UNITED STATES оf America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy McKINNEY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 81-1636.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Sept. 16, 1982. Decided May 23, 1983.
707 F.2d 381
Harry E. Hull, Jr., McDonough, Holland & Allen, Sacramento, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before TRASK and POOLE, Circuit Judges, and BELLONI,* District Judge.
Appellant Timothy McKinney appeals his jury trial conviction for armed bank robbery in violation of
In June 1981, three armed men robbed the Sequoia Savings and Loan in Fresno, California. Indictments were returned against Timothy McKinney, Larry Simmons and Joe Jennings. Jennings pled guilty to the bank robbery charge. McKinney was conviсted in a jury trial on September 17, 1981. On November 12, 1981, Simmons was convicted in a jury trial.
I
At trial, FBI Agent Hobart Johnson was a witness for the government. His testimony concerned conversations he had with Evonne Walker several days after the robbery. Evonne Walker was Larry Simmons’ girlfriend. Agent Johnson, relying on his report of his conversation with Walker testified as follows:
Q. What did she say in regard to seeing McKinney on the 11th of June?
A. When she saw him, he had on a dark blue jogging suit.
Q. What time did she see him?
A. At about 11:30 that morning.
Q. Where did she see him?
A. With Larry and Joe at her apartment.
Q. And what did she tell you about the circumstances under which she saw Tim McKinney, Larry Simmons, and Joe Jennings at her apartment at 11:30?
A. That when they came in, Larry told her they robbed a bank.
Q. And what were the words that she said he used?
A. That Larry used?
Q. Yes.
A. That they had just robbed a bank. (Emphasis added).
Evonne Walker had testified earlier that she had no recollection of the statement
We find thаt admission of Agent Johnson‘s testimony violated McKinney‘s sixth amendment right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The sixth amendment issue was not raised in the district court and was neither briefed nor argued in this court. “In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717, 718, 82 S.Ct. 1287, 1288, 8 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962) quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936); United States v. Jeffery, 473 F.2d 268, 270-71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 818, 94 S.Ct. 42, 38 L.Ed.2d 5 (1973);
II
The Confrontation Clause is not an absolute impediment to the introduction of extra judicial statements. If the statements are necessary and reliable they may be introduced at trial. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2538, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1330-31 (9th Cir.1982). The necessity requirement is satisfied by showing the declarant is unavailable. On the record before us we can not determinе if Simmons was available to testify at McKinney‘s trial.1 We can determine the reliability of Agent Johnson‘s testimony and find it to be unreliable for Confrontation Clause purposes.
The testimony of Agent Johnson was double hearsay—McKinney to Walker and Walker to Johnson.2 In Ohio v. Roberts the Supreme Court stated that, for Confrontation Clause purposes, “[r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hеarsay exception.”3 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539. This court, however, rejected this notion, at least for the coconspirator exception4 in United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 660 n. 5 (9th Cir.1981). We stated:
Although the hearsay rules and the confrontation clause promote similar values, admissibility under a hearsay exception does not a fortiori dissolve the court‘s obligation to review the record for constitutional infirmity. This principle has particular force when the admission of evidence is sought under the coconspirator exception: Admission under the coconspirator exception does not automatically guarantee compliance with the confrontation clause. Id. at 660. (citations omitted.)
III
Agent Johnson testified that Larry Simmons told Evonne Walker that they (Simmons, McKinney and Jennings) had just robbed a bank. The government contends that McKinney‘s silence in the face of Simmons’ statement constituted an adoptive admission pursuant to
In United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027, 102 S.Ct. 1731, 72 L.Ed.2d 148 (1982), we reviewed the foundation required prior to admitting evidence as an adoptivе admission. We said:
Before admitting a statement as an admission by acquiescence, the District Court must determine, as a preliminary question, whether under the circumstances an innocent defendant would normally be induced to respond. The District Court should not submit the evidence of an admission by silence to the jury unless it first finds that sufficient foundational facts have been introduced for the jury reasonably to conclude that the defendant did actually hear, understand and accede to the statement. 663 F.2d at 904.
We find that the foundation in this case was inadequate and, therefore, the district court erred in admitting the statement.8
Walker testified that she had no recollection of the statement Simmons supposedly made to her in McKinney‘s presence. Agent Johnson, relying on the report of his conversation with Walker, gave the testimony set forth earlier in this opinion. His testimony does not provide an adequate foundation to introduce the statement as an adoptive admission. From this testimony it is impossible to determine where McKinney was when Simmons made the statement. We can not determine if McKinney heard and understood the statement or if the circumstances were such that one could expect him to respond to the statement.
IV
Having determined that Agent Johnson‘s testimony violatеd McKinney‘s right to confront witnesses against him, we must now determine if that error requires reversal of the district court verdict. Violations of the confrontation clause require reversal unless they are harmless beyond a
The evidence linking McKinney to the robbery is not overwhelming. The government presented three witnesses who were employees of the savings and loan when it was robbed. These three witnesses identified McKinney in very general terms based on his height and build.9 The government also introduced several items seized at McKinney‘s apartment including a blue knit cap with stockings inside, a green plaid shirt and a .38 caliber revolver. The seized clothing was similar to clothing worn by one of the robbers but not the robber identified as McKinney. The revolver was similar to the one carried by the tallest robber (supposedly McKinney). There was also tenuous evidence of McKinney and Simmons being together at another savings and loan a week prior to the robbery and acting suspicious.
