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United States v. Toby C. Patterson
292 F.3d 615
9th Cir.
2002
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*1 prohibited from soon find ourselves we will America, UNITED of patriotic songs many- of STATES

using our album Plaintiff-Appellee, public settings. “God Bless America” and gone “America the Beautiful” will be sure, and whüe use of the first three stan- Toby PATTERSON, C. Defendant- Spangled zas of “The Star Banner” will Appellant. permissible, precluded we wül be stffl be straying into fourth.8 And cur- from No. 00-30306. rency Judges accept beware! can those Appeals, United States Court of if limit they results themselves to elements Ninth Circuit. tests, faüing good whüe to look at the principles that sense and animated those Argued Aug. and Submitted 2001. But so at place. they tests the first do May Filed 2002. price removing vestige of the awe all must feel at the immenseness of the we it, place

universe and our own small within

as well as the wonder we must feel

good country. fortune of our That wiU

cool the febrile nerves of a few at the cost removing healthy glow conferred

upon many citizens when the forbidden

verses, uttered, read, phrases, are or

seen. short, accept I cannot eliding simple phrase “under God” from our Allegiance,

Pledge when is obvious tendency religion its establish country or to

this interfere with the free (or non-exercise) religion

exercise is de

minimis.9

Thus, I respectfully part concur in part.

dissent stray thing we Nor will be able to into the fourth as a de minimis constitutional violation. "My Country stanza of 'Tis of Thee” for that say tendency What I do is that the de minimis matter. Pledge religion to establish a or to interfere with its free exercise is no constitu- misunderstood, emphasize 9. Lest I be I must tional violation at all. necessary decide case this it is not say, say, and I do not that there is such a *5 Smith, R. Assistant Pub- Gerald Federal Defender, WA, Spokane, lic for defendant- appellant Toby C. Patterson. Cook,

Nancy C. Assistant United States d’Alene, ID, plaiptiff- for Attorney, Coeur of America. appellee United States I George Gow re- Sergeant Detective named from a citizen information ceived marijuana growing Calvin Stevens about home near rural property on Stevens’ NOONAN, and TASHIMA Before County, Stevens told Gow Bonner Idaho. TALLMAN, Judges. Circuit walk, that, he noticed the out for a while marijuana near a mobile strong smell of Judge C. Opinion by RICHARD marijuana gated in a pots home saw TALLMAN; by Judge Concurrence informed property. on the Stevens trailer NOONAN; by Judge TASHIMA. Dissent with the look that he was familiar Gow marijuana he had been “in- since smell OPINION marijuana” Army. in the Ste- troduced humming also stated there was vens TALLMAN, Circuit C. RICHARD that the coming from trailer and noise Judge. trailer’s, to be covered windows seemed appeals his conviction Toby C. plywood. with manufacturing 188 month sentence Sergeant later with Gow Stevens met marijuana plants in violation 100 or more issue, property him and showed Patterson contends 21 U.S.C. actually take onto although he did not Gow the double district court violated property. Sergeant Gow saw trail- vaсating guilty plea jeopardy clause noise humming heard the described er and *6 fur- accepted. Patterson after had been Stevens, by a which Gow believed sound erred in that the district court alleges ther lights that halogen grow from Gow came suppress and to to denying his .motions marijuana grow opera- at other had heard the number of regarding exclude evidence hearing Sergeant After Cow’s testi- tions. admitting expert in marijuana plants, and observations, mony regarding his own marijuana plants. testimony about provid- information corroborated the which the district court Patterson claims that Stevens, magistrate judge by ed state jury provide to when it erred failed probable to issue search found cause on the option basing its verdict with the for property. warrant marijuana than on the weight of rather argues also three other officers plants. Sergeant number of Patterson Gow and sup- to property insufficient to execute the search that the evidence was went to urges Patterson port guilty They trailer and verdict. warrant. entered provi- marijuana plants grow- offender us to hold that the career a number of found and the Sentencing They pulled of the Guidelines in some ing sions boxes inside. sentences of to take mandatory plаnts minimum smaller of the boxes out Eighth larger § Amend- of the U.S.C. 841 violate as evidence and cut some Finally, asserts to they ment. were unable remove. stalks denying in his motion this five-hour videotaped district court erred officers The a total of departure. ultimately a downward and seized for search marijuana plants. jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. have We August in Patterson was indicted § and we af- and 28 U.S.C. knowingly and intentional- firip on one count of conviction and sentence marijuana or more ly manufacturing 100 grounds. on all 841(a)(1) §§ you in of 21 could tell plants might violation U.S.C. what the sentence (b)(1)(B). point? at this initially entering After be guilty, of not Patterson entered into Yes, THE DEFENDANT: I under- April on in plea agreement that, which stand Your Honor. agreed plead guilty manufacturing

he my THE It understanding COURT: marijuana. plea agreement The stated you you do admit that responsi- are marijuana plants that “the number of is in guilty ble or of manufacturing marijuana dispute, stipulates the Defendant no plants you guilty and that are of the facts which relate to the number of mari- particular elements of this charge as juana The plants.” Agreement Plea fur- outlined McHugh Mr. prosecu- [the provided that ther this issue “will be liti- tor], you remain but silent or not gated sentencing,” which was scheduled admitting marijuana the number of July Agreement 2000. The Plea plants; is that correct? provided also that “the Court has not correct, THE DEFENDANT: That is any relating made ap- commitment to the Your Honor. case,

propriate sentence this and is not again,.other THE COURT: So than not agreement.” (emphasis bound this admitting marijuana number original). plants, you agree summary do with given by Mr. McHugh? carefully district conducted Yes, do, I DEFENDANT: Your 11 colloquy the Rule when the .THE Honor. April taken on 2000. The court re- THE provisions agree- you

viewed the written COURT: So admit those facts agree ment that those facts with the defendant on the record and sustain each charge element of the remaining exception clarified the sole issue con- with the B, felony, .ofwhether it be a D tention: class C or that will have to determined be once Now, THE as counsel COURT: has plants; Court determines.the number of pointed open out and stated here in right? court, plants dispute, the number of *7 Yes, THE DEFENDANT: sir.

and going the Court is to have to resolve sentencing, that on the time of based 26, 2000, Subsequently, on June the United* upon presented; the evidence as that is Supreme States Apprendi Court decided your understanding? accordance with 466, 490, Jersey, New (2000), held which Yes, THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor. fact, conviction, any prior other than a ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡" ‡ that increases, penalty that the for a crime be- THE your position COURT: [I]t maximum, yоnd statutory the must sub- be your understanding that the has Court jury proven beyond mitted a a to any relating not made commitment. to doubt. reasonable Patterson filed various appropriate the sentence this case objections Report to the Pre Sentence by plea negotia- and is not bound the (“PSR”). government The filed a re- tions? ‍​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‍objections sponse arguing, to Patterson’s Yes, THE I DEFENDANT: under- alia, guilty plea inter that the should be stand. Apprendi set as insufficient under aside THE not COURT: Because the number of because Patterson was informed determined, plants marijuana plants has not been of at the time he neither number July hearing, anyone pled guilty. this Court nor counsel nor else At the Cir.1993). conclude that be- We plea was agreed court the district Pat- conditionally accepted marijuana the court cause the number invalid because Patterson, attach, and by jeopardy did not plea, to terson’s stipulated not plants was beyond placed jeopardy a reasonable jury Patterson was not twice by nor found the therefore vacated The court offense. doubt. for the same jury trial for and scheduled guilty plea

