United States v. Timothy Martin

majority opinion I not the the mand. do read challenging Payne’s cross-appeal, miss raising the these precluding as IRS from damages, pre- as district court’s award of they prove if nec- challenges in the future mature. understanding, I concur essary. that With clear that majority does not make The majority’s opinion part but VI. in all the IRS, may its Payne, also raise the like damages court’s challenges the district attorneys’ subsequent fees awards appeal nec- subsequent proves if a

appeal, Payne The that did

essary. argues IRS sufficient evidence of causation present

not America, STATES of that the UNITED damages district of actual Plaintiff-Appellant, for ac- punitive damages court awarded and were that were not disclosures tions argues The also that its not unlawful. IRS Timothy MARTIN, Defendant-Appellee. “substantially justi- position litigating No. 00-6266. fied,” the district preclude which would attorneys’ If the court’s award of fees. Appeals, United States Court court finds that Batista acted district Sixth Circuit. faith, not liable for

good the IRS would be Feb. 2002. Submitted any damages, and would not need to we 6,May and Filed 2002. Decided issues. I assume that the consider these by majority omits mention of these claims might

the the issues be avoid- IRS because decision on re- by

ed court’s district conduct, supposed are to clari- “necessity'' of cial courts to evaluate the the disclosures evaluating agents. fy law so that good applicable faith of the state of the before the same mistake in the officials do make Gandy approach court’s misunder required court therefore future. The Harlow good of the faith defense. stands nature "currently applica- judges that determine explained good faith defense We have determining law ble law” before whether the many respects qualified im resembles in "clearly established” at time munity for executive officials described reasoning Id. same would violations. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. Harlow apply § seem to under 7431: courts should (1982). Huckaby v. 73 L.Ed.2d 396 See agents acted first the IRS determine whether States, Cir. 794 F.2d only lawfully, acted in then whether ("pT]he 1986) good-faith defense in sec [sz'c] good faith. 7431(b) objective judged by an tion should be clearly contemplates courts The statute analogous employed in standard to that Har sequence. permits It should follow this Harlow, low.")', Gandy, 234 F.3d at 285. In "good only relying for actions defense Supreme explained judges ap Court ” faith, interpretations appli- but erroneous plying qualified immunity test should first way cable law. There is no to know whether applicable currently law” and determine "the interpretation an officer’s was "erroneous” only “whether the law was then determine evaluating law. without the current state of clearly time oc established an action Gandy, Although joined opinion in I Harlow, I U.S. at curred.” approach acknowledge that in that case our sequence is we 2727. The reason for this future, I would have was mistaken. do to allow executive officials to not want panels set the lead district courts follow indefinitely. pun do not violate the law We evaluating difficult, majority the ac- first who make close and but ish officials here— law, any good faith tual state of the and then wrong, legality of their decisions about But, approach than the followed time a lawsuit is defense—rather decisions. first Gandy. brought challenging particular kind of offi- Wisdom, (briefed), Charles P. Jr. Asst. Famularo, L. Attorney, Joseph U.S. Office KY, Attorney, Lau- Lexington, the U.S. (briefed), ra K. Asst. U.S. Attor- Voorhees KY, ney, Covington, Plaintiff-Appel- lant. (briefed), Stephen Ziegler

James Smith Schneider, KY, Timothy Covington, & Institute, Martin, Federal Correctional WV, Beckley, Defendant-Appellee. MARTIN, Judge; Before: Chief Circuit GILMAN, EDMUNDS, Judge; Circuit District Judge.* EDMUNDS, D.J., opinion delivered the court, GILMAN, J., joined. which MARTIN, 400-02), (pp. delivered a C.J. separate dissenting opinion.

* Edmunds, designation. Michigan, sitting by Nancy G. The Honorable Judge States District for the Eastern District purposes, they requested so

OPINION Neal, that officer Gene who was located EDMUNDS, Judge. District hereby cruiser, in a marked appeals The United States the district Martin’s vehicle. ruling suppress handgun court’s After Neal stop. stop, a car made during seized For reasons Maurer re- below, moved from the stated REVERSES and vehicle and in- panel terrogated her as REMANDS. stood on the side-

walk. told Maurer that she had Martin, met only known to her by his first I. BACKGROUND name, at her brother’s approximate- house January approximately On 1999 at ly year one earlier. She also admitted p.m., 9:20 William Maurer prior that she had prostitu- convictions for Gregory Kentucky Jones of Covington, for possession tion and of cocaine. Maurer police department traveling were an Martin, interrogated then who told him 8th police undercover car East Street had Wagoner he known for two Covington, Kentucky. They a observed months and that he had met her on one of woman, Virginia Wagoner (“Wagoner”), his walks area. The officers testi- by a Appel- enter vehicle driven Defendant fied that Martin could tell not them Wag- (“Martin”). Timothy lee Martin The offi- oner’s name. they initially cers testified that observed standing Wagoner slowly walking either or Martin, While Maurer was questioning wearing nothing jeans outside than more officer Jones obtained consent Wag- from shirt; short-sleeved she was located person, oner to search her at which time lot, in front parking carrying nothing of a he pocket. discovered a condom her except a cigarette.1 to the offi- According conferred, After Maurer and Wag- Jones cers, Wagoner carry- fact was not charged oner was arrested and with loiter- purse ing significant was because prosti- ing prostitution purposes, a misde- generally carry tutes do purses. They meanor under if Kentucky law the crime is they also testified that Wagoner believed Cook, Wesley a second offense. Officer been prostitution charges had arrested on subsequently responded who had to the past. scene, then searched the area passenger The officers characterized area as the-automobile and discovered .25 caliber n prostitution, one known for where semi-automatic pistol beneath the rear routinely conduct passenger undercover floor-mat. Because the officer investigations. officers, According Wagoner to the never observed turn around or Wagoner right extended her hand “about lean her over seat while seated in the front high” seat, waist and waved at passenger they Martin’s vehicle concluded that in a manner that recognized gun belonged charged the officers to Martin and to him prostitute’s hailing be a prospective carrying of a with deadly weapon. concealed Wagoner John. then entered vehi- After it Martin’s was determined that Martin had at proceeded conviction, cle and the two prior felony off. least one he drive was facts, upon Based these with charged the officers sus- the federal felon in offense of pected possession a firearm. evening's by Kentucky

1. The experiencing weather was described a "mild” winter. “cold”; Covington, officers as "cool” but not ” erroneous.... clearly ed unless are argues discovery Martin Shamaeizadeh, v. 80 F.3d the United States made in violation both firearm was (6th Cir.1996) (citations omit- Amendment to the United States Fourth ted). The “determinations district court’s Ken- and Section 10 Constitution probable cause of reasonable tucky Specifically, Martin Constitution. appeal.” be de novo on (1) should reviewed lacked reasonable argues: the officers States, (2) Ornelas car; the interro- 699, 116 134 L.Ed.2d 911 did not gation of Martin and (1996). Wagoner; create arrest probable (3) satisfy car the search of the did not Stop B. Car requirement

