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United States v. Turner
720 F.3d 411
2d Cir.
2013
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*1 circumstances of of the the individual Foont,

case,” America, UNITED 93 F.3d at none of STATES of Appellee, the cases cited Chhabra involved facts paralleling those here. above, in

As Part II.A. discussed TURNER, Harold Defendant-Appellant. found, alia, correctly district court inter No. 11-196-cr. that Chhabra had immi- expert consulted gration in January counsel 2003 and was United States Court of Appeals, at that advised time that the tax evasion to Second Circuit. pleading guilty

which he was an ag- was May Argued: 2012. that, gravated felony even if did not he Decided: June 2013. receive sentence that included incarcera- tion, subject him would to deportation.

See, (“Chha- e.g., 2010 WL 4455822 at *3

bra was aware of the potential immigration prior

issues to the ... acceptance of his 2003.”).

guilty plea in February light of knowledge state of Chhabra’s ability

2003—and his at that time to inform judge

the district that because his de-

portation plead concerns he did not towish to the guilty prior judge’s acceptance — plea guilty, no see abuse of

discretion the court’s conclusion that Petition,

Chhabra’s Coram Nobis which

was filed until untimely.

CONCLUSION have

We considered all of Chhabra’s

arguments support of the merit and petition of his

timeliness found have

them to be without merit. The judgment court district is affirmed. *2 (Ronald Russo,

Richard H. Dolan G. Wikstrom, Stone, David Harvey M. Eliza- Katz, beth Wolstein & David J. on the briefs), LLP, Schlam Stone & Dolan New *3 York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant. R. Ridgway, William Assistant United (Manish Attorney Shah, States S. Assis- brief), tant Attorney, United States on the for Patrick Fitzgerald, J.
Attorney for the Northern Illi- District of nois, IL, Chicago, for Appellee. LIVINGSTON, Before: POOLER and COGAN, Judges, Circuit District Judge *.
Judge POOLER in a separate dissents opinion.

LIVINGSTON, Judge: Circuit On June Harold Turner publish- a blog post declaring ed that three Sev- judges enth Circuit deserved to die for their recent decision that the Second apply Amendment did not to the states: they If get are allowed to away with by surviving, Judges other will act way. same These deserve to be made an example such of as to send a message judiciary: Obey to the entire the Consti- tution or die. lengthy commentary declared judges

that the blood of these three would “replenish liberty,” the tree of judges get “didn’t the hint” sent gunman family who had murdered the judge Chicago, they another federal willing had not “faced REAL free men to up walk kill them and them for their disobedience,” defiance and rul- their * York, Judge Cogan, sitting by designation. Brian M. the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New rallies, as that of such at national speak cunning as to de- sleazy and “so

ing was d’Al- Congress in Coeur Aryan World response,” serve the ultimate result, Bu- the Federal ene, As a The next Idaho. killed.” to be “deserve (“FBI”) contacted Investigation work reau of photographs, posted Turner morning he would each of to find out whether addresses, numbers for Turner room acts he map any indicat- violent along report willing judges, three in which occur. the courthouse learned were about location of ing the worked, photograph and a agreed. out “Anti-truck point building modified provid- 2003 and Between barriers.” bomb *4 information, helpful FBI with some ed the of Turner juryA convicted instance, extremists who on reporting, for Frank East- Judges to assault murder acts of proposed and his website visited Bauer, Pos- and Richard erbrook, William admon- ignored repeated Turner violence. intimidate, impede, intent ner with the Inter- his violent regarding own ishments performance in the them with or interfere however, the FBI termi- and speech, net them or to retaliate of their duties for what relationship in 2007 the nated of official performance their account of on at tri- FBI handler characterized Turner’s is- appeal presents several This duties. issues.” al as “serious control review, the including whether sues for our supported by sufficient was jury’s verdict Judges About B. Turner’s Statements We a true threat violence. evidence of Easterbrook, Bauer, Posner and sufficient, that was that the evidence hold regarding instructed properly was later, 2009—the on June years Two threat,” that Turner was not and a “true Court of day the Seventh Circuit same any error. We affirm. by prejudiced National As- handed down Appeals Rifle Chicago, v. 567 America sociation of

Background (7th Cir.2009), Mc- sub nom. rev’d — -, Chicago, Donald v. I. Facts (2010) 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 S.Ct. —Tur- after tri- was convicted Because Turner publicly his blog post on published ner al, taking facts evidence we recite the entitled, “OUTRAGE: website available to the verdict. light favorable in the most UPHELD; says Ban Court Gun Chicago Gowing, E.g., United States ap- not by Supreme Court ruling ‘Heller’ Cir.2012) curiam). (per Tur- municipalities!” to states or plicable fury that “American expressed ner’s post Background A. Turner’s spectacular put have been gun owners began Turner Harold Beginning in ruling that a federal court jeopardy by at halturner- located operating website all—ALL— or cities ban states enables time on a weekly purchasing and show.com Turner then wrote ownership!” firearms station, which he both of shortwave radio judges who three Seventh Circuit as a he described to broadcast what used killed: case should be decided “Hal “talk radio show”—the legal chal- years peaceful All the on race By opinions Show.” appeals; years peaceful all the popular lenges; politics had made show and lawfully years peacefully all the supremacist groups such violent white legislators, to Nations, lobbying federal and state Aryan Klan and the Ku Klux finally goal of penultimate achieve receiving invitations meaning interpreting Second the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court Ap- Amendment, only to have it all thrown peals that decided in the Matt Hale by Appellate Judges in the trash three Case, group that a which fraudulently sleazy in a cunning manner so as to trademarked the name “World Church response. deserve the ultimate of the Creator” despite the fact

knew that name had by been used Church for years, could KEEP government The especially these —and ruthless, name the church cunning, three because who un- had used —are years it for trustworthy, disloyal, unpatriotic, didn’t challenge deceit- ful Trademark filing! scum. Their entire reason for exist- ing themselves, power is accrue unto By challenging the Trademark everything. over registration, people who had used only thing that has ever stood years the name for LOST IT. way achieving pow- of their ultimate That decision lead to an order [sic ] er the fact that People We The have a lower court for the Church to “surren- *5 Now, guns. very much in jeopar- der its Bibles for destruction because dy- they infringed on the trademark” given lies, cheats, Government manipulates, to the fraudsters. outright disobeys twists and the su- thereafter, Shortly a gunman entered preme founding law and documents of the home of that Judge lower court and not, they this land because have in our slaughtered the Judge’s mother and lifetime, REAL willing faced free men Apparently, husband. the 7th U.S. Cir- up walk to them kill and them for their cuit get court didn’t the hint after those defiance and disobedience. killings. It appears another lesson is Jefferson, Thomas one of our Found- needed. Fathers, ing told liberty us “The tree of Judges These are traitors to the Unit- must be replenished from time to time They ed States of America. have inten- tyrants with the blood of patriots.” and tionally violated the They Constitution. It is time to replenish the tree! have now also intentionally ignored a Let me say plainly: be the first to this major ruling by the Supreme Judges These deserve to be killed. Court. Their blood replenish will tree If get away are allowed to liberty. A price pay small to assure this surviving, Judges other act will freedom for millions. way. the same Turner then referred to the infamous Judges These deserve to made such murders of United States District Court an example of as to send a message to Judge Joan Lefkow’s husband and mother judiciary: Obey the entire the Constitu- Judge in Chicago Lefkow’s home on Feb- tion or die. ruary 2005, which he connected to Judge role in Lefkow’s a court case involv- day, posted The next Turner “up- an ing supremacist a white organization, the date” stating: “Judges official work Creator,” “World Church of the and its map addresses and a of the area are be- leader, Matthew Hale: low. Their home addresses and maps will ” This is not the politically-motivat- first follow soon. Behold these devils....