September A trial, denied to the district court Prior evidence, in the instant case suppress plea agreement to The motions Patterson’s agree warrant was on concluding parties that the search did not provided that the court cause. The by probable sentence, com- supported that the court made no to exclude Patterson’s motion sentence, also denied it mitment about the number regarding videotaped evidence agreement. The was bound Patterson was not reasoning that plants, stated that the number agreement also officers’ police unduly prejudiced marijuana litigated be at sen- plants would pots in which the preserve failure was tencing and that Patterson aware Finally, granted the court plants grew. under 21 varying penalties U.S.C. weigh unopposed motion 841(b)(1) quantities of for different trial. marijuana prior to plants. Patter to trial proceeded The case over 11(c) of the Federal Rules Crim- Rule objection. jury found Patterson son’s requires that the district inal Procedure marijuana. It re manufacturing guilty of determine that the defendant under- court announcing, Special Verdict “We turned charge nature of the which stands “the Patterson, Defendant, Toby C. find the ac- is offered” before intentionally knowingly and manufactured 11(c). cepts guilty plea. Fed.R.Crim.P. marijuana: following quantity of One- colloquy, During thorough Rule (100) marijuana plants.” or more hundred if, “after judge told Patterson district to a court sentenced Patterson The district report and considering presentence imprisonment and five 188 months’ term of ; that, might it have that any other evidence release. time years’ supervised being than rec- something other what ly appealed. imposed, the should be Court

ommended II stated can do The court further that.” any “not made commitment had Patterson contends that because appropriate sentence this relating to the *8 accepted jeopardy attached when the court by plea negotia- case and not bound the plea, jeopardy clause guilty his the double finding plea that the was tions.” After when the district vacat was violated court voluntary, that knowing and there was and to trial. guilty plea proceeded and ed’ of a factual for each of the elements basis de jeopardy claims are reviewed Double offense, plea, accepted the court the the Byrne, novo. See United States and Pat- sentencing, told set the date denied, 671, Cir.), F.3d cert. pre- that to be the PSR terson about 1114, 861, Pat- Finally, the court reminded pared. the district is re Whether everything into it would “take terson that a is a plea agreement to enforce quired right up day of sen- consideration we de See question of law review novo. tencing.” Fagan, ” sentencing guilty date ar- verdict?’ United States v. Buck Before Patterson’s (9th Cir.2002) land, rived, Appren- decided Supreme Court (en banc) decision, (emphasis in original) (citing Ap- this the district light In of di. motion, 2348). court, prendi chose 530 U.S. at government’s on the in plea gave regard and him The answer to Patterson is defendant’s to vacate plea plainly a new no. option negotiating of either dis- going to trial. As the agreement Patterson’s reliance on States v. United noted, parties proceeded all had trict court (9th Cir.2000), Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053 of assumption the number on Buckland, by part overruled in proven at did not have to be plants issue unavailing. is also Patterson ar- jury a beyond a reasonable doubt before gues only pled guilty he since in assumption longer this was no valid and unspecified manufacture of an amount of Apprendi light of marijuana, the maximum sentence that he in could have received under 841 was upon original Based Indictment five case, Agreement, years. Nordby, 225 F.3d at a this the terms of his Plea colloquy panel the court of this court vacated and remanded a and the defendant’s with guilty, drug it is where the issue of plea quantity, he entered his of sentence when placed prescribed “a fact that that Patterson was not twice increases statu- clear tory penalty a in for the same offense. Patter- maximum to which criminal jeopardy time, jury; exposed,” by one defendant is not been sub- son was convicted had jury beyond manufacturing proven 100 or more mitted to a of the crime of marijuana plants in violation of 21 U.S.C. reasonable doubt. The court directed 841(a)(1) that, (b)(1)(b), Nordby’s punishable by light Apprendi §§ sen- par- statutory tence could “not exceed the years’ imprisonment. [] to 40 While understandably applicable as to to the facts as found ties were uncertain maximum jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” they proceed light Ap- by how should not err in Id. prendi the district court did vacating plea submitting quan- Nordby, Patter- Unlike the defendant jury Supreme as the Court tity issue to the sentence did not exceed the “statuto- son’s throughout At now commands. all times ry applicable maximum to the facts found single prosecution Patterson faced the this beyond jury a reasonable doubt.” crime, potential penal- same with the same conviction and sentence were Patterson’s ties, ultimately tried for which he was guilty on his conditional based convicted,

jury, and sentenced. marijuana. unspecified to an amount оf Rather, by a they finding were based on a

The district court vacated Patterson’s jury guilty that Patterson was of manufac- upon government’s under- based marijuana plants. turing 100 or more post-Apprendi argument standable drug quantity was submitted pled Patterson had never to a third “ele- issue ment,” by jury beyond a reasonable marijuana involved and decided quantity Thus, conviction and But as we have now clari- doubt. his offense. fied, fit the rule enun- squarely the distinction be- sentence within “Apprendi eschews *9 Apprendi, in by Supreme the Court sentencing factors and elements of ciated tween Nordby, recently, in acknowledged not of inquiry crime: ‘the is one relevant Buckland. form, by panel our en banc in required but the find- clarified of effect—does Nordby on the extent that relied ing expose greater pun- the to a To the defendant sentencing factors and jury’s than the distinction between ishment that authorized determination, acceptance court’s of Patter- it The district making its elements likewise condi- guilty plea here was son’s See 277 F.3d by Buckland. was overruled court told Patterson tional. The district at 1182. if, presentence considering “after the that that it report any other evidence B other than something have that might should be being what was recommended “[jjeopardy that it is truе While can do that.” The imposed, the Court accep the court’s ordinarily upon attaches reject plea the court retained discretion agreement,” United States tance of a of information it agreement on the basis .(9th Cir.1990), Smith, or on the basis gained from either the PSR conditionally ac that is guilty plea would any other evidence that indicate give jeopardy. rise to See cepted does not improper. In plea agreement that the was Cordova-Perez, had deciding plea agreement that the that (9th Cir.1995); also 21 AM. see not reflect the law as been entered into did Law 337 Criminal JUR.2d Supreme Ap- the Court enunciated Cordova-Perez, 65 F.3d at the properly court exer- prendi, the district guilty to a lesser related pled defendant cised its discretion. government’s for the exchange offense in anyone involved in At no time did these of other promise to move for dismissal stipulate quantity that proceedings ' rejected the charges. The district would determine the sentence Patterson viewing the PSR on the agreement after that ultimately faced. it was true While adequate- did not agreement basis everyone entry plea expected at of the of the defen- ly reflect the seriousness to make that factual determination judge Id. at 1554. dant’s offense behavior. We prejudice to Pat- sentencing, at we see no acceptance of district court’s held having jury do it since terson later “impliedly contingent” guilty plea was changed in the interim. The the law had PSR, upon of the its review might possibility that the court set aside to re- court therefore retained discretion guilty plea governing law because ject based on information subse- “is a risk inherent changed has from the PSR. See id. quently learned bargain a defendant makes when he concluded that the district We agrees accep- to the court’s conditional acceptance guilty plea of the was Here, court’s accep- guilty plea. tance of his rejected conditional and therefore. defen- tance was conditional.” See Cordova-Per claim, ez, Therefore, jeopardy jeopar- jeopardy since dant’s double 65 F.3d at 1556. dy upon “acceptance” upon acceptance of the not attach the court’s did not attach did plea.1 plea. conditional See id. at 1557. submitting We fail how that factual claims that we to see

