History
  • No items yet
midpage
United States v. Thomas E. Fallen
256 F.3d 1082
11th Cir.
2001
Check Treatment
Docket

*4 drinking. that he had been HULL, Fallen admitted Circuit Before TJOFLAT report, this in his PROPST*, Larson mentioned Judge. District Judges, * imprisoned not fined under this title or Propst, U.S. District B. Honorable Robert Alabama, both, Judge year, the Northern District of and in all for than one or more sitting by designation. cases, this title or be fined under other 111(a)(1) years, or more than three provides: imprisoned 1. 18 U.S.C.

Whoever both. assaults, resists, (1) opposes, im- forcibly intimidates, interferes with pedes, or ground, Fallen asks that his first 2. As relief on this designated in section 1114 of judg- court to enter we direct the district engaged account of the while in or on title remaining acquittal. As to ment of duties; performance of official that, whether con- grounds, contends Fallen collectively, individually he should sidered Shall, in violation of this where the acts granted a new trial. assault, only simple constitute section wherein he described Fallen as “very sentence, Just before he finished his how ever, drunk” and “confused.” repeated Fallen that he had a gun and would shoot and kill agents if a.m., phoned At 5:17 Agent Larson Mi- did not property. leave his kosky in regional the Jacksonville Secret Service office and him asked to follow up In the repeated threats, face of Fallen’s phone Mikosky on Fallen’s phoned call. agents went back to their ear and Fultz, office, Agent also in the Jacksonville drove out of the They immediate area.4 requested criminal that he run a histo- then went to neighbor’s house and tele- ry check on Fallen. When Fultz ran the phoned Fallen, explaining they just check, he prior gun-related found three wanted to talk himto about complaint incidents: a possessing conviction for he had made. Mikosky Fallen told that he weapon concealed an arrest for would not come out of the house because possessing weapon in concealed agents believed the would arrest him. and a conviction making for a false state- agents When the told him did ment in gun purchase connection awith him, not intend to arrest agreed hand, With this information Mi- talk agents to the through the solid front kosky and Fultz advised local police of the Mikosky door. him told that arrangement *5 and, a.m., situation at approximately 11:00 however, was unacceptable, because the went to Fallen’s house to investigate the agents feared that might Fallen shoot reported threat.3 they them if reentered property. his Al- Mikosky When and Fultz arrived at though replied, Fallen “I won’t a have t house, they Fallen’s knocked on his fron gun,” Mikosky suggested that open Fallen door. A male voice house, from inside the the solid front door and stand behind the identified agents the at trial Fallen’s, as screen door agents so the could see his out, called ‘Who is it?” Mikosky replied hands. Fallen agreed, but had to be re- that he was with the Secret Service and minded during ensuing the interview to looking was for responded, Fallen. Fallen keep sight. his hands in in what Mikosky described at trial as a agents When the returned to Fallen’s “very “very loud” and angry” voice, that house, son, Fallen told them that his who gun had a and would shoot agents the if had visited him days ago, seven had be- they did not property. leave his The come incensed he saw a bearing card agents backed away from the door and picture a of President Clinton and the Agent Mikosky identified again, himself Lady. First Fallen’s son stated that he was saying, Agent “This is Mikosky with the going to Washington, D.C. to “blow [the Service, Secret you called us.” At that head President’s] off with a shotgun.” point, Mikosky looked at the window to the During interview, the which lasted five right of the door and noticed someone minutes, appear Fallen did to be intox- pulling back the curtain. Although he icated; speech his was clear and articulate. could there, not see who was Mikosky pointed said, to his badge and Fallen, “Mr. Two later, and one-half weeks on Octo- we’re Service, the you 22, Secret 1998, called us.” ber agents returned to Fall- Mikosky testified trial at that he waited 4. Fearful that he would upon, indeed be fired nearly six hours to Agent contact Fallen Mikosky because he kept drew his sidearm but it was appeared aware that Fallen to have carefully been concealed while he retreated to the a.m.; heavily intoxicated Mikosky at 5:05 Agent car. Fultz had his hand on his side- hoping arm, up” by Fallen would “sober "fanny pack” which was in a contained agents time the arrived. he wore around waist. his so, any intention- ability to do includes arrested a warrant house with en’s give of force as would 29, display District of such a al Middle him. On October expect Fallen on one to fear or immediate jury reason grand indicted victim Florida Renfro, officer vio- assaulting bodily harm.” United States federal count of 111(a)(1). (5th Cir.1980) Fallen’s 497, (emphasis of 18 U.S.C. lation 6, At the January added).6 willfully on threat- began Clearly, trial case, Fallen’s injury upon of the Government’s close to inflict ened judgment for attorney moved the court that he agents when he stated would shoot and, court took after the acquittal totality gun. with a Under them advisement, without rested under circumstances, reasonably motion were agents jury returned calling witnesses. repeatedly were being afraid shot— April January 7. On verdict on guilty possibly angry-sounding, threatened mo- Fallen’s court the district denied in- prior convictions felon with intoxicated and sen- acquittal, judgment for a tion Moreover, agents volving firearms. Fallen, had been detained who tenced that Fallen could see them knew year su- and one custody, to time served range, as could hear shooting within pervised release.5 mov- the door and saw a hand him behind ing the window curtain.

