33 M.J. 694 | U.S. Army Court of Military Review | 1991
OPINION OF THE COURT
Before a general court-martial, the appellant pleaded guilty to committing indecent acts with his minor stepdaughter, indecent assault, and adultery, in violation of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1982) [hereinafter UCMJ]. A court composed of members sentenced him to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for six years, partial forfeitures for a like period, and reduction in grade to Private El. The convening authority, pursuant to a pretrial agreement, approved the dishonorable discharge, confinement for three years, forfeiture of $482.00 per month for three years, and reduction to Private El.
The appellant assigned, inter alia, the following error:
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO GRANT A CONTINUANCE TO ALLOW APPELLANT TIME TO OBTAIN AN EXPERT WITNESS AND TO EFFECTIVELY PREPARE HIS DEFENSE.
We also specified:
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING, AS A MATTER OF FACT, THAT APPELLANT’S RELEASE OF CPT WALKER AS DETAILED DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS VOLUNTARY.
We hold that the judge abused his discretion as alleged and find that he erred in denying the appellant his counsel rights.
I.
During his arraignment at a pretrial session at Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas, on 13 March 1990, the appellant indicated to the military judge (Judge Mitchell) that he desired to be represented by his detailed military counsel (Captain Walker) and his civilian counsel (Mr. Wheeler). Captain Walker was assigned to the Army Trial Defense Service office located at Fort Sam Houston; Mr. Wheeler was also from the San Antonio area. However, Captain Walker informed the judge that the appellant had requested in writing that he wished to be represented by individual military counsel. He anticipated that the request would be granted before the next session of trial and that the counsel would likely come from the Trial Defense Service office located at Fort Hood, Killeen, Texas. The distance between Fort Hood and Fort Sam Houston is about 150 miles. Mr. Wheeler also informed the judge that he was not prepared for trial and moved to continue the trial until 11 April. The government did not object and Judge Mitchell granted the defense motion.
A second pretrial session was held at Fort Hood on 5 April 1990, before Judge
The military judge did not inquire of the trial counsel whether the government opposed the defense motion. Instead, he interrupted Mr. Wheeler before he could fully explain the factual basis for his motion. Then he deferred ruling on the defense’s motion for the continuance and directed the following:
[O]n the 11th of April, you be as prepared as you possibly can be on that particular day. At that particular time, we will conduct a providence inquiry ... we’ll get the pleas, the providence inquiry, make findings, if we can, on that particular day, and then move into the sentencing phase of the trial. At such time, at least, the government can present their evidence in sentencing. I would also prefer that the defense be prepared at that time to present its evidence. If you cannot present your evidence, if you need a delay, then we will take a delay at that time, but I will tell you that I will continue the case on the 14th, but no longer than the 14th.
Mr. Wheeler requested reconsideration of this ruling and provided the judge with a more detailed explanation of why the defense needed the continuance. He explained that Doctor Croft was a psychiatrist who specialized in treating sex offenders and had examined the appellant on 2 April, but needed three weeks to complete his evaluation report. Mr. Wheeler further explained that the appellant’s military counsel, located at Fort Hood, was unable to assist him because of his caseload and logistical difficulties. However, the judge denied his request, implying that the defense had been tardy in contacting Doctor Croft and opining that it was an “eleventh hour preparation.” After a brief recess during which he consulted with the appellant, Mr. Wheeler advised the judge that the appellant had released him from the case. He explained that, in view of the judge’s denial of a continuance, he did not believe he could adequately represent the appellant in the time allowed him to prepare for trial.
Captain Walters also advised the judge that the appellant wanted to release him “if another military counsel could be detailed.” The judge conducted an inquiry into the appellant’s understanding of his right to counsel and his earlier request to be represented by Captain Walters. During this inquiry, the appellant told the judge that he had not wanted to discharge Captain Walker or to request Captain Walters. He implied that he was compelled to make that election because Captain Walker was about to be reassigned and would be unavailable to represent him. The judge, noting that a release of Captain Walters would “really put a stress upon whoever represents him to be prepared for trial on the 11th," denied appellant’s request to discharge Captain Walters.