1. The dissent are.unable justify why government jury judge should be allowed rather than the determination to bargain to hold Patterson to the when it is was less favorable to Patterson or more favor- government, renege favorable to the but when government. bargain never able to the However, arguments these rest on it is not. changed party Only to it. vis-a-vis either assumption the dissent's mistaken that Patter- identity changed of the decision-maker when growing pled guilty unspecified an son Supreme Apprendi. At all Court decided marijuana. quantity of That is not correct. times, higher Patterson was at risk for sen- agreed times that at all the sole plants tence if 100 or more were found to quantity to be decided contested issue him, regardless grown by of wheth- have been could be determined. before final sentence

625 Further, 1557; Sanchez, while we held that a dis 65 at have F.3d United States v. authority (5th Cir.1980). court is without to vacate an 761, trict 763 Accord- “unconditionally accepted” plea, see United ingly, there was no jeopardy double viola- Partida-Parra, 629, v. 631 States tion in this Vacating plea case.- in (9th Cir.1988), the conditional nature of the order to quantity submit the issue to the acceptance guilty plea court’s of the here jury was not error. this

distinguishes case from Partida-Par Cordova-Perez, ra. See also F.3d Ill (noting 1555 n. 5 that nature conditional of acceptance plea court’s оf the distin Patterson contends that the dis guished Cordova-Perez’s case from Parti- trict court erred in denying his motion to das-Parra). Thus, the district court did suppress the evidence found as a result of vacating not err in Patterson’s conditional the.search because the search warrant was plea Apprendi. in of light supported by probable cause. We re prohibition “The Amendment’s Fifth view the district court’s denial of a motion a against placing jeop defendant ‘twice in to suppress evidence seized a search de ardy” represents policy a constitutional of Murillo, novo. See United States v. finality for the defendant’s benefit in fed 1169, Cir.2001), F.3d cert. de proceedings.” eral criminal - nied, -, 1342, U.S. 122 S.Ct. Jorn, 547, 27 400 U.S. 91 S.Ct. (2002). L.Ed.2d 245 findings The factual (1971). policy L.Ed.2d 543 That has not underlying that decision are reviewed for been offended this case. Patterson has magistrate clear error. See id. The subjected not been harassment judge’s finding probable cause is there prosecutions successive no there is fore reviewed for clear error and is accord question multiple or multiple pun trials significant ed deference. See United judge clearly ishments. Because the stat Hay, States 634 n. n by plea ed that he was not bound — Cir.2000), denied, U.S. -, cert. agreement plea negotiatiоns, he had the (2001). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 88 right plea light to vacate the change sentencing in the law of as to who In determining probable whether .quantity would make the determination supported cause issuance of search by proof and what standard of as enunciat case, warrant this we must determine by Supreme ed in Apprendi.2 Court whether there was substantial basis for magistrate’s finding acceptance probable

The court’s cause. Patter Gates, 213, 239, 103 guilty plea son’s Illinois v. jeop was conditional and See Cordova-Perez, ardy did not attach. See 76 L.Ed.2d 527 finding by judge er guilty plea this was made the district because Patterson’s was rendered jury. or a involuntary intervening as result of an change in the law. The dissent that is correct States, Citing Brady v. United holding arguably such a would be foreclosed (1970), But, Brady. we the Court’s decision in argues the dissent that Patterson’s could prop- hold that the district court’s action was not be ‍​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‍withdrawn the district court since it er based on the nature of Patter- conditional voluntarily "intelligently made in judge plea, son’s assumed the light applicable problem of then law.” The quantity sentencing pur- would determine argument regard with the dissent's in this poses. Brady simply inapplicable to these holding characterizes our decision as unique facts. proper the district сourt's action was *11 626 testimony support was sufficient to practical, a Govifs “to make task is

magistrate’s decision,” totality id. given finding probable a cause. See We common-sense id. at denial See affirm the district court’s of the circumstances. therefore to is entitled magistrate suppress. S.Ct. 2317. to of Patterson’s motion enforcement officer’s rely upon the law evaluating when

training experience IV him in the de information related that because the Patterson contends cause. See United probable termination of (9th in Gil, government destroyed pots Cir. which F.3d States 1995). con- marijuana grew, which he claims n only evidence of whether stituted Patterson does not establish roots, plants had the district court erred finding proba- clearly erred in magistrate n denying his motion to exclude evidence the search warrant. On ble cause to issue marijuana plants. about the number circum- totality of the contrary, contends that the de- Patterson further finding probable a justified stances his “con- struction of the evidence violated in this case. cause un- right stitutional of access to evidence” that Stevens de- Sergeant testified Gow der the Due Process Clause. See United containing pots of gutted a trailer scribed (9th Belden, States v. and smellеd marijuana, that Stevens saw Cir.1992). marijuana property, and that Ste- on the coming from humming noise vens heard for an abuse of dis We review further Sergeant the trailer. Gow testified cretion the district court’s decision wheth while that his own observations for er to exclude evidence as sanction information, in- this property confirmed preserve evidence. destrojdng failing marijuana and the cluding the smell of at 674. court’s deter See id. The district noise, similar to what humming which was government’s fail mination of whether the marijuana opera- had at other Gow heard potentially exculpatory evi preserve ure to tions. process due dence violated defendant’s testified as to Sergeant Gow also rights is reviewed de novo. See United Gow experience. own law enforcement Cooper, States assigned he stated that had been . Cir.1993) eight and that he drug years task force for marijuana investigated had numerous A including serving growing operations, twenty-five such search warrants at over matter, As an initial reliability, Ser- operations. As to Stevens’ the roots of the contends without geant testified that he had known Gow plants, there is no evidence of the number eighteen years and that Ste- Stevens for plants, and so the evidence marijuana vens had been introduced marijuana weight. amount of is its Patter familiar with Army and was therefore argument require son’s on the based marijuana. appearance and smell of “readily ment that there must be observa for ble evidence of root formation” order circum totality of the Given the marijuana plant plant counted as a stances, to be deference at significant and the sentencing purposes. See United magistrate’s tached to the determination Robinson, cause, did not States v. probable magistrate Cir.1994). that the de- Sergeant Patterson asserts clearly determining err *12 pots containing clearly healthy struction of the the roots and viable. The district impossible has made to determine court also found that Patterson was not roots, plants whether or not the had and unduly prejudiced by the destruction of that, accordingly, there is no evidence of pots the containing the roots because he marijuana plants. the number of This as- had access to the video of the search and sertion erroneous. would have opportunity the to cross-exam- ine the officers who plants. counted the Sergeant Gow testified the See id. The court also noted that it was plants that he counted did have roots. state federal authorities who collected not Gow further testified about his training and stored the evidence. See id. Based experience in differentiating between facts, on these the district’s court decision stages different plant growth. spe He not to exclude evidence of the number of cifically stated that when he counted the marijuana plants was not an abuse of dis- in plants operation Patterson’s he did not cretion. The district court’s denial of Pat- any plants thought include that he did not terson’s motion to exclude is therefore af- addition, have roots. video firmed. provides search also sufficient evidence of marijuana plants the number of found. (cid:127)C Therefore, unpersua Patterson’s claim is Patterson also contends that sive that the proper evidence of the government’s preserve failure to the roots marijuana amount of in this case is its process violated his due rights. “[U]nless weight. criminal defendant can show bad faith on part police, of the preserve failure to