any exception to the warrant was no cause to because there pro “The Fourth Amendment vehicle, nor was the area behind search the searches and sei hibits unreasonable Wagoner’s im- seat within Obasa, 15 F.3d zures.” United States (6th Cir.1994). control. However, mediate a brief Terry investigative stop, stop, government argues response, “ point ‘specific to officer who is able to (1) legal the had basis to that: officers ” justifying his or her articulable facts’ Wagoner based on their reasonable stop suspicion suspect reasonable that the has the crime of in or is to be involved criminal been about being was commit- purposes activity is not seizure. an unreasonable (2) ted; probable the officers had cause to 1, Sokolow, 12, v. 490 United States U.S. interrogating after her arrest (1989) 1581, (quot 1 109 S.Ct. 104 L.Ed.2d Martin; (3) independent of the search 1, Ohio, 21, ing Terry 88 v. 392 U.S. S.Ct. arrest, incident to the the officers had (1968)). 1868, 20 “the L.Ed.2d 889 While to probable cause search the vehicle requires Fourth that the deci Amendment crime; (4) or of a contraband evidence stop sion to the individual be based on probable had cause to arrest the officers something ‘more substantial than inarticu carrying for the crime of a con- Martin hunches[,]’ totality the cir late ... ‘the deadly weapon. cealed picture whole be cumstances —the —must a suppres- district court conducted determining into account’” in the taken hearing granted and thereafter Mar- sion challenged stop. validity of a United suppress, on an anal- tin’s motion to based (6th Roberts, 1026, F.2d 1029 States 986 ysis stop of the car and the search incident Cir.) 22, 392 (quoting Terry, U.S. at 88 Wagoner’s to arrest. We conclude that 1868). S.Ct. finding court erred in that the the district ac scope of law enforcement jus- lacked reasonable investigative depends in stop tivities an tify stop finding car and in the Martin’s upon originally jus circumstances probable that the officers lacked cause to stop, tified See United States Oba Wagoner. arrest (6th Cir.1994). sa, 603, “Thus, 15 F.3d may the detainee a moder officer ask II. ANALYSIS questions ate number of to determine his A. Review Standard identity try and to obtain information confirming suspi de officer’s reviewing dispelling In a district court’s obliged questions, “a cions. But detainee is suppression termination And, an- accept- are unless the detainee’s findings respond. district court’s factual provide applied the officer with should be in swers United States v. Arvi him, zu, 266, to arrest he must then re be (2002). (quoting leased.” Id. Berkemer v. McCar Arvizu, L.Ed.2d 740 a border 439-40, ty, 468 U.S. agent patrol was found to have reasonable (internal (1984) quotations L.Ed.2d suspicion to conduct a stop car where: omitted)). stop occurred in a remote area of rural Arizona, southeastern an area known legitimacy evaluates the This Court law enforcement to frequented by drug be stop by investigatory making a two- smugglers; driving defendant was a mini part assessment of its reasonableness. van, a vehicle known drug to be be used First, must determine whether Court smugglers; of day time indicated de was a basis to indi proper there fendant pass intended to area through dur upon vidual based officer’s ing agents’ change. shift specific “aware[ness] articulable to a gave suspi facts which rise reasonable Furthermore, patrol agent border Garza, cion.” States v. 10 F.3d minivan; occupants saw five Cir.1993) omit (quotation adult man driving, an adult woman sat ted). Second, the Court must evaluate seat, front and three chil- degree “whether the of intrusion into the dren were the back. Despite ap- security reasonably suspect’s personal pearance family outing, defendant’s hand, scope related to the situation at had turned away vehicle from known re- judged by which is examining reason creational The agent areas. observed that given ableness of officials’ conduct sitting the knees of two children cir suspicions surrounding their and very high, back seat unusually were as if omitted). (quotation cumstances.” Id. propped up their feet were on cargo some on the floor. At that point, the border Generally speaking, not courts do look, patrol agent get decided to a closer each separately scrutinize factor relied began so he to follow Shortly the vehicle. by conducting the officer the search. See thereafter, children, all though of the still Sokolow, 8-r9, supra at 109 S.Ct. 1581. forward, facing put up their hands and given The fact that a locale is well known began in agent to wave at the an abnormal activity by for not justi criminal will itself pattern; agent the chil- testified that fy Terry stop; a it among but is the vari waving appeared dren to be as if instruct- may ous factors that officers take into toed do so. Wardlow, account. See Illinois 528 U.S.

119, 123, 145 570 L.Ed.2d agent registra- The next radioed (2000)(emphasizing that an “individual’s tion check on the vehicle learned that presence in of expected an area criminal registered the minivan-was to an address alone, activity, standing is not to enough border, four north of blocks area reasonable, particularized support suspi lawby known enforcement to be notorious person committing cion that is alien and smuggling. narcotics After crime,” that stressing but “officers are not information, receiving agent decid- required ignore to the relevant character stop. agent ed to make a vehicle The determining of a istics location whether stopped permis- vehicle and received sufficiently suspi the circumstances are sion from the driver to search the vehicle. investigation”). cious to warrant further vehicle, During agent his search of Supreme recently pounds marijuana found 128.85