Because CPT Walker, for one, was here on post and he was in the system. And the fact that he told me I could have both the military counsel and a civilian counsel — he would work with the civilian counsel. And to me, it didn’t make any sense not to use both of them if I could use them.
Notwithstanding the appellant’s testimony and the absence of any contradictory evidence from the government, the military judge found that the appellant’s decision to discharge Captain Walker and request Captain Walters was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. He denied the appellant’s request for Captain Walker and ordered the trial to proceed later that day.
When the court reconvened that afternoon, the military judge noted that Mr. Alexander was again absent but proceeded with the trial with appellant represented by Captain Walters. As the judge began the providence inquiry, Mr. Alexander suddenly arrived at the courtroom. Mr. Alexander informed the judge that he had been trying a case in a local civilian court and was unable to appear at the court-martial earlier. He stated that his appearance would be brief as he had to return to civilian court. He told the judge that although he had been retained by the appellant on 6 April, he had been unable to prepare fully for trial because of his caseload. He moved for a sixty-day continuance, focusing on the defense’s need for the expert testimony of Doctor Croft whom he wanted as both an expert witness and as an “expert assistant” for the defense. He asked that Doctor Croft be hired at the government’s expense. He also reasserted the appellant’s request to be represented by Captain Walker. The judge took both motions under advisement as Mr. Alexander was about to depart the courtroom to attend the civilian proceeding. He stated he would decide them if Mr. Alexander returned later that day.
In Mr. Alexander’s absence, the judge inquired into the providence of the appellant’s pleas, found them to be providently entered, and accepted them. The record reflects the judge requested and obtained the assent of Mr. Alexander and the appellant prior to conducting the providence inquiry in this manner.
After accepting the appellant’s pleas, the judge noted that Mr. Alexander had not returned to the court-martial. He asked the appellant if he objected to impaneling the court members without Mr. Alexander. Neither the appellant nor his military counsel, Captain Walters, objected to this action and a substantial portion of the voir dire of court members was completed before Mr. Alexander returned to court.
The judge denied the appellant’s motion requesting the assistance of Doctor Croft. His reasons for the ruling are as follows:
Number one, there was not a timely and proper request directed to the proper official for “the Army hiring Dr. Croft to assist in the preparation or examination of the accused”. Such request was improper and misdirected. This misdirection was as a direct result of SSG Thomas trying to represent himself. I note that such request was made without the knowledge of his individual military counsel.
Secondly, the request for or by the civilian defense counsel, Mr. Wheeler, to have Dr. Croft examine the accused was a belated request. That eleventh-hour request seems to be as a direct result of the constant change of defense counsels in this case. The request by the defense for the production of Dr. Croft as a witness is denied — especially, on sentencing.
Number one, there has been no showing of what his testimony is or would be, other than the fact that he will somehow or another give some testimony with regards to the rehabilitative potential of the accused in the matter of, I assume, pedophilia. It may be positive — it may be negative — no one knows. He is still in the investigative or preparation stages of his examination of the accused and the formulation of his opinion. That untimeliness in the preparation of the defense’s case is as a direct result, again, of the accused’s dismissal of his defense counsel, and I guess, his attempts to represent himself.
I do not believe that a showing that the testimony of Dr. Croft or even what the testimony would be, would be helpful to the defense, or that his presence is necessary for the determination of an appropriate sentence in this case. Right now, it may well be; again, it may not.
In light of the considerations present in this courtroom and the needs of the government — the prosecution — to complete the trial of this case without further delay, as I said before, your request to produce Dr. Croft is denied.
I would like to tell you one matter of substantial importance, here. Should there be any beneficial evidence obtained as a result of Dr. Croft’s examination of the accused, such matters may be submitted to the convening authority post-trial. The convening authority has great power over the sentence. If it is probative, especially — well, if it’s probative on the issue of rehabilitation potential. I would submit that, that would provide you relief from any prejudices that you might incur as a result of my ruling, do you understand?5
On appeal, in responding to the specified issue, appellate defense counsel filed affidavits from the appellant and Captain Walker. According to the appellant’s affidavit, after he told Captain Walker that he intended to retain civilian counsel, their discussions involved the completion of a pretrial agreement, a stipulation of fact to be appended thereto, and the selection of a replacement counsel for Captain Walker who was being reassigned from Fort Sam Houston. Subsequently, Captain Walker finalized the pretrial agreement and the stipulation of fact prior to appellant’s hiring of a civilian defense counsel. Captain Walker also prepared a request for individual military counsel from Fort Hood. The appellant stated he signed the request because he thought he would need another military counsel to replace Captain Walker who was about to be reassigned to a military school at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He claimed that he did not remember Captain Walker telling him he did not have to release him.
