounds that would have been legitimately known with or without the state search warrant. warrant based on

Magistrate Judge Speight signed the The information. presentation of that legitimately obtained untainted by the state federal search warrant, therefore, was search warrant.

c. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(f) Does Not Lead to Exclusion

Tyson's final argument for the exclusion of the evidence taken during the execution of the federal search warrant is the FBI's failure to follow Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(f) by not providing a copy of the federal search warrant to Tyson upon its execution. MOTION at 33-35. This argument is based on a flawed reading of Rule 41(f) and its requirements. The relevant part of Rule 41(f)(1)(C) states:

(1) Warrant to Search for and Seize a Person or Property. (C) Receipt. The officer executing the warrant must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken or leave a copy of the warrant and receipt at the place where the officer took the property.

The controlling language of Rule 41(f)(1)(C) is that a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken must be given to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken. u noted by the use of The rule is alternatively satisfied. by leaving the warrant and

conjunctive use of the word ft or.

receipt at the place where the officer took the property. the actions of the federal agents in executing the

Here, federal search warrant comply with the plain language of the Rule 41(f)(1)(C). Federal agents provided federal search warrant and the receipt of the property to be seized to the Powhatan County on their Sheriff's Office, which had possession of the phone June 24 premises after the execution of the state search warrant. at 19:19-20:6. By leaving the search warrant and receipt at

Tr. Sheriff's Office, the organization in Powhatan County possession of and also the premises in which the property at the federal agents complied with Rule 41(f) (1) (C) . time was located.

Even if the Court were to accept Tyson's argument that this Fourth Circuit precedent still does not is a violation of Rule 41, categories exclusion. There two \\ support are those involving constitutional violations, of Rule 41 violations: and all others. United States v. Boker, 807 Fed. Appx. 232, 235 (4^^ Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 403 (4th Cir. 2000) . Non-constitutional violations of Rule 41 warrant suppression only when the defendant is prejudiced by the violation or when there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard Id. (internal citations and quotation of a provision in the Rule. [T]he Fourth Amendment is not offended where the

marks omitted). executing officer fails to leave a copy of the search warrant with the property owner following the search ... or fails even to carry Id. (quoting United States v. the warrant during the search. 459 F.3d 463, 472 (4th Cir. 2006). It is not a realistic

Hurwitz, argument that the federal officers were acting intentionally and in deliberate disregard of Rule 41(f)(1)(C) by complying with its there is no evidence to support such plain language. And, indeed.

an argument.

CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the DEFENDANT'S SECOND RENEWED MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT (ECF 102) was denied pursuant to the Court's Order on January 10, No.

2025. (ECF No. 110).

It is so ORDERED.

/s/

Robert E. Payne

Senior United States District Judge Richmond, Virginia Date: January 4^, 2025

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Tyson

Court Name: District Court, E.D. Virginia

Date Published: Jan 13, 2025

Docket Number: 3:24-cr-00034

Court Abbreviation: E.D. Va.