ed trash to come out of the Seventh photo- U.S. What followed were the names and fact, Circuit Court of Appeals. graphs it was Judges United States Circuit intentions infer Turner’s Bauer, might reader Easterbrook, and William Frank Immediately preceding post. writing Posner; for the room numbers Richard Easterbrook, post about within Turner’s chambers judges’ each of Bauer, Posner, was an example, and McKinley Dirksen Everett on June which published also post, other map of Courthouse; photograph and and legislator and accused Connecticut Chicago. On location the courthouse’s (OSE) Ethics Office State red Connecticut Turner drew photograph building’s is our intent and declared: “It tyranny wrote, barri “Anti-truck bomb arrows these indi action direct to foment of these bar ers,” the location to illustrate beastly govern These personally.2 viduals building.1 around riers example an be made officials should ment post, published day government: warning to others of as a an an email from received Judge Posner or die.” Obey the Constitution Against Hate called Citizens organization continued, attorney, police any “If state website a link to Turner’s that contained they’re going or court thinks department might Judge suggested Posner this; I suspect uppity with us about get Posner, it. Judge a look at want to take put them down enough bullets we have safety, the Unit- notified concerned for Further, announced post too.” Turner’s Turner’s Service of Marshals ed States “releas[e] that week later he would time, one of At the same statements. of the Senator addresses home blog Judge Bauer’s clerks discovered Bill 1098 as Assemblyman who introduced Chief Judge Bauer. post and informed of Thomas K. the home well as address *6 learned of Judge Easterbrook words, Turner’s from the OSE.” In Jones thereafter, Judge Bauer shortly when post they’re proud are so of what “[I]f chambers Judge Easterbrook’s strode into every mind if they shouldn’t doing, [sic ] “was him. His immediate reaction to show A times they live.” one where knows kill me.” somebody was the after added tamped update was judges acutely only all three Not were simply: “Officer stated noon of June Judge Lefkow’s of murder of aware the Po Capitol Boyle of the Connecticut State (they Judge all mother and husband knew story. regarding this lice called just also knew judges the personally), Lefkow the they are concerned about ‘Com Seems by Turner— mentioned individual ’ tyrants are the mentary below. Looks of soli- been convicted Matthew Hale—had Good.” [sic ]. worried Judge Lefkow. See citing the murder Hale, that he also declared generally States Turner’s website United curiam). Cir.2006) (7th major player (per “going “every after” to in- “I intend meltdown.” financial C. The Context Statements “Vicious, Turner wrote. revenge,” cite brutal, malice afore- savage, revenge with three had heard None of ever why blog his thought.” explained blog post. reading his of Turner before seriously by his taken posts should be readily blog, accessible on posts Other targets: however, which a provided context from actually post his ar- before that home addresses promised posting in this

1. Turner 25, 2009. rest on June maps follow. FBI would addresses and Tur- agents recovered a from later document that when he wrote admitted at trial computer that residential 2. Turner ner’s consolidated intent,” intent. he meant own judges, Turner did "our the three but addresses for I can’t legally killing, While undertake to a Utah state court official judge’s after a may just say I able to him, MAY—be ruling angered stated, “[M]aybe I — enough right things, enough of ought to my power abuse give out [the right people, happen: to make it judge’s] home Having ] done address.f who People everything have lost on ac- things such the past, I know this is an you. People count of whose children way effective to cause otherwise immune everything you. have lost on account seriously servants to rethink how People nothing hunting to lose by they use power lent to them We you you. down and I murdering am The People.” email, In the second sent to pounding to be them going with informa- an individual working at the New York you tion day night. about On and Times, Turner wrote: on, after week week after Sooner week. perpetrator of [certain] murders later, some of them gonna snap are was later killed in a confrontation with and you get will dead. police. So there way was no to ever certainly IWhile would use never prove whether he by my was motivated endeavor, blog for such an my eight Hence, remarks. I prose- could not be years on the radio and on internet cuted. has me in touch with gotten enough of That taught my posi- incident me how right people get it done. I know tion on radio could be utilized. I Today, get how to it done. Federal District power use that to confront what I see as Judge Humphrey Joan Lefkow in Chica- injustice. late, Of I have naming been go proof. key players in the financial melt- Judge Lefkow made a in court ruling down as people “worthy being dealt opined I “worthy made her later, with.” Sooner or perhaps some that, death.” After I said went someone distraught who everything lost out and murdered her husband bankers, the shyster may go decide to mother inside the Judges Chicago house. after them. *7 You new types.I’ll world order If happens.I that won’t shed talking be about YOU next. tear.

Think this is terrorism? You ain’t

seen yet. terrorism But I think it’s II. History Procedural

coming. by Two emails sent 22, 2009, intro- July Turner was indicted on at trial light duced shed further on “threatening] Tur- to assault and murder three names, purpose posting ner’s in photo- judges United States with the intent graphs, and Judges intimidate, work addresses of impede, and interfere with such Easterbrook, Bauer, and Both judges Posner. while in engaged performance emails were sent in late April ap- of official duties and with intent to retali proximately five pub- against weeks before Turner ate judges such on account of the lished the statements at the of performance duties,” center of official in violation email, 115(a)(1)(B).3 case. The first § which Turner sent of 18 U.S.C. 115(a)(1)(B) provides § 3. 18 U.S.C. judge in rele- fere with ... engaged such ... while part: duties, vant performance in the of official assault, ... with to retaliate kidnap, Whoever threatens to intent such ... judge judge ... a performance murder ... account of the on intimidate, duties, impede, intent to punished.... or inter- official shall be per- in the engaged while judges States were Seventh the three victims Because duties, or with official assigned of their formance the case was judges, Circuit Circuit, against the United to retaliate in the Seventh the intent judge to a district perform- Judge Donald account of the on assigned States rather was but Judge of After deliv- Walter, District official duties.” States ance of their E. United Louisiana, instructions, court who the district District of ering these the Western the Northern designation jury: in sitting by to the explained September Illinois. On District vehe- protects Amendment The First motion, Judge Walter upon Turner’s ment, criticism of scathing, and offensive to the East- transferred the case ordered officials, States including United public York. of New ern District that the defen- judges. you find Should mistrials, in trial was held for which he is dant’s statements After two government presented politi- than mere charged were no more August 2010. agents, an may justified FBI testimony you from several then hyperbole cal Marshals States in fact inspector with the United no threat was finding in that Easterbrook, Bauer, Service, Judges however, that a you, I made. instruct as his own Turner served and Posner. the term in as I have defined that Turner admitted witness. principal protected is not these instructions blog question, but posts he wrote the of the United the First Amendment were mere that his statements contended Constitution. States not amount to and did political hyperbole deliberation, After about two hours argued Turner also violence. threat of a unanimous verdict of returned him, their had advised before that the FBI guilty. was terminated relationship 18, 2011, January Turner filed this On blog posts of June statements like his appeal. constitutionally protect- were testi- agents The relevant FBI speech. ed Discussion opined on never

fied rebuttal Turner’s conduct and never legality that the trial appeal, argues On officials. to threaten authorized him he prove evidence was insufficient Easterbrook, Bauer, threatened evidence, Turner At the close meaning of within the and Posner acquittal pursu- judgment for a moved 115(a)(1)(B), engaging in opposed Procedure Rule of Criminal ant to Federal *8 Amendment-protected speech. He First 29, court denied. which the district the court failed to also claims that district jury court instructed The district respect with to jury properly instruct the offense, the elements of the respect to Finally, he main- First Amendment. (1) a threat that “a statement is including improper government tains that various circumstances if it was made under such evidentiary rulings preju- and statements or read- person hearing that a reasonable each of these diced the trial. We address with its the statement and familiar ing in turn. contentions it as a serious context would understand injury;” inflict of an intent to expression Sufficiency I. the Evidence (2) only they if that could convict and argues principally doubt that Tur- beyond found a reasonable prove to in- at trial was insufficient impede, intent to evidence ner “acted with the Easterbrook, that he threatened timidate, the United or interfere with