In his affidavit, Captain Walker stated that in November 1989, he learned that he would be attending a three-month-long course of instruction at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, beginning in late March 1990. Al
II.
A trial judge should be liberal in the granting of continuances where there is good cause for the delay. United States v. Daniels, 28 C.M.R. 276 (C.M.A.1959); United States v. Nichols, 6 C.M.R. 27 (C.M.A.1952); United States v. Sutton, 46 C.M.R. 826 (A.C.M.R.1972). The decision to grant or deny a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the military judge and will not be overturned except for clear abuse of that discretion. United States v. Menoken, 14 M.J. 10 (C.M.A.1982); United States v. Dunks, 1 M.J. 254 (C.M.A.1976); United States v. Kinard, 45 C.M.R. 74 (C.M.A.1972); Article 40, UCMJ; Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, Rule for Courts-Martial 906(b) [hereinafter R.C.M.]. Whether a trial judge has abused his discretion depends on the fairness with which the judge has balanced the competing interests of the parties. This court has held:
Where the accused is the moving party, the military judge must weigh the underlying basis for the continuance against the adverse consequences to the prosecution from delaying the trial. If the accused’s request for a continuance is grounded on a substantial right and where the prosecution’s only basis for opposition is administrative inconvenience, its denial may constitute an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Furgason, 6 M.J. 844, 848 (NCMR 1979). However, if the request, though purporting to assert a substantial right, in fact does not do so or is not made in good faith but solely to vex the prosecution, it need not be countenanced and may properly be denied. United States v. Daniels, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 52, 28 C.M.R. 276 (1959); United States v. Alicea-Baez, 7 M.J. 989 (ACMR 1979).
United States v. Perry, 14 M.J. 856, 858 (A.C.M.R.1982), pet. denied, 16 M.J. 135 (C.M.A.1983); accord United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 57, 59 (C.M.A.1986) (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983) (“[O]nly an unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay’ violates the right to the assistance of counsel.”)).
Hence, we must ask several questions. Whether the appellant was deprived of any rights and if so whether those rights were substantial? Was the appellant’s request for a continuance reasonable or was it made to harass the prosecution? Would the granting of the continuance have unduly burdened the prosecution?
The appellant alleges that the military judge’s denial of a continuance effectively deprived him of several important rights. First, the right to the attendance of witnesses to testify on his behalf in mitigation and extenuation. Specifically, he asserts deprivation of the right to present psychiatric evidence from Doctor Croft, either through in-court testimony or a written evaluation report. Second, the right to effective assistance of counsel, Mr. Wheeler, who was faced with a heavy caseload and needed additional time to interview witnesses and otherwise prepare for trial. Third, the right to the effective assistance of his second civilian counsel, Mr. Alexander, whose belated appearance in the case and scheduling conflicts prevented him from being fully prepared for trial.
We are satisfied the defense met its burden as early as the 5 April pretrial session. There is no support in the record for the military judge’s findings that the defense’s request for witnesses, particularly Doctor Croft, was “not timely”, made at the “eleventh hour”, or “would [not] be helpful to the defense.”
The right of an accused to be represented by individually-selected military or civilian counsel has been long-recognized in military law. United States v. Kinard, 45 C.M.R. 74 (C.M.A.1972); United States v. Donohew, 39 C.M.R. 149 (C.M.A.1969); Article 38(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 838(b).
In United States v. Wilson, 28 M.J. 1054 (N.M.C.M.R.1989), the Navy court found that a trial judge had abused his discretion by denying a continuance to a civilian defense counsel that ultimately amounted to a denial of appellant’s right to counsel of his own choice because:
(1) there were no apparent adverse consequences to the prosecution from delaying the trial; (2) the defense offered to forego any speedy trial claims which might otherwise result from the delay; (3) denial of the continuance request led to the withdrawal of the retained civilian counsel due to his legitimate scheduling difficulties; (4) the request itself was for a reasonable period of time, and (5) there were no prior continuance requests.