B potentially useful evidence does not consti argues that because the process tute a denial of due of law.” Ari plants preserved by roots of the were not Youngblood, zona v. government, the district court erred (1988); S.Ct. United allowing government present other Rambo, States v. ). marijuana evidence about the number of Cir.1996 plants. Factors to be considered in deter argued Patterson has neither nor mining whether evidence should be exclud presented any evidence that the officers ed as a sanction for government destruc failing preserve acted bad faith in of, tion preserve, or failure to evidence are “Indeed, roots. he not chal does even quality government’s of the conduct lenge thd district finding court’s degree prejudice and the to the defen government'did not act in bad faith” Belden, dant. See 957 F.2d at 674. The preserving the roots. degree participation by nature and Hernandez, Cir. federal government attorneys and its 1997). process can due claims the loss or destruction the evidence is rejected be on this basis alone. See also a consideration. See id. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at In evaluating quality (holding preserve potentially failure to conduct, government’s pro district court useful evidence does not violate due police faith); found that the showing officers’ decision not cess-absent a of bad Her nandez, preserve plants (finding roots of the did not F.3d at 1455 no due faith, process constitute bad but was instead violation where there was nо evi based faith); Rambo, reasoning plants on their were dence of 74 F.3d at 954 bad A depu- claim because (rejecting process due judg- “only poor indicated ties’ conduct Professor Bar- government called faith”). ment, not bad “plant physiologist” who described ney, extensively having with himself as worked could demon Even if Patterson *13 testify whether plant propagation, to about faith, pro m for the due order strate bad police marijuana plants seen in the implicated, the evidence clause to be cess systems root and were video had thus possess an excul lost “must both that was indepen- plants capable ... “established apparent before the that was patory value that, al- Barney survival.” testified dent such a destroyed, and be of evidence was marijua- had never worked with though he would be unable nature that the defendant developmental characteristics plants, na discoloration, size, other or new comparable wilting, evidence such as to obtain many growth, shoot were common reasonably available means.” California Barney jury told the that all but plants. 489, Trombetta, 479, v. 467 U.S. Sergeant plants that he saw one Hernandez, (1984); 2528, L.Ed.2d 413 the video had cutting counting on Gow has not 109 F.3d at 1455. Patterson systems. root at issue satisfiеs shown that the evidence either of these conditions. that Profes- The district court concluded testimony Barney’s sor could assist - plants jury determining in whether

Y actually plants merely cuttings. were or that, although further stated argues that the district court Patterson marijuana Barney experience had no with admitting expert testimony by a erred in testify about the common plants, he did horticulturalist, Danny L. Bar- Professor Reasoning that plants. characteristics of ney, regarding plants whether the he saw Barney’s experience weight went to police in video had root formations. testimony than to its given be his rather argues that whether the video admissibility, court decided that marijuana plants roots on the showed jury decide whether would be con- jury determination. Patterson also Barney’s testimony was credible. as an Barney qualified was not tends marijuana. expert on B the district court’s de pro We review Federal Rule of Evidence 702 expert testimony for an cision to admit vides: of discretion. See United States

abuse scientific, technical, special- If or other (9th Alatorre, 1098, 222 F.3d Cir. trier knowledge ized will assist the 2000); Hankey, or to fact to understand the evidence (9th denied, issue, Cir.), qual- cert. determine a fact witness skill, expert by knowledge, as an ified education, training may or experience, given the district court is Because opinion an testify thereto the form of deciding whether to broad discretion or otherwise. may expert testimony, ruling its be admit “manifestly if erroneous.” reversed expert testimony determining “In whether (internal Hankey, quota 203 F.3d at 1167 Rule the district is admissible under omitted). keep in mind Rule 702’s court must ‘broad tions reliability, relevancy, thought cuttings, were based on the lack parameters of n ” growth the trier of fact.’ Sementil new plant assistance to dead tissue. Bar- Corp., 155 F.3d li v. Trinidad ney gave opinion as to whether the Cir.1998) Flight roots, Desrosiers v. (quoting plants had but he also described for Fla., 960-61 Int’l jury plant characteristics Cir.1998)). helped him make determination. This plant growth information about was rele- admit The district court’s decision to helpful question vant and to the ultimate Barney’s testimony Professor .jury, accept before the which was free to erroneous,” “manifestly and did not consti- reject his ultimate conclusion. See Fed. Hankey, 203 tute an abuse of discretion. 704(a) (“testimony R.Evid. Robinson, the form of adopted F.3d at 1167. we *14 opinion an or inference otherwise admissi- marijuana cuttings are not the rule that objectionable ble is not because em- plants sentencing purposes for unless an braces ultimate issue to be decidеd “readily there is evidence of observable fact”). (internal the trier of F.3d at 446 root formation.” 35 omitted). that “re- quotations We noted The district court did not mani quiring readily observable evidence of root festly in concluding type err that this of approach is a common-sense formation jury information would assist the in deter prevent costly ‍​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‍confusing that will and mining plants the number of for sentenc experts battle of botanical which occurred ing purposes, and therefore did not abuse (internal quotations in this case.” Id. in admitting testimony. its discretion omitted). However, we did not hold that It properly “gatekeeping” exercised its expert testimony regarding root formation function under Daubert v. Merrell Dow impermissible. is Pharmaceuticals, Inc., testimony likely fo- Robinson 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 actually plant cused on the issue of when a VI plant, inquiry a an which would

becomes require expert a considerable amount of Patterson contends Here, testimony. See id. the issue before failing district court erred in to instruct jury marijuana plants was whether the jury option basing that it had the of its actually seized had roots so as to be classi- weight marijuana, of the verdict on “plants” sentencing purposes. fied as for plants, rather than on the number of and roots, plant actually a has Whether failing option to include that on the plant thus meets the definition of Jury are re verdict form. instructions sentencing purposes, question is a whose as a whole to determine whether viewed by expert determination could be aided they guide misleading inadequate are testimony presented botanical such as jury’s deliberation. See United States in this case. (9th Dixon, v. Cir. 2000). adequate Barney

