611 F. App'x 677
11th Cir.
2015

In re Terri L. STEFFEN, Debtor. Daer Holdings, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Douglas N. Menchise, Trustee, United States of America, Terri L. Steffen, Defendants-Appellees, Paul A. Bilzerian, et al., Defendants.

No. 14-11592

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

Aug. 6, 2015

677

J. Robert McCormack, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael C. Markham, Johnson Pope Bokor Ruppel & Burns, LLP, Steven M. Berman, Seth P. Traub, Shumaker Loop & Kendrick, LLP, Tampa, FL, Rachel Ida Wollitzer, Mary Apostolakos Hervey, Francesca Ugolini, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants-Appellees.

Terri L. Steffen, Tampa, FL, pro se.

Before WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and VINSON,* District Judge.

* Honorable C. Roger Vinson, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Florida, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

This matter was fully considered by the bankruptcy court and district court below. Both courts applied the test set forth in Shades Ridge Holding Co. v. United States, 888 F.2d 725 (11th Cir.1989), to determine that Appellant Daer Holdings, LLC was the nominee of debtor Terri Steffen. After reviewing the parties’ briefs, and with the benefit of oral argument, we see no reversible error. AFFIRMED.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy HATTEN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-12299

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

Aug. 7, 2015

Non-Argument Calendar.

Kathleen Mary Salyer, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Lisette Marie Reid, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney‘s Office Miami, FL, Rolando Garcia, U.S. Attorney‘s Office, West Palm Beach, FL, Julia J. Vaglienti, U.S. Attorney‘s Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Timothy Hatten, Atlanta, GA, pro se.

Before MARTIN, JULIE CARNES and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Timothy Hatten appeals the denial of his motion for recusal of United States District Judge James I. Cohn. Hatten is serving a 360-month sentence after being convicted of two counts of conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute and four counts of possession of crack or powder cocaine with the intent to distribute. As he did in his motion for recusal filed in the district court, Hatten argues here that Judge Cohn is required to recuse himself because he entered a series of wrongly decided orders in response to Hatten‘s earlier motions.

We review the denial of a motion for recusal for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bailey, 175 F.3d 966, 968 (11th Cir.1999) (per curiam). We will affirm a judge‘s refusal to recuse himself unless “the impropriety is clear and one which would be recognized by all objective, reasonable persons.” Id.

A district court judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned” or where “he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). The bias “must stem from extrajudicial sources, unless the judge‘s acts demonstrate such pervasive bias and prejudice that it unfairly prejudices one of the parties.” Bailey, 175 F.3d at 968 (quotation omitted). We have previously stated that rulings adverse to a party are not sufficient to show pervasive bias. Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents, 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir.1983); see also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.“).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hatten‘s motion for recusal because there is no clear impropriety that would be recognized by all objective, reasonable persons. See Bailey, 175 F.3d at 968. Hatten has not identified any bias stemming from personal or extrajudicial sources. His complaint that Judge Cohn demonstrated bias by issuing adverse decisions—without any showing that those decisions were in fact wrongly decided—is not sufficient to require recusal.

AFFIRMED.