Id. at 1057.
Nearly all of the factors that motivated the court in Wilson to hold there was an abuse of discretion are present in the instant case. Although Mr. Wheeler obtained one continuance in the case, there was ample justification for another. The government did not oppose it; the appellant was not in pretrial restraint; the expected duration of the continuance (until the end of April) was not excessive; and there was a legitimate reason for it — to obtain psychiatric evidence relevant to adjudging an appropriate sentence.
By denying the continuance, the judge interfered with Mr. Wheeler’s ability to adequately prepare the appellant’s case in mitigation and extenuation. Once Mr. Wheeler explained this development to the appellant, the latter decided to relieve him from his duties. Under the circumstances, we hold that the judge impermissibly compelled the appellant to forgo his right to representation by Mr. Wheeler.
The military judge’s refusal to grant a continuance to Mr. Alexander after the appellant had retained him was also an abuse of discretion. Once the military judge permitted the appellant to discharge Mr. Wheeler on 5 April, it was incumbent upon him to allow newly-retained counsel a reasonable time to become familiar with the case and to prepare for trial. We need not decide whether Mr. Alexander’s request for a sixty-day continuance was unreasonable. We find that the thirteen-day period (from 6 to 19 April), begrudgingly permitted Mr. Alexander by the judge, was insufficient to enable him to prepare for trial.
The fact that Mr. Alexander and the appellant assented to the judge conducting the providence inquiry and voir dire without Mr. Alexander being present does not amount to a waiver of the judge’s improper action. The judge’s denial of the continuance coupled with his firmly stated intention to push on with the trial left the appellant and his counsel with little choice in the matter. If anything, the defense’s assent to the judge’s action reflected its resignation to, rather than agreement with, the judge’s ruling. Mr. Alexander’s absence was necessitated by a previous commitment to appear in a civilian court and was a legitimate reason for not appearing at the court-martial during the providence inquiry and voir dire. The judge should have recognized that and allowed him the necessary time to complete the civilian trial before reconvening the proceedings. See Wilson, 28 M.J. 1054.
III.
The judge’s ruling also affected the appellant’s right to be represented by his detailed counsel, Captain Walker, during his inquiry into the providence of the appellant’s plea.
The right to effective assistance of counsel and to the continuation of an established attorney-client relationship is fundamental in the military justice system. United States v. Palenius, 2 M.J. 86 (C.M.A.1977). An existing attorney-client relationship cannot be terminated without the accused’s consent merely for the convenience of the Government. United States v. Murray, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 61, 42 C.M.R. 253 (1970). Instead, in the absence of an accused’s consent or an application for withdrawal by the defense counsel, such a severance can only be for “good cause shown on the record.” United States v. Eason, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 335, 45 M.J. 109 (1972). Accord United States v. Hanson, supra [24 M.J. 377 (C.M.A.1987) ]; United States v. Gnibus, 21 M.J. 1 (C.M.A.1985); R.C.M. 505(d)(2)(b)(ii).
United States v. Baca, 27 M.J. 110, 119 (C.M.A.1988).
An accused represented by civilian counsel is also entitled to military counsel, whether detailed or individually selected, who shall act as associate counsel unless excused at the request of the accused. United States v. Gnibus, 21 M.J. 1 (C.M.A.1985); Article 38(b)(4), UCMJ; R.C.M. 506(b)(3).
The record and allied papers unequivocally establish that an attorney-client relationship between the appellant and Captain Walker was formed as early as 15 December 1989, and that Captain Walker counseled the appellant to plead guilty, negotiated a pretrial agreement for him and discussed the case with his civilian defense counsel (Mr. Wheeler).