Professor testified that Whether the instructions ly presented theory the defendant’s plants Sergeant Gow cut and counted novo, likely systems they de but if the in most had root because case reviewed fairly adequately covered healthy, vigorous, were and did not show structions offense, if “wilting you such as would see the elements of the we review signs you simply cutting “precise and stuck instructions’ formulation” for an had taken (internal quotations of discretion. Id. distinguished in into the soil.” He those abuse omitted). jury mis- plants other in the video that he instruction from seen Whether plants attributable is mine the number statutory crime the elements states Patterson, weight. Its rather than the Vallejo, 237 F.3d at See de novo. reviewed give option to use a them the decision not to district court’s decision 1024. The weight special a defendant’s on the verdict considering form over special verdiсt of dis for an abuse an abuse of discre- objection is reviewed did not constitute form Reed, 147 States affirmed. See United tion and is therefore cretion. Cir.1998). VII “knowingly stipulated to Patterson marijuana.” manufactur[ing] intentionally be contends that involves the a defendant’s offense When evidence that there was no reliable cause drug quantity marijuana, growing of existed, evidence was insuf any plants equivalency ratio using the determined There is the verdict. ficient to support Sentencing § 2D1.1 of the United States support a conviction sufficient evidence Guidelines, on the number is based which if, light most the evidence viewing Wegner, States plants.3 See United any rational government, favorable Cir.1995) (stating the essential of fact could have found trier establishes sufficient evidence that “[w]hen beyond a of the crime reasonable elements *15 actually grew and was defendant Wright, 215 doubt. See United States conviction plants, of live then possession denied, Cir.), 531 1020, 1025 cert. based on evidence sentencing can be 313 121 S.Ct. 148 L.Ed.2d U.S. is drug quantity The plants”). of live plants regardless of based on number police video of the search and Ser- The actually plants were seized of whether testimony geant constitute sufficient Gov/s Patterson’s or not. See id. at 926-28. - jury a rational to find that evidеnce for har- marijuana plants, not offense involved marijuana plants, and that grew Patterson prop- marijuana; he was therefore vested systems. Pat- they plants with root were of according to the number erly sentenced that there was insufficient terson’s claim mari- weight of the plants rather than the support verdict has no evidence to juana. merit. district court de Although the theory present clined VIII authority supports his jury, no case to argues the career accord claim that he should be sentenced § provisions of 4B1.1 of the Unit offender marijuana, rather ing weight of Sentencing Guidelines and the ed States plants. See United than the number (9th mandatory sentencing provisions minimum Mason, States process, § Cir.1990) of 21 U.S.C. 841 violate due is (holding that defendant Eighth Amend equal protection, and the theory jury instruction on entitled to a further contends that ment. Patterson theory supported by if of defense his between the treatment disparity in the evi law and has some foundation dence). marijuana manufacturers and those who jury instruc The district court’s marijuana is jury merely possess or distribute correctly to deter- tion directed marihuana, weight the usable commentary § actual to 2D1.1 of the Sentenc- 2D1.1, ing greater.” § marihuana "[flor Guidelines states U.S.S.G. whichever adoрted plants) 'has the Commission background. cmt. (cid:127) plant, equivalency grams per or the of 100 ratio, equivalency Eighth Amendment and the Due Pro- arbitrary, and according to pos- him to be sentenced cess Clause. convicted of requiring Carr was marijuana plants, is irra- number of intent session with distribute 66.92 constitutionality of a sentence tional. The grams of cocaine Because of two base. States v. is reviewed de novo. See United prior felony controlled substance convic- Cir. Reyes-Pacheco, tions, pur- Carr’s sentence was enhanced § 2001). suant to 4B1.1 to 262 months. Since the defendant’s sentence was less severe rela- determining whether sen tive to his offenses than other sentences Amendment, Eighth violates the we tence Court, upheld by Supreme held we leg “substantial deference” to must accord Eighth challenge that an Amendment appropriate pun islative determinations of by Supreme his sentence was foreclosed Michigan, Harmelin v. ishments. See Further, precedent. Court See id. we 957, 998-99, S.Ct. rejected the defendant’s contention that (1991) Helm, (citing L.Ed.2d 836 Solem v. § process; 4B1.1 violates due See id. 277, 290, 3001, 77 (1983)). Eighth Although L.Ed.2d 637 application Patterson’s claim that pro require Amendment does not “strict provisions the career offender sentence,” portionality between crime and arbitrary 4B1.1 his case resulted in an ... extreme sentences that are “forbids disproportionate must like sentence disproportionate’ to the crime.” ‘grossly rejected. “Generally, long wise be as as Harmelin, 501 U.S. at S.Ct. imposed the sentence on defendant does Solem, (citing 463 U.S. at limits, statutory not exceed this court will 3001). Eighth not overturn it on Amendment *16 Parker, grounds.” A (9th Cir.2001). 1114, 1117 F.3d applica contends that Patterson provisions tion of the career offender Nevertheless, we evaluate § Sentencing 4B1.1 of the Guidelines to his constitutionality of the sentence under the case,4 resulting sentencing in an increased Eighth by considering Amendment three range, process, equal protec violates due (1) gravity factors: of the offense and tion, Eighth and the Amendment. (2) penalty, harshness of the the sentences Carr, imposed In oh other criminals the same United States v. (3) (9th Cir.1995), jurisdiction, imposed the defendant claimed that the sentences § in a for of the sanie crime in other application of 4B1.1 resulted sen- commission Solem, disproportionate jurisdictions. See 463 U.S. at grossly tence seri- offenses, the circumstances prior violating ousness of his thus 103 S.Ct. 3001. Under every provides: history category in shall 4. Section 4B1.1 criminal case Category (1) be VI. A defеndant is a career offender if eighteen years prior for at defendant was at old at Patterson had convictions least the in- felony the time the defendant committed two crimes of violence and one least conviction, (2) Further, stant offense of the instant controlled substance offense. felony offense of is a is conviction conviction, at issue this offense manufac- n turing marijuana, violence a controlled either crime of felony controlled sub- is a offense, (3) defendant substance committed Patterson when stance offense prior felony has at least two convictions of Thus, years or older. Patterson he was 18 either a crime of violence or a controlled career offender the Guidelines. is a under substance offense ... A career offender's operate 4B1.1 not at 39. Section does case, say that Patterson’s cannot this we its process either on disproportionate to the contravention of due “so sentence was Carr, as to violate the case. applied offenses as in this See gravity of his face or Carr, 56 at 39. F.3d Eighth Amendment.” F.3d at 39. to 188 months’ was sentenced manufacturing 100 or