The Court clarified vehicle, totality Arvizu, how the test circumstances vehicle. driver 398 collectively to marijuana, arguing amounted reasonable sus- to1 suppress

moved picion). things, patrol that border among other Arvizu, agent did not have reasonable S.Ct. by required 751, 151 vehicle as the Fourth stop the L.Ed.2d 740. Amendment. Thus, Arvizu made clear that courts must upon which not view factors The District Court for the Northern rely to create reasonable iso- against ruled Arvizu. District Arizona Rather, Arvizu stressed that lation. Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court must consider all of the officers courts reversed. See 232 F.3d 1241. In the Ninth observations, not discard those view, weighing of fact-specific cir- Circuit’s may insignificant troubling seem when in- tests cumstances or other multifactor standing alone. viewed degree “a uncertain- troubling troduced Arvizu, Furthermore, Supreme into the Fourth ty unpredictability” totality of the Court reiterated that (inter- Id., analysis. at 1248 Amendment approach circumstances allows officers omitted). quotation nal marks experience special- their own draw on Supreme Court the Ninth overruled training to make from and ized inferences by stating: Circuit the cumulative informa- deductions about might tion to them available well by think that taken approach We See Arvizu person. elude an untrained Appeals departs here Court States, 752; see also Ornelas United teachings from the of these sharply 690, 699, U.S. L.Ed.2d rejec- cases. The court’s evaluation and must (1996)(reviewing give court “due tion of seven of the listed factors weight” by to factual inferences drawn lo- isolation from each other does take officers). cal enforcement law into account the of the circum- “totality stances,” our have Byrd, as cases understood United States v. WL Feb.21, 1995), phrase. appeared The court be- 72299 this Court Cir. constitutionality [the lieve each observation bor- considered the of vehicle by patrol agent] investigate suspect der that was itself in made order to Byrd up activity. readily susceptible expla- prostitution an innocent ed While constitutionality See weight.” entitled to “no held the of the vehicle nation was Terry, distinguished Byrd F.3d, however, stop, 232 at 1249-1251. the district court present separate from the case on four precludes divide-and-conquer this sort of Terry grounds. The district court stated: analysis. The officer in observed companions his re- petitioner First, and in Byrd the woman had been forth, peatedly walk back look into get night told earlier that off the window, streets, not; with one an- store and confer Wagoner while had the of- Although other. each of the series of only knowledge Wagoner ficers’ of was itself,” in “perhaps they was innocent we acts that believed she had been arrested that, Second, they together, past prostitution. taken “warrant- in for held Byrd U.S., in investigation.” ed further 392 at car in was immobile observed 22, 1868, street, See 20 889. the middle of the which itself was 88 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Sokolow, 9, 1, violation, supra, also separate probably at 490 U.S. traffic (holding 109 L.Ed.2d 1 committed no while defendant such by present which traffic offense in case. that factors themselves were Byrd Third, place in took at “quite consistent with innocent travel” events a.m., present while the incident oc- 460,' 3:30 that automobile.” Id. at 101 S.Ct. (footnote Fourth, omitted). 9:20 p.m. curred at and most The officer may also in search the of importantly, Byrd any the woman was contents containers found within that leaning talking compartment. observed window Therefore, Id. in Byrd, simply present case, while waved ability officers’ to constitutionally defendant. search Martin’s vehicle can exist only if they 4-5; Opinion and Order at APX 28- could have lawfully Wagoner. arrested 29. This Court finds that the officers could Although Byrd these differences between have lawfully Wagoner, arrested therefore exist, the present case that fact the officers’ search of Martin’s vehicle was present case did not permissible. degree have same s Kentucky law, Under guilty one i prostitution illegal activity occurring loitering for purpose prostitution in Byrd as the officers had does not mean when “he or loiters remains in a public they lacked suspicion. reasonable place for the purpose of engaging or they officers testified that believed agreeing offering to engage prostitu engaged in the offense Ky.Rev.Stat. tion.” § 529.080. This crime (1) prostitution for because: is classified as a violation for the first her dress typical prosti- and attire were offense and a class B misdemeanor for (2) tutes; an she was in area known subsequent each offense. Id. district (3) prostitution activity; they recognized court relied on the fact that in Kentucky, her as a woman who had been convicted of may only an officer make arrest without (4) in the past; crimes she a warrant when misdemeanor has been waved a manner that identified as presence. committed his Ky.Rev.Stat. being prostitute’s characteristic aof means However, § 431.005. requirement does soliciting customers. This Court finds not affect the outcome of the present case. combination the above observa- v. Wright, See United States F.3d tions, when considered from the perspec- (6th Cir.l994)(holding that “the ap tive of specialized training officers with propriate inquiry a federal court con familiarity with the of prosti- behavior sidering a suppress motion to evidence tutes, provide jus- reasonable suspicion to seized state officers is whether Arvizu, Ornelas, See tify stop. supra; arrest, search, or seizure violated the Cortez, supra; see also United States Fourth Amendment. The fact that arrest, search, or may seizure have violat (1981)(evidence 621 L.Ed.2d is to be long ed state law is irrelevant as as the viewed those versed the field of law developed standards under the Federal enforcement). offended.”). Constitution were not The C. Search ruling district court erred in Belton,

In New York v. interrogation 453 U.S. that .the Wagoner of and (1981), Martin, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 discovery with the combined of a Supreme po Court held that “when a in Wagoner’s pocket condom the offi made liceman has a lawful custodial of knowledge arrest cers’ her prior prostitution automobile, of the of occupant may, an drug proba he convictions did not create as a contemporaneous of ar Wagoner incident that ble to arrest cause for the crime rest, search the compartment loitering of of for prostitution purposes. (6th Cir.2001) a require police that a officer know not Long, v. 275 F.3d 544

Klein is occurred at the time the officer “probable that cause crime has this Court stated suspect.” of a reason- Strick- perspective from the or searches assessed arrests scene, land, (emphasis origi- than with officer on the rather 144 F.3d at able nal). hindsight, Wagoner long- of and thus fact no vision 20/20 an determinations involve reasonable loitering cause when officers’ probable er probable of and circumstances into cause all facts transformed examination her, moreover, time of knowledge at the does not render an officer’s to arrest within unlawful, probable for the officers “The threshold arrest because an arrest.” their practical loitering arresting upon prior factual her to cause is based observed everyday life that could of her. considerations to person believe

lead reasonable may conduct a Because illegal an act probability than there is after a lawful cus- of an automobile search to has occurred is about occur.” occupant, of the vehicle’s todial arrest Reed, 476, 478 220 F.3d v. States car of Martin’s that resulted search Cir.2000). a lawful discovery the firearm was supported the factors that In addition to New York incident to arrest. See search n Belton, officers’ reasonable 460,101 loitering purpose Wagoner was (1981). Therefore, this L.Ed.2d 768 Wagoner provided Martin and prostitution, on this reverses the district court Court how contradictory regarding answers as issue well. had known each long they