419 Bauer, Posner, that, because his dent review of the record to determine only reasonably “could blog posting whether the facts jury as found opinion” not a true political read[ ] establish the core constitutional fact” of a violence, protected by it threat of Hanna, true threat. United States v. 293 disagree. First Amendment. We (9th 1080, Cir.2002). F.3d 1088 Other courts, however, have conducted sufficien- reviewing a conviction for sufficiency cy review this context without reference evidence, we “view the evidence See, to the constitutional facts doctrine. light govern- most favorable to the e.g., Jeffries, 473, United States v. ment, 692 F.3d drawing all reasonable inferences in Cir.2012) (6th (reviewing a government’s favor.” threats (2d Cir.2010). 215, conviction sufficiency 599 F.3d without reference Sabhnani general, “In to given writing doctrine); ‘whether con- the constitutional facts Unit- Parr, stitutes threat is an issue of fact for the 491, ed States v. 545 F.3d 496-97 ” Davila, jury,’ (7th trial Cir.2008) (same). United States v. Moreover, at least (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Unit- one noted commentator has taken the view Malik, ed States v. 16 F.3d appellate that “federal courts have authori- Cir.1994)) (brackets omitted); see also ty to independent exercise judgment with Carrier, United States v. 672 F.2d 306 respect adjudicative facts decisive of (2d Cir.1982) (“Most [involving cases al- application,” constitutional law but that “it leged are within a expanse threats] broad goes too far to convert competence varying patterns fact which may not be duty,” into a even in the First Amendment law, resolved as a matter of but should be Henry context. P. Monaghan, Constitu- left affirm jury.”), and we therefore Review, tional Fact 85 Colum. L.Rev. the conviction if “the evidence at trial was (1985); Fallon, Jr., see also Richard H. ... to permit sufficient a reasonable John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer & that find conduct [Turner’s] constituted Shapiro, David L. Hart & Wechsler’s The Davila, a threat.” 461 F.3d at 305. Federal Courts & The System Federal challenge applica- does not (6th ed.2009) 334-35 (noting “[t]oday, case, tion of this standard of review to his vitality of the constitutional fact note, however, but reaffirms it. We disputed_”). is] doctrine! in matters implicating the First Amend- We need not decide in this case whether ment, in some independently contexts required we are independent conduct an facts,” review so-called “constitutional review of the record as to the core consti- “scrutinizing] carefully the lower court’s tutional question of the existence of a true application of the relevant standards to the Here, threat. the result is the same facts at hand” to judgment ensure that a whether the constitutional fact doctrine is does not intrude on First Amendment (or not) implicated. We determine Cutler, rights. United States v. the evidence at trial was more than suffi- (2d Cir.1995) 825, 833-34 (emphasis omit- *9 ted). permit cient to a reasonable to find The Ninth Circuit has invoked the 115(a)(1)(B)— § each of the elements of constitutional facts doctrine the context including requirement the a conviction, of a of true threats suggesting that an beyond a reasonable appellate jury’s court doubt. We “[d]efer[s] to the threat — findings facts, on also conclude on an credibility independent historical de- based re- terminations, statutory and elements of lia- that view record the core constitu- bility,” but then an indepen- tional fact amply “conduces] of a true threat was

420 disruption the and ‘from fear of violence’ Turner’s conduct was

established, that and v. Virginia engenders! ]’....” that fear First Amendment. by the unprotected 1536, Black, 123 S.Ct. 538 U.S. (2003) (quoting R.A.V. v. 155 L.Ed.2d 535 conviction, 18 of The statute 388, 377, Paul, 112 St. City of objec- 115(a)(1)(B),includes both § U.S.C. (1992)), 2538, L.Ed.2d 305 and 120 S.Ct. to be con- elements: subjective tive and the First Amend- with fully are consistent (1) “threat- have both victed, must Turner 1536; 359, see at 123 S.Ct. ment. See id. murder” a federal ... or to assault en[ed] Crime, Greenawalt, Speech, and also Kent (2) impede, intim- to “inten[ded] judge, and (1989) (“Despite Language 91 the Uses judge ... ... idate, with such of or interfere speech, legis- a of freedom the relevance of offi- performance the engaged in while make it reasonably decide to lature could retaliate duties, to inten[ded] ... cial or firm- apparent person for a criminal with ... on account judge ... against such legal specific a to threaten purpose ness of Id. of official duties.” performance the either likely to be to grave enough evidence wrong that not contest the Turner does that he to disturbance prove cause substantial emotional at trial was sufficient require or retaliate to to threatened or intended intimidate Easterbrook, Bauer, and Posner. resources for employment substantial failed Rather, that the evidence argues he investigation prevention.”). threat. a true prove

to en argues that he Turner first conduct test This Circuit’s whether pure constitutionally protected gaged in objective threat “is an to a true amounts of his edito speech: expression an political ordinary, an rea namely, whether one— opinion the Seventh Circuit’s rial about with the who is familiar recipient sonable respect to the Second decision with in would of the [communication] context Tur no doubt that We have Davila, Amendment. injury.” terpret it as to con entitled Malik, constitutionally ner was F.3d at (quoting 461 F.3d omitted).4 disparage Seventh Circuit. demn and 49) (internal mark quotation unin should be on issues “[D]ebate true where Prohibitions threats —even on hibited, robust, open, and and wide carrying intention of has no speaker vehement, caustic, include may from the well ‘protect[ ] them out—“ individuals speech qualify as a true necessary” for post-dates, to decision in Davila 4. This Court’s Black, (de- address, threat) Virginia Jeffries, v. at 479-80 692 F.3d but did not 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d specific 123 S.Ct. clining require intent in defini- to (2003), Supreme Court stated threat) which v. tion of a true " encompass state- those '[t]rue threats’ White, (4th Cir.2012) 508-09 speaker communi- means to ments where the (same). argument based makes on no expression to com- of an intent cate a serious poses and this no occasion this division case particular violence to a an act of unlawful mit assuming, arguendo, that Even it. address Id. at group of individuals.” individual “true threats” alter the Black did definition Black, dis- Since some 123 S.Ct. 1536. intimidate, require subjective intent among sister cir- agreement arisen our has the same: the this case outcome in would or over- regarding whether Black altered cuits which was convicted under statute objective for true test ruled traditional element, subjective see intent includes subjec- speaker requiring threats 115(a)(1)(B), on our inde- based U.S.C. recipient of the tively intimidate the intend to the record conclude pendent review of Cassel, Compare United States threat. pursuant threat was true established (9th Cir.2005) (interpreting 632-33 subjective objective and tests. both holding "intent to Black as intimidate