II. however, brief, Fallen contends in his A. at trial did not establish the evidence he “did not en- forcible assault because for reversal ground first Fallen’s any physical contact with the gage insufficient at trial was the evidence is that Moreover, because he did not agents.” forcible assault a conviction to sustain for *6 ... “display any weapons [t]here no 111(a)(1). Questions 18 U.S.C. under Fallen presented indicated evidence that pro the evidence sufficiency of the about ability to harm apparent the the had de novo. Unit at trial are reviewed duced added.) agents.” (emphasis (11th 628, Keller, F.2d 632 v. 916 ed States Cir.1990). all evidence We must view and others have held that This circuit United to the light most favorable the is not actual contact “proof physical of States, inferences with all reasonable § 111.” United States to violate required the uphold To in its favor. Id. drawn (6th 274, Chambers, 277 Cir. 195 F.3d v. motion for court’s denial district Hernan 1999); States v. see also United jury’s ver the acquittal of and judgment Cir.1991) (11th 1569, dez, 1577 F.2d 921 dict, only find that a reasonable need we (“[t]he by ... min may violated statute that the have concluded fact finder could contact, without the or even physical imal guilt the defendant’s established contact”) (internal any physical of presence Id. beyond a reasonable doubt. omitted); v. Fer States citations (11th 1031, nandez, Cir. F.2d 1035 837 has been defined Forcible assault Mathis, 1988) v. 579 (citing United States inflict attempt to “any willful threat as (7th Cir.1978), 415, propo the for F.2d 418 of another injury upon the bodily person that accused [the] that “evidence sition apparent present an coupled with Prichard, 661 City 28, 1999, v. 6. In Bonner violated the terms July Fallen 5. On of banc), 1206, Cir.1981) (en this sentenced and was supervised his release of binding all precedent deci- adopted as court appears that imprisonment. It ten months' to Circuit handed down former Fifth sions of the longer incarcerated. is no Fallen prior October to quantum some used or threat of and, force ened serious injury by his support force is sufficient to conviction un actions, gave words agents and the reason- 111”). argues der section Fallen that be able cause to injury fear such or death. cause these cases were decided before sec Thus, the fact that Fallen never made tion was amended the Violent physical agents contact with the does Crime Control Act of to add the degree lessen the of the assault. assault, simple lesser included offense of That Fallen did not “display” a they longer good are no law to the extent weapon agents so the could see it is of allow mere threats of force to moment, no as “present Fallen’s apparent Now, constitute a forcible assault. Fallen ability” to harm agents was established avers, ah threats unaccompanied of force repeated his assertion that he had a by physical contact must treated as gun and willing to use it. While we simple assaults under section can find no case in this addressing circuit no case for proposition, cites law this whether victim of a forcible post-1994 we find no assault Eleventh Circuit de actually must weapon see addressing cisions with the issue. which Other cir rejected threatened, cuits have overly Fallen’s we guided by broad are assault, simple however, definition of reasoning set forth in United v. have held instead that the more narrow Crouthers, (10th Cir.1982). 669 F.2d 635 common law definition simple assault confederate, Crouthers and his Garvin to applies section 111. See United States Trimm, conspired Salski, to use Robert Chestaro, (2d 197 F.3d 605-06 Cir. Fargo employee, Wells to an rob automatic 1999). think We this is the better facility. Crouthers, bank teller ac an view. Salski’s, quaintance of masterminded the robbery plan. supplied He Trimm with law,