“Courts should not lightly indulge the waiver of a fundamental right. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 L.Ed. 680, 62 S.Ct. 457 (1942).” United States v. Andrews, 44 C.M.R. 219, 222 (C.M.A.1972). However, “[w]hen the record reveals an affirmative acquiescence to the relinquishment of a counsel right, the burden is upon the accused to ‘show by a preponderance of the evidence that his acquiescence was not sufficiently understanding and intelligent to amount to a waiver.’ ” United States v. Griffin, 16 M.J. 836, 838 (N.M.C.M.R.1983) (citing Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 890, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962)). In Andrews, the court rejected the government’s argument that an accused waived his right, to counsel by failing to object to counsel’s absence where the government was responsible for terminating the attorney-client relationship and where it was
We need not determine whether the appellant discharged Captain Walker because he was misadvised of his counsel rights by Captain Walker or because of a self-induced misunderstanding of what those rights entailed.
We also find wanting, the trial judge’s inquiry of the appellant concerning his discharge of Captain Walker and subsequent request for his reinstatement. The military judge’s questions were conclusional in nature, interrupted the appellant during his attempts to explain his understanding of his rights, and seemed more inclined to prove that the appellant waived his right to Captain Walker’s services rather than to probe for his true intent. Thereafter, the judge rejected the appellant’s explanation that his release of Captain Walker was conditioned on his retention of Mr. Wheeler. We do not believe the judge acted solicitously and fairly in the conduct of the inquiry. See Donohew, 39 C.M.R. 149. Nor do we agree with his determination not to accept the appellant’s explanation concerning his release of Captain Walker. We find that the appellant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not waive his right to the presence of Captain Walker. Therefore, the judge’s denial of the appellant’s request for reappointment of Captain Walker constituted a denial of his right to detailed counsel.
IV.
Having concluded that the appellant was improperly denied the right to
To the contrary, the predominant view of federal appellate courts admonishes us to test for specific prejudice. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970) (case remanded to determine whether denial of right to counsel at preliminary hearing was harmless error); Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 66 S.Ct. 452, 90 L.Ed. 545 (1946) (denial of counsel during arraignment and plea held harmless); but see Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961) (denial of counsel at arraignment was prejudicial per se since the arraignment was a critical stage of the proceedings under state law); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 995, 96 S.Ct. 2209, 48 L.Ed.2d 820 (1976) (denial of counsel at hearing on motion to withdraw guilty plea held harmless); In re DiBella, 518 F.2d 955 (2d Cir.1975) (exclusion of counsel from attending the reading of grand jury minutes during contempt proceedings held harmless); but see Gann v. Gough, 79 F.Supp. 912 (D.C.Ga.1948) (failure to appoint counsel for defendant at his request before arraignment and plea held prejudicial per se as essential to fair trial). These decisions were based on the right to counsel under the Constitution. While instructive, they do not precisely answer the question of which standard applies when the right to counsel under Article 38 of the Code is abridged.
The Court of Military Appeals’ decision in United States v. Johnson, 21 M.J. 211 (C.M.A.1986), while not dispositive of the question, offers some insight into the standard we should apply. In Johnson, a military judge misadvised an accused of his counsel rights in violation of United States v. Donohew. Chief Judge Everett first observed that the statutory right to counsel provided to servicemembers is broader than that provided by the Sixth Amendment perhaps because, “Congress may have concluded that servicemembers, who risk their lives for their country, should be granted a right to counsel greater than that which would be minimally required by the Constitution.” Johnson, 21 M.J. at 213. Further, deprivation of the right is not justified on the grounds that the accused received a lenient sentence as “we cannot exclude the possibility that the requested lawyer might have done even better.” The Chief Judge then held that the
Judge Cox’s concurring opinion is clearly premised on his view that misadvice concerning the right to counsel should be tested for specific prejudice under Article 59(a) of the Code, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a) and would require the appellant “to make some allegation as to what different result might have been achieved by another lawyer if he had been present during the proceedings — i.e., that the accused would not have entered a guilty plea.” Id. at 217. However, he also opined, “[tjhere is a difference between denying an accused the right to counsel and failing to advise, or misadvising, an accused as to that right. As to the latter, I do not believe reversible error necessarily occurs.” Id.
We hold that the harmless error/specific prejudice standard should be applied in this case. See United States v. Fisher, 21 M.J. 327 (C.M.A.1986); Remai, 19 M.J. 229. Applying that standard, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant’s pleas of guilty were unaffected by the denial of his right to counsel.