421 Blue, unpleasantly sharp (Scranton) sometimes attacks on The Times-Tribune Oct. v. 23, Watts government officials.” http://thetimes-tribune.com/ States, 705, 708, United 394 U.S. 89 S.Ct. opinion/editorials-columns/roderick- (1969) 1399, curiam) 22 L.Ed.2d (per random/kanjorski-ponders-nuts-bolts-from- Sullivan, (quoting New York Times v.Co. Although blue-1.1052739. lack the nec 710, 376 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d essary context to many evaluate (1964)) (internal quotation mark omit- proffered statements, none of the brief or ted). But political Turner’s criticism was off-the-cuff remarks cited Turner rises Rather, the basis for his conviction. nearly to the seriousness of ex Turner’s he was convicted of doing something tended discussion of killing Judges Easter- more —of the lives of three brook, Bauer, and Posner.5 ifAnd Turner intent, 115(a)(1)(B) judges § with the as were able to furnish examples of other provides, intimidate, impede, “to or inter- threats apparently as serious as his attack fere with judge[s] such ... while en- on these judges, those threats would also gaged in the performance of official exceed the ambit of the First Amend 115(a)(1)(B). duties.” 18 U.S.C. As al- protections ment’s exonerate Turner. —not stated, ready prohibiting threats —both to The full context of Turner’s remarks preserve citizens from fear and “from the gravity reveals a readily distinguishable possibility that the threatened violence will from hyperbole mere or common public Black, occur,” 359-60, 538 U.S. at discourse. blog (internal post, Turner not quotation S.Ct. 1536 marks omit- ted) only wrote that these three should constitutionally permissible. The —is killed, explained but also sufficient, Judge evidence was more than how more- over, for a Lefkow against to conclude that had ruled Matt Hale and how, “political “[sjhortly thereafter, statements were not hyperbole,” a gunman en- contended, as he but violent threats tered the home of that lower court Judge against judges’ lives. and slaughtered Judge’s mother and husband. Apparently, the 7th U.S. Circuit per- contends no reasonable court get didn’t the hint after kill- those son could have interpreted his statements ings. It appears another lesson is need- as a threat because “[Turner’s] kind of talk Easterbrook, Bauer, ed.” permeates public Appellant’s discourse.” Posner were of course familiar with those Br. at 41. He examples, cites including murders, Lefkow, with Judge and with congressman former quoted who was in a subsequent Matt Hale’s prosecution for newspaper local saying gubernato- of a candidate, soliciting someone to kill Judge rial running “Instead of Lefkow. gov- Florida, they ernor of Such serious references ought to him to actual acts of have and shoot him. Put him violence apparent the wall carried out in retribution See and shoot him.” Christopher Kelly, judge’s J. for a clearly decision would allow a ‘Nuts,’ Kanjorski Ponders Bolts juror reasonable to conclude that Turner’s from examples 5. provides get my in his sights brief want to is L.BJ.” —at which Watts, 706, seem more akin point to the facts in laughed. the crowd Id. at 89 S.Ct. 1399; Supreme 89 S.Ct. in which the see id. at 89 S.Ct. 1399. The Court eighteen- reversed the conviction of an Court held that these facts were insufficient to who, year-old participating prove while in a discus- a true threat to harm the President. group during public rally sion at the Wash- See id. at 89 S.Ct. But 1399. such an Monument, ington recently he obviously flippant stated had re- quite statement is different ceived his draft classification but lengthy "[i]f from Turner's and detailed discussion rifle, carry ever make me killing judges. I first man the three *11 im- otherwise way to cause an “effective Davi threat. See a true were statements seriously to rethink servants that the evi mune (holding la, at 305 F.3d jury the had power,” a threat how use support [their] sufficient dence to conclude threatening letter from which the evidence where abundant conviction in well-publicized long “not after that Turner was was sent “accom and was en- ruling, of 2001” rather than anthrax attacks for their retaliation to anthrax by apparent references panied political hyperbole. gaging in mere Laden”). Indeed, Bin Osama and syntactical a “close argues that a threat recently affirmed Fourth Circuit that he reveals analysis” of his statements similar circumstances— very in conviction He wrote passive voice. only used email “concluded] [his] speaker where a Easterbrook, Bauer, Judges that variously Judge Lef- recipient] by comparing [the killed”; to be Posner “deserve and murdered.” kow, had been relatives whose this get away with they are allowed “[i]f White, 498, 512 v. act the Judges will surviving, by other Cir.2012). (4th deter The Fourth Circuit Judges de- way”; “[t]hese same and reference, among given this mined that example an of as to made such serve of “[a]ny recipient things, reasonable other judiciary: entire message a to the send have taken it as a threat would this email he Because Obey the or die.” Constitution Id. of violence.” them,” wrote, kill “I will explicitly never in case is of a threat this The evidence claims, cannot reason- his words web- posted on his stronger. Turner even interpreted as a threat. ably have been ruling made a in “Judge Lefkow site that in ar- essentially concurs The dissent ‘worthy her of opined I made court that an that at least when contending gument, that, death[,]’ I said someone [and] [a]fter “public state- alleged threat constitutes her husband went out murdered opposed “per- to a advocacy” as ment Judges Chicago house.” inside the mother ],” it “must be clear- eommunication[ sonal publicly statements that Turner’s Given constitute a of a threat” to ly the form Tur- between a causal connection implied Amendment pur- threat for First true judges’ deaths and actual calls for ner’s 434). (dissent poses. murders, about his statements neither comports with respect, this With Posner, Bauer, Easterbrook, were protections nor afford- precedent by reasonably interpreted as quite As we have by ed the First Amendment. intent that expression these the serious before, to the “rigid adherence literal said too, harm. come to See Planned judges, communication without re- meaning of a Columbia/Willamette, Parenthood of connotations derived to its reasonable gard Activists, Am. Inc. v. Coalition of Life render the its would stat- from ambience banc) (9th Cir.2002) (en 1058, 1079 ingenuity powerless against ute poster (finding naming that a “WANTED” can instill in the victim’s threateners who a true constituted specific victim impend- apprehension an mind as clear previously who had after three individuals aby injury by implied an menace ing posters featured such “WANTED” been 50; Malik, 16 F.3d at see literal threat.” murdered). The seriousness had been Shoulberg, 895 F.2d also United States moreover, threat, was further shown (2d Cir.1990) (upholding threat judges’ photo- posting Turner’s Amendment against a First conviction Coupled with graphs and work addresses. ... use “implied [of] to an challenge due email a admission an few of imminent and “overtones violence” releasing addresses was weeks earlier *12 added)). Malik, (emphases more- boasting threat” ner’s own that public dissemina- over, Supreme is in full accord with the tion of address information is “an effective Black, recognition Virginia way” fear, in v. Court’s to instill “to cause otherwise 123 S.Ct. 155 L.Ed.2d immune seriously servants to reth- (2003), given surrounding they con- ink how power use the lent to them text, burnings may unpro- People.” cross constitute We The violence, tected threats of at see id. We do not hold and do not mean to 1536, despite wholly 123 S.Ct. suggest that syntax is not a relevant factor nature of implicit the serious threat for consideration in appropriate cases.6 convey. But jury clearly reasonably acted in concluding that Turner’s statements Here, merely Turner did not advocate amounted to a true threat given, inter express law violation or an abstract desire alia, his lengthy discussion of killing the Easterbrook, Judges for the deaths of judges, three his reference to the killing of Bauer, posted photo- and Posner. He Judge family, Lefkow’s and his update the graphs, work addresses and room numbers day next with detailed regard information judges, along map for each of the with a ing Judges Easterbrook, how to locate photograph of the courthouse. More- Bauer, and Posner. All powerful this is over, Turner’s intent to interfere with of a evidence true threat —that Turner judges- through these intimidate them —to intended his website to intimidate Judges threat of violence—could not have been Easterbrook, Bauer, and Posner and to clearly in pointed more stated his refer- impede in performance them the of their colleague, ence to their family whose mem- by putting duties them in fear for their gunman bers had been killed: entered “[A] lives. Judge the home of that lower court slaughtered Judge’s claims, next, mother and hus- that United States Kelner, band. Apparently, the 7th Circuit Cir.1976), 534 F.2d 1020 get dissent, court didn’t the hint....” The very defines threats narrowly, and that it acknowledging that requires Turner wished to see reversal here. The Kelner Court dead, the three con- nevertheless concluded that “a narrow construction of ” cludes that Turner’s statements cannot § word ‘threat’ in 18 U.S.C. constitute a true threat publicly because which criminalizes the transmission in in- made, although speech “might be terstate sub- commerce of a communication ject if, to a different interpretation containing injure a threat to example, the another, statements were sent to the fully is consistent with the First (dissent Amendment, in a letter or email.” despite absence 434). It hard to any see how Turner’s threat requirement spe- that the defendant however, threatening, became less cifically carry because intend to out the threat. Id. publicly particularly Tur- given Affirming at 1027. the threat conviction issued— example, Bagdasari 6. For in United States v. as Turner's extended discussion an, (9th Cir.2011), 652 F.3d 1113 Easterbrook, Bauer, on which killing Judges heavily, Turner relies vacat Ninth Circuit Bagdasarian simply Posner: defendant conviction, basing ed a threats its decision in posted message a on Yahoo! Finance online part speaker on the fact that the did not use board two one—sentence comments contain- person writing the first that the President ing quoted language simultaneous- —while “will have a 50 cal in the head soon” and ly posting suggesting other comments that he nig.” "shoot the Id. at 1119. But the facts in id. was drunk. See at 1115 & n. 10. Bagdasarian nearly seriously were not appeared a substance dant delivered there, “[s]o dicta the court wrote vel in the The “existence powder). its face and anthrax threat on long as the *13 ” said, threat,’ it made is so “is a is we also which non of a ‘true circumstances unconditional, and immediate unequivocal, jury.” left to a generally best question threatened, toas the person as to specific Malik, 16 F.3d at 51. and imminent of convey gravity purpose a moreover, Turner’s importantly, More § execution, 875] U.S.C. [18 of prospect com- only Kelner —that interpretation of Id. at 1027. applied.” be

may properly facially unequiv- that threaten munications /., concur- (Mulligan, at 1029 But see id. immediate, unconditional, ocal, specific (“I obi- accept Judge Oakes’s cannot ring) with consistent injury may prohibited be requirement proposed [T]he ter dicta.... contrary to the the First Amendment —is immediate, imminent of that the threat be conclusion Black. Supreme Court’s to me to be injury seems unconditional can burning nor the that cross by the statute Black Court held neither required Amendment.”). argues, threat, upon Turner depending First a constitute that all effect, requires Kelner circumstances, that “[i]n- because surrounding threats, prohibiting the statute whatever constitutionally proscriba- timidation in the them, conditions before satisfy must these true type is a of ble sense of word with the they may punished consistent be threat, a threat to speaker a directs where First Amendment. persons of with the group a or victim in fear of bodi- placing not de- intent of say it to that this does

