237 F. 181 | 8th Cir. | 1916
The United States brought an action in the federal court for the district of Colorado to set aside certain patents for coal lands. Among the parties to that litigation were the original patentees and Keitel, who had secured the patents through dummy entrymen, and also many subsequent claimants of interests in the property. Among the latter were the appellees here, William A. Trogler and F. W. Keitel. The Commonwealth Trust Company, which held a trust deed to secure a loan of $25,000 upon the property, was also a party to that suit, as were the Dorseys, who were the benéficiaries of the trust deed. This suit was filed in March, 1910. Thereafter a suit was brought in the same federal court by the trust company to foreclose the trust deed. Everybody having any interest in the property, including the appellees here, were parties defendant to that bill. While the government suit to cancel the patent was still pending, the
In order to understand this litigation it is important to keep in mind that the trust deed was held to be valid, not only in the suit for its foreclosure, but in the suit by the government. It is also important to keep in mind that Trogler and Keitel, the appellees here, were defendants in the suit to foreclose the trust deed, and that by the decree in that case, and the sale, and the deed, and the confirmation of the whole proceedings by the court, all their right, title, and interest in the property was foreclosed and passed to the purchasers, the Dorseys. So, before the decree was entered in the government suit, the appellees here had ceased to have any right or interest in the property.
After the entry of the decree in the government’s case, and before any sale had been made under that decree, negotiations were had between the representatives of the government and the Dorseys. The Dorseys held title to a valuable 80 acres of coal land in another section. While there is no evidence on the subject, it is a reasonable inference that the Dorseys were anxious to get the northeast quarter of 26, because of its connection with the other properties to which they
We think the trial court was wrong. It was not asked to modify the former decree upon a re-examination of the issues that were involved in the suit in which the decree was entered. Its action was invoked to give effect to an agreement made between the parties to the decree subsequent to its entry. Clearly parties are at liberty to enter into agreements in respect to their rights under judgments of courts, the same as in regard to any other property right. And if the aid of the court is necessary in order to carry out their agreement, we see no reason why a court should not give them such relief. The real objection goes to a matter of practice. It is elementary that after a final decree is entered in a cause, and the term has adjourned, the parties are dismissed from the court. The defendant is not called upon to pay any further heed to the litigation. The court has no jurisdiction over him to modify its decree. That arises out of the fact that its process has ceased to be effective. The defendants are out of court, and the court cannot act in their absence upon the rights established by the decree. That formal objection, however, may be wholly obviated by parties to the suit returning to the court and asking for further action at its hands, which in no way involves a re-examination of the matters embraced in the decree. Upon such a reappearance there is no need of process. The court’s jurisdiction over tbe persons is complete, and there can be nothing but a formal objection to the court’s granting the relief asked.
It is plain what the difficulty was in the present case. If the original decree was executed, and the government obtained title to the northeast quarter of section 26, it would pass beyond the control of cou
The decree is reversed, with directions to the trial court to enter .a decree granting the relief asked for in the stipulation.