United States v. Timothy Patrick HoctorUnited States v. Timothy Patrick Hoctor
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Ely
Lead Opinion
The Govern3nent appeals fro3n the District Court’s order dismissing part of an indictment against Hoctor.1 Finding no error in the District Court’s ruling, we affirm.
Hoctor was indicted, in the count relevant to this appeal, for an alleged violation of
The District Court held that Hoctor could not be classed as a felon at the time of his alleged offense and was not, therefore, amenable to prosecution under
The expungement statute provides:
“Every defendant who has fulfilled the conditions of his probation . may . . . be permitted in the discretion of the court to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty . . . the court may in its discretion set aside the verdict of guilty; . . . the court may thereupon dismiss the information or indictment against such defendant, who shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of which he has been convicted.”
According to the Washington Supreme Court, .
“This statute is a legislative expression of public policy in the field of criminal law and rehabilitation. It undertakes in unambiguous terms, to restore a deserving offender to his preconviction status as a full-fledged citizen.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Matsen v. Kaiser, 74 Wash.2d 231, 237, 443 P.2d 843, 846-847 (1968) (concurring opinion). See also Tembruell v. Seattle, 64 Wash.2d 503, 392 P.2d 453 (1964). Further, the Attorney General of Washington, in a published opinion, has also written that the provisions of
The Government contends that this state determination could not affect the scope of
“No provision of this chapter [including§ 842(i) ] shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which such provision operates to the exclusion of the law of any State on the same subject matter, unless there is a direct and positive conflict between such provision and the law of the State so that the two cannot be, reconciled or consistently stand together.”
Both the Washington law and
Affirmed.
On Petition For Rehearing
A majority of the panel as originally constituted in the subject case has voted to deny the Petition for Rehearing and to reject the suggestion for a rehearing en banc, Judge Carter dissenting.
The full court having been advised of the suggestion for en banc rehearing and of the panel vote, and a judge in active service having requested that a vote be taken on the appellant’s suggestion for en banc rehearing, such a vote has been taken. Rule 35(b) Fed.R.App.P. The thirteen judges in active service have voted, by a majority of nine to four, that the suggestion be rejected.
Accordingly, the Petition for Rehearing is denied, and the appellant’s suggestion for en banc rehearing is rejected.
Notes
. There was a three-count indictment. The District Court dismissed counts One and Three on the same grounds and the Government appealed. Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed. 2d 488 (1971). On the Government’s motion, count One, which dealt with Hoctor’s alleged possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a) was dismissed by this court, under the Bass decision. i
. In support of its position, the Government cited several cases previously decided by this court dealing with the effect of expungement statutes on deportation orders. E. g., Kelly v. I. N. S., 349 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1965), cert, denied 382 U.S. 932, 86 S.Ct. 326, 15 L.Ed.2d 344 (1965) ; *272Garcia-Gonzalez v. I. N. S., 344 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 840, 86 S.Ct. 88, 15 L.Ed.2d 81 (1965). Those ^decisions are not here applicable. Congress has plenary power over the treatment of aliens and, from the specific language of the peculiar statute involved in those cases, our court held that Congress intended the sanction [i. e., deportation] to follow the mere fact of conviction, without regard to whether the alien subsequently fulfilled his probation terms without further incident. We cannot assume here that the Congress intended such a broad application of
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting on Petition for Rehearing)‘.
I must confess I was over-persuaded by my brother Ely and joined in the opinion. Now I am convinced that we were in error.
The issue presented in this case is whether a state legislature may define the terms of a federal statute. The federal statute in question is
The defendant, Timothy Patrick Hoctor, acquired his prior conviction in 1966 for second degree burglary under the *273laws of the State of Washington. This was a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years. The state court sentenced Hoctor to a term of probation. When the term had expired in 1969, the state court discharged the conviction pursuant to Washington’s so-called “expungement statute,” Revised Code of Washington, 9.95.240. Soon aft-erwards, Hoctor was charged under the federal statute,
My analysis has four parts: first, a general interpretation of
I
The twin guides in construing a statute are its words and its ascertainable purpose. If the plain meaning of the words in
Congress’ apparent purpose was to thwart a volatile mixture — the combination of an explosive material with a person having criminal tendencies. In
Defining a person having criminal tendencies was tougher. In
The expungement should be allowed to affect the terms of
*274
II
If
Thus
Ill
The opinion says that
For two reasons it is evident that
First, as stated in the preceding section, I see a direct conflict between the state statute and
Secondly, the state law does not concern the same subject matter as
IV
The Ninth Circuit Cases
The Ninth Circuit has numerous cases holding that state expungement statutes do not affect the scope of certain federal laws on deportation. E. g., Kelly v. I.N.S. (9 Cir. 1965) 349 F.2d 473, cert, denied, 382 U.S. 932, 86 S.Ct. 326, 15 L.Ed.2d 344 (1965); Garcia-Gonzales v. I.N.S. (9 Cir. 1965), 344 F.2d 804, cert, denied, 382 U.S. 840, 86 S.Ct. 88, 15 L.Ed. 2d 81 (1965).
The opinion in this case brushes aside these precedents in a footnote, saying they are not applicable. Two distinctions are drawn, neither of which is persuasive that Kelly and Garcia do not apply to Hoctor.
First, the opinion points out that the deportation statute,
Secondly, the opinion states that Congress has plenary power over deportation law, while Congress’ power to regulate explosives is of course limited to the sphere of interstate commerce. Although this is so, the fact that Congress’ power to regulate explosives is less than plenary does not mean that a valid enactment, within the limited scope of Congress’ power, is subject to alteration by the states. Federal law, expressing federal policy, is supreme, whether or not it concerns a subject over which Congress has plenary power.
The decision in Garcia controls this case. As said there, “It is sheer fiction to say that the conviction is ‘wiped out’ or ‘expunged.’ . . . . ‘Congress intended to do its own defining [of “conviction”] rather than leave the matter to variable state statutes.’ ” Garcia, at pp. 807-808.
The petition for rehearing should be granted and an .opinion filed, reversing the judgment below.