Suffice cases, 360, affirmed con- at ly which have harm or death.” 538 U.S. scribe our But, both condi- for threats that were Supreme victions as the Court S.Ct. 1536. Malik, 16 F.3d inexplicit. burning tional and cross does not acknowledged, “a 45, a threat con- example, we affirmed for convey message of intimi- inevitably which pursuant to 18 U.S.C. viction few, dation,” though any, messages if even threatening communica- mailing prohibits ominous. Id. at 123 S.Ct. 1536. are as menacing” let- tion, “cryptic and based on necessary that it that suggests is play as “I’ll (containing phrases such ters that on their face show he his statements likewise from a Koranic you judges ac- to take violent personally “intend[ed] eye an thats an for perspective and Torooh judges.” But neither Kel- tion life”). at 50. life for a Id. We eye and Black, ner, re- certainly impose this nor that the letters were acknowledged “[a]r- 359-60, id. at 123 S.Ct. quirement. See wrote, ambiguous.” ... Id. But we guably 1536. argument, directly contrary to Turner’s finally, that lan argues, explicitly of “[a]n absence face, direct guage, purported on its be finding language preclude does not than the parties, at third rather ed course, and, a conditional threat themselves, it cannot and that therefore your life’—is ‘your money or e.g., threat — unless it constitutes incite (citations prohibited at 49 a threat.” Id. nonetheless Brandenburg meaning Davila, ment within at omitted); 304- see also Ohio, 444, 89 S.Ct. delivering a (upholding conviction (1969) curiam).7 The (per the defen- L.Ed.2d 430 through the mail where inciting producing advocacy directed to or guarantees of free "[T]he 7. constitutional likely to incite action and is press permit a State to imminent speech and free do not lawless Brandenburg, 395 produce such action.” proscribe advocacy the use of forbid 1827. except U.S. at 89 S.Ct. violation where such force or of law and, language further, that with from agree, concluding Kelner appears dissent advocacy of the use speech, “as error violated Turner’s Sixth force, the true threats cate falls outside right Amendment to a trial on the perhaps may still be constitu gory,” but essential elements of the offense. Accord- (dissent 434-35). tionally proscribed, Turner, ing to the district court was re- however, over argument, again This relies quired jurors to inform could syntax denotation and much on the literal only convict him if his statements were “so statements, refusing to ac of Turner’s unconditional, immediate, unequivocal, *14 may that be knowledge threats —which threatened, specific person as to prohibited, consistent with the First convey gravity purpose a and imminent nor explicit Amendment —need be neither prospect Appellant’s execution.” Br. at conveyed grammatical precision with the Kelner, 1027). (quoting at of an don. Turner’s conduct was Oxford government argues that Turner by jury constitute reasonably found because, any objection waived such al- threat, by a the First Amend unprotected though requested Turner that the Kelner ment; it need not also constitute incite language jury included in be instruc- ment to imminent lawless action be trial, during specifi- tions his first he never properly proscribed.8 cally objected when the court declined to considered and dismissed Tur- Having it, proposed jury use and because the in- arguments respect to the suffi- ner’s during structions submitted evidence, that ciency of the we conclude second and third trials made no mention of found, jurors reasonable could have based from this sentence Kelner. Rule 30 of the trial, at that Turner’s on evidence pro- Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure statements constituted a threat of serious considering objection hibits us from an judges, harm to the three victim and that properly that was not raised below unless threat with the in- Turner undertook this plain it amounts to error. See Fed. tent to intimidate them while were 30(d). that R.Crim.P. We conclude we performance in the of their duties engaged need not decide whether Turner properly per- or to retaliate them for said however, objected, because the district Accordingly, formance. the evidence was by court did not err its instructions Furthermore, sufficient. based on an in- omitting any the Kelner dicta in event. dependent review of the record and for above, essentially the reasons stated jury We review claims of error that Turner’s constituted

conclude conduct de novo. States v. instructions United pur- a true threat for First Amendment (2d Cir.2011). Kozeny, 667 F.3d poses. “A if it jury instruction is erroneous mis Jury II. Instructions jury legal leads the as to the correct stan adequately inform the argues Turner next the district dard does Bahel, jury by failing jury court erred to instruct the on the law.” United States v. 115(a)(1)(B), argues properly § 8. Turner also that the indictment was and the in- constructively regarding amended from a threats offense structed the elements of that stat- or, alternatively, including requirements of a true to an incitement offense ute— threat, II, prejudicial there was a variance between the see Part The evidence trial infra. proof indict- than sufficient to establish Turner's indictment and the at trial. The was more Hence, ment, however, 115(a)(1)(B). charged with threat- violation of ening federal in violation of 18 U.S.C. claim is without merit. (2d Cir.2011) (internal however, a you, I made. instruct omitted). I the term threat as have defined marks quotation by protected instructions is not these in ease, district court In this the First Amendment of the United jury: structed States Constitution. [Wjhether statement is particular objective an stan- governed threat is reflect the Although these instructions is, a threat if That a statement is dard. cases, see, prior outlined in test we have such circumstances it was made under Davila, F.3d at Turner con- e.g., person hearing reasonable that a specified additional ele- tends that Kelner familiar with reading the statement and that are neces- of a threat offense ments it as a its context would understand namely, that it “so sary for conviction: of an intent to inflict expression serious immediate, unconditional, unequivocal, explicitly injury. an An absence threatened, as to specific as to the threatening language preclude does not convey gravity purpose and imminent *15 you finding from the statement be Kelner, 534 prospect of execution....” threat. at 1027. have affirmed convic- F.2d We necessary government It is not for the jury in instructed with tions which the was prove that the defendant intended to Malik, language, 16 F.3d at such see threat, carry out the that the defendant an in- but we have never held that such threat, carry ability had the out the In- constitutionally required. struction communicated the or that the defendant deed, in itself —where we affirmed Kelner in- to the victims. The relevant portion relevant of the the conviction—the tent is the intent to communicate jury only instruction stated that “[m]ere threat. political hyperbole expression opinion charged determining whether threat,” or discussion does not constitute threat, you statements constitute a justified in jury and that would be in should consider the context which in if finding that no threat was fact made they were made. Written words or “no more than an the statements were and their reasonable connota- phrases indignant stating or extreme method of ” character as tions take their Kelner, F.2d political opposition.... in or harmless from the context which (internal omitted) quotation at 1025 marks used, they are measured the common (alteration in original). district they in experience society which in contained court’s instruction this case the cir- published. are This includes therefore nearly language. identical We they are uttered as cumstances which conclude that the district court did not err well as the circumstances of the language by omitting requested Kelner who uttered them. from its instructions. argues vehe- Turner also the dis protects

The First Amendment ment, by charging the scathing, plainly and offensive criticism of trict court erred officials, jurors only they “may” than including United States —rather (cid:127) if judges. you acquit find that the defen- found Should “must”— political hyperbole. mere dant’s statements for which he is statements to be contest that he failed to charged politi- were no more than mere Turner does not objection and that our hyperbole you may justified cal then raise this below plain er- finding that no threat was in fact review is therefore restricted may exercise our A. Evidence and Accordingly, we Government Statements ror. only Regarding to notice a forfeited error Turner’s Audience discretion error, in fact it was plain, there was where argues government im- rights, substantial it affected Turner’s permissibly suggested jury, to the both fairness, seriously affects the the error questioning witnesses and in its summa judicial integrity, public reputation tion, that Turner was inciting large audi Cain, United States v. proceedings. followers, ence of racist which Turner con Cir.2012). (2d 271, 287 bur “[T]he tends is irrelevant to whether he made a relief for establishing den of entitlement to true threat in violation of 18 U.S.C. plain claiming error is on the defendant 115(a)(1)(B). Because Turner did not Dominguez it....” United States v. Beni trial, object at we review for plain error. tez, 124 S.Ct. Williams, See United States v. 690 F.3d (2004). L.Ed.2d 157 (2d Cir.2012); United States v. Si mels, 161, 168 Cir.2011). assuming arguendo Even error, We find no much plain less by using district court erred the word degree error. The to which Turner’s “may” portion rather than “must” in this widely statements were read and noted charge, plain. of its this error was publicly relevant to whether Turner preju Turner cannot show that he was intended for his threats to reach—and by any diced error. The district court’s Easterbrook, thus to properly *16 other instructions defined the ele intimidate — Bauer, emails, April and Posner. necessary jury ments for the to find a true Turner himself drew the link between convict, jury threat. To therefore had perceived ability audience and his influ to conclude that Turner’s statements public “position ence officials: his on the reasonably interpreted by would be some him gave “power” radio” to “confront hearing reading one them and familiar injustice” what I see as and to “cause with their context as a expression serious immune otherwise servants to seri injury, of an intent to inflict that he ously they power rethink how use the lent intentionally made these statements to in by People.” to them TheWe timidate or retaliate judges. findings satisfy