At simple common assault is briefcase for money defined as “a willful attempt inju gun. and loaded inflict ry upon person another, He up or ... then set a meeting with the unwit injury threat to inflict upon Salski, ting who had keys bank which, another when coupled with ap facility, Trimm arranged for to accost parent present ability, causes a reasonable them as both left apart Crouthers’s *7 apprehension of bodily immediate harm.” ment to to go dinner. plan Crouthers’s (internal Id. at quotation omitted); see pretend he, too, was to that merely an also States v. LeCompte, 108 unfortunate victim robbery. Id. at (8th Cir.1997). A forcible assault 637-38. would therefore have to something Trimm approached Crouthers and Salski more, such as a willful attempt or threat to in accordance with plan, and Crouthers bodily inflict serious injury, coupled with told Salski that Trimm gun had a to apparent present ability, which causes Crouthers’s back. Salski never saw the the intended victim a apprehen reasonable gun. Salski, “just Trimm told it easy take sion of immediate bodily serious harm or your and friend here won’t get hurt.” Id. Chambers, death. 195 F.3d at 277 Cf. fact, at 639. In unbeknownst to (“The both element of force necessary for a Salski, Crouthers and Trimm had removed [forcible assault] conviction under [section from gun. bullets may Id. be shown at 111] such a threat or Trimm directed display physical Salski to drive aggression the trio to toward the inspire officer as to pain, fear of automatic teller facility, unlock the death.”) harm, (internal safes, (which or quotation money take the amounted to omitted). citation Fallen certainly $13,650.00) threat- put it in his Id. briefcase. that appeal, In Crouthers contended his route, Crouthers Salski heard en While gun, not see the because Salski did shoot, us.” Id. at hurt don’t say, “don’t to show that was insufficient Trimm or- money, taking the 639. After put in was assaulted or his life They car. Salski into the men back dered the required as for conviction under apart- jeopardy to the area of Crouthers’ returned (d). court, in Id. at 637. The Id. at subsection took his leave. ment where Trimm argument, noted rejecting Crouthers’s expect unreasonable to that would be “[i]t investigation, Crouth- prolonged After Salski, crime, such as to the victim of of armed and convicted charged ers was positively in order to ensure risk his life 18 U.S.C. robbery in violation of bank weap- assailant did indeed have that his (d) 2113(a), pro- and 2. Section §§ ” light In of Crouthers’s on.... vides, part: pertinent in unambiguous statements about Trimm’s violence; (a) Whoever, or by force and presence, in the court gun Salski’s takes, attempts to intimidation, or reasonably perceived the held that “Salski take, presence or from the at 639. dangerous weapon.” Id. use of another, attempts to -obtain obtains or or reasoning of Crouth- agree with the We money or any property or by extortion It indeed unreasonable ers. would to, or belonging any thing other of value as agents in situations such require federal control, care, manage- custody, in the injury or death to this one to risk serious bank, of, ment, any credit possession or actually is in their assailant ensure union, associa- any savings and loan or weapon. Rath- dangerous of a possession tion; or er, assert concealed assailants who attempts or to enter enters Whoever of a loaded firearm possession are in union, bank, any savings or any credit totality peril. at their When do so association, any building or and loan supports a reasonable the circumstances bank, in as a part or used whole armed, a law inference that the assailant union, savings and loan or as a credit is entitled to take enforcement officer association, commit in intent with In the case before assailant at his word. union, bank, sav- or such credit such us, Mikosky Fultz aware Agents were and, association, building, or loan or ings and involving fire- prior convictions of Fallen’s used, thereof, any felony affect- so part intoxi- arms, may have been knew that he union, bank, or such credit