imprisonment for B minimum of his marijuana plants, the more claims rejecting Eighth Amendment to 235 range sentеncing guideline n mini mandatory consecutive Further, regarding the 188-month sentence months. statutory imposed maximum under 18 U.S.C. mum sentences was well within him, years. 924(c), See 21 U.S.C. “[generally, § stated that applicable to we have 841(b)(1)(B). gravity of Considering the § imposed on de long as as the sentence case, manufacturing 100 in this limits, the offense statutory fendant does not exceed and the fact marijuana plants, or more Eighth it on this court will not overturn was both at the penalty imposed Parker, 241 grounds.” Amendment range and well minimum of the Guideline at 1117. Patterson’s sentence is within maximum, cannot statutory we below the mandatory statutory limits of whose “grossly say that Patterson’s sentence upheld long minimum sentences have been to his crime. disproportionate” Eighth challenges. Amendment against Kidder, See, e.g., United States Further, crimes “classified and (9th Cir.1989). Moreover, 1328, 1334-34 felonies[,] ... length classifiable as “grossly was not so Patterson’s sentence actually imposed purely the sentence crime so as to disproportionate” to the Rum legislative prerogative.” matter of Eighth violate the Amendment. See Estelle, 445 100 S.Ct. mel v. U.S. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at (1980); Harmelin, 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (noting peno- “substantive sentencing laws involve matter, that, general

logical judgment as C province legisla properly within (internal courts”) tures, quotations disparity сhallenges *17 omitted). why marijuana is no reason growers There for between sentences sentences for legislature’s determination of marijuana distributors and to the committed career offenders rejected felonies also been equivalency ratio have less deference here Belden, should be accorded 957 F.2d at 676 by this court. See grossly dispro the sentence is not where rationally § (reasoning that 2D1.1 is based portionate to the crime. “recognition higher- on the of a level of marijuana growers com- culpability for process reject also Patterson’s due

We merely possess the pared to those who § challenge 4B1.1. This court has re to Wegner, 46 product”); harvested see also peatedly determined that Guidelines ver- (addressing pre-1995 F.3d at 926 sentencing unduly do not limit court’s the. n Guidelines, noting that Con- sion of the a defendant’s discretion to individualize regard to 2D1.1was to gress’ intent with sentence, not violate substan and thus do marijuana of See, “punish the manufacture process. e.g., or due procedural tive (9th severely”). challenges Patterson’s more Brady, F.2d 538 States v. 895 United Jones, are there- Cir.1990); Eighth under the Amendment v. United States Carr, 929, Cir.1990); 56 F.3d fore without merit. protects against prosecution IX “a second for the same after conviction” and offense contends that Patterson against “multiple punishments for adequately not consider court did district Ohio, same. offense.” Brown v. a dis departure. for Unless his motions depart refusal to downward trict court’s “ (1977). It constitutes ‘a constitutional lacks conclusion that on its based policy finality of for the bene defendant’s dis authority depart, a district court’s to ” Id., Jorn, quoting fit.’ cretionary depart refusal to downward 27 L.Ed.2d Sentencing is not re from the Guidelines States v. appeal. viewable on See United Cir.2001). Tam, Toby pleaded guilty When adequately a district court has Whether growing marijuana, the crime of he had for a sentence is stated the reasons escaped punishment growing and is reviewed dé novo. question of law rather, marijuana plants; or more he was Upshaw, See United States exposed to the risk that the court would so (9th Cir.1990). find; presumably and the court would misreading Apprendi have so found if a of clearly in this ease The record rejection had not led to and a district court’s refusal to indicates that the Patterson, jury finding Toby the number. depart from the Guidelines was not based therefore, jeopardy was not twice put that it lacked the authori on its conclusion life, limbs, any period definite Rather, ty depart. it was based on its subjected incarceration. He has not been history investigation of Patterson’s as own mul- prosecution punished to a second nor PSR, findings well as on the which the. tiple times for the same offense or de- Thus, adopted as its own. on finality prived any assurance of as to may not review the district appeal we I, there- punishment what his would be. discretionary depart court’s refusal fore, and in the concur his sentence from the Guidelines. downward parts Judge opinion. Tallman’s other X TÁSHIMA, Judge, dissenting: Circuit conviction and sentence áre

Patterson’s AFFIRMED. respectfully I dissent. The district thorough plea colloquy, court conducted

NOONAN, Judge, concurring: Circuit satisfying requirements of Fed. unconditionally accepted The Fifth ‍​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‍Amendment to the Constitu- R.Crim.P. Jeopardy guilty. con provides, tion of the States inter United *18 subject v. any person sequently attached. See United States alia: “nor shall be (9th Cir.1995) 1212, jeopar- Wong, 62 F.3d 1214 put offense to be twice the same Smith, v. 912 F.2d policy perceptible (citing United States dy of life or limb.” The 322, Cir.1990), proposition for the is unfairness of 324 provision beneath this the the time the person pun- jeopardy risk that attaches government making the guilty plea); accord United accepts offense after court again ishment for the same (2d Aliotta, 78, Cir. v. 199 F.3d 83 equivalent trial or its States he or she has stood 1999) jeopardy generally at (stating v. that escaped punishment. and Green United States, 184, 187, 221, accepts district court the 2 taches when the 355 78 S.Ct. Thus, plea). the district guilty also defendant’s L.Ed.2d 199 The amendment 634 pressure. respects, or In all authority by to vacate coercion not have the

court did therefore, 11 requirements the of Rule plea. satisfied, plea validly were and the was knowing plea was finding After that (find id. at 977 by accepted the court. Cf. was a factual voluntary, and that there and right appeal knowing of the ing a waiver the elements of the of- for each of basis voluntary the district court and where en fense, plea, set the accepted gaged colloquy” in an “extended with the sentencing, and told Patterson date for Grant, defendant); United States v. (“PSR”) Report the Presentence about (5th Cir.1997) 788, (rejecting F.3d prepared. The court going that was be contention that he should be defendant’s found guilty plea be allowed withdraw fully cognizant is and that Mr. Patterson meticulously “the district court satis cause capable entering plea, an informed he of 11”). obligations Rule The fied its under of has been made aware of the nature sentencing made no rec plea agreement the elements that make the offеnse and ommendation, unusual and but this is not up charge, that as well as what specifically by authorized Rule would be to es- Government’s evidence Fine, 11(e)(1)(A). See United States v. guilt charge to this of manu- tablish his (en banc) (9th Cir.1992) (not- 596, F.2d marijuana. facturing The Court further ing plea pursuant to Rule plea guilty of has been finds that 11(e)(1)(A), government and that ac knowingly voluntarily, and entered cordingly promised to dismiss some guilt, of is an by his admission there counts, a specific not to recommend sen independent containing basis in fact Gilliam, v. tence); United States each of the essential elements of the (7th Cir.2001) (plea agreement offense. sentences, minimum and maximum noted therefore, Court, going The to ac- noted that the final determination re but cept plea guilty the Defendant’s of garding the would determined sentence be judgment guilt enter a thereon. court). subsequent acceptance sentencing then set the date and The court rejection plea agreement does not to be truthful with admonished Patterson See validly accepted plea. invalidate the presentence investigator, reminding Hyde, States United everything him that the court “take would (1997) right up day into consideration (“Guilty pleas accepted plea can be while sentencing.” Id. at 20. deferred, agreements accep are and the “The record demonstrates the dis- separated two can tance be accept- 11 in complied trict court with Rule Ewing, time.”); United States v. ing” plea. (4th Cir.1992) (noting Aguilar-Muniz, position flaw the defendant’s was “its Cir.1998). required by As Rule acknowledge failure to the distinction be Aguilar-Muniz, similar to the court ad- guilty plea agree tween a and a vised of the nature of the ment”). him, charges against the minimum and “ fully one penalties, rights guilty maximum and the Patter- entered ‘[A] *19 See id. at 976-77. The up. ... giving consequences son was aware of the direct must (or prom- by court also determined that there was a stand unless induced threats harassment), improper plea plea factual basis for the and that the ises to discontinue voluntary, misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or knowing was not obtained

635 decided, tity. Apprendi After was the de- by- perhaps promises), unfulfillable colloquy that the Rule 11 improp argued nature fendants by their that are promises relationship to the the district court proper was insufficient because having no er as ” bribes).’ (e.g., business not inform them of all of the elements prosecutor’s did 1108, Kaczynski, offense, guilty pleas States v. and that their United Cir.2001) Brady v. (quoting 1114 the threat of a harsher were induced 755, States, 742, 90 S.Ct. 397 U.S. permissible United punishment than was under (1970)) (alterаtion in 1463, 747 25 L.Ed.2d that, indictment. The court reasoned — denied, -, U.S. original), cert. Apprendi reduced the maxi- though even (2002); In 1309, 152 L.Ed.2d 122 S.Ct. possible penalty mum the defendants rejected the Supreme Court Brady, faced, requirement ‘no in the “there is intervening contention defendant’s per- must be Constitution that a defendant plea involun guilty rendered his caselaw admissions in mitted to disown solemn plea held that tary. The Court open court that he committed the act with “because, judicial although later intelligent charged simply he is because it later which at the time of his indicated that decisions penalty ... develops that the maximum every correctly assess he ‘did not plea applicable then assumed has been held decision,’ into his entering factor relevant judicial inapplicable subsequent deci- counsel, was by competent he was advised Brady, (quoting Id. 397 U.S. at sions.’” faculties, ‘was in control of his mental 1463) (alteration 757, origi- in the 90 S.Ct. charge nature of the aware of the made nal). pleas Their therefore were still valid ” States, Bousley him.’ v. United against plea colloquies sufficient. Id. and the 1604, 523 U.S. Sánchez, plea was vol- As (1998) Brady, (quoting L.Ed.2d 828 in the untarily “intelligently made 1463) (citations 756-57, at 90 S.Ct. U.S. Brady, applicable of the then law.” light omitted). fact, misrepresenta- In “absent major- The at 90 S.Ct. 1463. U.S. conduct impermissible tion or other explain why government ity does not voluntary plea guilty agents, state to hold the defendant to of the then should be allowed light in the intelligently made it is bargain become vulnerable when favorable law does not applicable judicial renege decisions indicate when it is not. government, later but because faulty premise.” Gilliam, (affirming rested on a at 433-34 Cf. 90 S.Ct. Brady, anticipated by 397 U.S. than longer much sentence omitted). (citation fact that the de- histo- of criminal defense counsel because subsequent anticipate did not that, fendant reasoning had the defendant ry, and impugn the judicial “d[id] decision plea, he entered his been “at the moment Id. reliability plea.” of his truth or impact the Guidelines unaware of. sentence, that lack of have on his would Sanchez, 269 F.3d States v. United -— vacating require the knowledge would not denied, (11th Cir.2001), cert. Ritsema, 89 States v. plea”); of his United -, 122 S.Ct. Cir.1996) (noting that (2002), on Bra Circuit relied the Eleventh their rarely released from “defendants are contention dy reject the defendants’ despite the fact that the agreements, Jersey, Apprendi v. New not to be such bargain has turned out (2000), 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 all”). permit govern- To bargain after Id. at 1285. guilty pleas. their invalidated unfavorable, an but from in ment withdraw pled guilty to an had The defendants bе- valid, particularly troublesome plea is drug quan- that did not contain dictment *20 contemplate ty’s cause the rules do not even assertion that plea Patterson’s government only “conditionally” accepted by can move to set aside the court. valid, accepted plea. United States v. Moreover, only the authority cited in Partida-Parra, (9th 629, 859 F.2d Cir. support majority’s of the “conditional” ac 1988). ceptance assertion is United States v. Cor dova-Perez, (9th Cir.1995). 65 F.3d 1552 majority’s position solely The rests on Cordovar-Perez, however, In the district its assertion that plea, al- rejected agreement court the viewing after court, though accepted by the was “condi- agreement the PSR on the basis that the tionally” accepted jeopardy and that there- did not reflect the seriousness of the de fore did not attach.1 This assertion can be fendant’s offense behavior. Id. at 1554. however, accepted, only if one blinds one- contrast, By the district court here did not self to the record. The district court could plea base its any withdrawal the on clearer, firmer, not have been or more PSR, by matter disclosed but on unconditionally direct when it stated: “The intervening caselaw. Court, therefore, going is accept plea guilty Dеfendant’s and enter a majority The ignores also that the con- judgment guilt thereon.” That viability tinued of Cordova-Perez has been court sentencing retained its discretion called into question by United States v. acceptance does not make its plea 1033, Cir.1997) Hyde, 124 F.3d Sentencing necessarily “conditional.” can- J., (Ferguson, concurring), on the basis of (or verdict) place plea not take until after a Supreme Court’s reversal of our deci- guilty unconditionally and, accepted sion in Hyde, United States v. 92 F.3d 779 11(e)(1)(C) except in the case of a Rule (9th Cir.1996). Hyde, 670, See plea, fully a court sentencing retains its 935; 117 S.Ct. 137 L.Ed.2d see also plea discretion unconditionally State, (N.D. Froistad v. N.W.2d after Here, 11(e)(1)(C) accepted.2 unlike a Rule 2002) (noting that Cordova-Perez is no plea agreement, agreement ex- longer good Supreme law as a result of the pressly provided that “the Court has not fact, Court’s in Hyde). decision al- any relating made commitment ap- though Supreme Court did not specifi- propriate case, sentence in this and is not cally address the viability of Cordova-Per- by agreement.” bound (Emphases this in Hyde, reject ez it did the defendant’s Thus, original.) there is no factual proffered “fully distinction between accept- basis in support majori- the reсord to ed” and “conditionally accepted” guilty majority correctly 1. rejects govern- ing the district court’s denied of the defen- ment's contention that the was defective guilty dant's motion to plea, withdraw his drug quantity for failure to include as an drug quantity where was to be determined Maj. op. element of the (citing offense. at 623 court); Gilliam, later the district Buckland, United States v. 277 F.3d 1173 (finding guilty at 431-33 plea knowing Cir.2002) (en banc)). voluntary, though even the final determi- nation of the sentence was to be made Thus, being "unique,” Maj. far from op. at later, and the long- sentence was much 625 n. typical. the facts of this are case predicted by government er than and de- See, 676-77, e.g„ Hyde, 520 U.S. at counsel); Littlejohn, fense United States v. (quoting advisory committee notes to (9th Cir.2000) 32(e), (noting that the stating pleas Rule are not to be "tentative, prepared necessary— PSR "is not subject viewed until one is as to withdrawal sentence”); before pled guilty United after a defendant States v. Wallace had and been (7th Cir.2002) (affirm- convicted”). 363-64