These are sufficient to Moreover, himself, it was Turner not the First Amendment. government, emphasized who in his status supremacist community, thereby the white therefore that the We conclude district placing the nature of his audience issue.9 court’s instructions did not contain Miller, See States v. United prejudicial error. Cir.1973) (holding govern that questions ment’s on cross-examination and Arguments III. Other during regarding remarks summation de in supple- Both his counseled and in a fendant’s association a team of with rob brief, pro mental se Turner raises create unfair prejudice various bers did not be arguments challenging other his convic- cause defendant had in issue the “placed tion. that none requires scope We conclude re- of his association” with the robbers examination). versal. In the course during direct gov- open[ed] 9. The district court ordered that defendant the door.” Turner un- deniably "opened ernment could not reference Turner's mem- the door” to the line of now, bership organization inquiry belatedly, objects. in a racist “unless the to which he in-between. But speech, anything part on mounting a defense based you say what I think or ad- the minute previously [“]do had agents that FBI claim die,[”] protected not you’re gonna that’s of the sort he blog postings him that vised judge that’s what the will speech. consti- And 2009 were on June posted threats, you, by that as defined dur- instruct Turner testified tutionally protected, instructions, protected not “my [are] show was these that examination ing direct You have the First Amendment. don’t history that had a groups ... with popular analysis at all. part your that ... to let [such t]he violence doing terrible Klan, Nations, Aryan [and] Klux K[]u government “[v]ictims also said FBI claimed that the Nazis.” And punctuation and verb don’t care about celebrity or—I don’t him “as viewed tense,” average person and that “how an star, I’m not a because say a star want would understand if [these words] celebrity kind of status” but I had subject of that which was writ- were Indeed, groups. supremacist among white only thing ten” was “the matters.” owing to of Turner the FBI’s recruitment argues these state groups radical was the his association “completely wrong.” He did ments were defense, to Tur- according “center” of his however, trial, object at so our review counsel, referenced both and was ner’s Williams, plain error. is restricted to See specifically, testimony and exhibits— F.3d at 75. We find none here. Even ties mentioning Turner’s FBI documents assuming arguendo government’s part were supremacists to white —that the ele perfectly comments did not state Turner himself case. Since the defense 115(a)(1)(B) relevant ments of and the associations, to these attention first drew these re principles, First Amendment government hardly he can accuse the defendant sub “cause[ ] marks did not addressing jury by later prejudicing the trial prejudice by infecting so stantial no Accordingly, improprie- we find them. resulting with unfairness as to make the *17 and its ty government’s statements the process.” a denial of due Unit conviction regarding Turner’s audi- use of evidence Carr, 424 F.3d ed States v. ence. Cir.2005). Moreover, the district court jury immediately instructed the properly Regarding B. Government Statements following explicitly the summations and the First Amendment stated, accept the law as I “You must with certain re- Turner next takes issue it in these instructions.” We provide re- by prosecution the marks made in the plain therefore cannot find error Amendment. In its spect to the First regarding the government’s statements summation, jury: government told the the First Amendment. Now, judge instruct expect I the will Easterbrook, Testimony C. on the First you here —one moment Bauer, and Posner Amendment, actually. You’ve heard ease, in this the First Amendment about argues Turner next the district protected speech. is somehow this motion in li- denying court erred in his You’ll from the instruction that notice Easterbrook, preclude Judges mine case. You can’t actually it’s not the Bauer, testifying from because and Posner people. threaten violence testimony would be irrelevant such than substantially prejudicial proba- more you peo- In can criticize country, however, directly argument, is speech, hate love tive. This ple, you can use 115(a)(1)(B) Malik, § apply. Accordingly, precedent. our See foreclosed ruling (affirming comfortably at 49 a conviction for district court’s fell with- 16 F.3d scope in the of its discretion. judge, holding testimony regarding interpreta- judge’s E. Pro Arguments Turner’s Se statements was tion of defendant’s Davila, relevant”); also “highly see brief, supplemental pro se Turner (“[Pjroof of the effect of the F.3d at 305 arguments raises various other attacking highly alleged upon the addressee his conviction and sentence. have con- We (internal quotation marks omit- relevant.” arguments sidered these and find them ted)). merit, exception without with the of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. argues Judge

Turner also that Chief Easterbrook’s comment that “there have faced with a claim for “When inef many federal assassinated been fective ap assistance counsel on direct years” any lacked factual basis. past (1) peal, may: decline to hear the say, it to that Turner did not again, Suffice claim, permitting appellant to raise the object, Judge and Chief Easterbrook’s part subsequent petition issue as of a fleeting hardly preju comment could have writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 satisfy plain Turner so as to diced (2) 2255; § remand claim U.S.C. to the standard. States v. Zan error See United district for necessary factfinding; court (2d Cir.2012). gan, 677 F.3d (3) claim decide the on the record before Ramos, us.” United States v. D. Not Evidence that the Threats Were (2d Cir.2012) (internal quotation Carried Out omitted). marks Due to our “baseline resolving aversion to ineffectiveness claims Finally, argues that review,” on direct we decline to consider improperly court sustained the district argument ineffective-assistance objections when he government’s relevance (internal quotation at this time. Id. marks Judge attempted to ask Chief Easterbrook omitted). may pursue this claim in “anything happened] whether ever petition corpus for writ of habeas under con blog posting.” a result We 28 U.S.C. 2255. clude, however, that the district court did sustaining its abuse discretion Conclusion government’s objection. per Turner was *18 remaining have considered Turner’s We specific questions— mitted to ask more arguments and find them to be without Judge about whether Easterbrook Chief Having merit. concluded that Turner’s sought protection from the Mar additional by supported conviction was sufficient evi- shals or whether Turner ever tried to com dence, that the district court’s instruc- him. municate with Turner elicited from error, prejudicial tions contained no Bauer, moreover, Judge that no one had that no other reversible error affected the him, government tried to attack and the proceedings, we Affirm Turner’s convic- implied any of the had never tion. actually a been attacked. Whether is, best, ultimately carried out at of POOLER, dissenting: Judge, Circuit marginal relevance to whether the threat indeed, majori- from the place; respectfully

was made in the first I dissent relating sufficiency of speaker ty’s need not even have intended or conclusion that, evidence, because I find as a carry been able to out the threat 430 communication a the context of the law, speech was not with

matter of 115(a)(1)(B) interpret injury.” it as a threat of would 18 U.S.C. threat under true (quoting at 420 States Majority Op. United First Amendment. and the Cir.2006)) Davila, 298, v. 305 115(a)(1)(B), it “makes crimi- Section omitted). (internal For quotation marks inter- speech, must be pure nal a form of “[ijntimidation in the constitu- example, of the First the commands preted tionally sense of the word is proscribable clearly in mind.” Watts Amendment threat, speaker di- type of true where States, 705, 707, 89 S.Ct. 394 U.S. United group to a or of rects a threat (1969). 1399, Although 664 22 L.Ed.2d placing with the intent of the vic- persons afforded vast, protections “[t]he bodily of harm or death.” tim in fear absolute, are not Amendment First Black, 360, To 538 U.S. at 123 S.Ct. 1536. recognized gov- long have and we advocacy, distinguish incitement from we categories certain may regulate ernment the communication “is di- look to whether consistent with Constitu- expression inciting producing or imminent rected to Black, 343, Virginia v. 538 U.S. tion.” likely incite or lawless action and is 1536, 358, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 123 S.Ct. produce Brandenburg, such action.” 395 (2003); Chaplinsky Hamp- v. New see also 447, 1827; at see also Hess v. U.S. 89 S.Ct. 572, 766, shire, 568, 315 U.S. 62 S.Ct. 86 Indiana, 105, 108-09, U.S. S.Ct. (1942). Relevant to this case L.Ed. 1031 (1973) no (finding 38 L.Ed.2d 303 threats,” categories, “true are two such see incitement where the “statement was not Watts, at 394 U.S. S.Ct. any person group per- directed to Ohio, “incitement,” Brandenburg v. see sons”). 1827, 23 89 S.Ct. (1969). sum, analysis our First Amendment L.Ed.2d 430 threats and incitement as two has true evaluating speech purport- that is When categories unprotected speech, under protec- of constitutional ed to lie outside distinguish, respectively, which we true tion, in drawing must take care we and incite- purported threats from threats categories. “In defin- boundaries of these purported ment from incitement or advo- ing unprotected limited enclaves of these cacy. At issue in this case is the initial great pains ... we have taken speech, category under which the question ample breathing space in which preserve may speech given falls. A communication expression may flourish.” Thomas v. Bd. threat, be neither incitement nor true Educ., Dist., Granville Cent. Sch. other, arguably one or the even both. (2d Cir.1979). The true reaching any But of these conclu- before category distinguishes threats true threats determine, sions, we must first as a matter purported “po- from threats that are mere law, in, category are which “vituperative, litical even if hyperbole,” have an “incitement” case or a whether we Watts, abusive, and inexact.” *19 Only “true threats” case. then can we 708, Similarly, 89 1399. the incite- S.Ct. speech whether the at issue is determine category distinguishes ment incitement legal test. protected appropriate under the “advocacy from the of the use of force or cases, initial is not Brandenburg, many question of this law violation.” 395 U.S. addressed, 447, because the form of distinguish explicitly at 89 S.Ct. 1827. To true clear that the case is either political hyperbole, speech threats from we use an makes test, or a “true threats” objective “namely, whether an ordi- an “incitement” case it is undeniable that nary, recipient Regardless, who is familiar case. reasonable