ing such iden- cated, repeatedly told after and were association and viola- savings and loan be fired would tifying themselves States, any statute of the United tion of shouting at Fallen was not upon. Notably, this larceny-Shall be fined under *8 house or deep within the from agents the twenty not more than imprisoned or title just on the backyard from his —he years, or both. door, looking at the the other side of these a window. Under agents through (d) Whoever, in at- committing, circumstances, ability that Fallen’s we hold commit, any defined tempting to offense harm bodily imminent and serious to inflict (a) (b) section, this of in subsections enough “apparent” to agents was upon the puts jeopardy any person, or assaults assault constitute forcible under of a any person by the use the life of § in. U.S.C. device, weapon or shall dangerous fact a reasonable foregoing, Given the imprisoned not this title or fined under that the evi- have concluded could years, or both. finder twenty-five more than dence guilt beyond another, established Fallen’s of or a threat to inflict injury reasonable doubt. We therefore hold that upon another, which, properly district court denied Fallen’s coupled apparent with an present ability, motion for judgment acquittal, causes reasonable apprehension of im- that jury’s by verdict is supported mediate harm. sufficient evidence. above, as Now stated this offense re- quires proof of assault. forcible Where B. touching there is no by of the victim the Fallen contends that he should be defendant, the force element of this of- granted a new trial because the district may fense only by proof satisfied court abused its in failing discretion give to the defendant engaged in provoca- such proposed jury his instructions on forcible tive displays threats or physical ag- prevail assault. To on challenge, this Fall gression toward the inspire officer as to en must show that the district failed court fear of pain, imminent bodily harm or give (1) to an instruction correct; that was death. (2) substantially covered other in The district court’s definition of forcible (3) structions given; that were “so assault was a correct statement of the law. vital that give failure to requested We therefore hold that the court’s refusal seriously instruction impaired the defen give to Instruction 1.1 entirety in its did ability dant’s to defend himself.” United not constitute an abuse of discretion. Gonzalez, States v. 122 F.3d (11th Cir.1997). C. The first instruction pro Fallen Assuming the failure of his chal posed contained language from the Elev lenge to the district jury charge, court’s enth 1.1, Circuit Pattern Instruction per Fallen turns to the evidentiary court’s rul taining 111(a)(1), to 18 U.S.C. as well as ings; he submits that two them were strategically language selected from Unit operated erroneous and deny him a fair Fernandez, ed States v. 837 F.2d 1031 trial. We review rulings these under the (11th Cir.1988). proposed The instruction abuse-of-discretion standard. utilized Fernandez proposition for the States v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d force, threats of absent physical con (11th Cir.1992). tact, are insufficient to constitute a forcible established, assault. As we part II. infra A., proposed instruction a mis The ruling first questions Fallen con- statement of the law. Accordingly, the cerns agents’ testimony pre- about his district court did not abuse its discretion vious offenses involving firearms. He ob- refusing give it. jected to testimony ground on the After the court refused to instruct it was irrelevant. The court overruled his jury as requested, he asked that objection. erred, contends, court the court give the Eleventh Circuit Pat and because testimony was highly (In tern Instruction for forcible assault prejudicial, his conviction should be set 1.1) struction in its entirety. The court aside. *9 declined, and gave instead in modified struction that differed from Instruction 1.1 “Generally, evidence of other only in its definition of “forcible assault”: crimes committed outside of charged those