Agent Johnson‘s erroneously admitted statement was tantamount to a confession by McKinney. This testimony was highly prejudicial. In light of the relatively weak evidence against McKinney, we can not say that the jury was not influenced by Agent Johnson‘s testimony. The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and, accordingly, we reverse the judgement of the district court.
BELLONI, District Judge, dissenting:
I dissent. The majority opinion demonstrates the possibility of error that exists when a court injects into a case an issue that the parties did not raise, brief or argue at trial or on appeal. The majority concludes: that the judge committed “plain error” under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment by admitting into evidence, over the objection of the appеllant under Fed.R.Evid. 403, certain testimony of Special Agent Johnson; that the “plain error” was not “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969); United States v. Hollingshead, 672 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir.1982); and that, therefore, reversal is required. The majority‘s analysis does not support a reversal.
The majority describes the testimony of Agent Johnson as double hearsay—the appellant to Walker and Walker to Johnson.1 The characterization is erroneous. The first-level statement contains two components: the accusatory statement by Simmons, and the appellant‘s adoption of the statement by his silence. Neither of the components constitutes hearsay, and it is, therefore, incorrect to speak of Agent Johnson‘s testimony as double hearsay.
Without first considering whether a Confrontation Clause analysis is appropriate for the first-level statement, the majority begins examining the first-level statement, for “necessity” and “reliability” under Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2538, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), and United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044, 103 S.Ct. 464, 74 L.Ed.2d 614 (1982). Because the majority mixes together the two component statements in its analysis of the first-level statement, I cannot tell whether the majority is holding that the admission of Simmons‘s statement, or of the appellant‘s adoption of the statement, or of both in concert, violated the Confrontation Clause.2 Whatever the majority‘s intent, I disagree with its conclusion.
To the extent thе majority decides that the admission of Simmons‘s statement presents a problem under the Clause, the majority‘s holding is directly at odds with part of the holding in United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979, 100 S.Ct. 480, 62 L.Ed.2d 405 (1979). Giese holds inter alia, that statements like Simmons‘s come in only to lay the foundation for showing the accused‘s failure to deny the statements, and are not hearsay because they are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Id. at 1195; see
Because Giese undercuts any contention that Simmons‘s statement could be the source of a Confrontation Clause problem, the problem, if one exists, would have to be in the admission of appellant‘s own “statement by silence.” To the extent the majority raises this issue, it creates the odd situation of having the “declarant” object on hearsay grounds to the admission of his own statement. As the court stated in United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870, 99 S.Ct. 200, 58 L.Ed.2d 182 (1978), when faced with an appellant that raised the issue, “[t]his is an ironic twist in that the rule against hearsay has as its primary purposes the protection of the right of litigants to confront witnesses against them аnd to test their credibility through cross-examination.” Id. at 487. As was stated in Evans, this “unique situation” should certainly color the court‘s consideration of the issue. Id. at 488 (citing
The Evans court found the answer to its problem in the principle, recognized also in this Circuit, that “[a]ny and all statements of an accused person, so far as are not excluded by the doctrine of confessions or by the privilege against self-incrimination, are usable against the accused as an аdmission, and are not hearsay.” Id. at 488.4
See United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 770 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 568, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978).
The Evans principle may not completely solve the problem here, however, because the appellant‘s admission was a special kind of admission: an adoptive admission under
As the court in Perini states, “An adoptive [statement] avoids the confrontation problem because the words of the hearsay become the words of the defendant.” Othеr relevant case authority includes United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941 (D.C.Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989, 94 S.Ct. 1586, 39 L.Ed.2d 885 (1974) (court affirmed a trial judge‘s admission into evidence of certain incriminating statements adopted by the appellant and stated that “the exclusionary principles embodied in the Confrontation Clause [do not] nullify the well-established reasons for making such admissions exceptions to the hearsay rule.” Id. at 949 (citations omitted))5; and United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d at 1197 (“Neither due process, fundamental fairness, nor any more explicit right contаined in the Constitution is violated by the admission of the silence of a person, not in custody or under indictment [,] in the face of accusations of criminal behavior“).6
The majority‘s opinion does not make good law to the extent it concludes that the Confrontation Clause can be violated by the admission at trial against an accused of his own out-of-court adoptive statements. The accused will always be “avаilable” at trial, and he can, if he chooses confront and rebut his out-of-court statements through his own direct testimony or through the introduction of other evidence. If he chooses not to do so, that is his right too. See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 103 S.Ct. 1548, 1552, 75 L.Ed.2d 521 (1983). Moreover, as the Perini decision and others recognize, an accused has every opportunity to interpose a proper objection and to make
Accordingly, I would conclude that neither Simmons‘s statement nor the appellant‘s adoptive admission properly could have been the basis of an objection under the Confrontation Clause. The majority does not reach any issue about the second-level statement on Agent Johnson‘s testimony so I do not discuss it here. If this case is to be decided on the basis of the Confrontation Clause, I would require a re-briefing and oral argument. The majority does not reach any of the other issues presented in the appeal, so it would be imprudent of me to address them here. For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent.
BELLONI
DISTRICT JUDGE