431 threats), respective progeny, and their of- threats and advoca purported treat courts Collins, protections, 531 fer different Constitutional Fogel See v. cy as distinct. (9th Cir.2008); 824, advocacy Par and those afforded to would have Planned F.3d 830 analyzed speech v. less force if we all under Inc. the enthood Columbia/Willamette of Activists, 1058, Advocacy the “true threats” test. of 290 F.3d Am. Coal. of Life Cir.2002) (“Planned (9th force, of even if not Parenthood use incitement under 1072 Howell, II”); Brandenburg, place object will often of (5th Cir.1983). 1258, advocacy “in bodily We must make fear of harm or 1260 death,” category “constitutionally of the of which would be an initial determination analysis proscribable” our lies intimidation under Black. under which be speech 360, question turns on 538 U.S. at 123 S.Ct. 1536. Much of cause “the constitutional by fear.” Planned Par what is said even nonviolent the source of advocates the[ ] “aequire[ tinge Inc. v. can of ] menace.” enthood Columbia/Willamette of I, Activists, 1007, 244 Planned 244 at F.3d Parenthood F.3d 1014. Am. Coal. of Life Cir.2001) (9th (“Planned “[Hjowever, advocacy Parenthood that mere of the use 1018 (9th banc, I”), en 290 F.3d 1058 of force or violence does not remove rev’d Cir.2002). speech protection of “true from the of the First Application speech that the Amendment.” NAACP v. presupposes threats” test Claiborne Co., only threat and Hardware purported at issue is S.Ct. Black, (1982). 3409, “Speech 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 evaluates its seriousness. See (stating protected that does not lose its character at 123 S.Ct. it speaker simply may is a true threat if “a di because embarrass others or speech into group a threat to a coerce them action.” Id. rects true, For to be persons placing with the intent of vic S.Ct. 3409. we must death,” distinguish harm which bodily tim in fear of between threats other intimidate, speech may the communication is forms of that men- presumes threat). (unless Thus, ace, protected our “true threats” or coerce but are form a ordinary, category regulated an fall into another analysis looks to “whether advocacy familiar Political must be a recipient speech). who is with reasonable the true speech would form of stands outside [communication] the context injury,” analysis. it a threat of or if the threats interpret communication, threat, in form a while “the line between the two forms While political hyper constitutionally-protected speech may be difficult to draw in some Davila, 461 at 305. A different bole. F.3d Howell, instances,” 719 F.2d at case analysis distinguish purported is needed to distinguish principles law establishes categories speech. threats from other between threats and other forms

Furthermore, First, determining speech. respect whether to the true threat, “a court must be sure purported category, is a we must threats speech recipient is fearful of the execu speech make sure that the is not instead (or speaker advocacy protected by Brandenburg. tion of the threat (incitement) (true New York Brandenburg speaker’s co-conspirators).”1 and Watts adapted purpose.” necessary reasonably to that We have held that "it is not means 1. Sovie, prove the defendant United States v. the Government to Cir.1997) (internal present ability quotation marks and specific or a had a intent *20 however, threat, omitted). necessary, carry only that he brackets It is out his but intended object purported injury through the of the threat-the a threat of to communicate 432 Nat'l, implied menace as a literal threat.” Operation Rescue Spitzer

ex rel. v. Cir.2001). “Thus, 184, Majority Op. (quoting at 422 F.3d 196 273 (2d Cir.1994)) Malik, 45, informs someone person a who 16 F.3d 50 generally, (internal omitted). danger from a third that he or she is marks quotation threat, if made a even the party “explicit has not not have to be [or] Threats do may fear. This be produces conveyed grammatical precision statement with the tells the ob protestor Majority true even where a atOp. of an Oxford don.” 425. they danger are in jects protest “An lan explicitly absence of political support for finding and further indicates of a guage preclude does not In Malik, Id. other parties.” the violent third at 49 (discussing threat.”2 16 F.3d 876). words, of violence or other may ambigu a threat “warns Speech 18 U.S.C. speaker controls.” Planned injury harm will cause and still ous as who (Kozinski, II, at 1089 Parenthood 290 F.3d constitute a threat. /., contrast, the incitement dissenting). In a a principle, purported As second category “predictions involves or exhorta must toward the victim. threat be directed tions to others” to use violence. See Unit Natl, Operation See Rescue 273 F.3d at 1113, 652 F.3d Bagdasarian, ed States v. 196. “In most cases where courts have (9th Cir.2011). Drawing this distinc 1119 speech found that constituted a true necessarily syntax tion will lead us to the threat, threatening speech target “I Mil of the communication at issue: will against specific ed individuals or was com you” suggests danger speaker, from the subject directly municated to the

while, “you suggests deserve to die” Fogel, Purport threat.” 531 at F.3d 830. However, “rigid prediction exhortation. incitement, hand, ed on the other is direct meaning adherence to the literal of a com parties. Bagdasari ed toward third See regard munication without to its reason an, (describing advocacy 652 at F.3d derived from its ambi able connotations ”) “predictions or exhortations to others powerless ence would render the statute added). (emphasis ingenuity of threateners who can mind as clear an To the extent that speech ambiguous, instill the victim’s is injury by apprehension impending “public an the distinction between discourse” 300, Black, injury majority to befall-is at 304-05. on whom the In as the injury notes, potential from the Supreme "given concerned with Court held that whether, speaker. position context, I take no as to surrounding burnings may cross Black, after 123 S.Ct. we violence, unprotected constitute threats of de- subjective requirement must read a intent into spite wholly implicit nature of the serious analysis. Majority Op. our true threats See they convey.” Majority Op. at 423 420 n. 4. Black, 345, 357, 363, (citing 538 U.S. at 1536) (internal omitted). S.Ct. citation remembered, however, 2. It that we must be Hart, Eighth United States v. Circuit evaluating speech are or communication parking Ryder found that the defendant’s advocacy distinguish purported between truck at the entrance of an abortion clinic threats. "The First Amendment af- [also] threat, light constituted a true "in sur- symbolic expressive protection fords rounding circumstances.” speech,” conduct as well as to actual (8th Cir.2000). expres- While similar may constitutionally also be such conduct may Black, sions or conduct amount to a true proscribed. U.S. at threat, Davila, advocacy, cannot be mistaken for example, S.Ct. 1536. For ambiguity and thus as to the nature of the found that the defendant made a true threat pow- communication does not when he sent a small amount of white raise same con- "ANTRAX." der in letter labeled cerns.