met how Moreover, Martin’s Wagoner knew other. III. CONCLUSION name, not know her name. The but he did above, this For the reasons stated Court search revealed consensual ruling district court’s REVERSES the in her carrying a condom that she was handgun and REMANDS suppress no possessions. had other pocket, but proceedings. for further this case provid- Court that these factors This finds for the officers arrest probable ed cause JR., MARTIN, F. Chief Circuit BOYCE purpose for the Judge, dissenting. prostitution. I the dis- I dissent. believe respectfully explanations Although innocent correctly trict court determined that exist, may or all of these facts for some suspicion to stop police lacked reasonable possibility does not render offi Wagoner and that the firearm seized from in cers’ determination as the fruit suppressed Martin should be Reed, (noting F.3d valid. See an unlawful search. required are rule out “[o]fficers cir- evaluating totality every explanation other than Before possible cumstances, regarding I points note suspects illegal making conduct before two Strickland, arrest”); majority’s characterization of facts United States (6th majority 412, Cir.1998)(noting underlying stop. the The relies F.3d decision-(l) reaching four in its does not factors requirement “the typical and attire Wagoner’s evi “dress were require [police possess officers] (2) beyond she was in area guilt prostitutes; a of dence sufficient to establish (3) doubt.”). prostitution activity; [the has known for reasonable As this Court recognized her as a woman officers] does explained, police “the Fourth Amendment of prostitution prostitute who had been convicted whom had told earlier to (4) streets, in the she waved in a past; get crimes off the lean into the police manner that [the officers] identified window of car stopped a in the middle of being of a prostitute’s as characteristic the at street 3:30 a.m. Id. at *3. soliciting Maj. means customers.” Op. of Our state court counterparts, who ordi I Initially, at 399. note that there no is cases, narily prostitution handle re have indication the district court’s factual lied on similar particular combinations of or findings arresting in the officers’ sup- ized facts approving investigatory stops. pression testimony hearing Wagoner’s Goldstein, In State for example, the “typical prostitutes.” “dress” was of The court ruled that the police had reasonable simply district court Wagoner noted that (1) suspicion a car where the police jeans was wearing and a short-sleeved t- (2) driving observed car aimlessly night. shirt on a cool Op. District Court at car stopped engaged and the driver in a government 1. While characterizes a prostitute; brief conversation with known jeans a and short-sleeved t-shirt as “scant- (3) prostitute the known stepped into the clothed,” ily there is no record evidence (4) car; the car a made series of furtive supporting government’s assertion or movements it spotted police when offi indicating otherwise such an outfit was Goldstein, cers. State v. No. prostitute any a than typical more of other (Ohio Dist., *1 App. Jan.11, WL at Covington resident.1 1991); City see also Cleveland v. Har of opinion majority also airbrushes the mon, 91-TRC-54308A-C, No. 1993 WL police knowledge regarding Wag- officers’ (Ohio Dist., Nov.24, App. at *2 prior purported prostitution oner’s activity. 1993) a.m.], (relying on of day [3:19 time recognized It asserts [Wagon- “the officers reputation area, gender as a woman who er] been convicted of occupants the vehicle’s [male and female] prostitution past.” Maj. crimes in Op. and the fact that the vehicle illegally at But 399. the district findings court’s parked). reflected officers “believed that had been arrested on Considering totality of the circum- charges in past.” Op. District Ct. 1. stances in light Byrd and state its court Moreover, suppression the officers’ hear- analogs, I do not police believe that ing testimony reveals that one of the offi- particularized, officers had the reasonable cers department photo- based his belief on justify suspicion stop. IWhile credit graphs and that the other officer could not experience the officers’ do expertise, I specify source his belief. J.A. not believe that their interpretation of the 68. wave, combined with the nature of the 94-5301, v. Byrd, neighborhood, United States No. their Wagoner’s belief about Feb.21,1995), prior WL 72299 Cir. Wagoner’s cany our arrest and failure to only prior opinion addressing purse, justified reasonable stop Wagoner. their prostitution context, underlying simply we The too facts leave held that the constitutionally speculation could much to Wag- about whether stop a prostitution. woman on engaged prostitu- oner was suspect, purposes particular observed known tion instance. attire, respect 1. With carrying purse. officers testified J.A. prostitutes personal carry that most do not 70. belongings purse bag such as a and that if had continued Perhaps police officers might have wit- Wagoner, they

to observe factors that would have

nessed additional necessary suspicion, but un-

supplied the circumstances, I do not present

der the permissi- officers could police

believe I would

bly Accordingly, stop Wagoner. court’s decision.2

affirm district

Sherry MICHALS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

BAXTER HEALTHCARE CORPORA International,

TION and Baxter

Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 00-6256. Appeals, States Court of

Sixth Circuit.

Argued Nov. 2001. 6,May Filed 2002.

Decided and 2. do not believe the would not reach the issue Because I stop Wagoner, opinion. by majority I had reasonable addressed

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Timothy Martin

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: May 6, 2002

Citation: 289 F.3d 392

Docket Number: 00-6266

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.