Now, the term “assault” is However, a willful not means admissible. other crimes attempt to injury upon inflict the may evidence be if admissible it is inextri- in connection a false statement making re- evidence with the intertwined cably (inter- firearm; agents the purchasing Id. with offense.” charged the garding omitted). case, that Fallen testify only Fallen’s In this allowed were citation nal relevant was “a violation that were for offenses had a conviction firearms past Fall- assault: of the forcible of a firearm.” purchasing in the two elements involved inflict im- ability to present re- apparent And, offenses although en’s Fallen’s were rea- harm, agents’ the and minent time, strong probative value their mote in harm. The of such apprehension sonable in weighed favor offense in to the relation Fallen’s offenses, coupled with prior Thus, the district admission. of their to the “apparent” threats, more made it admit- discretion in not abuse its court did a gun. with was armed that Fallen agents prior criminal of Fallen’s ting evidence knowledge their testified agents The history. history reinforced criminal Fallen’s of might shoot that Fallen apprehension their Thus, the other any moment. them at evidentiary ruling The second inextricably inter- was crimes evidence prosecu the came when questions the regarding evidence with the twined many times Mikosky how Agent tor asked charged offense. during his law en “shot had been at” may neverthe- evidence Such intrinsic object lawyer career. Fallen’s forcement “is probative value if its excluded less be answer ed, contending that the would of danger the outweighed substantially objec overruled the The court irrelevant. Rule Fed.R.Evid. prejudice.” unfair been shot tion, Mikosky replied, “I’ve and however, remedy, extraordinary 408 is times, then prosecutor The sir.” at three since only sparingly be used should “which the inci you compare asked, would “[h]ow con- to exclude trial court permits it the on October house Thomas Fallen’s dent at The balance evidence. cededly probative you times were 4th, with the other therefore, Rule, should the under objected again, counsel at?” Defense shot admissibility.... struck favor to sustain going “I’m replied, court and the not Rule 403 is implicated question my previ from I’ll recede objection. the prejudicial whether evidence the last answer Disregard ruling. ous ‘is value itself, probative its but whether Thus, witness, gentlemen.” ladies and the danger outweighed by substantially not to consider instructed jury was ” Fortenberry, 971 F.2d prejudice.’ unfair improper allegedly evidence. omitted). (internal citations at 721 have jury not should Assuming that the prejudicial do not believe We and Mi- questions prosecutor’s heard evidence sub- other crimes nature of the in- that the court’s kosky’s responses probative value. outweighed its stantially error, to cure inadequate was struction jury dur- court instructed The district the error whether must determine we testimony that Fallen’s both ing agents’ Hands, 184 harmless. only “considered to be were prior offenses Cir.1999) (“An erro- 1322, 1329 F.3d victims reason- of whether the on the issue in re- result evidentiary ruling will neous bodily harm apprehended immediate ably resulting error if the only versal Fur- alleged assault.” of the at the time harmless.”). case, are con- we In this by the any thermore, association to avoid “had no substantial error vinced making making threat jury between outcome,” Fortenberry, on influence statement, limited the court a false light of the substantial at for felony conviction *10 1092