433 case, is 49. Unlike these cases present communications” personal and “direct personal Planned Parent all involved communications. See “highly significant.” 1018; I, also 244 at see Clai F.3d hood contrast, Supreme In Court has held at 926-27, Hardware, 102 borne language that even that seems (“Since would im respondents 3409 S.Ct. may, public part political if made in as public ad liability basis of on the pose communications, fall under the incitement contained predominantly dress —which Hardware, speak category. In Claiborne lying rhetoric at charged political highly Evers, organizer er Charles as of a civil- ap First Amendment —we the core of the rights boycott, spoke against boycott out liability suggested this basis proach during public rallies. breakers several 458 care.”). ugly or speech, “Political extreme rally, at At one S.Ct. 3409. be, may lies at as it sometimes frightening boycott he stated that breakers would be process.” heart of our democratic “If “disciplined”; at another he said: we II, at 290 F.3d Planned Parenthood in any you going any catch of them J., (Reinhardt, also Boos dissenting); see stores, gonna your racist we’re break 108 S.Ct. Barry, 485 U.S. v. Supreme damn neck.” Id. The Court ac (“As (1988) mat general 99 L.Ed.2d 333 knowledged public that Evers statements indicated, ter, public in debate have we “might inviting have understood as been insulting, tolerate citizens must our own or, least, discipline an at unlawful form speech in order to outrageous, and even a fear of intending to create violence.” to the adequate breathing space provide 927, 102 Nevertheless, at it Id. S.Ct. 3409. the First Amend protected by freedoms analyzed Brandenburg and held under omitted). ment.”) (internal quotation marks were constitutional that Ever’s statements one-on-one do threats delivered “Private 927-29, advocacy. Id. at ly-protected II, Parenthood 290 F.3d not.” Planned S.Ct. 3409. /., (Reinhardt, dissenting) (emphasis public that a imply I do not wish to added). ambiguous have often found We In can never be a true threat. statement conveyed a true threat when speech Kelner, v. we found true In Malik the private in communication. said, an inter speaker threat where the in “[a]rguably two letters with defendant sent television, “[w]e later broadcast on view threats, we affirmed ambiguous” Mr. Arafat.... planning are to assassinate letters were jury’s finding F.2d Everything planned is detail.” 534 In threats. 16 F.3d at 50. United true Cir.1976). (2d 1020, 1025 major While the passed a Shoulberg the defendant States ity correctly that the Kelner Court’s *22 I, 244 Finding Parenthood F.3d at 1018. that the communications were Planned threat, imply advocacy I to that a statement and not a I dissent from Nor do wish arguably purported majority’s opinion cannot be both a the and find that the a advocacy. Speech may permit threat and threat- evidence was not “sufficient to speaker that the to find that con- en violence controls and reasonable Turner’s act, directing speech Majority Op. exhort others to duct constituted a threat.” 305) Davila, parties. (quoting the victim and third But at 419 461 F.3d at both (internal omitted). speech question If to the extent is alterations Turner’s address, threat, public “approach we must statements were in form a I would Hardware, disagree majority’s holding with extreme care.” Claiborne not with the public at 102 S.Ct. 3409. A that to distinguish test true threats advocacy clearly objective an political hyperbole statement of must be from is one, 420; apply Majority form of a threat for us atOp. that a determi- Holding “true threats” test. otherwise nation of speech whether Turner’s is a true insufficiently protect public would dis- threat under this test an is issue fact 419; jury, course. id. at that the district court’s jury instruction in this was proper, case id. hand, to the I Turning case at would 425-26; at and that Turner’s statements hold that Turner’s communications were gravity readily distinguishable “reveal[ ] advocacy of the use of force and not a hyperbole public from mere or common threat. It is clear that Turner wished for discourse,” However, id. at 421. I do Easterbrook, Posner, Judges the deaths of statements, although believe Turner’s Majority Op. and Bauer. at 414-16. But abhorrent, amount to a threat. The dis- statements, passive I read his made in the advocacy tinction between and threats voice, id. at see as an exhortation not turn on gravity speech. does willing toward “free men up to walk kill Constitution, them and them” and not as a warning From this discussion of the planned violence directed toward the I turn to the statute under which Turner victims, 115(a)(1)(B), intended id. at 414-15. charged, This read- was Section which ing is furthered fact that interpreted Turner’s “must be with the commands posted blog words were on a a publicly clearly on of the First Amendment in mind.” website, Watts, accessible at id. and had 89 S.Ct. 1399. discourse, 115(a)(1)(B) trappings political invok- Section it makes a crime to ing Thomas quotation assault, Jefferson’s famous kidnap, ] or murder “threaten! liberty tree of must be ... a replen- judge.” “[t]he 18 U.S.C. 115(a)(1)(B). ished from time to time with the blood of It is clear that this statute tyrants patriots,” Although proscribes threats, hold, id. at 415. true but I would vituperative, above, there is no doubt that speech, as discussed that Turner’s public political force, speech advocacy discourse. His of the use of falls out- might subject to a interpreta- different side the true category speech. threats if, tion for example, the statements were speech may proscribed Turner’s still be (1) sent to the in a letter or email. under the statute if pro- statute Malik, However, (2) See 16 F.3d at 50. Tur- scribes incitement and Turner’s advoca- ner’s statements of political cy qualifies dis- as incitement under Branden- agreement are different from a burg. threat. speech may protected. It lose Con- possible statute. with the

I start protection Brandenburg under Section stitutional under word “threaten” *23 115(a)(1)(B) and, indeed, Be- “incitement.” the district court felt that it includes in the is not defined cause “threaten” did: “ordinary,

statute, its give the word pro- The First Amendment does not meaning.” common See contemporary, speech inciting tect which “is directed to Davila, (discussing 18 at 302 461 F.3d producing or imminent action lawless (internal 876(c)) marks quotation § U.S.C. likely produce and is to incite or such omitted). noted that In Davila we Party action.” See Communist English Dictio- [according to the Oxford Whitcomb, 441, Indiana v. a “denunciation to a

nary, a threat is (1975); S.Ct. 38 L.Ed.2d [94 635] him; esp. a decla- of ill to befall at 447 Brandenburg, [89 395 U.S. S.Ct. loss, or of of hostile determination ration clearly Supreme The Court has 1827]. in- damage or to be pain, punishment, drawn a between the mere distinction conditionally in for or flicted retribution teaching of a resort to violence from course; a menace.” The some upon “prepar- individual is instances where an Dictionary, Fourth Heritage American ing group a for violent action and steel- Edition, word as ex- “[a]n defines the ing it to such action.” Noto v. United pain, to inflict of an intention pression States, [81 297-98 S.Ct. evil, in- or injury, punishment,” “[a]n (1961). 1517, 6 L.Ed.2d 836] impending danger or harm.” dication of The Court finds Defendant’s dictionary defines the word The same urge actions are sufficient incite “threaten,” turn, express a “[t]o Moreover, posting the vic- lawlessness. against.” pictures, exact location where tim’s significant numbers, “[n]o It is also Id. room employed are circuit,” perhaps the Fourth except building and a to the federal com- map Circuit, that incitement can “has concluded where the “Anti- plete with indications located, under a threat statute.”3 punished be pro- truck bomb barriers” are In 652 F.3d at n. 18. Bagdasarian, vided exact information facilitate ordinary meaning of the word light of threat.” circuits,

“threaten,” the case law of other argues Defendant that his statements necessity the constitutional draw not meant to incite imminent law- were true threats and incitement line between support, he notes that his lessness. As speech categories as two different computer on his posted comments were tests, I hold that use two distinct would Jersey were New while 115(a)(1)(B) proscribe in does not Section actually Chicago, and that he did true threats. proscribe citement but does urging stand outside of Courthouse advocacy rather than speech Turner’s group supporters rush Court- threat, a true and therefore could not be Judges. house to attack the Court threat. unpersuasive. argument finds this live, has clear, speech in which we say I and do not the world

To be need not The fact constitutionally- geographical no boundaries. speech is "[mjuch Patillo, injure,” but also added that the Fourth Cir- others to 3. In United States v. guilt” say element cuit held that “an essential what we here is dicta.” statute, (4th Cir.1971). is "a under 18 U.S.C. a threat injure ... or incite present intention either to issued his statements on that Defendant in person only rather than blog that an indefinite audi-

served to ensure remarks, had access to his

ence subject

enlarged group of individuals

to incitement. may right. It

The district court

certainly changed true the Internet has “geographical speech. boundaries” of

However, charged un- as Turner was statute, I need not reach

der an incitement

the issue here.

Accordingly, I DISSENT from the ma-

jority’s opinion and would vacate Turner’s proceed-

conviction and remand for further

ings consistent with the above. America,

UNITED STATES

Appellee, GALPIN, Jr.,

James R. Defendant-

Appellant.

Docket No. 11-4808-cr.

United of Appeals, States Court

Second Circuit.

Argued: Nov. 2012.

Decided: June 2013. notes co-conspirator that “carried over note to a test is dicta and that our standard is a third of imminent threat” toward tones broader, 423-24, it nota Majority Op. at is Cir.1990). person. 895 found that the ble that the Kelner Court White, States v. United “unequivocal, an un speech at issue was (4th Cir.2012), an the defendant sent expression[ of in specific ] conditional and Judge comparing recipient email injury.” 534 immediately to inflict tention to Turner’s invocation of Lefkow—similar say, speech That is to when F.2d at 1027. Judge Lefkow this case—and a vic unambiguously directed toward affirmed the threat convic Fourth Circuit tim, need not look to the distinction Majority Op. at 421-22. tion under Watts. communica personal cases, between courts found true In all of these ambiguity face of tions. It is explicitly despite threats the “absence Malik, “highly significant.” distinction is 16 F.3d at threatening language,”

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Turner
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date Published: Jun 21, 2013
Citation: 720 F.3d 411
Docket Number: 11-196-cr
Court Abbreviation: 2d Cir.
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