Neither the appellant nor any other evidence in the record, allied papers, or post-trial affidavits has suggested that he would not have pled guilty irrespective of the denial of his rights to counsel. Rather, there is objective evidence that he would have pleaded guilty whether or not Captain Walker represented him during the providence inquiry. The appellant had a favorable pretrial agreement in the face of very serious charges. The agreement was drafted by Captain Walker with substantial assistance from Mr. Wheeler after several meetings with the appellant. Also, the main thrust of appellant’s testimony during presentencing and his counsel’s argument on sentence was that he was admitting guilt as a first step toward rehabilitation. Finally, despite ample opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea at trial and on appeal, he has not indicated a desire to do so. See United States v. Hamil, 35 C.M.R. 82 (C.M.A.1964).
We have considered the remaining allegation of error and those raised pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A.1982) and find them to be without merit. The findings of guilty are affirmed. The sentence is set aside. A rehearing on the sentence may be ordered by the same or a different convening authority.
. Mr. Wheeler advised the judge that his records indicated that he had made twenty-six court appearances between 26 February and 5 April that included numerous criminal cases and several divorce and traffic cases.
. Judge Hewitt noted that after the 5 April session, he had been “inundated with [telephone] calls from the Regional Defense Counsel and others.” He granted a continuance until 19 April. His apparent reason was "the fact that [the appellant] had dismissed Mr. Wheeler from his case, that left CPT Walters to be his sole counsel. And CPT Walters, anticipating his release at that particular session, was not prepared to proceed.”
. The military acronym "PCS" stands for “Permanent Change of Station” and refers to a permanent reassignment from one duty station to another.
. The record indicates that Mr. Alexander was present in the courtroom during the last third of the uvoir dire. He examined only one of the court members, contested the trial counsel’s peremptory challenge of one of the members, and asserted challenges on behalf of his client.
. The military judge did not expressly rule on the civilian defense counsel’s reassertion of appellant’s request to be represented by Captain Walker. However, as the judge decided to proceed with the trial in that counsel’s absence, it is obvious that this request was also denied.
. The appellant also alleged that he was denied the effective assistance of the military co-counsel, Captain Walters, whose heavy caseload and distant stationing at Fort Hood arguably war
. Even an untimely request for witnesses may not justify denial of a continuance. Where the testimony is relevant and important, would not be cumulative, and where the delay would be minimal, denial of a continuance may constitute an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ford, 29 M.J. 597 (A.C.M.R.1989).
. The right to counsel of one’s choice, while substantial, is not absolute and may be required to yield to the government’s interest in the expeditious administration of justice. Thomas, 22 M.J. at 59; United States v. Bowie, 21 M.J. 453 (C.M.A.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820, 107 S.Ct. 83, 93 L.Ed.2d 37 (1986); see also Perry, 14 M.J. at 858-59.
. On that date, Captain Walker submitted a memorandum to the convening authority requesting a delay of the Article 32 investigation until 5 January 1990 because he had leave scheduled. The appellant’s affidavit to this court dated 13 May 1991, also attests to the fact that he initially met with Captain Walker prior to the Christmas holiday.
. Although appellant testified that he would not have discharged Captain Walker if he had known his reassignment to Fort Leavenworth was only "temporary,” we doubt the sincerity of his explanation. In any event, Captain Walker did state that his temporary school assignment was to be followed by a permanent reassignment from Fort Sam Houston. Hence, his reassignment to Fort Leavenworth was, for all practical purposes, "permanent.”
. We did not request briefs from appellate counsel as to whether the judge, by conducting the providence inquiry in the absence of Mr. Alexander, the replacement civilian defense counsel, denied the appellant his right to counsel of his own selection. As we held previously, this resulted from the judge’s failure to grant Mr. Alexander a continuance. Therefore, this too constitutes a denial of appellant’s right to counsel.
. In United States v. Jerasi, 20 M.J. 719, 722 (N.M.C.M.R.1985), aff'd 23 M.J. 162 (C.M.A.1986), the Navy-Marine Court of Military Review further subdivided these categories. We find it unnecessary for our purposes to take the concept of prejudice that far.