637 conclusion Not is Cordova-Perez’s at 117 Hyde, pleas. See it also incon- suspect Hyde, is because 1630. S.Ct. sistent with our decision Partida-Parra. reversed Supreme Court Hyde, the In Partida-Parra, government mistak- the had an the defendant our conclusion plead to enly permitted the defendant guilty plea his right to withdraw absolute than a guilty to a misdemeanor rather plea accepted the court the district before set felony subsequently moved to 1630. Id. at agreement. plea, already which had guilty aside the accepted guilty the court had The district accepted by the district court. been on whether decision plea, deferred but granted the motion and district court set until the PSR agreement accept plea the noted, jury for trial. howev- the case We sentencing, the de Before prepared. er, authority un- that “the district court’s guilty plea, to withdraw his sought guilty fendant an accepted the Rules to revisit der the motion court denied but the district The district court plea is limited.” Id. reason, just a fair and provide plea questions a if about the may failure vacate 32(e). The Su plea subsequently to Fed.R.Crim.P. for the pursuant factual basis that, although arise, fair and if the defendant shows a reasoned preme Court reason, just if a fraud was committed guilty plea and “[t]he true that might be dis court. Id. at 631-33. The up togeth upon the are ‘bound plea agreement the ” accordingly did not have author trict court (quoting er,’ 1630 id. at S.Ct. Rules or un ity under either the Federal Cordova-Perez, 1556), guilty at the plea agreements der the “сommon law” agree plea while the plea accepted can be 3, 633-34; Id. at 632 n. plea. to vacate the 674, 117 1630; deferred, id. at S.Ct. ment is Fagan, F.2d see also United States guilty nowhere state “the Rules (9th Cir.1993) that, (asserting must be plea agreement the plea and guilty a accepts court “once the district 677, 117 id. at S.Ct. identically,” treated plea fraud or breach of plea, absent that, once therefore held The Court 1630. defendant, the court by the has agreement agree plea if the accepted, even plea a is guilty plea be authority vacate no 32(e)’s deferred, requirement Rule ment - asserting government motion cause of a just a fair and show the defendant (on govern fact [the a mistake of ‘that Id. plea applies. to withdraw reason of a prevented the formation part) ment’s] 677-80, 117 1630. at ”) Partida- binding agreement’ (quoting require- Hyde focused on Although 633) (alteration in Parra, 32(e), import of its ments of Rule Fleming, States v. original); United cf. the court has ac- clear—once holding is Cir.2001) (“When F.3d if it has deferred plea, a even cepted guilty voluntary knowing a with presented in order plea agreement acceptance options district court’s agreement, a plea PSR, may defendant to review the Further, a court ac once are limited.... showing a fair plea only by withdraw ‘it is bound cepts plea agreement, ability just ”) If the defendant’s reason. v. Man States bargain.’ (quoting United limited, Cir.1990)); fortiori, plea dell, to withdraw (stating be at least ability should 156 F.3d at 978 government’s Aguilar-Muniz, has been limited, that, agreement do not even the Rules “[a]fter as because court, the to set accepted motions and entered “contemplate!] government agreement Partida-Parra, may F.2d at not rescind plea.” aside de- unless the motion government’s on the contends, agreement”); correctly fendant has breached the guilty plea consti *22 Kurkculer, 295, tuted a conviction for the lesser included (1st Cir.1990) (holding 301-02 that the dis- offense of manufacturing unspecified an guilty plea trict court could not set aside a quantity marijuana, and he could not objection upon pros- over a defendant’s subsequently greater be retried for the agreement). ecution’s breach offense of manufacturing 100 or more mar Ohio, ijuana plants.3 See Brown v. Partidor-Parra, Ritsema, Similar to 161, 167-70, 2221, 97 S.Ct. 53 L.Ed.2d held that the Seventh Circuit district (1977) (holding jeopar the double authority court had “exceeded its limited dy prohibited prosecution clause for the under 11” it prior Rule when withdrew its greater following offense of auto theft approval plea agreement of a based on its defendant’s conviction for the lesser in in deeming belief “that it had erred joy-riding); cluded offense of Green v. pled guilty count to which [the defendant] States, 184, 189-91, United 355 U.S. adequately representative of his criminal (1957) L.Ed.2d (finding 400, conduct.” 89 F.3d at jeopardy double violated where defendant accepted plea Once the court has was retried on a first degree murder is, agreement, rule, ... it a general as charge following reversal of his conviction agreement. bound the terms of that ‍​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‍by jury offense, of a lesser included second provision There is no the rules allow- murder); degree United States v. ing reject modify a court to an agree- cf. Timbana, Cir.) 701-02 accepted. ment once contrary, On the (rejecting argument the defendant’s principle plea agreement that a once plea his was not knowing voluntary accepted binding signaled by is Rule where he voluntarily assured the court he 11 itself. gave up rights order to enter a (footnotes omitted). Id. at 399 and citations to a lesser offense than that charged in the Thus, the Rules of Criminal Procedure “do indictment), denied, cert. grant power the court the to revisit a 121 S.Ct. plea merely át a because later date the Partida-Parra, Under the district cоurt thoughts bargain has about a second did authority not have the already approved.”' has withdraw the Id. at 401. Just plea. Accordingly, as Patterson’s rarely criminal defendants “are sentence' released should from be vacated and the agreements” “plea their when a case remanded bar- gain resentencing has based on turned out not to be such a the offense to all,” bargain pleaded guilty. which he after neither gov- should the permitted ernment be to do so. Id. defective, was not validly district court and unconditional- Thus,

ly accepted plea. as Patterson " 3. The statute that proof Patterson violated is 21 of a fact which the other does not.’ 841(a). Brown, § U.S.C. The offense that is the lesser (quot- 432 U.S. at 97 S.Ct. 2221 841(a) § offense is the ing violation of Blockburger, with no 284 U.S. at finding quantity, 180). Rather, subjecting invariably "[a]s is true aof 841(b)(1)(D), sentencing provision offense, §of greater and lesser included the lesser five-year greater with its maximum. The requires proof beyond of- offense ... no 841(a) § fense is the violation of required with a greater find- which is for conviction of the ing plants, resulting 100 or greater more in his ... The offense is therefore defini- 841(b)(1)(B). sentence under purposes jeopar- "[I]t clear- tion the ‘same’ for of double ly not [provision] requires dy the case that ‘each any as lesser offense included in it.” Id.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Toby C. Patterson
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: May 16, 2002
Citation: 292 F.3d 615
Docket Number: 00-30306
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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