After a bench trial, the defendant, Troy Patterson, was found guilty of possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute in violаtion of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Prior to trial, the defendant had filed a motion to suppress the evidence as to the cocaine found in his car at the time of his arrest. It is from the denial of this motion that defendant now appeals.
*122 Upon a review of the record, we conclude that the motion to suppress was properly-denied and we affirm defendant’s cоnviction; however, we follow a different line of analysis than that employed by the district court.
I.
In the early morning hours of August 18, 1990, twо Columbus, Ohio, police officers patrolling in their police cruiser had their attention attracted to the defеndant. The defendant, alone in a motor vehicle, was stopped in the middle of the street talking to another unidentifiеd person and blocking the roadway in so doing. As the police cruiser came up behind Patterson, he took off аt a high speed, failed to stop properly for a stop sign, and made a left turn without signalling. The police officеrs followed the vehicle until it pulled into the driveway of an apartment complex where the vehicle abruptly stopped, partially on the grass.
Patterson was approached and informed of the violations he had just cоmmitted. A records check revealed that Patterson was driving on a suspended license, and he was placed undеr arrest. Patterson’s car was then searched and impounded. In the course of the search, a plastic baggiе was found under the driver’s seat containing what later proved to be crack cocaine. The vehicle search was characterized by the officers as an inventory search. The impounding of the vehicle was claimed tо be pursuant to city policy as evidenced in a City of Columbus ordinance. 1
Patterson was subsequently indicted and filed a mоtion to suppress, challenging the propriety of the warrantless search of his vehicle after his arrest. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that this was an inventory search conducted pursuant to established policy of thе City of Columbus relating to the conditions under which vehicles can be impounded. The court found this inventory search to be consistent with the law as enunciated by the Supreme Court in
South Dakota v. Opperman,
II.
The parties devote their efforts on appeal to аrguing whether or
not
this was a valid inventory search. We find that it is not necessary to resolve this issue. Patterson does not challenge the propriety of his arrest.
2
At the time of his arrest, he was operating a motor vehicle. In
United States v. White,
In making the determination to affirm on the basis of the car search being a vаlid search made incident to a lawful arrest, we do not reject the findings of the district court. We do avoid, however, the necessity of our interpreting the Columbus ordinance and determining anew whether the situation presented here fell within the criteria authorizing the impounding of a vehicle.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Columbus City Code provides in pertinent part: 2107.01 Reasons for impounding.
Any police officer is authorized to remove from the streets, sidewalks, or public grounds:
(a) Any vehicle parked, left standing оr abandoned thereon in violation of any of the specific terms of this Traffic Code, subject to the provisions оf Section 2150.02 of this Traffic Code.
(b) Any vehicle which has been reported stolen.
(c) Any vehicle from which the driver has been arrested, or any vehicle operated by a person who refused to obey the instruction of any police officer after such person has been placed under arrest.
(d) Any vehicle from which the driver or operator has been removed due to illness or injury.
(e) Any vehicle which, in the impounding au-thoritiesf] opinion, creates a condition which presents a risk of physical harm to pеrsons or property including vehicles which, without authorization, release, discharge or leak substances into or upon the environment.
(f) Any vehicle operated by a person while engaged in, or connected with, the commission of a crime.
(g) Any vehicle operated by a person without an operator’s license, or during a period of suspension or revocation of such license.
(h) Any vehicle that has been involved in an accident and the driver/operator has failed to stop after such accident.
(i) Any vehicle which fails to comply with the provisions of this Traffiс Code relative to equipment.
(j) Any vehicle abandoned after an accident on public or private property away from the owner's residence. (Ord. 453-87.)
. Under the law of our circuit, as set forth in
United States v. Pino,
.This holding is consistent with
New York v. Belton,
It is not questioned that the respondent was the subject of a lawful custodial arrest on a charge of possessing marihuana. The search of the respоndent’s jacket followed immediately upon that arrest. The jacket was located inside the passenger cоmpartment of the car in which the respondent had been a passenger just before he was arrested. The jaсket was thus within the area which we have concluded was "within the arrestee’s immediate control" within the meaning of the Chimel [v. California,395 U.S. 752 ,89 S.Ct. 2034 ,23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969)] case.
(Footnote omitted). In Belton, as in the case at bar, the defendant was out of the car at the time the vehicle search occurred and did nоt have access to either weapons or contraband which might have been in the car.
.
Contra United States v. Vasey,
. Note, however,
United States v. Strahan,