remaining Mikosky of assault Court, and actors. The Ladner apprehension Fultz’s of serious bodily referring policy to the of lenity, stated that harm during their encounter with Fallen “[w]hen choice has to be made between was reasonable under the circumstances. readings two of what conduct Congress We thus any conclude that error was crime, has made a it is appropriate, before harmless because “sufficient evidence un we choose alternative, the harsher to re- infected supports error the verdict.” Id.quire that Congress spoken should have in

language that is clear and definite. We should not derive outlawry criminal from some ambiguous implication.” Id. at 177- foregoing reasons, III For the the judgment 78, 79 (quoting S.Ct. 209 United States v. of the district court is Universal C.I.T. Corp., Credit 344 U.S. 218, 221-22, AFFIRMED. 227, 73 S.Ct. 97 L.Ed. 260 (1952)). 111(a) Title § 18 U.S.C. refers to PROPST, Judge, District dissenting: “acts violation of this section”. The The appellant was indicted for and con- Model Penal Code contains even more re- victed of “forcible assault.” I see no evi- strictive definitions of assaults. See dence that he committed an assault nor § 1.13(2) seq. 211-0 et Section that he used force. There was no evidence Model Penal Code defines “act” as a “bodi- any act except defendant for the ly movement whether voluntary or invol- pulling back aof curtain. I respectfully untary.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines ” dissent. an “act” something as “done or “per- When a (5th statute does Black’s Law Dictionary not define “as 24 formed.” sault,” ed.1979) gives added). this court (emphasis the term its mean ing at common law. United States v. I have not found cases which Williams, 1091, (11th 197 F.3d 1095 Cir. mere words have been held to constitute 1999); Guilbert, United States v. 692 F.2d an assault. There are few cases that dis 1340, (11th Cir.1982). 1343 According to specific issue, cuss this apparently because Guilbert, law, “[a]t common ‘assault’ had it has not been often raised. In Dunkle two meanings, being one a criminal as berger v. Commonwealth Pa. Board sault, which is an attempt to commit a Parole, Probation & the Supreme Court of battery present [not in this case], Pennsylvania held that alone, words no and the being other assault, tortious which matter how threatening, cannot constitute is an puts act that another in reasonable “assault,” because the “actor must be in a apprehension of bodily immediate harm.” position carry out the threat immediate added). Id. (emphasis In United States v. ly and take must some affirmative step to Estrada-Fernandez, 491, 150 F.3d 495 do so.” 600, 132 Pa.Cmwlth. 573 A.2d (5th Cir.1998), the Fifth Circuit referred to 1173, 1174(1990) added). (emphasis an assault which “can be upon based act that places Government merely primarily upon relies victim reason able apprehension Hernandez, United v. imminent 921 F.2d 1569 (11th harm.” Guilbert, Cir.1991); (quoting 1345, 692 F.2d at United States Wollen zien, (noting (8th difference 972 Cir.1992); between 18 F.2d 890 U.S.C. United 113(d) 113(c))) § added). Street, (emphasis (8th States v. Cir.1995); F.3d 969 In States, Ladner v. United Walker, (2d U.S. States v. 835 F.2d 983 79 S.Ct. (1958), Cir.1987); L.Ed.2d 199 Fernandez, United States v. Supreme Court repeatedly referred to acts Cir.1988); F.2d 1031 and United

1093 v. (5th majority cites United States The Cir. F.2d 497 Renfro, 620 v. States (2d Cir.1999). Chestaro, In very- the 600 at 197 F.3d 1980). distinguishable, is Each following Chestaro, bases: a box- least, defendant removed on the the to began he pocket, [and] “from his cutter Hernandez 1. ... Each officer at the officers swing it the range, poked at close heatedly Spoke the injury as a result of a minor received got manner. “He threatening ain agent Perhaps the clos- Id. at 603. altercation.” me, ...” and to nose nose up against right majority support by cited the case est at 1576. F.2d 921 the victim. threatened States v. majority is United conclusion the Cir.1999). Chambers, F.3d 274 195 2. Wollenzien officers, There, however, the in full view of in the back struck agent The FBI defendant, told who had been the blow. with a severe from behind neck down,” FBI, down, “FBI, get get agents, at 981. F.2d hand in his place to his “attempted instead and, in re- .... pocket right front coat 3. Street and tackled agents] Chambers sponse [the ap- and his car out of got “Street Bersa semi- loaded 380 caliber found swinging his fists rangers, the proached front coat right in his pistol automatic stood Street shouting obscenities. and main- 276. I do not Id. While at pocket.” fifteen for about face with Coe face to physical proof of that must be there tain open him between trapping minutes I do weapon, or a view contact threaten- of the truck and the inside door an act which that must be there maintain at 66 F.3d 975-976. him ...” ing force, not mere and an assault evinces offi- that the question There is no words. Walker 4. reasonably concluded have here could cers office; an into walked defendant The That, however, weapon. Fallen had vic- stood over language; abusive used is primary The issue the sole issue. is not him; his gestured with tim; threatened assault. he committed whether jack- his forcible finger; index removed thumb unless that he did so no evidence There while of victim et; inches walked within as- a forcible constitutes moving a curtain office; and had to be following him from between vast difference There is a at 835 F.2d 987-988. sault. “separated.” happened happened here and what what Fernandez 5. Chambers, had been the defendant where victim, ran after “get to down” followed and told Defendant under arrest placed at 1032- him, him. 837 F.2d chased pocket where for his then reached but him.” Id. “bumped into then He 1033. Id. actually had firearm. victim’s touched the chest

