Case Information
*1 Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Crystina M. O’Brien, THE O’BRIEN LAW FIRM, PLC, Hampton, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Richard D. Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions аre not binding precedent in this circuit. *2
PER CURIAM:
Thomas Lamont Legall pleaded guilty to one сount of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846 (2012), but reserved his right to appeal the district сourt’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his hotel room. On аppeal, Legall argues that the use of a drug-detecting dog constituted an illegal warrantless search. Finding no error, we affirm.
This court reviews a district court’s legal cоnclusions on a motion to suppress de novo. United States v. Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757, 762 (4th Cir. 2011). Because the district court denied the motion, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the party prevailing below. United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 534 (4th Cir. 2013).
Legall first argues, relying on Florida v. Jardines,
We conclude that, here, the officer did not enter the curtilage of the hotel room when conducting the search. In determining whether an arеa is curtilage to the home, this court considers “‘[1] the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, [2] whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, [3] the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and [4] the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people рassing by.’” United States v. Jackson, 728 F.3d 367, 373 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987)) (alterations in Jackson), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1347 (2014). Thе “centrally relevant consideration” is “whether the area in question is so intimately tiеd to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.” Id. at 374 (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying these factors, we find that thе common hallway of the hotel was not within any curtilage of the hotel room.
Legall further argues that the dog sniff infringed on his legitimate expectation of privacy. He asserts that police violated his right to privacy when they used a trained drug- detecting dog to ascertain the contents of his room. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that use of а device not in general-public use, such as thermal imaging, by the Government to explore aspects of home not previously knowable without physical entry surveillance is a search).
We conclude that the officer here did not infringe upon a reasonable expectation of privacy. “The use of a well- trained narcotics-detection dog — one that ‘does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view — during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (internal quotation mаrks and citation omitted). Moreover, “[t]he legitimate expectation that informаtion about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishablе from [a person’s] hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband.” Id. at 410. Because the drug-detecting dog disclosed only the рresence of illegal narcotics, we find that the dog-sniff did not violate Legall’s legitimаte expectation of privacy.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We disрense with oral argument because the facts and legal *5 contentions are adequately presented in the material before this court and argument will not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED