UNITED STATES оf America, Appellee, v. Janice TROISI, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 16-1046
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
February 24, 2017
Kelly Begg Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
Before HOWARD, Chief Judge, LYNCH and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges.
LYNCH, Circuit Judge.
After a bench trial, Janice Troisi was convicted in 2015 both of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, see
I.
We summarize the basic contours of the healthcare fraud scheme and proceedings below, reserving a fuller exposition of the relevant facts for our analysis of the particular issues presented by this appeal. See United States v. Lopez-Diaz, 794 F.3d 106, 109 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Flores-Rivera, 787 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2015)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1229, 194 L.Ed.2d 226 (2016).
On September 18, 2013, Troisi and codefendant Michael Galatis1 were indicted by a grand jury in the District of Massachusetts on one count of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, see
Medicare determines whether a beneficiary qualifies for coverage of home health services—and, in turn, whether and to what extent to reimburse the beneficiary‘s healthcare provider for the cost of such services—based primarily on information contained in two forms submitted by the healthcare provider. The first form, called the OASIS Form, documents the healthcare provider‘s assessment of the beneficiary‘s medical condition and needs. In filling out this form, a healthcare provider must, inter alia, rate on a numerical scale the beneficiary‘s ability to perform certain activities—such as eating, dressing, and bathing—without assistance. The second form, called the Form 485 Home Health Certification and Plan of Care (“Form 485“), requires a physician to certify that (1) the beneficiary is confined to the home (“homebound“), (2) the beneficiary is in need of skilled services, (3) such “services will be or were furnished while the [beneficiary is or] was under the care of a physician,” and (4) a “plan for furnishing the services has been established and will be or was periodically reviewed by a physician.”
The prosecution charged that the AHVNA scheme proceeded as follows. AHVNA aggressively recruited Medicare-insured individuals for in-home nursing services, for which they could not legally receive Medicare coverage, either because they were not homebound or because they were not in need of such services. Troisi instructed AHVNA‘s nurses to fill out those patients’ OASIS Forms to represent, inaccurately, that the patients were incapable of caring for themselves. Troisi then personally prepared a Form 485 for each patient, poрulating it with whatever false information was required to obtain Medicare coverage for in-home nursing services.3 And AHVNA‘s Medical Director, Dr. Spencer Wilking, signed the forms without
AHVNA nurses made home visits to patients, but most of those visits did not actually involve the nurses providing skilled services. Yet at Troisi‘s direction, the nurses falsified their notes to indicate that they had provided such services. Using fraudulent records, AHVNA billed Medicare for tens of millions of dollars’ worth of skilled nursing services, which had not been provided or had been provided unnecessarily, between 2006 and 2012, inclusive.
Only the portion of the scheme beginning on January 1, 2010—when Troisi beсame AHVNA‘s Clinical Director—is relevant to this appeal. The government‘s theory was that Galatis agreed to promote Troisi from part-time employee to Clinical Director at that time because she could—and did—take the scheme “to another level.” Accordingly, she had a direct stake in the fraud even though she did not рersonally receive the reimbursement checks from Medicare.
Troisi and Galatis proceeded jointly to a jury trial on October 27, 2014.5 The district court declared a mistrial as to Troisi on November 30, 2014, after she became too ill to proceed. Troisi waived her right to a jury on retrial. A bench trial before the same district judge who hаd presided over the earlier trial started on July 28, 2015. The parties stipulated that “transcripts of the testimony of 27 government witnesses who testified at the earlier, joint trial, along with the exhibits admitted during the joint trial,” would be admissible evidence at Troisi‘s bench trial.6 The government supplemented this evidence with live testimony from four additional witnesses. In totаl, the government introduced 217 documentary exhibits, including the transcripts. Its witnesses included patients linked to the substantive fraud counts, nurses who had provided care to those patients, most of those patients’ primary care providers, and Dr. Wilking.
At the conclusion of the government‘s case, Troisi moved for a judgment of acquittal, which was denied. In her defense, Troisi called no witnesses and introduced five exhibits. The thrust of her defense was that the government had not proved that she possessed the requisite mens rea to commit the relevant crimes.
On August 5, 2015, the day after the trial ended, the district court delivered its verdict from the bench, finding Troisi guilty on all of the conspiracy and fraud counts. The сourt concluded that Troisi had participated in a “sophisticated scheme among the senior managers [of AHVNA] . . . to provide inaccurate information” to the government so as to secure payments, “which the [g]overnment was not obligated to make.”7 While “[h]er
II.
“In assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we ‘examine the evidence, together with all inferences that may be reasonably drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the’ verdict. Lopez-Diaz, 794 F.3d at 111 (quoting United States v. Andujar, 49 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 1995)). Where the factfinder drew “inferences from circumstantial evidence,” we will not “sеcond-guess[] [its] ensuing conclusions as long as (1) the inferences derive support from a plausible rendition of the record, and (2) the conclusions flow rationally from those inferences.” United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1995). Ultimately, we ask “whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.‘” United States v. O‘Donnell, 840 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Grace, 367 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 2004)).
