143 F. 287 | 8th Cir. | 1906
This is an appeal from a decree of dismissal upon a demurrer to a bill exhibited by the United States to prevent the county of Thurston in the state of Nebraska from collecting taxes from certain Indians of the Omaha and Winnebago tribes
In the consideration of the questions which this bill presents the assumption will be indulged that the Indians for whose benefit the proceeds of these lands are held are citizens of the United States and of the state of Nebraska. Their civil and political status, however, does not condition the power, authority, or duty of the United States to exert its powers of government to control their property, to protect them in their rights, to faithfully discharge its legal and moral obligations to them, and to execute every trust with which it is charged for their benefit. Matter of Heff, 197 U. S. 488, 509, 25 Sup. Ct. 506, 49 L. Ed. 848; Buster v. Wright, 68 C. C. A. 505, 135 Fed. 947; Wallace v. Adams (C. C. A.) 143 Fed. 716, decided at
The power to tax is the power to destroy. The Constitution, the laws of the United States made in pursuance of it, and the government of the United States, in the execution of these laws, are supreme. They are superior to, and control, the Constitutions, the laws, and the governments of the states. The power of a state to tax the forts, the arsenals, the ships, the buildings, the lands, the funds, or any other means lawfully used by the nation to exert its legal powers, is inconsistent with its supremacy and subversive of the national government. Hence no such power exists, or can exist, in any state. Every instrumentality lawfully employed by the United States to execute its constitutional laws and to exercise its lawful governmental authority is necessarily exempt from state taxation and interference. McCullough v. Maryland, 6 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 479; Van Brocklin v. State of Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 155, 6 Sup. Ct. 670, 29 L. Ed. 845; Wisconsin Central Railroad Co. v. Price County, 133 U. S. 496, 504, 10 Sup. Ct. 341, 33 L. Ed. 687. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court decided that lands held by Indian allot-tees under Act Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 389, c. 119, § 5, within 25
The answer of counsel for the county is: (1) Because these deposits are discharged of the trust by Act May 27, 1902, 32 Stat. 245, 275, c. 888, § 7; and (2) because the United States has no lawful authority to withhold these moneys from their beneficiaries or to control their disposition. Let us examine these positions. The lands which were sold were held by the complainant in trust to preserve them for the exclusive use and benefit of the respective Indian allottees and their heirs until the expiration of 25 years from the respective dates of their allotments, and then to convey them to the allottees respectively or their heirs “in fee discharged of said trust and free of all .charge or incumbrance whatsoever.” 22 Stat. 342, c. 434, § 6; 24 Stat. 389, c. 119; § 5. The undertaking to convey them at the end of the 25 years free of all charge or incumbrance imposed an obligation to keep them free from the burden or charge of state taxation, as well as of every other incumbrance. U. S. v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432, 23 Sup. Ct. 478, 47 L. Ed. 532. The act of May 27, 1902, provides that any heir of any Indian allottee to whom a trust or other patent containing restrictions on alienation has issued may sell and convey the lands inherited from such an allottee, “but all such conveyances shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior and when so approved shall convey a full title to the purchaser the same as if a final patent without restriction upon alienation had been issued to the allottee,” and that lands so conveyed shall thenceforth be subject to taxation by the state in which they are situated. 32 Stat. 275, c. 888, § 7. The authorized sale and conveyance of trust property by a trustee discharges the property sold from, and charges the proceeds of its sale in the hands or under the control of the trustee with, the trust. No change of form of property can divest it of a trust. The substitution of one kin'd of property for another, of goods for promissory notes, of lands for bonds, or of money for lands, does not destroy it. The substitute takes the nature of the original and stands charged with the same trust. Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule & Sel. 562, 574; In re Hallett’s Estate, Knatchbull v. Hallett, 13 Chan. Div. 696, 717, 719, 733; Cook v. Tullis, 85 U. S. 332, 341, 21 L. Ed. 933; McLaughlin v. Fulton, 104 Pa. 161, 171; Third National Bank v. Stillwater Gas Co., 36 Minn. 75, 78, 30 N. W. 440; 2 Perry on Trusts,
Nor is the complainant without lawful authority to hold these' proceeds and to control their disposition in the same way that it held and controlled the lands in trust for the benefit of these Indian heirs. The act of 1902 authorized these heirs to sell and convey their inherited lands only when the proposed sales were approved by the Secretary of the Interior. It thereby vested in the Secretary plenary power to permit or to forbid the sales proposed. The whole is greater than any of its parts, and includes them all, and the authority to allow or to prohibit proposed sales necessarily included the power to consider and determine the terms and conditions on which such sales should be approved. By rules and regulations approved October 4, 1902, and amended September 16, 1904, and May 25, 1905, the Secretary provided that owners of inherited Indian lands might be permitted to sell them on condition that they agreed that the proceeds of such lands should be placed in one or more banks, which should furnish satisfactory bonds to guaranty the safety of the deposits, to the credit of each heir in proper proportion, subject to the checks of such heirs only when approved by the agent or officer in charge for amounts not exceeding $10 to each in any one month, and subject to their checks for larger amounts only when approved by the agent specifically authorized by the Commissioner of Indian Aifairs. The acts of Congress authorized the Secretary to make these regulations for the purpose of carrying into effect the act of 1902, and, when made, they had the force of statutory enactments. Rev. St. §§ 441, 465 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 252, 264]; U. S. v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 688, 12 Sup. Ct. 764, 36 L. Ed. 591; Wilkins v. U. S., 96 Fed. 837, 37 C. C. A. 588. The Indians whose rights are under consideration made the sales of their lands subject to the conditions prescribed by these rules. The bank and a surety executed a bond in the sum of $50,000 to the United States, conditioned that it would pay the rate of interest upon the proceeds of the sales of these lands deposited with it which should be agreed upon by it and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and that it would pay over the deposits in the manner provided in the regulations of the Secretary of the Interior to which reference has been made. The proceeds of these sales were deposited with this bank under this bond and under these rules. These facts, the statutes, and the principles of equity jurisprudence which have been considered, have led our minds to these conclusions:
As the Secretary of the Interior was empowered to permit or for
The decree below must be reversed, and the cause must be remanded to the Circuit Court, with instructions to permit the defendants to answer the bill and to take further proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion. It is so ordered.