The defendant’s Crouthers, F.2d In stated Id. victim after a threat. arm majority, victim cited him. Id. pushed had the defendant open kidnapped and forced actually participated defendant safes. The bank Renfro say I do not robbery. Again, planned door, the to their office got “When see a had to victims here alleged on lying Agent Tichenor employees saw there had I maintain that only firearm. top of Renfro on floor with defendant assault, simply of forcible said be One witness at him.” intimidation. threat or oral him. Id. choking Renfro was *12 In States v. Le Compte, another involving threats the future use of force.’ upon relies, case majority which the .... The word ‘forcibly only means that ’ ” “physically defendant attacked Welch with some amount must be used of force his fists and and knocked feet her down added) (citations (emphasis omitted). Id. into a ditch where he continued to kick her at 1035. dicta, Other than possibly in no and threaten her.” 108 F.3d 948 Cir. Eleventh Circuit case has stated to the 1997). The court held that the victim contrary. could that reasonably assume the defen is Assault sometimes defined as “at- might dant hit also her with a rock which tempted battery.” “Menacing” is some- standing he held while over her. Id. at times referred to as attempted assault. 952. “menacing” Even requires likely some act. v.Mathis, In United 579 F.2d I am well aware that an “assault” does not (7th Cir.1978), by majori- also cited require injury or However, even touching. ty, the pulled defendant out an automatic I do believe that it requires more than

pistol, took ignition the victim’s key and words, and that a curtain “twitch” is not ordered him money to give or he would be sufficient. killed. Interestingly, was defendant any person Will goes who to an un- guilty found assaulting or interfering opened says door and officer, to a federal with a federal agent without the use of a “I gun.... have a my porch Get off Ior deadly dangerous weapon. Id. at 417. you,” will shoot guilty of forcible as- may There be some scattered “kudzu” sault?3 An assault is an assault. The fact language1 in the cases which supports the that the victim is a federal only officer majority position, but, again, I find no case it makes a federal crime. It does not in which it has been found that mere change the nature of an assault. The ma- words stated on the other side aof door jority has not any cited case in which an with no significant act or deed can consti- act by the defendant as innocuous as mov- tute an assault any kind. The defen- ing curtain, act, or some similar coupled have, dant could perhaps, been found words, with mere was held to be a forcible guilty intimidation, but he was not. The assault. case was only submitted on “forcible as- sault” While I will not the lesser address the included other offense of issues simple Fernandez, assault.2 In the appellant, raised I the Elev- will note that the enth stated, marginal Circuit appellant “The cor- admission of may well rectly states concept that ‘the of the use of have worked to the appellant’s substantial force contemplates requires prejudice in, than best, more at the very a marginal merely verbalizing or implying case of forcible assault. jury The found language” "Kudzu language persis- that only ... offense if following all of the facts tently spreads applicable areas not into First, nor are proven ... that the defendant forci- contemplated initially written. bly person....” assaulted the It should appellant noted was majority 3. The has not discussed right what not convicted simple of a misdemeanor as- the officers had appellant's to be porch on pursuant 111(a)(2), sault to 18 U.S.C. but of and have I not it. considered The defendant felony pursuant to the same section. The only threatened shoot the officers indictment if charge did not "intimidation” did property. not leave his even in the charged It There is no alternative. evi "knowingly willfully defendant dence he caused problem did forci- after bly jury assault....” threat, instructed that did While so. I do not condone such a "the defendant guilty can be found it is not tantamount to an assault. than rather assault of forcible guilty simple as- offense included lesser them. also submitted sault, which to even appear here does

The evidence own defi- majority’s level of

reach *13 assault,” “simple misdemeanor

nition majori- to the remarkably similar

which assault, less much of forcible

ty’s definition felony. of a the level Plaintiff-Appellant, BASS,

Michael W. OF COMMISSION- COUNTY

BOARD COUNTY, FLOR-

ERS, ORANGE Defendant-Appellee.

IDA,

No. 99-10579. Appeals, Court Circuit.

Eleventh 9, 2001.

July

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Thomas E. Fallen
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date Published: Jul 9, 2001
Citation: 256 F.3d 1082
Docket Number: 99-11329
Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.