A defendant violates
Troisi does not dispute that officials at AHVNA successfully executed a conspiratorial scheme intended to defraud Medicare. Nor does she dispute that she took actions that directly and crucially furthered that scheme. She attacks her convictions solely on the ground that the government allegedly failed to present sufficient evidence that she took those actions with the required culpable state of mind.8 Cf. id. at 9.
We disagree. Troisi‘s culpable state of mind can be readily gleaned from “several strands of circumstantial evidence” presented at trial. Vega, 813 F.3d at 398.
First, Troisi cannot claim that she was ignorant. She was deeply familiar with the regulatory scheme that she helped contravene. She knew what was permitted and
Troisi also exercised total control over AHVNA‘s preparation of the documentation required for Medicare reimbursement—the aspect of the scheme that directly contravened the regulations she knew so well. See Vega, 813 F.3d at 398-99 (finding the defendant‘s “large degree of control over [her company‘s] operations” evidence that she knew the claims the company was submitting to Medicare were fraudulent); United States v. Willett, 751 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding the defendant‘s “proximity to” and prominent role in “fraudulent activities” evidence of a culpable state of mind). As AHVNA‘s Clinical Director, Troisi was in charge of “developing [and] implementing . . . the day-to-day functions of clinical services, in accordance with сurrent rules, regulations, and guidelines that govern Home Health Agencies.” In fact, she oversaw AHVNA‘s team of nurses, who were hired fresh out of nursing school with no experience in home health services or Medicare regulations. Those inexperienced nurses were tasked with filling out patients’ OASIS Forms, which Troisi reviewed and edited at weekly meetings along with the notes reflecting the services that the nurses had provided. Troisi also personally filled out the Form 485s before giving them to Dr. Wilking so that he could sign them. All of this documentation contained misrepresentations material to Medicare‘s payment decisions.
Further, in exercising her control over the documentation procеss, Troisi instructed the nurses to put in particular information regardless of whether it was true or not. She insisted that the nurses filling out OASIS Forms never assign a score of “zero” to a patient‘s ability to perform any activity (as such a score would indicate full independence); never state that a patient had not been home at the time of a sсheduled visit (as doing so would indicate that the patient was not homebound); and never check a box indicating that a patient had been “alert and oriented.” When nurses protested that a patient‘s condition warranted a zero and that they were “not comfortable” assigning a different score, Troisi would force them to do so, еven though Troisi had not evaluated the patient herself and had no basis for disagreement.
At oral argument, Troisi tried to put an innocent gloss on this behavior, explaining that she was just an “aggressive” boss and that her rules were aimed at ensuring that the nurses qualified patients for home health services she believed the patients
Additionally, Troisi‘s purported management style does not account for the incriminating actions she took on her own. Troisi would often personally change the number that a nurse had entered on an OASIS Form, using the same color pen that the nurse had used so as to make the form appear unaltered. Troisi would even replace entire pages in OASIS Forms completed by nurses if thе forms contained information suggesting that the patient was not actually homebound or in need of skilled services. She knew that the OASIS Forms did not accurately reflect the opinions of the medical professionals who had evaluated the patients, and she directly facilitated the fraud. See United States v. Njoku, 737 F.3d 55, 63 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding the defendant‘s instructions to a nurse to rеpresent patients as homebound on OASIS Forms, despite the nurse‘s “concern that some patients were not homebound,” evidence of the defendant‘s culpable state of mind).
Finally, Troisi filled out patients’ Form 485s based on the contents of those falsified OASIS Forms, knowing that Dr. Wilking would sign them without taking the time to read them—let alone meet with and evaluate the patients. See Vega, 813 F.3d at 399 (finding evidence of the defendant‘s knowing complicity in healthcare fraud where she “allowed” her company to seek Medicare reimbursement for services “prescribe[d] [by a doctor] for patients he did not see“). And she continued to recertify patients for further home health services even when their nurses had recommended that they be discharged, their primary care physicians had sent letters explaining that such services were not needed, and the patients themselves had tried to discontinue the visits.
This evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, thаt Troisi conspired to commit, and indeed committed, healthcare fraud. See, e.g., United States v. Eghobor, 812 F.3d 352, 362 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding sufficient evidence of a healthcare-fraud conspiracy where the defendant “admitted patients . . . by falsifying OASIS forms,” “create[d] [Form 485s] prescribing [those patients] home health care,” and had the forms signed by a doctor who had never treated those patients). The circumstances underlying each of the substantive fraud counts “share[] the [same] badges of fraud that characterize[] the overall scheme.” Iwuala, 789 F.3d at 12. Ultimately, “the guilty verdict finds [sufficient] support” in this record. O‘Donnell, 840 F.3d at 18 (quoting United States v. Hatch, 434 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006)).
III.
The convictions are affirmed.
